European Union

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On Tuesday 21 January 2020, The Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) will hold a public hearing on the Eastern Partnership - vision of development after 2020.

On 21 January, the Committee on Foreign Affairs will hold a public hearing on the future of the Eastern Partnership. The Members will discuss with experts the achievements and shortcomings of the Eastern Partnership both at the regional and multilateral level. They will also analyse possible evolution of the EU's relations with its six Eastern partners and a way forward for the Eastern Partnership in the next decade.

The hearing will help the Parliament in drafting its contribution to the Eastern Partnership summit, which is foreseen in spring 2020.
Location : JAN 2Q2, european Parliament, Brussels
Further information
AFET Public Hearing - Draft Programme
The Eastern Partnership a decade on looking back, thinking ahead
Live Webstream
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In its foreign and defence policies, the EU has to be united and assertive, while its member states must take responsibility, say MEPs. No single EU member state can provide, on its own, an efficient response to today’s global challenges, warn MEPs on Wednesday in two annual resolutions, one on foreign policy, the other one on defence.
In the resolution assessing the state of play on the EU´s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), MEPs note that the world is facing a global power shift, with geopolitical competition becoming a leading trend.They express their full support for new Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's decision to transform the European Commission into a 'geopolitical Commission'.

Team up with like-minded partners

MEPs point out that the EU has to switch from a responsive to an anticipatory approach. Teaming up with like-minded EU strategic partners, in particular NATO and emerging countries, is essential to defend the global rule-based order.

Further information
Press Releases from the Plenary session, 15-01-2020
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The foundation, on 13 January 1980 in Karlsruhe, of a nation-wide ecological party in West Germany came as a surprise. Not the idea itself: the time was ripe for creating a strong political movement based on environmental concerns, frustration with representative democracy, and radically pacifist convictions in the middle of the Cold War arms race. The surprise lied in the fact that this utterly heterogeneous smorgasbord of local protest initiatives and splinter groups, represented by approximately 1000 delegates, managed to get their act together in the first place (albeit under “chaotic” circumstances).

Karlsruhe, 13 Jan 1980.

But there it was, and two months later, at the federal congress in Saarbrücken, the party even succeeded in formulating a detailed manifesto of 47 pages proudly called a “Bundesprogramm”. This denomination clearly indicated that the project was to compete in the federal elections, building on the experiences at local and regional polls since 1977.

The German Greens were not the first ecological party to emerge in Europe. In Switzerland, a “popular movement for the environment” had been created as early as 1972, and the UK had seen in 1975 the establishment of the first party bearing the term “ecology” in its very name. Even the hopelessly scattered ecologist groups in France had managed to nominate (rather: persuade) a candidate for the presidential election in 1974, the remarkable René Dumont.

What made “Die Grünen” special right away was their fantastic name. Their founders may have had strong anti-capitalistic convictions, they definitely had an instinct for clever marketing! Turning a colour, which in German culture traditionally stands for the concept of “hope”, into a political brand, was a stroke of genius. So was the unique and unmistakeable “sunflower” emblem. So was dropping any further qualifier, like “party” or “list”. True, foreign media have trouble applying the appropriate declination of this German noun, but the benefits of this spectacular branding success clearly outweigh the grammatical drawbacks.

1980 poster.

As an eighteen-year-old citizen, about to vote for the first time, I was intrigued. While the Greens were quickly labelled, both by traditional politicians and mainstream media, as “dangerous leftists” and “muesli-crunching eco-nerds”, I had serious doubts about this categorisation, despite the look of most of the delegates. I was also unable to see why putting the fight against the ever more visible and smellable pollution of our industrial environment on top of the agenda should be a bad idea. And what on earth was wrong with eating muesli?

Two years earlier, in summer 1978, I had, by pure chance (probably waiting for some football news), bumped into a television programme of which I still remember the clever alliterative title “Gruhls Grüne Gründung”. The Gruhl in question was no Tolkien creature, but Herbert Gruhl, a well-known conservative MP who quit the Christian-Democrats after a quarter century of membership, reading an open letter to their president, a certain Helmut Kohl, in which he accused him, among other mistakes, of stupidly clinging to the growth dogma of the 1960s.

In my readings I had come across Gruhl’s 1975 book entitled “A planet is being looted – the terrifying balance sheet of our politics”, which introduced me to the Meadows report “The Limits to Growth”. Clearly, this guy was the only member of the CDU who had read and understood it rather than repress the uncomfortable truths it spelt out and buy the latest Mercedes or BMW instead. Most of all, he showed that evidence-based environmental concerns and their inevitable ethical consequences were not intrinsically leftist, but perfectly capable of transcending the political spectrum.

The TV programme in 1978 also informed the audience about Gruhl’s new creation, an ecological party named “Grüne Aktion Zukunft” (“Green Action for the Future”), which sounds like a prequel to Greta Thunberg’s movement, but which was much less successful. Two years later, Herbert Gruhl joined the Greens at their founding congress in Karlsruhe (third from the left on the picture above), but he only stayed one year in the new party, in which he never really felt welcome, and created the Ecological-Democratic Party (ÖDP), which never made it beyond 0.2% of the votes in the federal elections (the ÖDP does hold a seat in the European Parliament, though, obtained with 0.99%!).

The 40 years of the Greens may be interpreted as a success story. Favoured by Germany’s proportional voting system, they managed to disrupt a hermetically closed party system. Opting, after long ideological battles, for a pragmatic rather than a radical approach, they managed to take root in the middle-class electorate (at least in the West). And by being faithful to their convictions, they accumulated a tremendous credibility capital, which is likely to bear fruit in the years to come.

Would Herbert Gruhl, who died in 1993, have imagined that forty years after the foundation of the Greens the CDU would be the junior partner in a government run by a green minister-president in Baden-Württemberg, the land of the automobile? Or that there would be serious talk about the possibility of a green chancellor in Berlin? Probably not.

But the glass can also be seen as half empty. The questioning of the growth dogma may have made its way into mainstream political debate, but the time for practising what is starting to be preached is running out. Herbert Gruhl’s 1988 campaign slogan “Less is more” was utterly unsuccessful at the time. The fact that all those decades later it is more pertinent than ever and that the ÖDP did not even need to update it painfully reveals how difficult it is to subvert capitalist doctrines.

The post Forty years of green appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The European Parliament condemns the recent attempted coup to prevent Juan Guaidó from being re-elected President of the Venezuelan National Assembly.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

Transition remains the Cinderella of Brexit: unnoticed by the ugly sisters of Withdrawal and the New Relationship, but actually rather important.

This might have been understandable during the chaos of the past year, when most political efforts were being diverted into securing UK ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement, but it seems much less so now, when our progression to this next stage is all but guaranteed.

Debate about transition might now exist, but only with regard to when it might end.

While this is understandable, it is t

o miss much of what transition will be like and how that experience might condition what comes after.

Recall that this time will not only be for negotiating a future relationship, but also for continuing the UK’s participation in every current aspect of EU membership, bar voting.

We covered this ground back in September 2018 with the UK in a Changing Europe, in The Challenges of Transition, where we identified three challenges.

We put legitimacy ahead of negotiation and extension because the lived experience of non-representation is likely to be a powerful tool for various groups.

For those seeking the hardest of Brexits, the notion of BrINO (Brexit in name only) will be ideal for pointing the finger at any future relationship as being even more lopsided than membership was.

For the EU, the opportunity to foist decisions on a UK that cannot block anymore will be one that some might fail to resist,

 

precisely because of that same lopsidedness.

And for a public that still has to get a constructive and informed presentation of what’s happening, this year will be a source of further confusion and disillusionment.

Those tensions will undoubtedly suck up much attention during 2020, leaving less space for the discussion of what comes after, perpetuating the cycle.

All of which is to highlight the irony of taking back control. Control is all well and good, but without an objective for that control to work towards, it counts for very little. And no, ‘getting Brexit done’ isn’t that objective.

So as MEPs return from Brussels and Strasbourg, and improbably amounts of energy are spent on the clapper of Big Ben, perhaps we might all more profitably turn our attention to making the most of the situation that confronts us and laying our plans accordingly.

The post Settling in for transition appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Privacy International
Principles of Community law
Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona: the means and methods of combating terrorism must be compatible with the requirements of the rule of law

The Subcommittee on Security and Defence will take stock of the achievements and failures in the key areas that are crucial for a rapidly developing Common Security and Defence Policy, on 22-23 January 2020. Ten years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, experts are expected to provide input to the debate on CSDP priorities for the current legislative term, and next decade.
Further information
SEDE meeting agenda and documents
EU Fact Sheets: Common Security and Defence policy
Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

A multi-speed or multi-tiered Europe has often been presented as a solution to Europe’s current challenges. But this kind of differentiation can generate democratic problems, argues EU3D Scientific Coordinator John Erik Fossum.

The EU that emerged from the crises has also become more differentiated, explains EU3D Coordinator John Erik Fossum.

In the last decade, the EU has faced a broad range of crises and challenges, such as the financial and Eurozone crises, the refugee crises, the rise of nationalist and Eurosceptic movements, disintegrative pressures associated with the possible fallouts from Brexit, and an increasingly unstable geopolitical scene.

Although the EU has shown quite a bit of resilience and unity when facing these challenges, there is broad recognition that the measures taken have not been adequate. The crises and the EU’s reactions to these have had negative democratic effects. The EU that emerged from the crises has also become more differentiated in that EU member states appear less willing to move in the same integrationist direction than before, and some members seek to down-scale, roll back, or re-negotiate their relations with the EU.

Although the EU has shown quite a bit of resilience and unity when facing these challenges, there is broad recognition that the measures taken have not been adequate.

Post-crises EU appears less capable of directing its energies in a clear and coherent direction. A more differentiated EU is therefore a more open-ended and underdetermined entity. Thus, whereas differentiation in the past has been an important means for managing conflict and containing disagreements, it can also generate problems for democratic governing. When is differentiation part of the problem and when is it a part of the solution to the EU’s current challenges? This is what EU3D seeks to find out. Through developing a sorting mechanism, researchers from 10 universities in 10 European countries seek to distinguish between those forms of differentiation that are democratically problematic and those that are not.

All modern political systems are differentiated

Differentiation is not a problem unto itself. All modern political systems are differentiated in territorial and functional terms. The nation-state was established through a distinct process of differentiation: establishing a system of hierarchically structured government for a given territory. That system of government was at the same time functionally differentiated, in the sense that there were different bodies in charge of executive, legislative and judicial functions. Functional differentiation is important to prevent overly strong concentrations of power, for instance in the executive. In a similar manner, multilevel systems like the EU need territorial differentiation to avoid an overly strong concentration of power at the central level. In other words, multilevel systems need governments at multiple levels with a division of powers and competences.

Multilevel systems like the EU need territorial differentiation to avoid an overly strong concentration of power at the central level.

In this context, differentiation was an intrinsic aspect of national integration, and differentiation is intrinsic to EU integration. In other words, the political system that has been established at the EU-level is functionally differentiated. In contrast to states, which are based on the principle of territorial-functional contiguity – which implies that the state is formally in charge of all functional realms within its territory – the EU’s territorial control is far weaker and there is far less territorial-functional overlap. Non-member states, especially the EEA states, are included in the EU’s internal market and are affiliated with Schengen with responsibility for EU external border controls, whereas some EU member states are not inside the Schengen area. Further, only 19 of the EU’s member states are fully incorporated in the euro area. Opt-outs and opt-ins are common.

Exacerbating divisions in Europe

Meanwhile, some forms of differentiation that have come as a result of the crises have been problematic. European governance now exhibits more arbitrariness than pre-crises, associated with a certain turn towards informality, a greater reliance on intergovernmental bargaining arrangements that are less predictable and less transparent, and arrangements that yield a measure of functionality, albeit are democratically deficient. One example is the European Stability Mechanism, which has its own intergovernmental decision-making body that is not subject to public or parliamentary control. The crises had serious distributive effects as well as adverse effects on some states and citizens’ status, rights and entitlements. Given this, we may need to think of crises not simply as uniform waves with uniform across-the-board effects, but rather as ‘differentiating shocks’ that hit unequally and have differentiating effects; and which may thus exacerbate divisions across Europe.

Further, after the crises, the European Parliament as well as national parliaments have found themselves facing an uphill battle in catching up with executives and experts. Some member states have turned illiberal, notably Hungary and Poland, actively chipping away substantial portions of constitutional democracy.

After the crises, the European Parliament as well as national parliaments have found themselves facing an uphill battle in catching up with executives and experts.

Some of the possible solutions such as a two-tiered Europe have also generated debate. Concerns are raised that second-tier EU member states would be excluded from EU decision-making while nevertheless being subject to EU decisions due to Europe’s states’ and societies’ high degree of interdependence and interweaving.

Differentiation, democracy and dominance

In assessing whether differentiation is part of the problem or part of the solution, EU3D will develop a ‘sorting mechanism’. The sorting mechanism will help distinguish which forms of differentiation could lead to dominance, and which forms could be conductive to democracy. Dominance is understood as arbitrary forms of rule and arrangements that are exclusive, in-transparent and/or have very negative distributive effects. Dominance may ensue from crises and shocks; it may therefor be an unintended by-product of processes of problem-solving and conflict resolution under conditions of contestation.

We need to look at EU reform proposals and consider to what extent these are tailored to grapple with the problematic forms of differentiation and/or to the promotion of democratizing processes.

In more concrete terms, we need to start by establishing the nature and scope of the forms of differentiation that are clearly problematic. We need to clarify how well-entrenched these are in the EU’s overall structure and makeup, and in addition look for countervailing democratizing processes and reforms, especially in parliaments and civil society and at the level of citizens. Finally, we need to look at EU reform proposals and consider to what extent these are tailored to grapple with the problematic forms of differentiation and/or to the promotion of democratizing processes.

The post Differentiation: Problem or solution? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Rina
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
Advocate General Szpunar proposes that the Court should rule that the victims of the sinking of a ship flying the Panamanian flag can bring an action for damages before the Italian courts against the Italian bodies which classified and certified that ship.

Commission v Hungary (Transparence associative)
Free movement of capital
Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona: the restrictions imposed by Hungary on the financing of civil organisations from abroad are not compatible with EU law

The President and Members of the European Commission give a solemn undertaking before the Court of Justice of the European Union

Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.
Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

This policy brief provides an overview of what the EU has done through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations since 2003, and which achievements and challenges it faces at the end of EU High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini’s mandate. It evaluates how the overall political context and the EU’s approach have evolved over time, and how this has affected the launch and implementation of CSDP actions. It looks at a range of criteria for evaluating the success of missions and operations such as effectiveness, degree of match between mission launch and EU interests at stake, responsiveness, coherence with wider policy strategies, coherence with values and norms, and degree of democratic scrutiny and oversight. It assesses some of the achievements as well as shortcomings of previous and ongoing missions and operations against these objectives. The brief identifies three underlying and cross-cutting problems hampering performance: (i) incompatible attitudes among Member States towards the use of force; (ii) resource disincentives and barriers to timely European solidarity; and (iii) gaps between early warning and early action. It outlines some selected initiatives launched and options discussed to address these shortcomings and improve the EU’s performance in crisis management operations.
Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

For several decades, European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Member States have worked closely to coordinate and, in some cases, jointly develop their military capabilities. Both NATO and the EU ask Member States to provide military capabilities to meet agreed force requirements. European states also cooperate increasingly closely over ways to increase efficiency and improve interoperability. Yet both EU and NATO force requirements suffer from longstanding capability shortfalls. Neither modest growth in defence spending nor deeper cooperation have yet been sufficient to fill these gaps. Spurred on, however, by the impact of the 2008 financial crisis and the recent deterioration in security in the east and to the south of Europe, EU Member States have sought to re-invigorate their approach to collaborating on the development of defence capabilities. They have overhauled existing measures and introduced new initiatives, notably the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). While it is too soon to judge the effectiveness of these initiatives, they do significantly extend the scope for action in this field. Success, however, will only be assured if EU Member States support the new ‘top-down’ initiatives while also delivering on their own ‘bottom-up’ commitments to funding and deeper levels of cooperation.
Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

The EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) has been a key focus of EU policy efforts in recent years, not just for security reasons, but also for economic ones. There have been a host of funds to strengthen and reinforce the EDTIB, and to ensure deeper cooperation, avoid duplication and underscore the interoperability of equipment. These funding streams have not been fully evaluated, but they are important symbols of the energy and commitment with which the EU has attempted to create an integrated pan-EU defence industry. There have, however, been challenges. The EU Member States remain predisposed to procuring weapons nationally or internationally, rather than regionally. There is a question as to whether these funds are great enough to be genuinely transformative, or whether in practice they are insufficient in relation to investment in the domestic defence industries. Finally, efforts to integrate the EDTIB also risk the EU being seen as protectionist, which may lead other major weapons suppliers such as the US to respond in kind.
Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

This policy brief provides a short overview of recent initiatives and developments in the EU’s institutional defence architecture, with a particular focus on changes proposed and implemented since 2016. Specifically, it looks at the new Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Military Planning and Conduct Capacity (MPCC), as well as proposals to establish a European Peace Facility (EPF) and to take more Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) decisions through qualified majority voting. It examines the institutional state of play at the end of Federica Mogherini’s mandate as EU High Representative and the implications of EU defence institutional innovation for existing governance structures, internal coherence and effective oversight. Finally, it identifies some of the challenges posed by the recent reforms and initiatives relating to the EU’s existing defence infrastructure, and briefly introduces proposals to address these challenges.
Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP

This policy brief provides an overview of what the EU has done through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations since 2003, and which achievements and challenges it faces at the end of EU High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini’s mandate. It evaluates how the overall political context and the EU’s approach have evolved over time, and how this has affected the launch and implementation of CSDP actions. It looks at a range of criteria for evaluating the success of missions and operations such as effectiveness, degree of match between mission launch and EU interests at stake, responsiveness, coherence with wider policy strategies, coherence with values and norms, and degree of democratic scrutiny and oversight. It assesses some of the achievements as well as shortcomings of previous and ongoing missions and operations against these objectives. The brief identifies three underlying and cross-cutting problems hampering performance: (i) incompatible attitudes among Member States towards the use of force; (ii) resource disincentives and barriers to timely European solidarity; and (iii) gaps between early warning and early action. It outlines some selected initiatives launched and options discussed to address these shortcomings and improve the EU’s performance in crisis management operations.
Source : © European Union, 2020 - EP