European Union

Length of video : 66'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Find out how the new EU Digital Covid Certificate will allow you to travel safely and easily in Europe during the pandemic.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Find out how the new EU Digital Covid Certificate will allow you to travel safely and easily in Europe during the pandemic.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

On 27 May 2021, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Security and Defence will hold an online hearing "Collective security in the GULF". The recent tensions in the Middle East, as well as frequent attacks on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia or series of oil tankers detentions in the Strait of Hormuz, have contributed to a worsening of security situation in the region.

While de-escalation is key, the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have significant influence on the stability of the region, where 20% of the global oil supply flows transit. The hearing will aim at evaluating the security situation in the Gulf region while analysing the possibility of setting up a regional security mechanism.
Draft programme
Biographies and presentations
Poster
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

In the context of the exponential growth of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), the President of the European Parliament has announced a number of measures to contain the spread of epidemic and to safeguard Parliament's core activities.

The current precautionary measures adopted by the European Parliament to contain the spread of COVID-19 do not affect work on legislative priorities. Core activities are reduced, but maintained to ensure that the institution's legislative, budgetary, scrutiny functions are maintained.

The meetings will be with remote participation for Members (being able to view and listen to proceedings, ask for the floor and intervene in the meeting). Other participants are invited to follow the meeting through webstreaming.

Following these decisions, the next meeting of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) will take place on 16 and 17 June 2021 (online).
The meeting agenda and documents will be published here.

SEDE meetings' calendar 2021
EP calendar 2021
Press release: Sahel: Security situation from the African perspective - 12 April 2021
Press release: MEPs quizzed the head of the IAEA about nuclear non-proliferation - 16 March 2021
Press release: Exchange of views with the NATO Secretary General - 15 March 2021
Press release: Instability in the Central African Republic - 24 February 2021
Press release: Chair of the Security and Defence Subcommittee welcomes extension of the New START Treaty - 5 February 2021
Press release: MEPs to discuss security and defence priorities with Minister Gomes Cravinho - 28 January 2021
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Length of video : 67'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

The European Neighbourhood Policy and its Eastern Partnership are key strategic policy frameworks for European Union external action. However, after little effective transformation and many unanticipated consequences, the EU admitted in 2015 that its once prized policy was overly ambitious. In response, it was scaled back to an incentivized reward mechanism for good government behavior, yet unfulfilled promises remain. Now, the Eastern Partnership countries are rethinking the original EU-led partnership framework in favor of a balanced, mutual cooperation that amplifies their voices in their diverse and evolving region.

Ex-Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker with president of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev. Photo: Etienne Ansotte

Grandiose and unattainable ambitions are (hopefully) left in the past

After unexpected challenges, the European Union (EU) downgraded the Eastern Partnership in 2015. Originally intended as a path towards EU Membership, the policy framework did not perform as anticipated, leading the EU to scale down expectations, and instead refocus it as a reward system for good government behavior. My doctoral research examined the build-up to and fall-out from this decision as it pertains to the critical relationships between the EU and the formerly Soviet Eastern Partnership countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The Eastern Partnership falls under the EU’s broader European Neighbourhood Policy framework, which is a core responsibility of the European External Action Service (EEAS). However, its complex and comprehensive design involves various agencies, policies, interests, and objectives.

The key objective of the Eastern Partnership is to manage the acclimatization of the post-Soviet region to EU integration standards. By the EU’s own account, however, this framework and its objectives proved to be far too ambitious. Involved policymakers and policy experts have criticized the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership for their “one size fits all” regionalism perspective, dependence on conditionality compliance, lack of reciprocity, ineffective democracy promotion, and under-estimation of security threats, among other concerns. These issues were met with promises from the EU to implement a tailor-made approach that differentiates between partner countries. However, such promises remain unrealized, and as a result, the future of the EU’s relations with its Eastern Partners is unspecified and lacking a long-term perspective.

The EU claimed that relegating the European Neighbourhood Policy, including the Eastern Partnership, to a reward system for good governance in 2015 would assume a less ambitious and more pragmatic, flexible approach moving forward. Yet, merely increasing funding packages as ad-hoc rewards takes on a diminished “payer not a player” role compared to a mutually engaged and beneficial strategic partnership. Consequently, applying this incentivized reward perspective across the board has not worked out as the EEAS intended. The EU’s influence in its Southern Neighbourhood, the Middle East and North Africa, has continued to decline since 2015. Similarly, despite the EU’s aim to bring its Eastern Partners up to its own standards, the EEAS has not managed to effectively promote democratization or stabilization in its Eastern Neighbourhood that is left vulnerable to longstanding regional tensions.

Unidirectional governance obstructs cooperative partnership

The lack of mutual exchange between the EU and its Eastern Partners substantiates criticism that the Eastern Partnership was not intended as a balanced and equal cooperation. While democratic peace, economic progress, and civilian safety may generally inform EU policy standards regarding societal needs, the inability to provide those needs abroad as promised challenges views of EU external action as merely humanitarian and civilian-oriented. Contrary to claims that the EU is simply a promoter of universal norms, its EEAS objectives and behavior towards its targeted Neighbourhoods do not corroborate merely apolitical intentions. They instead reveal that considerable power would be required to accomplish foreign compliance with the EU’s conditions and standards. As such, the claim to be “one of the most important, if not the most important, normative powers in the world” does not communicate a non-hierarchical and mutual cooperative exchange.

The EU’s emphasis on prescribing its own standards and values to its Eastern Neighbourhood confirms that the Eastern Partnership was not designed as a horizontal and equal relationship, especially since the partner countries were meant to acclimate ‘up’ to EU standards. Moreover, this prescriptive, asymmetrical association has communicated to the stronger countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood region, such as Turkey, Russia, and Azerbaijan, that integration with the EU is not pragmatic and offers little comparative value. Other Eastern Partners’ recent statements of disappointment in the EU suggest similar reservations.

The value of recognition

The 10-year Anniversary Summit of the Eastern Partnership in May 2019 marked an important milestone for the policy framework, as well as for the EU’s relations with the Eastern Partners. From the EU’s side, there was an expectation for all involved parties to sign a Joint Declaration regarding progress made and future goals. However, the Anniversary Summit came and went without the anticipated signing of the Joint Declaration. Azerbaijan’s refusal to acknowledge a statement that did not mention its conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh was the most adamant position against the Joint Declaration. Nevertheless, the other Eastern Partners also expressed disappointment with uncertainties and delays, including the lack of EU accession prospects.

Soon after, in December 2019 the Euronest parliamentary assemblies of Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Armenia proposed a new partnership agenda called the “Trio Plus Strategy 2030.” This strategy better acknowledges these specific Eastern Partners’ many years of reforms measures in compliance with the EU’s partnership conditions. It also emphasizes these partner countries’ preferences for potential deeper integration with the EU. Rather than including all original six Eastern Partners, the Trio Plus Strategy proposes finally abolishing the EU’s regionalism perspective. It holds the EU to its differentiation promises, and demands greater recognition and reward for their greater compliance.

Conclusion: mutual exchange can support fair and realistic cooperation

The EU should clarify that its objective for future partnerships within its Eastern Neighbourhood is to in fact still have them. In order to save itself – and its Eastern Partners – the trouble of further over-ambitious governance goals or unrealized promises, the EU must show that it does not take its relations in the region for granted. Additionally, it is important to express that it recognizes and appreciates the steps towards positive reforms that have occurred. Most importantly, while EU support may encourage such steps, any meaningful change is expressly the result of the Trio Plus countries’ own diligence and resolve.

Rather than unidirectional, prescriptive governance from a foreign institution, the future iteration of the Eastern Partnership should entail a cooperative and strategic framework that outlines shared interests and goals. The framework should also design mutually beneficial and reciprocal action steps that the EU and its Eastern Partners can take together in order to achieve their common objectives.

The post Trading ambition for cooperation: What’s next for the Eastern Partnership? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Length of video : 36'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

REPORT on a European Parliament recommendation to the Council on the 75th and 76th sessions of the United Nations General Assembly
Committee on Foreign Affairs
María Soraya Rodríguez Ramos

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Length of video : 104'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Length of video : 104'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

After the referendum, and before Covid, I sat down at one of my favourite eating places to enjoy a vegetarian curry. Hot stuff!

But more heated was the discussion that took place afterwards.

Brexiters to the left of me; Brexiters to the right of me. I was outnumbered, but I put up a good fight. Here’s how it went.

‘The EU isn’t democratic!’

‘Yes it is; laws are democratically passed.’

‘No. You are deluded. The Parliament is full of puppets. They do as they’re told.’

‘Actually, the EU is run by democratically elected politicians.’

‘You’re talking out of your behind! Look, tell me this, if the EU passed a law saying everyone had to wear women’s knickers on their heads, what could you do about it? Well, what could anyone do?’

‘The EU would never pass such a law. What could you do if our Parliament passed such a law?’

‘We could vote at the next general election.’

‘So, we can vote in the next European elections. Did you vote in the European elections?’

‘No. Waste of time. So you see, if the EU told us to wear women’s knickers on our heads, there’s nothing you could do.’

‘So, tell me one law of the EU that you don’t like.’

‘There are thousands, so many.’

‘Well, just tell me one.’

No answer. Conversation moves on…

‘And the EU accounts have never been signed off!’

‘Yes, they have been signed off every year by the independent auditors.’

‘No they haven’t.’

‘Yes they have.’

‘No they haven’t’

Get out mobile phone.

‘Look, here’s the signature of the President of the European Court of Auditors, signing off the EU accounts.’

‘Oh that’s not independent, it’s got European in the name’.

‘Of course it’s independent.’

‘No, I mean when PwC [PriceWaterhouseCoopers] refused to sign off the EU accounts.’

‘PwC has never audited the EU accounts.’

‘So, it must have been one of the other big accountancy firms.’

‘Why would any of them audit the EU accounts when the EU accounts are already signed off by the European Court of Auditors?’

‘Look another thing, it’s a gravy chain for EU bureaucrats. There’s a guy at the EU who gets paid 90,000 a year just to look into the shape of lettuces.’

‘Who are you talking about?’

‘I met him at a party. He told me. Why would he lie to me?’

‘Well, people sometimes embellish things at parties. What’s his name, I’ll contact him to check this out?’

‘I don’t know his name. I just met him at a party, and that’s what he told me. Of course he wouldn’t lie!’

‘Look, this is getting ridiculous. The referendum has split the country in half. There’s a real danger that it could split up the four countries of the UK.’

‘What’s wrong with that? We don’t need Scotland. Let them go.’

‘I think it would be very sad for the UK to split.’

Look, get over it. We’re leaving That’s democracy. We’re leaving.’

‘Yes, but in a democracy, voters can change their minds.’

The exchange went on for another hour. You can guess the rest.

These are all the same comments left on my Facebook pages every day, but this time, in real time, real space, face to face.

I said in passing,

‘The best debates are ones where you can agree the facts, and then discuss what you think about those facts. But the problem with the debate about Brexit is that nobody can agree on the facts.’

We all parted on good company, shook hands, and agreed it was a lively and interesting discussion.

But it’s taken over 40 years for such misinformation about all things EU (and Europe) to become rigidly entrenched in the minds of millions and millions of Britons. 

Where’s the big campaign to enlighten and change minds? There isn’t one.

If there was another referendum next week, all the same immovable myths and misunderstandings would swirl around the country. Just like last time.

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• And LinkedIn

________________________________________________________

The post “What if the EU ruled that we must all wear knickers on our heads?” appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

As I noted in an earlier post, if the first priority in establishing the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade & Cooperation Agreement was the legal text, then the second has been their implementation.

Part – a very visible part – of that has been the politics of getting that done, from domestic arrangements and infrastructure to supporting affecting individuals and organisations. Indeed, even before the signing and ratification of either Agreement, there has been plenty to consider on both sides.

But there is also a more prosaic element of operationalising an institutionalised relationship. Both Agreements set up a framework of bodies for the EU and UK to meet and discuss.

PDF version: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic71

If the graphic looks a bit daunting, then be encouraged by the realisation that all either system (and they are separate) is simply a main body, plus sub-committees dealing with each section of the relevant treaty. The TCA’s Trade Partnership Committee breaks down that work into sub-sections, again mapping onto the legal text.

The ambition of the TCA framework is clearly bigger than that of the WA’s: the latter is a closed arrangement for the limited purposes of the winding-up of liabilities from membership, while the former seeks to create a space in which future discussions and negotiations can occur, up to and including treaty revisions. It’s a similar approach to the one that the EU has been trying to get the Swiss to agree to for some years (not very successfully).

The logic is a simple one: a standing institutional framework can be re-used, rather than having to reinvent the wheel each time, plus it helps embed that framework more firmly if it has a general purpose. Which is part of why the UK was rather resistant to it at the start.

The TCA framework also provides for inputs from parliamentarians and civil society, again underlining the ambition.

But ambition isn’t facts on the ground.

While it’s possible to map the meetings of the WA bodies since March 2020 (below), we still have yet to have any meetings of any TCA bodies. The delay in EU ratification to the end of April this year offers some explanation, but given the pressing nature of many of the implementation issues that have arisen since New Year, there has been a distinct lack of urgency on either side.

PDF version with clickable links: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic78

This week’s European Council did engage in a short discussion and review of relations with the UK, but its conclusions offered little beyond the usual reminders about the costs of non-membership and the need for effective implementation.

While much of this seems – and is – highly technical stuff, it remains important. In the context of a low-trust environment, it will be through constructive and effective interactions at this level that the two parties will start to be able to find a more stable modus vivendi.

I’ll be running regular updates to this meeting tracker for both Agreements on my Twitter feed, so do check on this as we progress.

The post Making the WA/TCA work, institutionally appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Of all European defence initiatives launched since 2016, the European Defence Fund (EDF) is without doubt one of the most promising, if not the most promising. However, the EDF will not by itself solve all problems related to the fragmentation and therefore inefficiency of European defence procurement. Only the Member States can do so, working in good faith together with the Commission in deciding the EDF work programme and funding allocations. Doing this, it will be essential not to confuse the ends – the creation of a strong and competitive European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) – the ways – inclusiveness through wide cross-border cooperation and the will to pursue strategic autonomy – and the means – the defence research projects funded by the EDF. Keeping the course between at times conflicting paths and ensuring the return on a meaningful but still modest investment (EUR 7.9 billion over seven years) will be the main EDF challenges in the years ahead.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

The Executive Board today approved the calendar of Plenary meetings and European Citizens' Panels, with the series of events starting next month.
Committee on Constitutional Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

The Executive Board today approved the calendar of Plenary meetings and European Citizens' Panels, with the series of events starting next month.
Committee on Constitutional Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

Length of video : 41'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

The Commission’s audit findings confirm the ongoing conflict of interest of Czech Prime Minister Babiš that Parliament raised in several resolutions and discharge reports.
Committee on Budgetary Control

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

The Commission’s audit findings confirm the ongoing conflict of interest of Czech Prime Minister Babiš that Parliament raised in several resolutions and discharge reports.
Committee on Budgetary Control

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

The certificate will facilitate free movement without discrimination and contribute to the EU’s economic recovery.
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP