As climate negotiators gathered in Belém for the 30th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP30), the surrounding rainforest was in the spotlight, with COP30 being dubbed a “forest COP”. As one of its key projects, the Brazilian government launched the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF). The fund for the conservation and restoration of standing rainforests aims to serve as a successful and innovative initiative in multilateral cooperation through blended finance. However, there remains a gap between current forest finance and what is needed to reach the Rio Convention targets. Germany and a few other European states have pledged investments into the fund and could shape its implementation. Additional financing mechanisms for forest restoration play a complementary role and should be enhanced. Still, not all success lies in finance. Forest finance mechanisms must reconcile targets of increasing carbon sequestration and storage in forests along with biodiversity and sustainability targets, while upholding the rights of local populations.
In Lateinamerika haben drei Länder offiziell angekündigt, sich zu einer feministischen Außenpolitik (FAP) zu verpflichten: Mexiko im Jahr 2020, Chile und Kolumbien im Jahr 2022. Die Einführung eines feministischen Ansatzes in die Außenpolitik steht im Zusammenhang mit einem zunehmenden Gender-Bewusstsein in der internationalen, regionalen und nationalen Politik. Im Vergleich zu europäischen FAP-Varianten zeichnen sich die FAP-Ansätze dieser Länder durch einen stärkeren Inlandsbezug aus, einen Bezug zu den Problematiken der eigenen Gesellschaft. Dies zeigt sich besonders im mexikanischen Fall, während die chilenische FAP auch die feministische Perspektive im Außenhandel betont und die kolumbianische FAP sich als pazifistisch definiert. In keinem dieser Länder führt die FAP eine politische Wende herbei. Sie verleiht vielmehr einer bereits bestehenden Politik der Gleichstellung der Geschlechter und des Gender-Mainstreamings neuen Schwung. Sie sorgt dafür, den Grad an Partizipation und Repräsentation von Frauen zu erhöhen sowie deren Beiträge zur Außenpolitik deutlich sichtbar zu machen. Im Sinne einer globalen Gender- und Menschenrechtsagenda sind Mexiko, Chile und Kolumbien wichtige Partner, für Deutschland wie für die EU. Da sie untereinander die Zusammenarbeit in diesen Bereichen intensivieren, sind sie zudem lohnende Partner für die Erweiterung von Dreieckskooperationen. Da das Auswärtige Amt die FAP aufgegeben hat, das Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung die feministische Entwicklungspolitik jedoch weiterführt und die Zukunft der FAP in Chile angesichts eines anstehenden Machtwechsels ungewiss ist, empfehlen sich für die Kooperation in diesem Feld variable begriffliche Rahmungen und Formate. Deutschland sollte den bi-regionalen Dialog und Austausch – auch zwischen feministischen und Frauenorganisationen – intensiv fördern und sich nicht nur mit Finanzmitteln, sondern auch an den Lernprozessen beteiligen.
I notice it’s been some six months since my last post here, which reflects on both the new pace of UK-EU relations and the lack of anything useful to add to the debate.
I did bestir myself to write about the return of finance-based framing back in November, as various people noticed this was a thing, but even that was a very brief matter (albeit one we might return to).
Even the recent number of press stories launched by Labour about the new for a closer relationship currently lack any great depth: the items that are being mentioned relate to stuff already on the reset agenda, which have themselves moved at a glacial pace. The failure of SAFE negotiations in November was undoubtedly a set-back and one that helped to move up the ERASMUS+ decision some weeks later, but this has deflected attention from the lack of quick movement elsewhere. Even the Spain-UK treaty on Gibraltar, agreed last June, is still to be put through ratification.
At best, this suggests that things might be moving forward, rather than are demonstrably doing so. Even if we make allowances for the likely cross-linkage of ETS, SPS and Youth Mobility, there risks being little to show come the next EU-UK summit, whose date is still to be fixed.
Ultimately, this reflects on the lack of urgency for either side. The EU has many other more pressing things to attend to right now, while British policy is caught up in the general funk about the government’s central strategic purpose. Moreover, none of the reset elements will actually make a huge difference to those involved, beyond helping to remove some points of friction and to rebuild trust.
However, with Labour languishing in the polls, the EU might be forgiven for wondering whether it’s worth moving now on more relations, when a new British government might come along a tear those apart in three years’ time: witness the flourishing adoption of ECHR withdrawal on the right that continues to contain no concern about the impact on the TCA/WA.
This all said, it’s good not to be too downbeat about things. The rhetoric remains positive, negotiations do continue and British public opinion is still relatively benign on closer links.
As such, I’m going to try to be more active this year as we move through the reset, looking both at the specific elements and the wider relationship. As ever, I’m always very happy to produce graphics on particular things: just contact me and I’ll be on it.
In the meantime, here are some updates of the main trackers on WA/TCA meetings and the progress on the Strategic Partnership. As always, you can follow the links to the PDFs with clickable links to source documents.
PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic85
PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic125
PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic141
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