ELIAMEP

Papazisis publications just published the new book Understanding the Greek Crisis: Answers to Key Questions about the State, the Economy and Europe, edited by Dimitris Katsikas, Kyriakos Filinis and Marianthi Anastasatou. The book is the result of an initiative by ELIAMEP’s Crisis Observatory and its objective is to offer answers to much debated questions about the Greek crisis.

You can find here more information.

The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy has started a new series of strategic dialogues. The second series is related to the State of the Union of Jean Claude Juncker and how it is perceived by Greek scholars. You can access it here (in Greek).

The “Balkan Silk Road” is the name given to the transport route and logistics corridor that China is beginning to establish in the region. The Balkans, and by extension Southeast Europe, is a region where China can empirically test various elements of its “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) which was launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013. As an investor and loan provider for infrastructure projects, China is a newcomer to the region. Its growing footprint in southeast Europe reflects how different actors – the European Union, Russia, Turkey and now China – are positioning themselves and seeking spheres of influence. The level of engagement by Chinese state-owned companies, political leaders and lending institutions in Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe is gradually redefining the relationships between China and countries comprising Southeast Europe. Greece, Serbia, the FYR of Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina see in China the opportunity to provide them with the financial assistance to build highways, expand harbours and modernize public utilities.

Working Paper 82/2017:  Opening a New Silk Road from China 

Author: Dr Jens Bastian

ELIAMEP Crisis Observatory participates in the bi-regional research programme Jean Monnet Network “Crisis-Equity-Democracy for Europe and Latin America”. The aim is the comparative study of crisis and crisis management as well as its social and democratic implications, in Europe and Latin AmericaThis process will allow an exchange of information and experiences between Europe and Latin America, but also the opening of a bi-regional dialogue on the social and macroeconomic policies and crisis management, providing additional content to the Strategic Alliance  the Summits EU-CELAC are supposed to build.

The programme will be coordinated by IRELAC with the participation of:

Institute of International Relations of the University of Sao Paulo (IRI-USP) (Brazil)

Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)

Istituto Affari Internazionali (Italy)

Academic Researcher: Stephan Schulmeister (Austria)

IRELAC (Belgium)

The duration of the project is three years (September 2016-August 2019).

For further information, please contact Dimitris Katsikas, head of Crisis Observatory.

The programme is co-funded by the European Union through the Erasmus+ programme.

The kick-off meeting of the programme was held on 6th June 2017 in Brussels where Dimitris Katsikas represented the Crisis Observatory.

You can find here  the full schedule of the event.

On the occasion of the event organised by ELIAMEP, the Embassy of the US in Athens and GMF on 26 September 2017, Kathimerini reported on discussions held. You can access the article here (in Greek)

The project is geared towards enhancing the knowledge and debate about the European integration project and the role of citizens. Within and beyond a network of renowned policy institutes specialising in EU affairs, the partners intend to enhance (i) participatory and (ii) representative democracy and (iii) accountability in the EU, and thereby strive “Towards a Citizens’ Union” (2CU).

2CU fosters the dialogue between the academic world and policy-makers and to build bridges between different communities. The defined target group captures a wide cross-section of interlocutors, e.g. other think tankers, academics, politicians, national and EU-level policy-makers, representatives of civil society organisations (CSOs), and journalists.

The project’s objectives are:

– To inform and influence national and EU-level debates about the citizens’ union

– To advance knowledge and experience of (young) researchers

– To advance the study area at (inter)national level

Its activities include:

• Organizing research workshops to simulate negotiations in the 3 key subject areas, “researchers-meet-EU policy-makers” seminars to gain feedback, and public outreach events to stimulate debate in capitals across Europe.
• Producing a series of policy briefs, published online and disseminated widely, as well as a final report synthesising findings and offering policy recommendations.

The project will be carried out by a consortium of 19 partners

• CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES
• CENTRE FOR LIBERAL STRATEGIES
• EUROPEAN INSTITUTE FOUNDATION
• ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI
• SABIEDRISKAS POLITIKAS CENTRS PROVIDUS
• Latvijas Arpolitikas instituts
• FUNDACJA INSTYTUT SPRAW PUBLICZNYCH
• EUROPEAN DIN ROMANIA
• Centre for International Information and Documentation
• Centre for European Reform
• Carnegie Europe
• STIFTUNG WISSENSCHAFT UND POLITIK
• Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik
• Institute of International Relations
• Tænketanken Europa
• ELIAMEP
• WISEEUROPA – FUNDACJA WARSZAWSKI INSTYTUT STUDIOW EKONOMICZNYC
• FUNDACION REAL INSTITUTO ELCANO DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES
• SLOVENSKA SPOLOCNOST PRE ZAHRANICNU POLITIKU
• Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Duration of the project: 1/09/2017 – 31/08/2020

Contact persons at ELIAMEP

Dr. Filippa Chatzistavrou

Konstantinos Papanikolaou

Co-funded by Erasmus+ Jean Monnet actions 2017

Sorry, this entry is only available in Greek.

Joining the debate on the role of President of Russia Vladimir Putin in international politics and the relations between Russia and the West, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy publishes (in Greek) a relevant working paper written by Mr Alexandros Mpoufessis. You can access it here.

President XI Jinping’s “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, seeks to expand and secure maritime routes, road networks, railway and bridge infrastructure projects for China from Asia across Africa to the Middle East and Europe. The Chinese blueprint includes a mosaic of infrastructure investments, trade agreements, energy cooperation and establishing a financial footprint through extensive lending arrangements. The Balkan Silk Road initiative connects Beijing with Athens and establishes further infrastructure links with Belgrade, Sarajevo, Skopje, Budapest, Tirana, Podgorica, etc.

Seen from a southeast European perspective, the BRI has major repercussions in countries as diverse as Greece, Serbia, FYR Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Port infrastructure, highway projects, high-speed railway links and thermal power plant renovation form the constituent elements of the BRI in southeast Europe.

The report – written by the independent economic analyst Dr. Jens Bastian – was commissioned by the EBRD in London. It was presented and subsequently made available as a public document on Thursday, 14. September 2017. On the invitation of the South-East Europe” and the “Asian Studies” Programmes of ELIAMEP, Dr. Jens Bastian presented the report at the Office of the European Parliament in Athens.

Prof. Loukas Tsoukalis, President of ELIAMEP, chaired the event.

Dr. Peter Sanfey, Deputy Director for Country Economics and Policy at the EBRD made introductory remarks.

Dr. Plamen Tonchev, Head of Asia Unit at the Institute of International Economic Relations (IIER), Athens  served as a discussant to Dr. Bastian’s report

You can read here the article on required changes in the Greek national security, which was written by Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos. This commentary was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini on 9 August 2017 [in Greek].

The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy starts a new series of strategic dialogues. The failure of negotiations on the Cyprus Question is the first theme of analysis. You can find more information on the Greek version of our website.

Sorry, this entry is only available in Greek.

Transatlantic relations have entered a difficult period since the inauguration of Donald Trump. While during the administration of Barack Obama collaboration and mutual understanding were taken for granted on a plethora of issues of joint interest, the new US president does not significantly count on Europe. Although he has softened his rhetoric in comparison to his comments before the election of last November – principally regarding his support for NATO – the US and the EU have not yet worked out how their new symbiosis will look in the next four years.

Meetings between Trump and European leaders help both sides formulate their approaches. In that regard, the third visit of the US president to the EU deserves particular attention as he decided to go to Paris, accepting the invitation of his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron to attend the Bastille Day celebrations. The timing is symbolic. This year, American troops joined their French allies in the annual parade, to mark 100 years since the US intervened in World War I.

Until their recent meeting in Paris, Trump and Macron had met on the sidelines of other multilateral summits and events such as a NATO gathering in Brussels. One of their initial handshakes is still attracting the attention of international media. Macron treated Trump to a strong handshake in front of the cameras in May, which he then refused to release for several long moments. As he explained to French media, he wanted to show he would not make small concessions to his American counterpart.

In the French capital, the two presidents had of course much more to say than focusing on handshakes and publicly explaining them. Although their meetings started with Trump’s bizarre compliment of Macron’s wife, Brigitte, on her figure, the two leaders did later start serious discussions about Syria and terrorism. As Macron asserted during the press conference, both countries are “determined to take any necessary measures in order to root out terrorism and to eradicate it no matter where, in particular the narrative on the Internet” and also tackle cyber crime.

Also, the two presidents agreed to work together in Syria supporting a political roadmap for the post-conflict days, months and years. It is important to mention – as Macron revealed – that Paris no longer requires Assad’s departure. This constitutes a fundamental shift in French policy.

From the American side, however, the outlook for the future is obscure. Trump praised Macron in the press conference saying that “the friendship between our two nations – and [themselves] is unbreakable.” However, as it is the case with almost all of his public remarks, he was ambiguous on critical issues.

It is not clear how the US and France will cooperate on trade as Trump advocates a new type of protectionism and Macron is always talking about free trade, or more recently about fair trade, possibly as a courtesy to his American counterpart. France is enjoying a trade surplus with the US that amounted to $15.6 billion in 2016 with the total trade volume reaching approximately $78 billion.

Cooperation between the US and France on climate change also remains a mystery. Trump sent ambivalent messages about the Paris agreement when he said, “Something could happen with respect to the Paris Accord. We’ll see what happens.” With regard to NATO contributions, Trump is demanding member states spend two percent of GDP on defense. France’s current contribution is 1.8 percent. It is close to the target but still falls short of satisfying Washington’s interests.

Last but not least, it is worth-mentioning that both Trump and Macron referred to their Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping with great respect in the press conference. Trump described him as a “friend” who “loves China” and “wants to do what’s right for [it].” Macron announced that he will visit Beijing early next year, and said that he saw China as “a key partner in order to build peace all around the world” and commented positively on Xi’s multilateralism vision. When two world leaders meet to discuss other topics and simultaneously talk about the need for cooperation with China, this clearly shows the growing international role of the country.

Πηγή: Global Times

You can read here the article on the Cyprus Question, which was written by Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos. This commentary was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini on 13 July 2017 [in Greek].

The London School of Economics and the Hellenic Observatory published a new book on Greece: Modernisation and Europe 20 years. The book is edited by Dr Spyros Economides. Contributions include chapters written by Professors Loukas Tsoukalis, George Pagoulatos and Dimitri Sotiropoulos.  By clicking here, you can access the book.

Assessments of the quality of democracy focus on deviations from the rule of law and decreasing levels of political participation, but do not adequately explore the mechanisms through which the quality of democracy decreases. Populism is such a mechanism, used by populist leaders, after they ascent to power. Populism is combined with clientelism and corruption to form means of political domination in democratic regimes which are backpedalling or backsliding. Examples are three recently consolidated democratic regimes of Western Balkans. The governments of Aleksandar Vucic in Serbia, Nikola Gruevski in FYR Macedonia and Milo Djukanovic in Montenegro purposefully use populism, clientelism and corruption. Although not present in all backsliding democracies, populism, clientelism and corruption are associated with backsliding from recently consolidated democracies and deterioration of the quality of democracy.

Τhe paper written by Dr Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos is available here.

You can read here the article about terrorism and the refugee crisis, which was written by Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos. This commentary was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini on 9 July 2017 [in Greek].

You can read here the article on the name dispute ith FYROM, which was written by Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos. This commentary was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini on 3 July 2017 [in Greek].

The Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) is launching a new online discussion on critical security issues. The views of Greek and international scholars and policymakers will be published on this website in order to enhance the ongoing debate and raise public awareness. This is the continuation of a pilot reseearch project implemented from September 2016 until December 2016 in cooperation with the Greek opinion-making newspaper: Hi Kathimerini.

Radicalisation

• Dr Rosa Vasilaki: ‘How can the radicalisation phenomenon be explained?‘ (in Greek)

In Greece, the sovereign debt crisis and its subsequent management by the country’s European partners have tarnished EU membership and watered down a previously overwhelming level of support for European integration. Often portrayed as a ‘special case’, Greece sees the EU as failing to deliver the goods, be they economic growth or, more recently, solidarity vis-à-vis unprecedented migration flows. The Greek political class understands the benefits of continued membership – even if this becomes multi-speed – but lacks the tools and the credibility to influence the EU’s future direction according to the national interest. Unable to provide a positive narrative or endgame for the European project, it is left with a public struggling to associate the EU with political stability and economic prosperity. There is no roadmap to economic recovery, unemployment remains disproportionately high and approximately half a million Greeks, primarily the youngest and brightest, have emigrated since 2008.

A major survey conducted by Chatham House and Kantar Public in 10 European countries offers interesting insights into Greek attitudes toward the EU. Predictably, 67% of Greeks consider austerity as the EU’s greatest failure, a percentage that singles Greece out from every other country in the survey and betrays the effects of the three bailout programmes on Greek society’s perception of the EU. ‘Economic crisis’ is the phrase most strongly associated with the EU (62%), followed by ‘loss of national power’ (44%, double the survey’s average). Reflecting the same undercurrent, 39% ‘strongly disagree’ with the statement that ‘people like you have benefited from being a member of the EU’. Yet, prior to the crisis, Greece was a net recipient of the EU budget, a fact that has been lost in public debate. More recently, hundreds of billions of euros of mostly EU funds have been committed to keep the economy afloat, admittedly with stringent conditions attached. Rather than explain this to the public, Greek political leaders have used the crisis to scapegoat the EU and divert attention from their own failures.

Stuck in the eurozone’s straightjacket of fiscal discipline, and unable to will the EU tools that could replenish the sovereignty lost at national levelGreeks feel overwhelmingly ‘uneasy’ (74% versus 38% survey average) and ‘pessimistic’ (60% versus a 40% average) about the EU. Populists of all persuasions tap into this deep-seated frustration, pitting patriots against foreigners and quislings and invoking national determination against the implementation of reforms imposed ‘from above’. They also tap into the strong and rising anti-German undercurrent in Greek politics. The survey shows that a significant number of Greeks see German interests as defining the solution parameters to the the Greek crisis with over 80% (compared to the sample average of 27%) thinking that Germany plays a negative role in the EU.

Greek leaders and European elites developing policy approaches to re-legitimize core aspects of integration and bring the Greek people ‘on board’ should consider a number of important results reported in the survey:

– An overwhelming number of Greeks (80%) think that ‘within the next 10 years other member states will decide to leave the EU’. The price tag of membership may prove increasingly highfor Greece and a number of other countries, given the EU’s continuing inability to balance national interests equitably or rein in members that openly defy European values and EU commitments. It is worth noting that with regard to ‘Britain’s vote to leave’, 73% of Greeks believe that it will weaken the EU, 3% more than the British (70%). At the same time, for a majority of Greeks (60%), maintaining a good relationship with the UK in the future should not come at the cost of compromising the EU’s core values.

– Regarding the EU’s future path, 53% disagree that ‘the EU should become a US of Europe with a central government’, an unexpected result considering that the Greek public was, prior to the crisis, among the most pro-integrationist in the EU. Greeks no longer link integration with the possibility of real convergence to the EU average but with sub-optimal concessions on national sovereignty which disrupt political stability and the social fabric. At the same time, even though Greeks today are living in more precarious situations compared to other country samples (31% had to ‘go without needed medication and 48% had to ‘borrow money to pay for life essentials’ compared to European averages of 19% and 22%), 44% are ‘moderately’ satisfied with their life, mirroring the extent to which they have ‘some control’ (43%) over it.

– Trust in the EU’s rules of the game and its ability to deliver benefits for citizens is in doubt, as reflected in the fact that Greeks are evenly divided on whether the EU is moderately democratic (41%) or not democratic (40%). Greeks see a Europe characterized by asymmetries over the sovereign debt crisis and more recently the refugee crisis. Regarding immigration, many have negative views, with 68% rejecting the idea that ‘immigration has been good for the country’ and 58% believing that ‘all further migration from mainly Muslim countries should be stopped’. Greeks appear ambivalent as to whether EU enlargement has gone far enough and whether new countries should be able to join the EU. Interestingly, although 67% oppose Turkey joining the EU, this is less than in Germany, Belgium, France (73%) and Austria (82%).

What are the implications of these findings for the Syriza-Anel government? The current administration and any future government elected in 2019 must promote difficult reforms at home before it can have a meaningful say in reform at EU level. An important reservoir of public support stands unutilized. 47% agree that ‘people should take responsibility for themselves rather than expect the state to provide for them’. This marks an important shift from state reliance to self-reliance. Provided that this can be tapped and a credible roadmap to growth can be paved, the Greek political class can adopt a number of strategies to re-energize support for the EU, and help address its contested legitimacy. In a country where many feel that sovereignty has been eroded by the EU and the IMF, Greek political leaders should view multi-speed Europe as an opportunity. Deepening integration and cooperation in key domains for the Union such as the eurozone and the Schengen area can only come with the creation of necessary tools to manage this, a fiscal capacity and/or eurozone budget or the reform of the Dublin system for managing refugees. These would provide significant policy space, and potentially generate mechanisms for financial and operational support. The same could apply for foreign and defence policy. Obviously, in areas where the national or even level performs better, political leaders will need to balance their approach with the recognition that 66% of Greeks think that ‘the EU should return some of its powers to individual member states’.

Greece along with the countries that have shouldered the burden in the refugee crisis, could promote solidarity as an organizing principle in future EU policy. Greeks (68%) followed by Italians (66%) and Germans (62%) top the list among European publics in believing that ‘every EU member state should have to accept the same proportion of refugees according to their population’.

Finally, in order to repair the EU’s reputation in Greece, Greek leaders must communicate a positive narrative around the EU’s ‘greatest achievements’. In Greece, the highest of these  are considered to be ‘freedom to live and work across the EU’ (56%), followed by 41% who value ‘removing borders between states (i.e. the Schengen area)’ – predictably, only 19% vouch for ‘the euro currency’. The sense of European belonging that emerges in this survey cannot be discarded. 43% are proud to be Greek and European, while 66% (the highest percentage in the group) consider nationalism ‘a danger to peace and stability in Europe’. It is this valued existence of a common space that can propel Greek political leaders to contribute to initiatives where a collective European response brings benefits. Besides terrorism and migration, mechanisms will be needed to share the tasks and costs associated with the management of unemployment, health and social security, and environmental protection at the EU level.

Author: Dr Eleni Panagiotarea 

Source: Chatham House