The National Interest

Summary and Key Points: Russia's sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, has long been plagued by technical issues, accidents, and maintenance woes, making it more of an embarrassment than a strategic asset.

-Laid down in 1982 and commissioned in 1991, the carrier was meant to project Soviet naval power but has instead become a symbol of Russia's naval shortcomings. Despite ongoing modernization efforts, many experts believe the vessel is beyond saving.

-Russia's insistence on keeping the aging carrier afloat, driven by national pride and fear of losing carrier capabilities, may be a futile effort, with Admiral Kuznetsov remaining a costly and ineffective relic.

Russia’s only aircraft carrier, the smoke-spewing, broken down Admiral Kuznetsov, is described by the Russian Navy as a “heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser.” While that might sound impressive, it is not. Admiral Kuznetsov is a continuing embarrassment for the proud Russian military.

The only reason one can assume that the Russians want to keep this national embarrassment around is to train crews for the future, supposedly better, aircraft carrier fleet that Moscow has been planning to build since 2017. 

Still, the carrier is a smoldering embarrassment that any other nation would have scrapped years ago. Indeed, Admiral Kuznetsov was more of an experiment than anything else – one undertaken at a time when the Soviet government was on its way to history’s dustbin. 

Originally laid down in 1982 and commissioned in 1991, the same year that the USSR collapsed, Admiral Kuznetsov was a product of the Soviet Union’s ambitions for a greater navy. The carrier was intended to project Soviet air power and provide a strategic advantage in any potential conflict.

Even at the start of this project, though, Moscow had to make compromises – if not for budgetary constraints or technological limitations, then for strategic disinformation purposes. For instance, its qualification of being a, “heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser” was done expressly to skirt international rules. Russia is a mostly landlocked nation. It has just four warm-water ports, with possibly its most important one, the naval base at Sevastopol in Crimea, existing along the Black Sea. Since Turkey controls the entry point to the Black Sea for Russia, Moscow must adhere to Turkish rules.

One of Turkey’s rules has been to deny access to aircraft carriers in the Black Sea under the Montreux Convention. With a displacement of nearly 62,000 tons, Admiral Kuznetsov is the largest warship ever built by Russia. But it can also transit the Turkish Strait, because it comes just under the requirements of the Montreux Convention. 

Admiral Kuznetsov has a sloped ski-jump flight deck, which enables conventional takeoffs and landings of its naval aircraft, including Su-33 and MiG-29K fighters. Of course, the ski-jump is highly limiting, which is why the United States prefers to use catapults to fling its aircraft into the air. The Soviets and later the Russians simply did not have the technical skills or funding to install such capabilities on this model of carrier. 

The carrier itself has been plagued by technical issues, accidents, and maintenance problems throughout its more than 30 years in service to Russia. These problems have severely limited the carrier’s usefulness to Russia and has ensured Admiral Kuznetsov is little more than a sunk cost for Russia’s navy.

Russia’s decision to maintain the aging Kuznetsov can be attributed to national pride as well as a fear of a capabilities gap. Russia already is behind the Americans, and now the Chinese, when it comes to carrier operations. Should Moscow let the decrepit Admiral Kuznetsov be retired, it could mean a lost generation of carrier capabilities for their navy. 

Then again, the wayward carrier spends most of its time in the shipyard, begging the question of whether those capabilities are already lost to Russia. Money might be better spent actually building a new generation of decent carriers.

As if unable to let go, Moscow is apparently investing to extend the service life of this failed carrier by another 25 years. The modernization efforts will include upgrades to the carrier’s air defense systems, propulsion, and flight deck, among other investments.

Despite their insistence that the carrier will be modernized, though, there is much evidence to suggest that the carrier is dead and cannot be modernized anymore. Regardless of what speculation exists on the internet and among analysts, Admiral Kuznetsov is an objectively awful flattop that should have been scrapped 30 years ago.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The RAH-66 Comanche, envisioned as a stealth reconnaissance and attack helicopter by Boeing and Sikorsky, was set to revolutionize the U.S. Army’s aerial capabilities in the 1990s.

-Designed with advanced stealth features, it was fast, agile, and highly survivable. Initially, the Army planned for a fleet of 1,213 Comanches, later reduced to 650, but the program was ultimately canceled due to cost overruns, technical challenges, and shifting military priorities.

-While the decision remains controversial, with some arguing it was a missed opportunity akin to the F-22 Raptor, the Army opted to modernize existing helicopters and focus on UAV development instead.

The U.S. Army in the 1990s wanted to upgrade its aging Kiowa OH-58D and AH-1 Cobra helicopters. The RAH-66 Comanche was born. It was designed to be a stealth reconnaissance and attack helicopter developed by Boeing and Sikorsky. The Comanche was intended to be a highly advanced, stealthy, and versatile platform capable of performing reconnaissance, light attack, and air-to-ground missions. 

Fast and agile, with a top speed of around 200 miles per hour, this bird could hover out of ground effect at an altitude of 10,000 feet. It also had a maximum range of 345 miles and an operational ceiling of 18,000 feet. The estimated cost of each Comanche was around $30 million.

The Comanche was designed to be highly survivable, with features like low radar cross section, infrared signature reduction, and advanced self-protection systems. 

The Army originally envisioned a fleet of 1,213 Comanches. The number was later reduced to 650. Ultimately, a total of zero would go on to serve. The Pentagon worried about the helicopter’s ability to meet the changing requirements of modern war. Comanches were designed to fight the Soviet menace, but they would not have been ready until well after the Soviet Union collapsed and America was ensconced in its unipolar moment.

Had production continued as originally planned on the RAH-66 Comanche, it would not have entered service until the second decade of the Global War on Terror, a totally different fight. Rather than build what most experts agree would have been the world’s finest helicopter, the Army chose to invest in modernizing its existing fleet of helicopters and building unmanned aerial vehicles.

Terminating the Comanche program was a highly controversial decision at the time. Proponents argued the Comanche would have provided the Army with a much-needed capability for reconnaissance and light attack missions. They also argued the Comanche’s advanced stealth and survivability features would have been favorable in the kind of future conflicts the U.S. military faces now. 

Others, however, argue that the cancellation was the right decision. They point to the program’s cost overruns, the Comanche’s technical challenges, and the changing nature of warfare, all of which made the Comanche less relevant. These detractors also figured the Army’s decisions to invest in upgrades to its existing helicopter fleet and in developing UAVs were more cost-effective and flexible approaches to meeting the Army’s needs. 

Of course, these cogitations are pure hogwash. 

The RAH-66 Comanche would have been to America’s helicopter fleet what the F-22 Raptor is to the U.S. air fleet. 

But the Army, and its political authorities, lacked the vision needed to turn the Comanche into a real fighting force. 

The Comanches should have been built in the numbers originally planned. The failure to do so is a serious missed opportunity for the United States.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force has announced a pause in its Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, which aims to develop a sixth-generation fighter jet.

-Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall emphasized that while the fighter platform's development is paused, other elements of the air dominance system, such as the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drone program, will continue. The decision comes amid concerns over the NGAD's high costs, which are expected to reach "multiple hundreds of millions" per airframe.

-The pause allows the Air Force to reassess the program’s design and necessity before proceeding with further development.

Yesterday, the US Air Force announced that it will be “taking a pause” from the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program.

This news makes sense intuitively; the development of a sixth-generation fighter may seem exceedingly proactive, as no other world power can be reliably capable of matching America’s fifth-generation platforms. 

However, the American taxpayer is still bruised from cost overruns on the F-22 and F-35 projects, so this demographic will likely be glad to hear that the Air Force is stepping back with NGAD to get things right, rather than plodding ahead unrestrained.

“We’re taking a pause there,” said Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall. “With the platform itself, we’re taking a pause. With the rest of the elements of the air dominance family of systems, we’re moving forward as fast as we can.”

Exactly what elements of the air dominance system Kendall was referring to is not clear. Presumably, Kendall meant the Collaborate Combat Aircraft (CCA) – the autonomous drone system expected to serve as a “wingman” to the NGAD’s crewed aircraft.

Last week, the Air Force awarded contracts to five companies for the development of software to be used in the CCA. The award of multiple CCA contracts stands in stark contrast with the decision to pause the NGAD platform for which the CCA system is meant to complement – suggesting that the NGAD will proceed eventually.

Kendall did not offer specifics about how long the NGAD program will be paused, or even why this decision was made.

Kendall did say that Air Force officials would be “taking a few months right now to figure out whether we’ve got the right design and make sure we’re on the right course.”

Kendall also clarified that the NGAD program would merely be paused, and not outright canceled. “I’m absolutely confident we’re still going to do a sixth-generation crewed aircraft,” Kendall said, although he did acknowledge the possibility that a sixth-generation fighter could be unmanned. “There’s a chance it might be uncrewed…but I think we’re not quite ready for that. And we could always do something like an optional crewed platform.”

The NGAD’s costs were expected to be astronomical. Kendall said previously that each airframe would cost “multiple hundreds of millions.” Some have said it would cost around $300 million per airframe. 

The reason for the exorbitant price tag: exhaustive research and development into the cutting-edge technologies that would comprise the airframe.

For example, the NGAD was expected to feature advanced adaptive cycle engines that could offer more power, improved fuel economy, improved heat regulation, and better loiter times – just generally an improved type of engine. Similarly, the NGAD was expected to feature improved radar absorbent materials and a sensor suite that rivaled or exceeded that of the F-35s.

Of course, developing all of these technology features is an expensive proposition. Given the cost, the need for the systems, in the field, needs to be pronounced. It's possible that the Air Force took their NGAD pause because the need for such urgent resource spending just wasn’t there at the moment. Yet, given the nature of military-industrial relations, given the expectancy of Boeing and Lockheed Martin, and given the efforts of China to improve their military capabilities, the NGAD program will likely resume in due time.

Harrison Kass is a defense expert with over 1,000 published articles. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: Despite its aging status, the B-2 remains a critical asset in the U.S. nuclear triad, thanks to its low observability and long range.

-With only 19 units in service, the B-2’s role is increasingly vital as tensions with China and Russia escalate.

The U.S. Air Force’s legendary B-2 Spirit stealth bomber showed its worth during the world’s largest naval exercise, which took place around Hawaii this month. 

During the U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific exercises, or RIMPAC 2024, a B-2 was used to take out a large surface ship in an exercise for the first time. Using an inexpensive guided bomb, the aircraft was able to “hit and sink” the retired USS Tarawa. The drill, called QUICKSINK, could demonstrate a “a low-cost method of achieving torpedo-like seaworthy kills from the air at a much higher pace and over a much larger area than covered by a lumbering submarine,” according to the Air Force Research Lab. 

The B-2 is one of the most versatile aircrafts in the U.S. military, but only 19 remain in service.

The B-2 is aging, but the stealth bomber continues to play a critical role in America’s nuclear triad. Capable of delivering nuclear and conventional weapons, the multi-role bomber deters U.S. adversaries by its mere existence. 

The Spirit is the product of stealth technology’s refinement during the early days of the Cold War, when aircraft engineers were uncovering methods to avoid interceptors and missiles. The military wanted an aircraft capable of flying nearly undetected by deflecting or absorbing radar signals. Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman were selected to develop prototypes incorporating this technology, leading to the F-117 and B-2, respectively. 

The B-2’s renowned flying wing design makes it virtually invisible to radar. As detailed by the Air Force, the bomber’s top advantage is its low observability, which provides the platform with greater freedom of action at high altitudes. Northrop Grumman created a radar-absorbent coating called alternate high-frequency material to preserve stealth characteristics while minimizing maintenance. Its unrefueled range is roughly 6,000 nautical miles. 

The Spirit first flew in the 1990s and achieved full operational capability in late 2003. 

The Spirit can carry up to 40,000 pounds of weaponry in two weapons bays at the center of the aircraft. Both weapons bays feature a rotary launcher in addition to two bomb-rack assemblies. A generic weapons interface system was added to the bomber as part of the Block 30 upgrade, which allows the B-2 to attack up to four different types of targets on one mission.

When the B-2 was designed, the Air Force was gearing up for a longer arms race with the Soviet Union. The collapse of the USSR, and the shift to the War on Terror that followed, certainly altered the Pentagon’s priorities. Initially, the Air Force intended to procure 75 B-2 bombers. The Bush administration cut this number drastically in the early 1990s. A total of 21 were produced, but not before the cost per bomber soared to roughly $800 million-900 million.

While a larger B-2 fleet probably would not have been critical to the U.S. military’s missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the renewed competition with Russia and China changes priorities. The Air Force’s bomber fleet is small, and its upcoming B-21 Raider is still under development. Regardless of how capable the service’s remaining 19 Spirit bombers are, Beijing’s expansive naval force could dominate if a kinetic conflict were to erupt.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Less than a year after Hungary launched its rapid manufacturing program at its newly opened military vehicle factory, the first domestically-made KF41 Lynx infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) has been delivered. The Lynx was completed last December, but as the initial vehicle to roll off the assembly line at the facilities in Zalaegerszeg, it was put through extensive inspections and performance tests.

It was officially handed over to the Hungarian armed forces earlier this month – the first of a new batch of IFVs that will be produced in Hungary under license from the German-based Rheinmetall arms manufacturer. Budapest is already on track to receive forty-six of the German-made tracked IFVs by the end of next year, with the first of the Lynx already delivered in October 2022.

Production on the remaining vehicles began last year at the new Hungarian facility, which was opened as part of a Rheinmetall Hungary Zrt. joint venture – with Rheinmetall controlling a fifty-one percent stake and the Hungarian government maintaining a forty-nine percent share.

Hungary will receive a total of 209 of the modular Lynx vehicles as part of an August 2020 deal valued at 2 billion euros ($2.2 billion). Forty-five will be produced in Germany, while the remaining 172 vehicles will be built domestically in Hungary.

"We are grateful to be able to support the Hungarian armed forces as an industrial partner in the Lynx lighthouse project. We have now reached an important milestone within the project. With the production of the Lynx, we are seriously proving our commitment to creating local added value in Hungary and transferring technology to the country. This model is also transferable to other countries which might also be interested in similar partnerships," said Dr. Björn Bernhard, head of Rheinmetall Vehicle Systems Europe.

In addition to the basic IFV vehicle, other variants include a mobile command post, armored reconnaissance vehicle, fire control vehicle, mortar carrier, medical vehicle, and driving school vehicle. A Lynx air defense tank, armed with a Skyranger 30 turret, is currently in development as part of a second contract that was placed in December 2023.

"Peace requires strength, which means a lot of kinds of strength, and in this regard, we have gained real and serious strength with Rheinmetall and in this alliance, which significantly enriches Hungary," added Hungarian Minister of Defense Kristóf Szalay-Bobrovniczky. "This is a kind of strategic partnership that is more than strategy or partnership – this is a real alliance, and within this framework, we hope to win the future for Hungarians, and we're building something that will remain for the next generations, and we're strengthening Hungary."

In addition to supplying the Hungarian Army, the factory will produce the KF41 Lynx for other NATO members and partners. The Lynx was one of the platforms considered by the U.S. Army in its Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle program to replace the aging Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).

However, the initial Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) was canceled in January 2020, only to be "rebooted" in July 2021. The program has since continued to move forward, and in June 2023, the American Rheinmetall KF41 Lynx was selected – along with an offering from General Dynamics Land Systems – as part of the program's efforts to produce the XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Summary and Key Points: The RAH-66 Comanche was the U.S. Army's ambitious attempt to create a stealth attack helicopter, designed to replace the OH-58 Kiowa and provide undetected reconnaissance and support.

-Despite the program's $7 billion investment from 1996 to 2004, the Comanche never entered production due to technological challenges and unproven stealth capabilities. The helicopter featured a smooth fuselage, Radar-Absorbent Material (RAM) coatings, and infrared-suppressant paint, along with a quieter composite rotor.

-Although the program was eventually canceled, the Comanche highlighted the potential value of stealth technology in helicopter operations, especially for special missions like the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound.

For the the last several generations, American aerospace designers have invested heavily in stealth technology. The majority of new fighters and bombers that roll off the assembly plant are stealth airframes, with radar cross sections comparable to that of a bumble bee. Examples of new stealth aircraft include the F-117 Nighthawk, the B-2 Spirit, the F-22 Raptor, the F-35 Lightning II, and the B-21 Raider. But as one may have notice, the list does not include any helicopters, despite the use of the rotary-winged aircraft in attack, reconnaissance, and special operations roles which stealth capabilities would be quite useful.

Conceptually, a stealth helicopter makes a lot of sense. US war planners thought so, at least, which is why considerable resources were dedicated to building the RAH-66 Comanche, a stealth attack helicopter. The Comanche never quite panned out, but you can’t fault the effort.

Helicopters are inherently unstealthy. The turbine exhaust system is cacophonous; the tail rotor is loud; the fuselage vibrates vigorously during flight. Helicopters are simply not well suited for moving through air and space undetected. Yet, given the inherent challenges of sanding down the non-stealth corners of the rotary-winged aircraft, the fact that aerospace designers were willing to try speaks to the value that a stealth helicopter would add.

Stealth characteristics would be helpful for a helicopter in any situation in which you did not want the helicopter detected – that is to say, in most military operations. Consider how helicopters are used: fire support, troop transport, and reconnaissance. Nearly every facet of helicopter operations would benefit from stealth technology. And of course, helicopters are a central component of special operations, which are, almost innately stealthy.

Consider the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound – an example of why the US might want stealth helicopter technology. The US needs to surreptitiously infiltrate a sovereign state (because the US did not have permission to enter the sovereign state), locate an approximate location (bin Laden’s compound), and deliver a SEAL Team. The needs of the mission all demanded a helicopter – aside from the need to enter the sovereign state undetected; which would require stealth. Fortunately, the US happened to have a stealth Blackhawk prototype on hand, two of which were deployed for the raid. This article isn’t about the bin Laden raid or the stealth Blackhawk, but rather a demonstration of why the US might be interested in developing a stealth helicopter like the RAH-66.

The RAH-66 made a lot of sense on paper, prompting the US Army to invest $7 billion dollars on the program between 1996 and 2004. The RAH-66 was slated to replace the OH-58 Kiowa, a scout helicopter that often attracts small-arms fire. Naturally, the Army would have appreciated a scout helicopter with the ability to move about unseen.

Two Comanches were built, with a smooth fuselage, Radar-Absorbent Material (RAM) coatings, and infrared-suppressant paint. The Comanche was also outfitted with an all-composite, five-blade rotor, which churned more softly than other helicopter rotors. But the Comanche never entered production, because “aspects of Comanche’s technology were deemed too risky (i.e. immature i.e. hadn’t been developed i.e. didn’t exist),” wrote Dan Ward for TIME.

The Comanche was a financial flop. But you can appreciate why the Army may have wanted such a stealthy helicopter.    

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's reliance on expensive, complex nuclear-powered submarines is under scrutiny as global rivals like China and Russia expand their naval capabilities.

-Despite the proven effectiveness of diesel-electric submarines—used successfully by allies like Japan, Sweden, and Israel—the U.S. has focused on nuclear subs, which are costly and slow to produce.

-Diesel-electric subs offer a quieter, more affordable alternative that could quickly bolster America's undersea fleet. By purchasing these submarines from advanced allies, the U.S. could enhance its naval power and meet current challenges more effectively, rather than waiting for long-term solutions.

The United States Navy has fallen in love, like the rest of the Armed Forces of the United States, with technological wizardry and expensive programs to augment, indeed replace, less sophisticated, affordable, and plentiful systems. America’s wünderwaffe is going strong today. 

Yet, the U.S. military is quantifiably the weakest it has been since the interwar years. One key system that the Navy will need to defend against America’s rising great power rivals is the submarine. And, thanks to long-running problems with America’s failing defense industrial base, as well as the increasing cost of complex systems, America’s vital submarine capability is insufficient to meeting the challenges America faces today.

There is no amount of funding that can address the bottlenecks in our defense industrial base. Nothing short of a complete overhaul of our infrastructure will make U.S. capabilities meet the needs of the U.S. Armed Forces. Despite having spoken wistfully of the need to restore America as the “arsenal of democracy,” no political leader—not former President Donald Trump or current President Joe Biden—has managed to revitalize the dying arsenal of democracy. In fact, as multiple crises across various fronts pull America’s limited supplies of critical systems, ammunition, and personnel to their breaking points, almost nothing has been proffered in the way of a reliable solution in the near term. 

And no one in Washington thinks about the long-term anymore (and whenever they do, the bureaucrats usually get it wrong).

The threats, however, persist. 

The need for a large and capable submarine force remains. We keep hearing about the glories of America’s allies. Although, increasingly, these alliances seem to be pretty one-sided: America gives and gives, while the allies take and take. But America does have competent and technologically advanced allies. 

Many of these allies, such as Sweden or France, routinely and unapologetically rely upon diesel-electric submarines to meet their strategic needs. 

This is not because America’s allies are technologically inferior to the Americans. Quite the contrary. It’s usually because America’s allies don’t want to spend the kind of money, time, and resources building the entire fleet of nuclear-powered submarines that the Americans have built. 

Even the recent Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) submarine deal demands that Australia purchase, and the Americans and British provide, nuclear-powered submarines. Thus, defense contractors are happy because these are long-term contracts that are worth far more than if the contracts were for diesel-electric submarines.

In the meantime, America’s rivals—notably China—grow stronger and their own navies grow larger and more competent. By the time these proposed new nuclear-powered submarines make it to the battlefield, the facts on the ground may have fundamentally changed in China’s favor. What’s needed, therefore, are solutions in the here and now. Not theoretical solutions for 2040 and beyond (which is what the Pentagon is planning for). 

The fact of the matter is that diesel-electric subs work. Indeed, these were the kind of submarines (although much less sophisticated than the diesel-electric subs operated by multiple modern navies today), that won the Pacific Theater of World War II for the Americans. After that conflict ended, though, the U.S. Navy was bitten by the nuclear bug. It’s an understandable trend. Nuke-powered subs are better than their conventional, diesel-electric submarine older brothers. 

But they’re expensive and take long to build—and require long stays in already overburdened U.S. shipyards.

Besides, a coterie of diesel-electric submarines has proven their worth against their nuclear-powered brethren. More importantly, diesel-electric subs have proven their mettle in a variety of instances against nuclear-powered U.S. aircraft carriers! 

That’s because diesel-electric submarines, on top of being cheaper than nuclear-powered boats, are usually quieter. They’re harder to pick up on sonar. An ancient Chinese Song-class diesel-electric submarine infamously popped up within torpedo firing range of the USS Kitty Hawk when the nuclear-powered carrier was on maneuvers in the Pacific. 

Similarly, a Swedish Gotland-class diesel-electric submarine got within firing range of an American aircraft carrier during joint training exercises. The crew of the American carrier was none the wiser until it was too late. 

A French diesel-electric submarine did the same to an American flattop during joint training between the U.S. and French navies.

The Israelis have also proven that diesel-electric submarines are more than capable of providing for their national defense. While never officially acknowledged, everyone understands that Israel possesses a flotilla of German-built, diesel-electric Dolphin-class submarines that can carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Israel is a highly sophisticated nation that could easily build nuclear-powered boats. They chose not to because diesel-electric subs are cheaper, easier to maintain, and still get the job done. 

During World War II, America’s submarine force became a refined and essential element of America’s maritime defense. While the nuclear-powered sub had yet to be invented, and there were real limitations of diesel-electric subs back then, the fact remains that the United States was able to mass produce these subs and overwhelm the Japanese at sea. America’s rivals today, such as China and Russia, routinely rely upon a mixed force of diesel-electric and nuclear-powered subs to meet their strategic needs. 

Why can’t America do this as well?

The best part of this entire story is that America’s overburdened shipyards do not need to build diesel-electric subs from scratch. Washington should simply purchase a tranche of diesel-electric subs from one of America’s various advanced allies. James Holmes believes that the Japanese-built Soryu-class diesel-electric sub would get the job done. 

But why stop there? 

We should purchase a hodgepodge of various diesel-electric subs from Japan, Sweden, and France. Let our allies help us out. America needs to augment its submarine force with simple numbers. American allies are more than capable of helping us with this task.

After all, quantity has its own quality. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: As tensions with China rise, the U.S. Navy's reliance on the F-35 Lightning II faces scrutiny, particularly regarding its range limitations. The F-35C, designed for carrier operations, has a combat radius of 600 nautical miles—outdistancing the F/A-18 Super Hornet but still within the reach of China's long-range anti-ship missiles.

-This raises concerns about the vulnerability of carriers in the Pacific theater.

-The Navy’s next-generation F/A-XX program aims to address these issues with enhanced range and capabilities, but the question remains whether any carrier-based aircraft can keep carriers safe from emerging threats.

Throughout its development history, the F-35 Lightning II was plagued by delays and budgetary overruns. Although it took much longer to reach initial operating capability than expected, the end result is a well-refined tactical aircraft. Detractors of the program have not been silenced, however, and continue to point out challenges facing the aircraft. As tensions with China increase and planners look to the wide expanse of the Pacific, questions about the F-35’s range become more acute, particularly in the case of the Navy.

Launching from a carrier far out at sea limits the options pilots have for landing to refuel; realistically, they usually must return to the boat. If their fighters don’t possess much range, that means the carrier must sail that much closer to the adversary in order to launch effective sorties, potentially exposing itself to enemy defenses.

So, does the F-35 have a range problem? And, if so, what can the Navy do about it?

Widely considered to be the most dominant fifth-generation platform in the skies today, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter incorporates stealth, versatility, range, top speed, and advanced electronic warfare/avionics. The F-35 comes in three different variants with their own specifications and, importantly, different ranges.

The F-35A is colloquially designated as the “runway queen” of the group as it is operated like a traditional fighter. This low-cost variant requires roughly 8,000 feet of standard runways to take off properly and land. The F-35B is the Marine Corps’ Lightning II variant. As the most mechanically complex of the three, the F-35B features short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) capability.

The Navy operates the C “Charlie” model. Designed for carrier operations, the F-35C has the largest fuel load and, consequently, the longest range. With full tanks, its combat radius is 600 nm, edging out the F/A-18 Super Hornet at 570 nm in the air-to-air mission configuration. For attacking ground or surface targets, the F-35 maintains its radius while the Super Hornet’s radius drops to only 320 nm.

While the Lightning II does outrange the Super Hornet, it cannot carry nearly the same payload. It makes up for this drawback in that it is a stealth aircraft with a radar cross-section about three orders of magnitude less than that of the F/A-18.

All the stealth airplanes in the world won’t hide the carrier itself, however, and even though the F-35C has longer legs, the carrier would still have to place itself in harm’s way in order to carry out strikes.

Although the F-35 is still a relatively new platform, the Navy is already looking for its next tactical aircraft in the form of the F/A-XX program. This jet, intended to replace the Super Hornet and the EA-18G Growler, is expected to have stealth capabilities, mount-directed energy weapons, and be capable of integrating with unmanned systems.

Depending on the direction the Navy pursues, it could also have an even greater range than the F-35.

Ultimately, however, no carrier aircraft will have enough range to keep the mothership safe. Tensions between Beijing and Washington have continued to escalate, indicating that the vast Indo-Pacific region is a likely future area of combat operations for the sixth-generation platform.

The Navy will require the jet to have long-range capabilities in order to evade China’s air defense systems across long distances. The rapid growth of the People Liberation Army’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the form of long-range, anti-ship ballistic missiles cannot be overstated.

Their current missiles are capable of reaching a staggering 2,200 nm or more, far beyond even the most ambitious of endurance aircraft.

Clearly, the Navy will have to consider other options for its carriers if it wants to keep them safe and relevant. 

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The F-35 Lightning II, the most advanced fighter jet in the skies, faces a hefty $2 trillion lifetime cost, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

-The report estimates $1.6 trillion in sustainment costs, significantly higher than previous projections, and $445 billion in acquisition costs.

-Factors driving the increased expenses include the U.S. military’s plan to operate the F-35 until 2088 and higher inflation.

The F-35 program’s complexity stems from its three variants (A, B, and C), each designed to meet the specific needs of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, replacing multiple older aircraft.

The F-35 Lightning II is the most advanced jet in the skies today. However, its journey to the skies hasn’t been easy. Indeed, the F-35 program had to overcome several challenges and setbacks to be where it is today. To a certain extent, these challenges continue to this day.

According to the latest assessment by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the F-35 Program will cost more than $2 trillion during its lifetime. This astounding cost makes it the most expensive defense program in recent history and one of the most expensive in military history in general.

Specifically, the GAO report estimates $1.6 trillion in sustainment costs, which include operational demands and maintenance – this is about 45 percent higher than the previous estimate in 2018 ($1.1 trillion). It also estimates approximately $445 billion in acquisition costs, which include the development and procurement of the stealth fighter jet.

One of the main reasons for the hefty half a trillion dollars increase in sustainment costs is the fact that the U.S. military plans to operate the F-35 fighter for an additional decade, or until 2088. Another reason is the higher inflation.

The fact that the GAO had to revise its estimate within six years coupled with the ongoing production and delivery of the aircraft, could indicate that the F-35 Program’s cost might further increase in the near future.

Lockheed Martin and the F-35 Joint Program Office have tried to bring costs down but without significant success. Nevertheless, for many, the high cost and challenges surrounding the F-35 Program have a reasonable explanation.

Much like the Russian Babushka wooden dolls that fit several similar toys of different sizes in each other, the F-35 Lightning II isn’t just one aircraft and isn’t intended to replace just one aircraft.

The F-35 comes in three versions: A, B, and C. Although they are essentially the same aircraft in terms of capabilities, each is designed differently to meet the different demands of the U.S. military’s services. Essentially, Lockheed Martin designed three different aircraft in one, and that is reflected in some of the costs.

The F-35A is the conventional take-off and landing aircraft that operates from runways; this is the version used by the Air Force and most of the 19 countries that comprise the F-35 Program.

The F-35B is the Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing (STOVL) version of the aircraft and can take off and land like a helicopter but still fly like a fighter jet; this version is used by the U.S. Marine Corps, as well as several foreign partners.

Finally, the F-35C is the aircraft carrier version of the aircraft and is designed to withstand the extreme pressures of carrier operations; this iteration is used only by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

In addition, the three versions of the F-35 Lightning II are going to replace several older aircraft, including the A-10 Warthog close air support aircraft, AV-88 Harrier STOVL fighter jet, and also probably the F-16.

As such, they include capabilities that would normally be spread over several aircraft. This streamlining of mission sets in a single aircraft is a logistical miracle for the U.S. military and will benefit it in a time of war.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a Greek Army veteran (National service with 575th Marines Battalion and Army HQ). Johns Hopkins University. You will usually find him on the top of a mountain admiring the view and wondering how he got there.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

The program to replace America’s aging nuclear ICBM arsenal, known as the LGM-35A Sentinel, is already projected to go at least 81 percent over budget, which represents tens of billions of dollars in anticipated cost overruns. Yet, despite the program’s ballooning expenses, the Pentagon has reaffirmed its commitment to the effort, calling its continuation, “essential to national security.”

To many outside of the Defense apparatus, the Sentinel ICBM program may seem unnecessary. After all, the United States already maintains a standing arsenal of more than 400 nuclear-armed Minuteman III ICBMs, each of which can deliver its nuclear payload to targets more than 8,000 miles away, traveling at speeds over Mach 23. These weapons lay in wait, housed in hardened underground silos spanning Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota, and represent only the land-based portion of America’s traditional nuclear triad.

A bevy of nuclear gravity bombs, spanning in yield from as low as 0.3 kilotons to as high as 1.2 megatons, serve alongside long-range air-launched nuclear cruise missiles as the airborne leg of the triad, delivered via a laundry list of bombers and fighters. And then, most importantly, a fleet of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, each carrying 20 Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with multiple warheads onboard, serve as the at-sea leg of the triad while also representing the majority of America’s deployed nuclear arsenal.

The land-based Minuteman III fleet is often seen as the least important facet of America’s deterrent nuclear posture, with many experts and analysts dismissing these weapons and their hardened silos as little more than a “warhead sponge,” meant to give adversary nations such a long and daunting list of targets for any potential first strike that there will have little hope of blunting the edge of America’s nuclear response. But while this might make these ICBMs seem less important than the Navy’s deployed SLBMs, for instance, the truth is, using these isolated facilities as a “warhead sponge” might make all the difference in a nuclear conflict. 

The known and permanent locations of these ICBM silos give enemy nations a list of hundreds of targets to focus on, allowing America’s missile subs and nuclear-capable aircraft to retaliate with less interference.

In other words, with hundreds of nuclear ICBMs lying in wait beneath the grasslands of the Great Plains, adversaries planning a nuclear first strike must address the looming threat of these missiles, which are dispersed and sufficiently hardened to nearly require a direct nuclear strike on each to eliminate the possibility of Minuteman III retaliation. 

Even for Russia, which maintains the largest nuclear stockpile in the world and claims to have some 1,710 deployed warheads at any given time, this would be a serious challenge. If you assumed a broadly unlikely 100 percent hit rate, using just one Russian warhead for each of America’s known 450 Minuteman III silos, nerfing America’s ICBM fields alone would require more than a quarter of the nation’s entire deployed nuclear arsenal. If Russia opted to play it safe and devote two warheads to each silo, it would dramatically increase its chances of success, but at the expense of more than half of its deployed nuclear arms. This, of course, also means no other nation on the planet besides Russia has the warheads and the means to mount an effective attack against America’s ICBM fields. 

China’s nuclear stockpile is growing faster than any other nation’s in the world, but its entire arsenal currently amounts to just 500 or so warheads, meaning it could feasibly require every nuclear weapon in China’s inventory – not just the ones deployed – to have the same effect. 

It might be easier to think of the importance of the Minuteman III as a guard standing his post with his rifle up at the alert. Adversaries know there are other guards hidden throughout the landscape and the known location of that rifleman might make him an obvious target, but attackers still have to deal with him first if they intend to mount a successful assault. 

“The land leg’s geographic dispersal creates targeting problems for our adversaries, and our missileers sitting in an alert posture 24/7 ensures responsiveness,” explained Air Force Vice Chief of Staff General James Slife on July 8th.

It’s a cynical and deeply depressing way to see this swath of the American midwest – with these remote, but populated communities carrying that target on their backs for the sake of the rest of the nation. Yet, that’s the inherent and objectively cold-blooded math of nuclear warfare: It’s a game that ultimately, has no winners; only survivors.

And it’s in the interest of continuing this nuclear game of chicken that the Air Force is now forced to swallow the now-projected $140.9 billion cost of replacing those “warhead sponge” Minuteman IIIs, as the ballistic missiles Uncle Sam has long kept tucked beneath the northern Great Plains are rapidly aging into what the Pentagon considers to be an unsafe and strategically neutered obsolescence.

This is a problem the Pentagon saw coming. The Minuteman III program began in the early 1960s, with the first operational missiles entering service in 1970 before microwave ovens were common in American kitchens. At the time, the projected service life of these weapons was just 10 years, meaning the Minuteman III arsenal was slated to be replaced starting in 1980.

Since then, the branch has invested billions of dollars into not just maintaining these weapons but updating them to remain viable in a rapidly changing technological world. After all, these missiles and their launch facilities were designed and built before personal computers, VCRs or portable tape players had been invented. In fact, it wasn’t until 2019 that the Air Force finally migrated away from using eight-inch floppy disks (from the 1970s) to operate the Strategic Automated Command and Control System, or SACCS, that’s responsible for launch functionality.

The dated electronics found throughout the Minuteman III weapon and support infrastructure create significant concerns about cybersecurity – a defensive realm that simply didn’t exist when the weapon was being designed. Likewise, despite limited updates and upgrades over the years, the Air Force has been clear that the Minuteman III’s intercept countermeasures, or classified systems carried onboard meant to hinder an enemy’s ability to shoot the missiles down before they reach their targets, are aging out of relevance, presenting the real possibility that the longstanding nuclear deterrent philosophy of mutually assured destruction may no longer be quite so mutually assured.

More pressing than concerns about hacking, or the unrealistic idea that an adversary state could intercept hundreds of inbound warheads simultaneously, are the continuously reduced reliability of aging systems and components that are now so old that there’s no vendor, contractor, or commercial entity that can support, repair, or replace them – at least, not without a prohibitively high price tag. 

To put it into simpler terms, the Minuteman III is the nuclear equivalent of a 1969 Dodge Charger. Its iconic design and powerful legacy are still enough to leave many in awe, but nobody in their right mind would want to race in the thing today. Upgrading the Charger to make it safe and competitive on the modern race track is certainly possible with enough money and willpower, but there’s no denying that it would be a whole lot cheaper (and easier) to just buy a modern race car.

And that’s exactly what the Air Force determined in 2014 when it conducted what the Congressional Research Service describes as a “comprehensive analysis of alternatives” to the Minuteman III, ultimately assessing that replacing these aging weapons with new, more modern ones would reduce life cycle costs while also ensuring America’s ICBMs are technologically capable of outpacing emerging threats. 

Of course, there are always two sides to a debate, and others have argued that continued service life extension programs (SLEPs) on the Minuteman III arsenal, replacing aging components with more modern ones and eventually producing the ballistic missile equivalent of the Ship of Theseus, might actually be the more cost-effective solution. 

That was the position taken by a group of analysts at the Rand Corporation in 2014 who were tasked with assessing possible alternatives to a new ICBM program (then known as the  Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program). While the Air Force’s 2014 analysis concluded that modernizing the Minuteman III would cost just as much as replacing them, the Rand study presciently argued that a replacement ballistic missile system “will likely cost almost twice (and perhaps even three times) as much as incremental modernization and sustainment of the MM III system.”

Yet, even the Rand analysis left the door open for replacement to be the logical conclusion based on three potential factors. These were, firstly, if the Air Force felt the pressing strategic need to increase the capability of these weapons, which wouldn’t be cost-effective using the old missiles as a basis. Secondly, if the threat environment outside the U.S. changed in such a way that demanded it – such as emerging missile defense capabilities reducing the likelihood of success for Minuteman III strikes. Thirdly, and most pressingly, if the number of Minuteman III missiles the United States had left to launch declined. 

As part of ensuring the land-based leg of the nuclear triad is ready and capable of responding to attack, the United States usually conducts four to five ICBM test launches per year. If the U.S. continued this pace of testing, it would run out of extra weapons to launch by 2035, forcing it to either halt test launches indefinitely or start shaving operational weapons off the inventory to be used for these tests. 

Yet, the Air Force contends that there are several other challenges it would have to face to keep the Minuteman III alive for the foreseeable future. The first and most prominent is the aging out of the rocket motors meant to carry the weapons to their targets. Rocket motor lifespans are determined by destructively testing a small number of them and measuring the degradation of physical, chemical, and mechanical properties to create statistical models that can be used to determine when the motor’s functionality would fall below operational thresholds. In other words, they subject these rockets to immense stresses, measure the damage, and then use that data to extrapolate an expiration date for when the rocket will no longer work well enough to accomplish its mission. 

Based on the Air Force’s rocket lifespan modeling, the three boosters in the Minuteman III will begin to expire in 2029. 

The next technical hurdle another service life extension program would need to overcome is the weapons guidance system also aging out of service. The Minuteman III originally came equipped with the NS-20 Missile Guidance System, which had already aged out of relevance by the 1990s, prompting the branch to kick off the Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program midway through the decade. This program saw the NS-20 swapped out for the more modern and accurate NS-50 system. This cost some $1.6 billion in 1995 currency, or roughly $3.34 billion today, and would extend the lifespan of these guidance systems out to 2020. 

By 2012, the Federation of American Scientists reported that the Defense Department had already invested a total of $7 billion into various Minuteman III service life extension efforts – roughly $9.7 billion in today’s dollars, and it certainly didn’t end there. 

Then, 2020 came and went without a Minuteman III replacement, and the Air Force had to award several subsequent contracts to Boeing to stretch their lifespans out to 2030 and beyond – when the Minuteman III’s replacement was meant to come online. 

While not a conclusive list of these life-extending costs, public records exist for a $51.2 million contract award to Boeing for the job in January 2015 ($68.83 million today), followed by at least two contract modifications to add an additional $15.6 million the following February and an additional $8.1 million in July (a combined $31.43 million today for a total of $100.26 million). 

But even with all this invested, the Minuteman III still faces a laundry list of systems that are not only aging out of relevance but aging out of being feasible to maintain and support. 

A 2019 analysis conducted by the conservative think tank Hudson Institute posited that between 2031 and 2033, as many as 50 missiles might age out of service due to motor or onboard systems falling below the operational threshold, and by 2037, the operational Minuteman III fleet could be as small as 100 weapons. However, the Air Force awarded Boeing another $1.6 billion in February 2023 for Minuteman III “guidance subsystem support,” which is likely to curtail at least a portion of these losses, even if it did mean eclipsing the $10 billion mark on service life extensions. 

As the Pentagon sees it, continuing to funnel billions of dollars into keeping these Kirk-and-Spock-era weapons in service simply isn’t sustainable from either financial or strategic perspectives. 

As Lt. General Andrew Gabera, deputy chief of staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration explained, the Air Force has already modeled out the costs of keeping the Minuteman III relevant, but even those projections have limited value because they simply don’t know what the future may hold. Adapting to unforeseen threats would objectively be simpler (and cheaper) with a fully modern system. 

In 2021, the head of U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Navy Admiral Charles Richard, did not mince words regarding the future of the Minuteman III, saying it was simply no longer logical to pursue more service life extensions for the weapon, and issuing harsh criticisms for external calls to do so. 

“I don’t understand frankly how someone in a think tank who doesn’t have their hands on the missile, looking at the parts, the cables, all of the pieces inside that. I was out at Hill Air Force Base looking at this. That thing is so old that in some cases the drawings don’t exist anymore. Or where we do have drawings they’re six generations behind the industry standard. There’s not only not anybody working that can understand them, they’re not alive anymore,” he said. 

The admiral went on to highlight concerns about cyber vulnerabilities, saying the U.S. needed to replace what was “ basically a circuit switch system with a modern cyber defendable up-to-current standards command and control system.”

“Just to pace the cyber threat alone, GBSD is a necessary step forward,” he argued. 

He also highlighted the changing threat environment, one of the factors the 2014 Rand analysis acknowledged would justify an ICBM replacement. 

“This nation has never before had to face the prospect of two, peer, nuclear-capable adversaries who have to be deterred differently and actions to deter one have an impact on the other. This is way more complicated than it used to be,” Richard said. 

But if replacing the Minuteman III was supposed to be the budget-friendly solution, that appears to have backfired. Originally, Northrop Grumman and Boeing were competing for the opportunity to design and field this new missile, with both firms planning to use solid rocket motors produced by Orbital ATK. However, Northrop Grumman purchased the rocket maker in 2019, giving them the ability to procure their rocket motors at cost, while Boeing would have to buy them at market rate. This allowed Northrop Grumman to significantly undercut Boeing’s proposal, and recognizing that, Boeing bowed out, leaving Northrop to pursue the contract uncontested. 

The Air Force ultimately awarded the company a $13.3 billion developmental contract for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) that would become the Sentinel ICBM in September of 2020, with a projected overall program cost of $77.7 billion by the time a new fleet of missiles, silos, and launch facilities had been constructed and put into service. 

Of course, it wasn’t long before that projected $77 billion price tag began to climb. By February of 2021, the projected program cost has already risen to $100 billion, a figure that held until 2023, when the Pentagon acknowledged that the program’s cost had risen so substantially that even a “reasonably modified” version of the ongoing missile program, meant to reduce overall costs, would still likely ring in at roughly $140.1 billion — representing an 81% cost overrun over the effort’s initial projections. More recent estimates from earlier this month saw another roughly $800 million increase, bringing the current total to $140.9 billion.

While cost overruns are pretty commonplace among the Defense Department’s highest-priority efforts, an increase this substantial is not — in fact, the Sentinel’s budget woes are so severe that the program ran the risk of being canceled by law until just a few weeks ago. 

Significant cost overruns in the 1980s associated with programs like the H-60 Series Black Hawk helicopter and MIM-104 Patriot Air Defense System prompted Senator Sam Nunn and Representative David McCurdy to sponsor what has come to be known as the Nunn-McCurdy Act, which mandated public reporting to Congress when Defense acquisition costs began to skyrocket. 

This law has seen at least nine amendments since, with today’s Nunn-McCurdy laws identifying two types of budgetary breaches separated by severity. Significant Breaches occur when a weapon system or platform’s per-unit cost exceeds 15 percent or more of the current baseline cost, or when overall program costs grow more than 30 percent above their original baseline estimate. More severe Critical Breaches occur when costs increase 25 percent or more over current baseline estimates or 50 percent more than the original baseline estimate. 

As of 2009, any program that meets the criteria for a Critical Breach is considered legally canceled unless certified otherwise by the Secretary of Defense, which is generally accompanied by a plan to restructure the program and a full written explanation of the problems — and intended solutions — for Congress. 

At 81 percent above the original program cost estimate, the LGM-35 certainly met the criteria to be classified as a Critical Breach, prompting a Defense Department review of issues the program is facing and potential alternatives to continuing its development. 

The results of that review were released to the public on July 8, with the Pentagon certifying the program to continue despite its immense cost for a number of reasons that could truly all be boiled down to one: The Air Force simply doesn’t have any other option. 

America’s deterrent nuclear posture requires that the country maintain at least 400 operational ICBMs, and even if all the technological hurdles to extending the Minuteman III’s life could be easily overcome, testing alone will ensure that number can’t be maintained through the foreseeable future, as Uncle Sam simply starts running out missiles to launch. 

“We fully appreciate the magnitude of the costs, but we also understand the risks of not modernizing our nuclear forces and not addressing the very real threats we confront,” explained Bill LaPlante, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment. 

“Based on the results of the review, it is clear that a reasonably modified Sentinel program remains essential to U.S. national security and is the best option to meet the needs of our warfighters.”

Over a 120-day review, the Pentagon considered options ranging from starting over with a new ICBM program to doing away with permanent silos in favor of road-mobile ICBM launchers like those employed by nations like Russia. However, it was determined that none of these options could meet the nation’s strategic needs without also coming with an even higher price tag. 

But it isn’t all bad news for the Sentinel program. As General Andrew Gebara pointed out, the missiles have actually been progressing well through development, and while this effort is centered around the new ICBM, the vast majority of cost overruns within the program aren’t related to the weapon itself. 

“It is important to remember the program that stage one, two and three of the missile have been successfully test fired already. I’m not going to say that we’ve retired every risk on the missile. But largely the issues of the missile are known issues that can be worked, and are largely okay,” he said.

The problems, it turns out, are almost entirely caused by the exploding costs of building the new missile’s command and launch facilities. While the plan is to reuse as much of the existing launch infrastructure left behind by the Minuteman III as possible, much of the communications systems, command and control infrastructure and even the launch silos themselves will need to be modernized at best and completely replaced at worst. 

Based on the Air Force’s original assessment, this will require the demolition of 45 missile alert facilities (MAF’s) in the existing silo fields, to be replaced by 45 new communications support buildings in their place, with 24 new “launch centers” constructed to support them, as well as a complete renovation of all 450 launch silos. 

The plans also call for the procurement of 62 plots of land, each roughly 5 acres in size, near existing missile fields to erect the same number of new 300-foot-tall communications towers, as well as the construction of some 3,100 miles of new utility corridors for utility lines to be housed entirely below ground, and a whole lot more. 

As of July 8, however, the Pentagon has rescinded the program’s Milestone B decision that would have allowed the Sentinel ICBM to move into the engineering and manufacturing development phase, pending a program revamp meant to keep the program at or beneath their newly projected $140.9 billion figure. Chief among these changes will be a “scaling back” of the planned launch facilities to make them smaller, simpler, and more cost-effective. 

The Air Force also fired Sentinel Systems Director, Col. Charles Clegg, at the end of June, citing a loss of confidence in his ability to lead the effort. The branch said his termination was not related to the Nunn-Mccurdy violation, but was instead because the colonel “did not follow organizational procedures.”

All told, the Air Force believes plotting out the new way forward for Sentinel may take as long as 18-24 months, and during that time, other big-ticket programs within the branch are also finding themselves in flux. The Air Force’s new air superiority fighter, being developed under the name Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD), is still expected to see a contract award this year, but senior Air Force officials have voiced uncertainty about its future, while being clear that it will have to see cost reductions — almost certainly informed by the need to pick up Sentinel’s financial slack. 

Ultimately, the LGM-35 Sentinel is still expected to enter service sometime in the 2030s, though it may be late in the decade before these new weapons finally do come online. Once they’ve finally made it into their silos, these weapons are expected to remain in service until at least the 2070s, with modular systems meant to allow for cheaper and easier updates as the years press on. 

Of course, there remains a growing chorus of dissenting opinions, with some arguing that the U.S. should simply continue to update the Minuteman III and simply reduce the total number of ICBMs kept in service to 300 or even just 100. This would allow for a continued land-based deterrent at a much lower cost, though others argue that doing so would defeat the purpose of using these sprawling missile fields as a conceptual shield for the rest of the nation, and importantly, the rest of the triad. 

Those who contend the Sentinel ICBM program is absolutely essential to America’s deterrent nuclear posture argue that it’s not just about maintaining a large number of targets for adversaries to worry about, but it’s also about distributing the focus — and the resources — of enemy states looking for ways to work around this deterrent nuclear shield. Put simply, with fewer ICBMs to worry about, Russia and China could allocate more money toward funding ways to detect or track America’s ballistic missile submarines, potentially reducing their efficacy in the long term. 

And therein lies the heart of the financial warfare that is nuclear deterrence. For the better part of a century, the United States’ greatest military asset has been a big pile of money that it can use to fuel a wide variety of defensive endeavors, but nowhere is cost a greater factor than when it comes to nuclear weapons — which are vastly expensive systems to develop, to build, and to maintain, despite having absolutely no utilitarian value beyond the threat of their use. 

While new fighters or bombers could be used in a wide variety of conventional combat operations, nuclear weapons have only two potential use cases: Holding off the end of the world, or directly causing it. 

And that makes the value of these high-dollar assets difficult to quantify. After all, there’s really no way to know how many times nuclear war has been deterred by the mere presence of America’s sprawling nuclear triad, if it truly ever has at all. But deterrence only has to fail once to change the face of our planet and civilization forever. 

And while $140 billion is a high price to pay for a few hundred missiles, some would argue that the cost of nuclear deterrence is worth it, no matter how big the price tag. 

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Summary and Key Points: China's Type 003 Fujian, the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) most advanced aircraft carrier, successfully completed its third and longest sea trial, returning to port after 25 days in the Yellow Sea.

-The Fujian, equipped with electromagnetic catapults similar to those on the U.S. Navy's USS Gerald R. Ford, is the second domestically-built Chinese carrier and the largest after U.S. supercarriers.

-The trials indicate smooth progress, with the carrier expected to enter service in 2024. China aims to have six carriers by the mid-2030s, signaling a significant enhancement of its naval capabilities.

The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) completed the third sea trials of its Type 003 Fujian, its second domestically-built aircraft carrier – and the first to be equipped with advanced electromagnetic catapults that are employed to launch aircraft. The carrier returned to the Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai on Sunday after spending 25 days in the Yellow Sea.

The carrier's return to port was anticipated after a traffic restriction notice was issued by Shanghai's maritime safety administration on Saturday that warned a large ship was scheduled to enter the Yangtze River.

A video of the Fujian returning to port escorted by tug boats was shared on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter.

The recently completed sea trials marks the longest period the carrier has been out of port since being launched in 2022, and further serve to highlight that the PLAN's warship is slowly but surely completing its trials while is on track to enter service sometime next year. The Type 003 Fujian had previously conducted its eight-day first sea trial that began on May 1 and lasted until May 8. It was followed by a 20-day second sea trial beginning on May 23 and concluding on June 11, according to a report from the Chinese state media outlet The Global Times.

The Beijing-based news outlet cited Chinese military analyst Fu Qianshao, who said the completion of the three sea trials indicates the testing phase of the aircraft carrier is "going very smoothly." Each sea trial also includes additional tests, beginning with basic systems including the propulsion systems and the carrier's electrical systems. That has likely been expanded to the more complicated shipborne equipment, which likely includes the electromagnetic catapults.

The Type 003 Fujian is the first warship after the United States Navy's USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) to be equipped with the advanced launch system. While CVN-78 is nuclear-powered, the Fujian is still a conventionally-powered carrier – yet, it is still the 80,000-ton Chinese warship is still the largest aircraft carrier in service today after only the U.S. Navy's 10 Nimitz-class and sole Ford-class supercarriers.

The Type 003 Fujian, named after East China's Fujian Province, is expected to operate not only improved versions of the J-15 fighter jet, but also new aircraft including the next-generation stealth fighter J-35, as well as the fixed-wing early warning aircraft KJ-600, and the JL-10 advanced trainer jet. Launched in June 2022, the Type 003 Fujian completed its mooring trials, outfitting work, and equipment tests earlier this year in preparation for its sea trials.

In just over a decade, the People's Republic of China has made a great leap forward in aircraft carrier development. The PLAN's first aircraft carrier, the Type 001 Liaoning, a refurbished Soviet carrier, was commissioned in 2012. The second carrier, the Type 002 Shandong, was launched in 2017.

The PLAN has a goal of having six carriers in service by the mid-2030s, and Beijing is expected to soon reveal plans for its fourth aircraft carrier. Speculation abounds that the next carrier could be nuclear-powered, indicating that China will continue to improve its naval capabilities.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: HMS Queen Elizabeth, the Royal Navy's flagship aircraft carrier, returned to Portsmouth after a four-month hiatus for mechanical repairs. Initially set to lead NATO’s Exercise Steadfast Defender, the £3.2 billion carrier encountered a mechanical fault in February.

-Repairs at Rosyth Dockyard included sea trials to ensure readiness for upcoming deployments.

-The 65,000-tonne warship, capable of deploying 36 F-35B Lightning II fighters, sailed under the Forth Bridge and exchanged salutes at the Isle of Wight’s Cowes Week regatta.

-Despite her time in dock, the crew engaged in extensive training exercises. HMS Queen Elizabeth is now preparing for operations later this year.

The Royal Navy flagship aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth finally returned home after being sidelined for four months.

The £3.2 billion ($4.17 billion) carrier had been preparing to serve as the flagship for Exercise Steadfast Defender, NATO's largest naval operation since the Cold War when a mechanical fault was discovered during pre-sailing checks in February. The carrier, forced to head to the Rosyth Dockyard in Scotland in March for repairs to her shaft lines, spent last week undergoing sea trials in advance of her next deployment.

"HMS Queen Elizabeth has completed her defect repair work and capability upgrades at Rosyth and will now undergo a period of sea trials to prepare for future tasking," a Royal Navy spokesperson said earlier this month.

The 65,000-tonne warship arrived in Portsmouth on Tuesday evening, where she will next prepare for operations later this year.

"Whilst no warship wants to find itself spending unscheduled time out of the water, I am enormously proud of the work that has gone on in Rosyth," said Captain Will King, commanding officer of HMS Queen Elizabeth. "Everybody on board is looking forward to getting back to sea, where we belong, and picking up a busy programme in the autumn."

It has already been a picturesque trip for the aircraft carrier – one of two currently in service with the Royal Navy. After departing Rosyth in Fife, Scotland on July 22, HMS Queen Elizabeth sailed under the iconic Forth Bridge towards the North Sea.

On Tuesday, the warship sailed past the Isle of Wight, where she exchanged gun salutes with the Royal Yacht Squadron as part of the iconic Cowes Week regatta, the BBC reported. The River-class offshore patrol vessel HMS Tyne was reported to be serving as the "guardship" for the regatta. Though the racing events were postponed due to a lack of wind, numerous dignitaries were in attendance for the gun salute, while large crowds gathered to see the carrier sail past on her way to Portsmouth.

Even as the ship had been sidelined in Scotland, the flagship carrier still hosted visits from the heads of the Swedish and Chilean Navies, while her crew was able to take part in various drills and training exercises. That included a team from the Fleet Operational Standards and Training (FOST) organization, which provided a week of firefighting and damage control instruction.

HMS Queen Elizabeth formerly entered service in 2020, becoming the first carrier operated by the UK's Royal Navy since the HMS Ark Royal was decommissioned in 2011. The 932-foot-long warship is far more automated and advanced; and is capable of deploying 36 of the F-35B Lighting II fifth-generation stealth fighters. The carrier is able to launch twenty-four of the aircraft in just five minutes and has a maximum recovery rate of twenty-four aircraft in as many minutes.

In addition to carrying what has been described as the most dominant fifth-generation jet fighter in service today, the carrier's air wing is also composed of nine anti-submarine Merlin HM2 medium-lift naval helicopters along with four or five Merlin choppers for airborne early warning missions.  For land operations, the carrier can also carry a mix of other helicopters including the CH-47 Chinook, AH-64 Apache, Merlin HC4, and Wildcat HM2.

However, apart from deploying F-35s against ISIS during her 2021 globetrotting voyage to the Indo-Pacific and back, HMS Queen Elizabeth had not taken part in combat operations.

There was speculation either the Royal Navy flagship or her sister carrier, HMS Prince of Wales, would be sent to aid the United States Navy's mission in the Red Sea to protect commercial shipping from the Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen, but the plans never materialized. It is unclear now if HMS Queen Elizabeth could finally be sent to the region later this year.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

The Republican presidential ticket of former President Donald Trump and U.S. Senator JD Vance (R-OH) represents a bold and much-needed departure from the failed foreign policy consensus that has dominated Washington for decades. Meanwhile, the administration of the now likely Democratic presidential candidate, Vice President Kamala Harris, will largely double down on many of these failures.

This “DC Blob,” as once described by President Obama speechwriter Ben Rhodes, has made a series of disastrous errors that have weakened America’s global position and neglected the interests of middle-class Americans, especially in the Heartland. By adopting a realist foreign policy approach reminiscent of President Nixon and a domestic policy of renewal, a Trump-Vance administration is poised to correct these mistakes and put American interests first.

It is next to impossible to overstate the myriad of failures that can be laid at the doorstep of the  Washington establishment as it has spent the still-young early twenty-first century burning through the capital earned by America’s victory in the Cold War. They are numerous and far-reaching. The worst is how both government and business elites helped facilitate China’s rise, which has now left the United States confronting the greatest geopolitical and economic challenges in its history. The Blob naively believed that economic engagement with China would lead to liberalization and democratization. Instead, it empowered a strategic competitor on an unprecedented scale that now threatens American interests globally.

This is by no means the only failure, however. The list of Blob failures also includes:

Neglecting border security: The failure to secure America’s borders has undermined national sovereignty, strained social services, and allowed for a massive influx of deadly drugs, like fentanyl from China, to enter the country and kill hundreds of thousands of Americans.

Ignoring the American Heartland: While pursuing free-trade policies, Washington elites overlooked the economic struggles of middle-class Americans, particularly in the industrial Midwest.

Pushing Russia into China’s embrace: By expanding NATO to Russia’s borders and dismissing Russian security concerns, the establishment pressed on the most neuralgic points for Russia while inflaming its inherent paranoia and imperialist urges. Even more catastrophic for U.S. interests is that it drove Moscow and Beijing into a dangerous axis that threatens to become dominant in Eurasia, thus threatening the overall U.S. geopolitical position.

Engaging in Middle Eastern misadventures: For over twenty years, ill-conceived interventions and regime change efforts destabilized the region, creating power vacuums that have bred terrorism and refugee crises.

The Trump-Vance ticket offers a clear alternative and appropriate repudiation of this failed consensus, exemplified by the lumbering Biden Administration, which, while making some gestures toward focusing on China and improving domestic industrial policy, falls short of the wholesale change needed.

This is particularly necessary given China’s rapid economic growth and technological progress, which have transformed the geopolitical landscape in Asia. The country has substantially invested in essential technologies like semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology. This technological push, combined with China’s enormous economy and vast population, has made it conceivable that China could become the central global economic actor and put itself in a position to undermine not only American influence but also its domestic economy. If this were to happen, a foreign policy that puts American interests first would be unobtainable under a Sinocentric world order. Thus, an effective balance of power with China must be found to keep America’s Heartland from further decline.

Accomplishing this requires a sophisticated, multifaceted geopolitical grand strategy combined with domestic reforms to ensure America remains innovative while empowering those so long disenfranchised by the era of hyper-globalization.

First, the United States should demand that its European NATO partners increase their defense spending. America can no longer play the role of GloboCop and must prioritize increasingly national debt-limited resources in the decisive theater of Asia.

Second, relations with Russia must be recalibrated. Pursuing regime change in Moscow is a dangerous gamble, as is continuing to allow Ukraine to use U.S. equipment to strike deep into Russia. The risks of catastrophic inadvertent nuclear escalation are real. Further, continuing this policy will continue the consolidation of the Sino-Russian axis. Instead, the United States should lean on Europe to balance Russia in its backyard while seeking opportunities to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. This won’t be easy, and it will take time. However, if the western flank of Russia can be settled into a stable line, China’s long-term threat to Russia in Central Asia can begin to be appreciated by the Putin regime and, more importantly, its eventual successor.

Third, while the United States should make sure Israel is taken care of during its existential confrontation with Hamas while also being able to balance Iranian ambitions, the United States should continue to limit its direct involvement in the region, adopting a policy that does not embrace any one regional power.

Fourth, the United States should unambiguously embrace India and not allow India’s relations with Russia to become a stumbling block. The U.S.-India relationship should be seen through a broader geopolitical lens rather than focusing primarily on moral or trade issues. India represents an essential and powerful counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific.

Fifth, the United States should continue strengthening its relations with Japan and fully resource an actual pivot to Asia while shifting defense investment from Europe.

Sixth, the United States should embrace a “strategy of denial,” as outlined by former Trump administration defense official Elbridge Colby, to ensure China does not invade Taiwan. If it does, China could gain control over the production of high-end semiconductors and the ability to challenge U.S. naval power and the open system of fair trade.

A vital component of the Trump-Vance approach would be a domestic agenda that implements a strategic industrial policy to revitalize American manufacturing and protect critical industries. While the Biden administration has begun some worthwhile movement in this direction, including supporting the CHIPS Act, their focus on climate change and diversity, equity, and inclusion requirements for subsidies have led to energy cost increases and difficulty in getting dollars out the door as effectively for industry. A Trump-Vance team would build off of these underperforming efforts by:

1. Embracing an all-of-the-above energy approach that ensures affordable electricity for industry, tech users, and everyday consumers. This means exploiting the inherent advantages geography has given the United States through copious natural resources.

2. Reshoring critical supply chains and reducing dependence on China for essential goods and technologies. This includes improved mining of these materials in America alongside efforts at dramatically increasing domestic refining capacity.

3. Increasing government funding for cutting-edge research and development to maintain America’s technological edge.

4. Supporting critical industries and sectors like semiconductors and artificial intelligence.

5. Investing in homegrown workforce development to ensure all Americans can effectively compete in high-tech industries.

6. Deregulating as much of the American industry as possible to ensure that investments actually meet their objectives of modernizing transportation networks, broadband, and energy systems to support economic growth.

Other essential policies include a robust focus on fair trade policies that protect American workers and industries from unfair competition, especially from China. Other policies would put the Heartland front and center and support small Main Street businesses over Wall Street by reducing regulatory burdens and providing targeted assistance to entrepreneurs.

The Trump-Vance Administration should address the opioid crisis by investing in treatment and prevention programs, securing the border, and getting tough on China for its “reverse-opium war” on America by flooding streets with fentanyl.

A Trump-Vance administration will prioritize border security by completing the wall, enhancing technological surveillance capabilities, cracking down on visa overstays and illegal employment, and finally deporting those who have entered America illegally, not just giving lip service to doing so.

Unlike the stale shibboleths of the current elite, this comprehensive foreign and domestic strategy recognizes the realities of a changing global order. It prioritizes American interests at home and abroad. It effectively competes with the only great power with the capacity to undermine the living standards of everyday Americans—China—by laser-focusing on this competition while making sure our allies pull their weight. It also makes suitable investments at home and finally secures our border while defending American sovereignty.

By rejecting the failed policies of the Washington Establishment and adopting this approach, the Trump-Vance ticket offers a path to renewed American strength, unity, and prosperity rather than division and decline.

Greg R. Lawson is a Contributing Analyst with Wikistrat. Follow him on LinkedIn and X @ConservaWonk.

Image: Jonah Elkowitz / Shutterstock.com.

On June 28, Iranians went to the polls to vote in a snap election to determine who would succeed former President Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash on May 19 while returning from a diplomatic visit to Azerbaijan. In the aftermath of the crash, Vice President Mohammed Mokhber assumed interim powers until elections could be held. Six candidates were eventually approved by the country’s Guardian Council, which is responsible for supervising elections and approving candidates for national and regional elections. Five candidates were hardliners, and one was a reformist, Masoud Pezeshkian. In the first round of voting, neither side won a majority, leading to a runoff. Pezeshkian won by a significant margin. 

While ultimate decisionmaking power lies with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the president oversees the government’s day-to-day affairs and can influence domestic and foreign policy. As such, Pezeshkian’s victory could signify the potential for gradual, limited, but still significant reforms within Iran.

Before his presidency, Raisi rose through the ranks of Iran’s theocracy to become the country’s chief justice and was seen as the leading favorite to succeed Khamenei. However, this was not guaranteed due to the country’s opaque politics. Raisi’s ability to cultivate good relations with all branches of government—the legislature, military, and clergy—made him a powerful figure. His total alignment with the establishment allowed him to act as an “effective executor, rather than a formulator, of policy.” His election solidified the hardliners’ control of the political system. Yet, his time in office was marked by multiple crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, a stagnating economy, high inflation, a devaluing currency, and protests over the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s morality police.

Raisi’s death came as a shock to the country’s theocratic establishment. His predecessor, Hassan Rouhani, was a moderate and negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The agreement bound Iran to curb the development of its nuclear weapons program for ten years in return for a gradual alleviation of sanctions. When Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions on Iran, Tehran’s hardliners used the decision to sideline their moderate rivals.

Raisi’s passing also raises uncomfortable questions about who will succeed Khamenei. Potential candidates are Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s grandson, Hassan Khomeini. However, their election is unlikely since the regime likely wishes to maintain the image of meritocracy and is hesitant to be seen endorsing a dynastic succession. In any case, Pezeshkian’s win means that should Khamenei pass away or resign, then he would have a strong role in influencing the outcome of who would succeed the Supreme Leader. While hardliners dominate the system, they are split into multiple competing factions with differing views on domestic and foreign policy. While these factions temporarily set aside their differences in the aftermath of Raisi’s death, the elections exposed and aggravated those rivalries, something that will work to Pezeshkian’s advantage. 

When it comes to foreign policy, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is thought to be the primary decisionmaker. However, the president can influence policy, even relations between the United States and Iran. Pezeshkian’s electoral victory comes amid escalating fears of a wider regional war due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip. Before Raisi’s death, the United States and Iran fought a proxy war in the Middle East while also engaging in diplomatic efforts to manage the conflict. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, who was killed alongside Raisi, played a crucial role in these efforts. While more hardline than his predecessor, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Amir Abdollahian was a career diplomat, a fluent Arabic speaker, and had considerable diplomatic experience in the Middle East. His deputy Ali Bagheri Kani took over as interim foreign minister and continued indirect talks with the United States to avoid further attacks. Amir Adollahian’s death, however, has halted the expansion of these talks until after the elections in the United States.

The conflict in Gaza has also brought the long-running shadow war between Iran and Israel into the open when an Israeli attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria led to retaliatory strikes by Iran. The situation was more or less resolved when Israel launched a symbolic, targeted strike on Iran, but the potential for escalation remains high. While the situation remains fluid, there is little immediate concern that Raisi’s death would have a larger security impact. Despite supporting groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, who are part of the “Axis of Resistance” against Israel, Iran has repeatedly stated that it wants to avoid a wider war and instructed its regional proxies and allies not to provoke the West. It is against this backdrop of regional tensions that Iran has been maneuvering to increase pressure on the West. Shortly after Raisi’s death, Iranian officials met with delegates from the “Axis of Resistance” to coordinate plans to escalate their attacks, with the objective of forcing the United States to convince the Israelis to accept a permanent ceasefire without triggering a regional war. In the aftermath, Hezbollah has increased the number of missiles fired at Israel, while the Houthis have managed to sink two ships passing through the Red Sea.  

These issues highlighted the potential futures that Iran faced during the elections. Pezeshkian ran as a moderate reformist who supported the rule of the Ayatollah but wanted to liberalize the economy, decrease repression, and possibly expand relations with the West, all of which would be appealing to Iran’s urban youth who are frustrated by curbs on political and social freedoms. He also adopted symbols of previous reformist campaigns, such as by making his campaign slogan “For Iran,” echoing an earlier campaign slogan by former President Mohammad Khatami, as well as trying to associate himself with the 2009 Green Movement protests by wearing green scarves.

Pezeshkian’s former opponent, Saeed Jalili, is a zealous ideologue and a staunch defender of velayat e faqih (“rule by supreme jurisprudence”), the political ideology that forms the basis of the system that enables the Supreme Leader’s paramount position of power. Jalili’s hardline platform advocated rigidly adhering to the ideals of the Islamic Revolution to resolve the country’s social, political, and economic problems. This ultra-conservative approach was designed to appeal to Iran’s conservative lower-income and rural voters but offered little to young and urban Iranians. So, while Pezeshkian has won a presidential mandate, he will have to be careful in balancing the interests of his electorate without alienating the elements of Iranian society who voted for Jalili and support the theocratic establishment. This is especially true since Pezeshkian is relatively inexperienced in foreign policy and national security matters. Nonetheless, by accepting the results of the election, the regime has shown some willingness to accept reforms. How far they will go along remains an open question.

When it comes to foreign policy, the main difference between Peseshkian and Jalili was on Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Pezeshkian made resuming negotiations with the United States and the wider West a central pillar of his campaign platform, with the hope that a revised version of the JCPOA would reset relations between the two countries and alleviate sanctions. This would go a long way to improving Iran’s economic growth and reduce the power of the IRGC, which has monopolized swathes of the economy. While a new government has not yet been formed, it is expected that Pezeshkian will appoint either former foreign minister Mohammad Zarif (who led the discussions toward the JCPOA) or Abbas Araghchi (Mr. Zarif’s deputy and a member of the team that negotiated the nuclear deal) to the post of foreign minister. 

This stands in contrast to Jalili, who advocated continuing the late Raisi’s strategy of not linking the economy with nuclear talks, a position that the IRGC shares. In other areas, Pezeshkian shares many of the same viewpoints as his opponent. He is a supporter of the IRGC, has reaffirmed Iran’s anti-Israel policies, and expressed his support for the “Axis of Resistance.” Until Pezeshkian is able to reach a new agreement with the United States that will enable him to implement economic reforms, Iran will likely keep expanding its military capabilities.

Pezeshkian has also stated that he intends to continue Raisi’s policy of fostering closer ties with Russia and China. To soften Iran’s diplomatic isolation and improve its economic situation, Raisi pushed Iran to join the Shanghai Cooperation Council and BRICS+ earlier this year. He also signed a Chinese-sponsored agreement with Saudi Arabia to restore diplomatic relations and reduce tensions. Iran has also provided material support to Russia in its war with Ukraine and signed a free trade agreement with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). This strategy, however, did not deliver for the economy, which means that Pezeshkian will have to strike a balance in its foreign policy.

So, what are the chances that Pezeshkian will succeed in turning things around? While it is still too early to tell, it will not be an easy road. Pezeshkian will have to navigate a system where power is concentrated in the hands of the Supreme Leader, as well as a hardliner-dominated legislature that is deeply skeptical of his agenda. It is also no secret that Khamenei favored a hardliner like Jalili for president, so Pezeshkian is starting at a disadvantage in terms of how much he can maneuver. This antagonism could also curtail Pezeshkian’s foreign policy ambitions. During the elections, Khamenei issued a thinly veiled warning to Pezeshkian, saying that anyone who “thinks that all ways to progress pass through America” should not be supported. While this can be interpreted to mean that the moderates should not expect too much support for any resumption of talks, it could also be seen as advice that Pezeshkian should temper expectations. 

Considering Trump’s actions during his first term in office, this is understandable. While Biden unofficially declared the JCPOA dead in 2022, there has been progress in fostering closer ties. For example, in September 2023, Iran released five Americans as part of a prisoner exchange that saw Iran gain limited access to $6 billion in frozen funds. Trump’s re-election is a scenario that Tehran is treating as a foregone conclusion. During the election, hardliners argued that a strong response would counter Trump due to Iran’s ability to utilize its network of regional proxies to attack the United States’ Middle Eastern allies as well as American military infrastructure in the region. Pezeshkian and other reformists have argued that in order to manage Trump’s unpredictability, a more conciliatory strategy is needed.

Whatever his limitations as a reformer, Pezeshkian’s election is a step in the right direction. Expectations about what he can accomplish, however, should be realistic. He has limited powers and must operate in a system where influence is split between multiple actors whose interests will clash with his own. He will also have to plan for how to deal with a United States whose own foreign policy direction could drastically change in the next few months. 

Joe Boueiz is an independent analyst focused on international relations in the Middle East. He is a former Middle East Intern at the Center for the National Interest and a graduate of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs. Follow him on LinkedIn.

Image: Khamenei.ir.

Is the Chinese Navy building a new class of submarines?

It is quite likely, at least according to some new satellite imagery.

With the potential of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific increasingly likely in the coming years, submarines are expected to play an important role to the fighting.

Tom Shugart, an open-source defense analyst and former submariner, published a series of satellite imagery on his X (formerly Twitter) account showing what is very likely a new class of Chinese submarine under construction.

“Imagery update: looking back at some commercial imagery at Wuchang Shipyard (one of China's conventional submarine builders), if I'm not mistaken I believe there may be a new class of Chinese submarine out there,” Shugart wrote on X.

I recently acquired this interesting image of the shipyard from 26 April 2024.

On the left, you can see what appears to be a freshly-launched Hangor II-class submarine, the 1st of 8 being built for Pakistan.

You can also see the other, possibly new class of boat. pic.twitter.com/txZO8m8fDe

— Tom Shugart (@tshugart3) July 28, 2024

“I recently acquired this interesting image of the shipyard from 26 April 2024. On the left, you can see what appears to be a freshly-launched Hangor II-class submarine, the 1st of 8 being built for Pakistan. You can also see the other, possibly new class of boat,” Shugart stated.

According to U.S. military intelligence estimates, the Chinese Navy has about 45 diesel-powered electric submarines; around half of them belong to Yuan class (Type 039A/B) and have the ability to launch cruise missiles.

But based on Shugart’s analysis of satellite imagery provided by the global imaging company Planet Labs, the Chinese Navy might very well be working on a new type of vessel.

“The ID of the Hangor-II is based on separate reporting of its launch in late Apr, matching nicely with what we see. Comparing the Hangor with images of earlier 039A class boats—and the new boat—the difference is plain to see. The new boat appears substantially longer,” the naval defense analyst said.

A new Chinese submarine could force the U.S. Navy to adjust its posture in the Indo-Pacific, as well as its strategy.

“Looking at multiple images of it, also appears to have an X-stern, a feature not seen before on any Chinese submarine,” Shugart added.

“Measuring to the X-stern, what we can see of the new boat is over 80m long, compared to ~77m overall for the 039A. I'm guessing it's around 83-85m overall,” the former submariner wrote.

An X-stern refers to the configuration of the rudder of the submarine from the traditional cross-shaped design to an “X” one. Among other things, the X-stern design offers better maneuverability and a reduced noise signature, both important traits for the survival and effectiveness of a submarine at war. To be sure, there are benefits to the traditional cross-shaped design, but advances in technology have made the X-stern more viable. The U.S. Navy’s upcoming Columbia-class nuclear submarine will sport an X-stern.

Open source intelligence is becoming increasingly important to military and intelligence officials. Indeed, the U.S. Intelligence Community regularly incorporates open-source collection in its intelligence products to accompany covert collection.

Chinese Submarine Force

The People’s Liberation Army Navy, as is the official name of the Chinese Navy, can field about 61 submarines of all types.

Specifically, Beijing has 45 attack submarines—the aforementioned diesel-powered Yuan vessels—9 nuclear attack submarines, and 7 nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The Lockheed F-104 Starfighter, developed by the legendary Skunk Works under Clarence “Kelly” Johnson, was a groundbreaking aircraft known for its Mach 2 speed and sleek design. Introduced in 1958, it served in the Vietnam War and multiple international air forces.

-Despite its advanced capabilities, the F-104 was plagued by high accident rates, earning nicknames like "Widowmaker."

-It was retired by the U.S. Air Force in 1969 but continued to fly in countries like Germany, Italy, and Pakistan, where it achieved its first air-to-air kill. Today, the F-104 is remembered for its historical significance and controversial service record.

The Lockheed F-104 Starfighter came from a veritable blueblood of an aircraft family. That being Clarence “Kelly” Johnson and his legendary “Skunk Works” program. Among the many fabulous creations spewing from Mr. Johnson’s Skunk Works was the SR-71 Blackbird – still the world’s fastest air-breathing aircraft – and the WWII P-38 Lightning, which was used by America’s “ace of aces,” Major Richard Ira Bong, to score all 40 of his air-to-air kills. 

With a pedigree like that, you’d think the F-104, aka “the rocket with a man in it,” would have equally high-flying (bad pun intended) levels of success. But it didn’t quite work out that way.

The Starfighter made her maiden flight on March 4, 1954, and officially entered service on February 20, 1958. A total of 2,578 planes were built.

Though it didn’t totally live up to expectations, the F-104 still made history. It was the first operational aircraft to sustain Mach 2 speed (1,534 miles per hour/2,469 kilometers per hour) in flight. 

During the Vietnam War, the Starfighter served the U.S. fairly well from April 1965 to July 1967.  It flew a total of 5,000 sorties during the conflict, and North Vietnam’s pilots never challenged one in combat. Not all of the birds stayed in the air, however, 14 F-104Cs were lost in Southeast Asia – six to groundfire, four to non-combat causes, three to Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, and one to a Chinese Shenyang J-6 fighter while suffering a navigation systems failure near China’s Hainan Island. 

The Starfighters’ primary mission was escorting Lockheed EC-130 motherships carrying drones and the “Big Eye” early warning (radar-equipped) planes. The latter provided surveillance support to U.S. aircraft over North Vietnam. Starfighter pilots also conducted strike and close-air-support missions in North and South Vietnam, as well as Operation Iron Hand missions to destroy North Vietnamese SAM sites.

However, the F-104 suffered from short-range, obsolete avionics, high landing speed, and until late 1967, an unreliable engine. All of these factors served to stunt the plane’s long-term growth potential. Besides the aforementioned “rocket with a man in it” label, as well as the nicknames of “Zipper” or “Zip,” the F-104 was also dubbed with the far more tragic sobriquets of “flying coffin” and “Widowmaker.” This was due to the fact that it suffered over 30 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. As noted by Robert Farley, “Over 50% of F-104s in Canadian service were lost in crashes, over 30% in German.” The active-duty component of the U.S. Air Force would retire the bird in 1969, and the Air National Guard followed suit in 1975.

Despite the morbid reputation of this so-called “flying coffin,” it continued to serve in multiple foreign countries’ air forces well after the U.S.-owned Starfighters were retired, including NATO allies Canada, Germany, Turkey, the Netherlands, and Italy. For good measure, the “Zip” was also chosen by non-NATO allies such as Japan and Pakistan.

Regarding the post-WWII Luftwaffe in particular, the official Lockheed Martin website notes that upon joining NATO on May 9, 1955, then-West Germany needed a viable replacement for the outdated jet fighters on loan from the U.S. and Canada. “After German officials witnessed the flight of an aircraft already in production – the sleek, yet durable, Lockheed F-104 Starfighter – they instantly knew they had found the ideal plane.”

In fairness to the plane’s deathtrap reputation, “Lockheed would then launch specialized training programs funded entirely by the company to familiarize inexperienced German pilots with their new planes, drastically reducing the number of in-flight accidents.” 

The Italians, for their part, kept their “Zippers” in service until 2005. But it was a non-Western nation, Pakistan, that notched the F-104’s first air-to-air kill. During the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, on September 6, 1965, Pakistani Air Force Flight Lieutenant Aftab Alam Khan shot down an Indian Air Force Dassault Mystère IV and damaged another. 

Stateside, military aviation museum buffs who wish to see a Starfighter in-person have a variety of venues to choose from. Exhibits include the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum in Washington, DC, and the Wings Over the Rockies Museum in Denver, Colorado. Additional surviving aircraft are preserved at museums and airfields scattered across 17 different foreign countries.

Crew: 1

Engine: General Electric J-79-7A turbojet with 15,500 pounds of thrust

Wingspan: 21 feet, 9 inches

Length: 54 feet, 8 inches

Max. weight: 27,853 pounds

Max. speed: Mach 2.2

Combat radius with two wing tanks: 294 nautical miles

Operating altitude: 58,000 feet

Armament: One M61A1 Vulcan 20mm cannon; two to four AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles

Bomb load: Two 750-pound bombs or rocket pods

Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon).  

Main image is from Shutterstock. All others are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The Mirage 2000, introduced by Dassault in 1978, was designed as a lightweight replacement for the Mirage III. Known for its delta-wing design, the Mirage 2000 offered exceptional maneuverability and speed, capable of exceeding Mach 2.

-Featuring advanced aerodynamics, fly-by-wire controls, and an SNECMA M53 afterburning turbofan engine, the jet became renowned for its performance.

-Entering service in 1984, it saw action in the Gulf War, Bosnian War, and Kosovo War. Widely exported to countries like India, UAE, and Taiwan, the Mirage 2000 remains a significant achievement in military aviation, blending affordability with impressive capabilities.

French aerospace manufacturer Dassault is perhaps best known for the delta-wing Rafale fighter. But the Rafale was not Dassault’s first delta-winged fighter. Flying first in 1978 was the Mirage 2000, which would be produced for 30 years and flown by air forces around the world.

The Mirage 2000 was designed as a lightweight fighter replacement for the Mirage III, which the French Air Force used in the 1960s and 1970s. (The Mirage III is still in use today with the Pakistani Air Force.) Production of the Mirage 2000 occurred at three different sites. The wings were built at Martignas, while the fuselages were built at Argenteuil. Final assembly was overseen at the Bordeaux-Merignac Airport.

The Mirage 2000’s debut flight in 1978 took place just 27 months after the program was given a green light. Piloting the first flight was Jean Coureau, who took the jet to Mach 1.02 without afterburner, climbed to 12,000 meters, and then accelerated to Mach 1.3. After 65 minutes aloft, Coureau returned the aircraft safely to Earth. 

Later, the Mirage 2000 would show itself capable of surpassing Mach 2 while still retaining the ability to perform well at low speed. The jet could maintain a 25-degree angle of attack, or 30 degrees with fuel and ordnance.

When the Mirage 2000 rolled off the assembly line, it featured a delta-wing construction. Specifically, the jet had low-set, thin wings with a leading edge swept back at 58 degrees and a trailing-edge forward sweep of 3.5 degrees. The wing’s flight surfaces were composed of four elevons and four leading edge slats. 

One benefit of the delta-wing design was a comparatively large wing area, which reduced wing loading. The Mirage 2000’s wing area was about 41 meters squared, creating a wing loading of about 77 pounds per square foot at a takeoff weight of 33,000 pounds. The result was a highly maneuverable aircraft, exceeding the maneuverability of the F-15 and the similarly sized F-16, which had a wing loading of 110 pounds per square foot.

Another benefit of the Mirage 2000’s delta wing was the blending of wing root and engine, which allowed the jet to carry more fuel. The jet’s internal fuel tanks could carry over 900 gallons of fuel – about 200 gallons more than the Mirage III. 

The delta wing also allowed for low drag, low radar cross section, high-speed aerodynamics, and a simple design.

An airbrake was fitted above and below each of the wings, while a distinctly tall tailfin helped increase stability. The jet was designed with a degree of relaxed stability, with the center of gravity placed ahead of the center of pressure. This, again, enhanced maneuverability. The Mirage 2000 relied on fly-by-wire controls and four analog computers to help maintain stable flight – a necessity given the shortcomings of the delta wing at low speed.

The Mirage 2000 ran on an SNECMA M53 afterburning turbofan engine, a single-shaft engine of modular construction that was relatively light and simple. The M53 featured three low-pressure compressor stages, five high-pressure stages, and two turbine stages. The engine was rated for 21,000 pounds of thrust with afterburners engaged.

The jet was equipped with two built-in DEGA 554 autocannons, a 30mm revolver-type cannon with 125 rounds each. The cannons could be configured to fire at either 1,200 or 1,800 rounds per minute.

The Mirage 2000 entered service with the French Air Force in 1984. The jet was deployed during the Gulf War, flying high-altitude air defense for U.S. Air Force U-2 spy planes. The Mirage 2000 would later support NATO forces during the Bosnian War and Kosovo War. One Mirage 2000 was shot down over Bosnia; the pilots were captured and later released after mediation.

The French found an eager export market for the Mirage 2000. The jet was exported to India, the United Arab Emirates, Taiwan, Greece, Egypt, Brazil, Qatar, and Peru. 

In all, the Mirage 2000 was a relatively cheap and small fighter with respectable performance. Granted, peer aircraft overshadowed the Mirage 2000, and it has come to be associated with developing-world air forces.  

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s two-part presidential elections on June 28 and July 5 resulted in the lowest turnout on record since the 1979 revolution, a testament to the tanking legitimacy and popularity of the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism, antisemitism, and Holocaust denial. The majority of Iranian voters protested what they dubbed as “Circus Elections,” ahead of which the Guardian Council had banned seventy-four candidates from running. Although media outlets have described the ultimate winner, Masoud Pezeshkian, who was sworn in earlier today, as a “reformist,” many Iran watchers warn against being fooled by his political label.

Pezeshkian’s interactions with and statements about the Iranian regime’s terrorist proxies across the Middle East offer a more accurate picture of his worldview. Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Tehran’s Lebanese proxy Hezbollah, was one of the first to congratulate Pezeshkian, stating: 

We, in Hezbollah and in resistance movements in the region, consider the patronage of the Islamic Republic as strong, stable, and eternal. We will accompany your government on the path to the realization of final victory, which will be based on a strong and powerful Iran.

In his response to Nasrallah, Pezeshkian pledged the regime’s support for Hezbollah, writing: 

The Islamic Republic of Iran has always supported the resistance of the people in the region against the illegitimate Zionist regime. Supporting the resistance is rooted in the fundamental policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the ideals of the late Imam Khomeini, and the guidance of the Supreme Leader, and will continue with strength.

Similarly, Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas’s political bureau, expressed his gratitude to Pezeshkian during a phone call: “We appreciate Iran for playing a role in supporting the Palestinian cause, and we demand more political and diplomatic efforts to bring an end to Israel’s aggression.” Earlier, Pezeshkian had pledged his “comprehensive support” to Hamas “until all their aspirations and rights are realized and Al-Quds (Jerusalem) is liberated.”

As a politician, Pezeshkian has firmly abided by this basic Iranian-regime tenet, consistently expressing anti-Israel views. For example, in December 2023, while serving as a member of parliament, he stated: “Zionists are murderers, Zionists attacked the maternal land of Palestinians and trampled on the basic rights of the people of this land.”

He added:

In addition to encroachment and occupation of this land from more than half a century ago until today, the Zionists, using false pretenses, have bombarded the people of Palestine, have carried out many crimes against them, and have trampled on all international laws regarding such issues and have not shown any mercy to women, children, the young and the old.

Pezeshkian also justified Hamas’s murderous attack on Israel on October 7: 

When a people [ie. Gazans] are under siege and are, in a way, imprisoned and are not allowed any movement, eventually, they will react. No one can stay in prison until the end of their life. The Palestinian nation carried out the Al-Aqsa operation because of sanctions, siege, cruelty, and oppression. The people of Palestine want their lives and freedom.

Pezeshkian also publicly supported the Islamic Republic’s massive drone and missile attack against Israel on the night of April 13. He described the attack as a “source of pride:” 

The world did not imagine that the armed forces of the Islamic Republic could even throw a stone in their [Israel’s] direction, and in the operation, all the world’s missile powers came to Israel’s help, but ultimately, Iran’s drones and missiles hit their targets and their grandeur collapsed.

Although the new Iranian president has been echoing regime hardliners in embracing terrorism against the Jewish State, he also has diverged from them in other areas of foreign policy. During his presidential campaign, he called for the Islamic Republic’s return to the nuclear deal. He has also claimed to desire an improvement in relations with the United States and the European Union.

During Pezeshkian’s election campaign, the issue of supporting Palestinians against Israel was raised mostly by Shamsollah Alvaezin, the head of his campaign. In an interview with the regime’s Ofogh TV on June 16, 2024, Alvaezin stated that for years, the issue of Palestine has been one of Pezeshkian’s concerns. “In case of victory [in the elections], special expert groups regarding Palestine will be formed and the issue of Palestine will receive special attention from the region’s countries [the Middle East] and Islamic countries.” Alvaezin added that as president, Pezeshkian plans to support the Palestinians by joining South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice.

Statements by Pezeshkian and his inner circle show that despite potential outreach to the European Union and the United States, Tehran’s support for terror groups targeting Israel and Jews worldwide will likely continue unabated. Pezeshkian calls himself a reformist, yet neither he nor his boss, Khamenei, have any intention of “reforming” the regime’s sponsorship of terrorism, antisemitism, and Holocaust denial. It would be prudent for the international community to remember that when dealing with the new Iranian president and not be fooled by the misleading “reformist” label.

Meir Javedanfar is an Iranian-Israeli lecturer, author, and commentator. He has been teaching Iranian politics at Reichman University in Israel since 2012 and is the Anti-Defamation League’s Advisor on Iranian Affairs. Follow him on X @MeirJa.

Aykan Erdemir is ADL’s Director of Global Research and Diplomatic Affairs. Follow him on X @aykan_erdemir.

Image: Khamenei.ir.

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy requires a robust fleet of advanced attack submarines, such as the Virginia-class Block V, to effectively project power and counter threats from rivals like China, Russia, and Iran.

-These submarines can operate in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environments, carrying out long-range missile strikes and supporting Special Forces operations. However, budget constraints and a struggling industrial base have limited the Navy's ability to build these vital platforms.

-Despite recognizing the need for more submarines, the Navy has reduced its procurement, jeopardizing its strategic capabilities in contested regions. Enhanced production of these submarines is crucial for maintaining U.S. naval superiority.

The U.S. Navy requires a large fleet of advanced attack submarines if it is to project power. This is because rivals such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea –  and even non-state threats like the Yemen-based Houthi rebels – are building anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) defensive systems. These are designed to prevent traditional U.S. power projection platforms such as the aircraft carrier from approaching contested territories, thereby negating the U.S. military’s ability to deter these rivals. 

With only a handful of the expensive and complex Seawolf-class attack submarines on hand, the Navy has come to rely on the newer Virginia-class Block V submarines. 

These systems, costing $4.3 billion per unit to build, are considered more affordable than the Seawolf and just as advanced. 

The Navy had been building an average of two Virginia-class subs per year. But, much to the shock of many defense experts, the Navy canceled one of the Virginia-class submarines from its requests for Fiscal Year 2025, citing a “struggling industrial base and stifled procurement funding stemming under Congressional spending caps.” 

Not to worry, though, the Navy continues blowing its budget on the $13 billion Ford-class aircraft carrier, which is likely to be kept out of any fight with China out of fear of what Beijing’s A2/AD capabilities could do to it. 

The Navy has been explicit about its need to expand the attack submarine fleet, but it has consistently failed to accomplish this worthy goal. Considering steady advances in China’s A2/AD systems, and the aforementioned “struggling industrial base” here in America, the Navy needs to start moving much faster toward the goal. Otherwise its ability to project power will be seriously diminished. 

The Virginia-class Block V submarine allows the Navy to project power deep inside an enemy’s A2/AD bubbles. It is likely the best U.S. Navy attack submarine ever built to date. 

These submarines can carry out devastating missile strikes at long range. Because they possess what many experts refer to as acoustic dominance, they can evade detection far better than any other submersible platform. 

Meanwhile, the Block V Virginia class’ fly-by-wire control system allows the ships to operate more safely in shallower waters. The South China Sea and Taiwan Strait are considered far shallower than other locations U.S. submarines operate, making the fly-by-wire system key to ensuring safe operations while the submarines maneuver in those contested regions. 

This class of submarine can carry up to 37 torpedo-sized weapons. The Block V has an expanded vertical launch system that can accommodate 28 projectiles, namely the Tomahawk cruise missile. The new Tomahawks being outfitted to the Block V possess an anti-ship missile capability, as well as their traditional land-attack mode. 

Lastly, the submarine has a reconfigurable torpedo room that can substitute as a preparation area for large U.S. Special Forces teams. These commandos can store themselves and their equipment in this part of the submarine. Once the submarine reaches its destination, the operators can stealthily maneuver themselves off the vessel and move toward their targets. 

Virginia-class Block Vs are designed for more efficient combat operations in littoral waters. In other words, these subs can get close to the enemy and blitz the bejesus out of them in ways that aircraft carriers and their attendant air wings will be unable to do if A2/AD systems are present and effective. The Virginia class was meant to wage war on China. Yet the Navy continues to shortchange itself by refusing to build sufficient numbers of these systems. 

Inevitably, the Navy will realize how essential this submarine is to win the next war. Sadly, it doesn’t seem like anyone in Washington cares or understands what’s happening to the U.S. Navy.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. military's reliance on traditional aircraft carriers is becoming increasingly problematic in the age of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems. Submarines, such as the Virginia-class, offer a more viable alternative for power projection.

-However, the Navy lacks a sufficient number of these submarines, hampered by budget constraints and a weak defense industrial base. Additionally, emerging technologies like unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), AI-driven detection systems, and advanced satellite tracking could soon make manned submarines obsolete.

-Despite these threats, submarines remain crucial for U.S. naval strategy, especially in potential conflicts with near-peer rivals like China over Taiwan.

The face of warfare may be changing but its basic principles remain timeless. Yet, failure to adapt to the changing nature of conflict could lead to defeat. The United States military has become complacent since the end of the Cold War. It has clung onto the tactics and equipment of the previous era of warfare for too long. The aircraft carrier is quickly becoming an obsolete system in the age of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD). Until A2/AD can be overcome, the flat tops will be increasingly useless. 

An alternative form of power projection is the submarine. The United States Navy lacks a sufficient number of submarines to sustain itself in a protracted conflict with a near-peer rival, such as China. Its defense industrial base, meanwhile, is sclerotic at best. Still, investments have been made to build new submarines. The Virginia-class submarine is one of the best, new classes of submarines in the US Navy fleet. Sadly, because of budgetary constraints and the limitations of America’s weak defense industrial base, there are not enough Virginia-class submarines available for when a great power conflict erupts. 

For all the concerns from submarine advocates like me about the Navy not prioritizing this essential power projection platform enough, there is a chance that, like its aircraft carrier cousins, the submarine may become obsolete soon. That’s because of the rise of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV). While unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) get all the spotlight from the press, UUVs are increasingly prevalent in the maritime domain. What’s more, they are an evolving threat against which there is little defense. 

As time progresses, the major countries of the world will expand the capabilities of their respective UUV arsenals. UUVs are maneuverable, hard to track, and can be deployed in ways that make it nearly impossible for larger manned vessels to evade their destructive capabilities. 

It gets scarier for submarines when that UUV threat is married to rising artificial intelligence capabilities as well as to a growing coterie of advanced detection satellites, such as China’s Project Guanlan (which means “watching the big waves”), which uses sophisticated, multi-colored lasers to track the movement of submarines when they are underwater by monitoring movement of waves.

Many fear that the eerie green laser show over Hawaii that a Japanese research team recorded on January 28, 2023, was one of these laser submarine tracking satellites on display. As for artificial intelligence, a US, AI-driven satellite made history as it was able to identify and track hundreds of “dark vessels” just based on information that various satellites collected on the Earth’s oceans. The same techniques can be applied by an advanced military, such as America’s or China’s, to hunt and kill US submarines. 

One study found that the entire concept of manned submarines would be obsolete by 2050, given the technological advances mentioned above. Of course, one can never know what the future will hold. 

What is certain is that, in the remainder of the 2020s, there is a great power war brewing. The United States is not in the most advantageous strategic position. Submarines today are highly important and may prove to be decisive in any great power conflict—especially with China over Taiwan.

Still, submarine enthusiasts like me must be aware of the dangers of letting drone technology developments, or the enhancements of artificial intelligence and spy satellites dissuade US war planners away from using submarines as they should be used in combat. Whatever machine apocalypse may be on the horizon, it is not yet here. Until UUVs, AIs, and laser satellite tracking of subs is a reliable feature, American submariners should not expect to be kept out of fighting. 

Until that day, however, US submarines should stay in the fight.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and Shutterstock.