Ideas on Europe Blog

The return of a majority Conservative government following the May 2015 general election in the UK has made the Conservative Party’s plans for reforming human rights law in the United Kingdom a likely prospect. It is recalled that on 3 October 2014, the Conservative Party published a policy document that sets out its proposal to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and replace it with a British Bill of Rights.

In addition, the policy document raises the prospect that the UK might withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) though this is less clearly formulated. It expresses a general desire for the UK to remain part of the ECHR, but only if ‘the Council [of Europe] will recognise these changes to our Human Rights laws’. It contains the warning that in ‘the event that we are unable to reach that agreement, the UK would be left with no alternative but to withdraw from the ECHR, at the point at which our Bill comes into effect’.

The Conservative Party’s election manifesto repeats the party’s intention to ‘scrap’ the HRA and replace it with a British Bill of Rights. It also promises to ‘curtail the role of the European Court of Human Rights’ but, in contrast to the policy document from October 2014, does not mention withdrawal from the ECHR, so that one must presume that this is not a manifesto commitment.

These plans raise a host of legal questions, some of which were discussed at a workshop held at Edinburgh Law School in February, which had received the support of a UACES Small Events Grant.[1] The product is a policy paper. The following are its key findings.

It is axiomatic that the HRA can be repealed by Act of Parliament. However, any attempt to repeal and/or replace it would need to take into account the devolution settlement. The legal situation in this respect is not obvious.  Repeal of the HRA might trigger the Sewel Convention so that the devolved legislatures might need to be asked for their consent. Depending on timing, at the point at which an Act repealing the HRA is passed, the Convention may be enshrined in statute following the recommendations of the Smith Commission. This might make a repeal if not legally impossible then politically very difficult. For instance, the Scottish government seems opposed to a repeal. As regards Northern Ireland, a repeal would at present run counter to the UK’s international treaty obligations under the British-Irish Agreement, which was incorporated in, and agreed as part of the UK-Ireland obligations under the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. The Agreement places the UK under an international treaty obligation to ‘complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the ECHR’.

If the HRA is replaced by a British Bill of Rights it might require the consent of the devolved legislatures. In substantive terms, it would provide Parliament with the opportunity to provide for the protection of additional (non-Convention) rights. Having said that, the political dynamic surrounding the possible repeal of the HRA suggests that rights protected will be curtailed rather than expanded. Moreover, it would also allow Parliament to introduce certain procedural changes, such as no longer making it mandatory for courts ‘to take into account’ the case law of the ECtHR or to read legislation ‘as far as it is possible to do so’ compatibly with Convention rights.

In the unlikely event that the HRA were not replaced (or if a replacement leaves significant gaps in the human rights protection), individuals would still be able to rely on common law remedies, as far as they exist, as well as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in cases in which the UK has acted within the scope of EU law. Given that the Charter is based on the ECHR, in some areas a repeal of the HRA might not lead to the desired result.  Moreover, if the UK remains a party to the ECHR the right to lodge a complaint with the ECtHR would still exist.

Withdrawal from the ECHR is technically possible with six months’ notice.  It would, however, have wider consequences for the UK’s other international commitments in that long-term membership of the Council of Europe may become impossible and a withdrawal from the ECHR may be incompatible with the UK’s commitments as a member of the European Union. Importantly, it would not relieve the UK of the duty to comply with judgments already handed down by the ECtHR, for instance on prisoner voting. Moreover, the UK would also be setting a negative example internationally.

[1] The workshop consisted of presentations by Ed Bates, Christine Bell, Colm O’Cinneide, Fiona de Londras, Sir David Edward, Alan Greene, Paul Johnson, Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, and Tobias Lock.

The post The Legal Implications of a Repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 and Withdrawal from the ECHR appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Nobody can tackle IUU fishing alone: Will opportunities for global leadership be grasped?

IUU fishing activity detected by Google Earth Images

Those who doubted the potential of the European Union’s Council Regulation 1005/2008 (the IUU Regulation) to change the laissez faire culture that has been prevalent for too long in respect of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities inside and outside EU borders have had plenty of food for thought over the past four and a half years. In the time since the IUU Regulation came into force, the yellow card warning system, followed up on occasion by a trade-suspending red card, have seen a significant change in the administrative practices of a number of fish producing countries.  Most importantly, the IUU Regulation has placed IUU fishing high in the agendas of nations that had previously not been predisposed to delve into the issue.

True, the regime is not perfect and there is yet much work to do to make a true dent in the global IUU trade. IUU fishing practices continue to cause vast losses to the worldwide economy (Eur. 10 Bn, according to the European Directorate for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries – DG Mare- which is equivalent to 19% of the reported value of catches worldwide). In addition, the destructive and insidious nature of IUU operations cause important harm not only to fish stocks and the marine environment, but also undermines every seafood producing fleet that plays by the rules. The ungovernable nature of covert IUU activities means that administrations that are keen to ensure sustainable exploitation have their work systematically undermined by the covert, dishonest nature of unreported captures.

Millions of people depend on seafood for nutrition as well as work and income, not just in producing countries, but also through the processing, importation and distribution and retail of seafood products. Further, many of those involved in fisheries have close, even ancestral, cultural ties to the activity. In many regions of the world (including of course the EU) domestic fishery production cannot match internal demand, and imports from third countries have become a necessity.

What this means, of course, is that the conservation and sustainable management of fishery resources is a collective, thoroughly intertwined effort of many actors and of very diverse nationalities. Nobody can tackle IUU fishing alone, irrespective of how much they may want to.

Yet, not everyone wants to. Routine commercial narratives evidence attitudes where business as usual, and turning a blind eye to stock erosion and illegality creep, are rife. A good illustration of such attitudes was a recent comment made to the Thai press by the head from a national fishery association, asserting his view that the yellow card presented to Thailand over IUU fishing by the EU must have more to do with protectionism and political intervention rather than with the relevance of Thailand’s mismanagement of the considerable presence of IUU activity in their production chains (not to mention the serious mistreatment of people, including their trafficking and abuse, marring the Thai seafood industry). If a comment ever represented a lack of consciousness as well as conscience, then this is it.

The interviewee’s suggestion that Thailand should seek to export to the Middle East, rather than put in an effort to clean up its act is sadly representative of a type of viewpoint that prioritises short-term, entrenched approaches that are not only ultimately doomed to failure, but which also represent a real risk for all administrations working toward long term, rational and fair approaches to seafood production and trade.

It is clear that a sustained collective effort is needed in order to address and change such attitudes and get to the root of IUU activity. With this in mind, the Presidential Task Force on Combating IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud has recently presented its Action Plan for Implementing the Task Force Recommendations has caused some degree of concern at House of Ocean. Whilst much of what is contained here is ambitious and commendable, it is striking that no mention is made anywhere in the report with regard to trade measure compatibility with existing programmes and regimes. In particular, coordination with the EU is only mentioned in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) agreement, the negotiations of which are still ongoing. No mention is made anywhere in the Action Plan of the specific measures adopted by the EU to combat IUU fishing to date, nor those adopted by Regional Fishery Management Organisations since the onset of the 21st Century. Perhaps the Task Force is reluctant to admit that the US has lagged behind in the development of IUU-specific trade measures?

However, it now has a golden opportunity to seek convergence with existing regimes, to make a substantial contribution to their improvement and expansion, and to become a formidable co-architect and a leading engineer in the fight against IUU operations. To sacrifice such an important global role for the sake of more self-serving solutions may yet become a tragedy of similar proportions to the uncooperative disease that has for far too long affected our ocean commons.

Sources

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/publications/2015-04-tackling-iuu-fishing_en.pdf

http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/iuu/noaa_taskforce_report_final.pdf

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/EUs-motive-behind-yellow-card-queried-30259466.html

The post The US, the EU and IUU – Part 2 appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Not long ago, I presented a paper at a conference, an experience many of the writers and readers of the blogs hosted in this site have probably had at some point.

In my presentation, I defended the main argument of my thesis: that Western European states promote international human rights law insofar as it fits in their idea of international order, not because they believe in human rights as a matter of justice. In this sense, I claimed that representatives of the English School of International Relations of the 1960s and 70s (so-called pluralists) were right when they argued that order is the main driver of the international society.

In her turn, one of my co-panellists made the argument that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is best explained by classical realism, that is, by the idea that the incorrigible human nature predisposes national leaders to mistrust each other, and that countries are forced to maximise their relative power as a result of the anarchic condition of the international system (please, excuse my simplicity). Not that it necessarily matters, but for the sake of full disclosure, she was a Ukrainian citizen.

There was a cocktail at the end of a day full of methods, theories, slides, metaphors, arguments and counterarguments. The Ukrainian co-panellist and I started to exchange some ideas while a thoughtful waiter made sure our glasses were sufficiently wet. As a good classical realist, she believed international law does not matter much. My view, on the other hand, had to be different, since part of my argument is built on the principle of pacta sunt servanda, “promises must kept”.

At some point, one professor from the hosting university got close to us. He wanted to make us feel welcome, which was very nice of him. He asked about the conversation topic, so we summarised our disagreement and explained that she located her argument in classical realism and I located mine (partly) in the first wave of the English School.

He smiled: “You two are quite retro, aren’t you?!”

He left pretty much right away, and we kept talking until the nice waiter decided to carry on with his life and the wine evaporated totally, a clear sign that it was time to leave.

But the professor’s comment did not leave me. I must admit I found it quite funny. And I still do. In fact, I think he picked the right word.

I hereby assert my right to be retro.

I wonder if you feel the way I do, dear reader (if you have got this far! Thanks, by the way), but I feel the pressure to follow a certain academic fashion, either because you are supposed to choose trendy topics, as if your PhD could fit in a tweet, or because you are encouraged to combine mixed methods, or, above all, because impact must drive your research.

I have no problem with any of the above, particularly with the idea of impact, if by it we mean that Academia should try to provide answers to the questions and dilemmas of the world today.

However, it sometimes feels as if that’s all there is in campus nowadays. Theoretical and interpretivist approaches would not be for this time. They were overtaken in the behaviouralist turn of the 1970s, and were left one lap behind by the post-modern, constructivist and critical turns of the 80s and 90s. Previous stuff is retro, not good for the quick and flashy taste of present times.

Well, I just refuse to accept that the interpretivism of classical realists or indeed of English School has been outpaced by other approaches in International Relations.

In university, if I have to choose, I’d rather be retro than sexy.

The post Retro, not sexy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

May 1975: Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannian and ECC Commissioner for external affaires Christopher Soames.

These days, the People’s Republic of China and the European Union celebrate the 40th anniversary of their diplomatic relationship. At the age of 40 one might assume that this relationship has indeed ‘grown up’ by now.

But has it, really?

Here are three indicators supporting this view and three against it:

FOR: China established diplomatic relations in 1975 with the – back then – European Economic Community at a time that is commonly dubbed “Eurosclerosis”, with European integration stalling and a Community that was far from establishing a common foreign policy. The move thus underlines the strategic importance for global politics that China has seen in the European integration project from the very beginning, and even during an era that was clearly dominated by only two Cold War superpowers.

AGAINST: Times have changed, notably the old bipolar
world has come to an end. But even if we believe theories
of a multipolar configuration, there are still doubts
whether the now much more mature European Union,
which even has a face to show to the world, can be considered
one of these “poles” or even an actor in global politics, with
institutional crisis having become a permanent feature
and 28 members attached to their individual prerogatives.

FOR: The trade relationship between China and the EU
is still the largest in the world. For several years now,
China is Europe’s No. 2 partner and Europe is China’s
No. 1 partner. Goods and services of over 1 bn EUR
per day are exchanged between the two economic giants.
Initiatives such as the new investment treaty and
possibly a free trade agreement are likely to foster
EU-China trade further.

AGAINST: If TTIP comes, the US-EU trade relationship may
outperform the Sino-European one. The fact that Europe and
China could not even find common ground in terms of China’s
WTO-status (market economy or not) indicates the level of
difficulty to turn negotiations into concrete outcomes.
What is more, EU-China relations are still based on an agreement
of 1985 as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement failed.

FOR: Even if international relations are increasingly
dominated by business, investment and economics,
one cannot exclude politics. We’ve come a long way
over the last 40 years in terms of approaching each
other politically. Since 1998 China and the EU have
held annual summits. Politicians at all levels from
China and all member states and at EU-level constantly
meet each other. Chinese has become a popular
language to study and cities such as Beijing and Shanghai,
which host some of the finest universities worldwide,
have become attractive destinations for European
exchange students and vice versa.

AGAINST: Notwithstanding the exponential increase of
people-to-people exchange, a recent survey by the
EU-Asia Institute at ESSCA School of Management
and Oklahoma University has confirmed the negative
perceptions of Europeans towards China, notably the Chinese
government. It is noteworthy that strong trade relations do not
seem to help mitigate the situation: the Germans are among the
most skeptical Europeans vis-à-vis the Chinese.

This blogpost was published simultaneously on the website of the EU-Asia Institute and on Blogactiv.eu.

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When the European Council – the institution that sets the European Union’s agenda on broad, strategic issues[1] – published its Declaration on the Environment on December 3, 1988, climate change was mentioned briefly and in passing.[2] In 2009, the year of the United Nations climate summit in Copenhagen, the topic’s salience had risen dramatically. In that year, climate change made up more than 80% of the references to the environment in the European Council’s publicly-available Conclusions, and more than one-tenth of all references to policy issues.

This estimate of climate change’s increasingly important role is possible because of data compiled by the EU Policy Agendas Project. The project’s researchers have analyzed the European Council’s Conclusions sentence-by-sentence from 1975 to 2012 to identify which policy issues are discussed and when.[3] This information is available in a public dataset[4], which gave me an exciting opportunity to explore how much attention the Council has given to climate change in the last three decades. This post retraces how I mobilized the EU Policy Agendas Project data – and added to it – to explore patterns in the Council’s attention to climate change since 1988.

First, some context: in the EU Policy Agendas dataset, climate change is considered a subtopic of the broader “Environment” policy topic.  Between 1975 and 2012, the environment garnered an average of around 4% of the Council’s attention.[5] Overall, 32% of the references to the environment in the Council’s Conclusions are categorized as related to climate change. However, this average masks significant year-to-year changes. For example, in the six years from 1988 to 1993, climate change made up only 5% of the Council’s references to the environment. In contrast, from 2006 to 2011, climate change made up 74% of environmental references.

Figure 1. Council attention to the environment, by subtopic, 1975-2012 (1,679 total mentions). Source: Alexandrova et al., 2014.

Climate change: international negotiations and EU climate policy

Although the EU Policy Agendas dataset distinguishes between climate change and other environmental issues, it does not include analysis of the specific climate-related topics that the European Council discusses. Therefore, as a next step, I analyzed all mentions of climate change in the dataset and organized them into three overall categories: general statements about climate change, statements about the international climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and statements about European Union climate policy. Three examples of statements I placed in each category are given below in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Examples of European Council climate change-related statements in three categories: general climate change, international climate negotiations, and EU climate policy.

So which of these three categories gained the most attention? Overall, the international negotiations under the UNFCC garner almost 60% of the Council’s climate-related attention. The EU’s climate policies attract a further 25%, with 15% related to generic climate statements. Figure 4 below gives a historical perspective on these estimates (from 1997 to 2011). The first mention of climate change was in 1988 (not shown), but it did not become prominent on the Council’s agenda until after the international agreement on the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. This same pattern was repeated in relation to the 2009 Copenhagen Conference, explaining the large increase in references to the international negotiations during that year.

Figure 3. European Council attention to climate change topics by year. Author’s analysis based on Alexandrova et al., 2014.

Which EU climate policy?

Finally, I wanted to explore which specific climate policies the Council discusses. In its 132 references to internal EU policy over the period 1988-2011, the Council focused on general references to policy (39%), the EU’s targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (22%) and the EU Emissions Trading System (20%). Other policies received 5% or less of the Council’s attention.

Figure 4. European Council attention to EU climate change policies. Author’s analysis based on Alexandrova et al., 2014.

Conclusion

As I mentioned in the introduction, the data exploration presented above has a few limitations. I have looked at the basic share of attention to climate change, and have not attempted to explain why we see the patterns that we do. Although I did not have the time to do so, more detailed analysis could examine the reasons why these patterns of attention exist. I also limited the analysis to only the references that were coded as climate change-related in the EU Policy Agendas dataset. Some climate topics were categorized differently (for example, ‘the global carbon market’ was placed in the energy policy category[6]). A broader analysis could attempt to track Council attention to those climate-related issues that were categorized as a different policy topic.

What I have found is, however, quite interesting. Taken together, this analysis suggests that in the mid-2000s, climate change became the dominant environmental issue on the European Council agenda. Much of the Council’s attention focused on the international climate negotiations, but with increasing space for EU climate policies like the EU Emissions Trading System. Although the EU Agendas dataset stops in early 2012, climate change is still clearly on the Council’s agenda (as evidenced by the 23-24 October, 2014 Council Conclusions, where the EU’s 2030 climate and energy framework occupied more than half of the document). It remains to be seen whether climate change will continue to play this important role on the EU’s environmental policy agenda in the years to come.

[1] Peterson, John and Michael Shackleton. 2012. The institutions of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See pages 43-67.

[2] European Council Conclusions, 2-3 December 1988, Annex I

[3] Alexandrova, Petya, Marcello Carammia, & Arco Timmermans. 2012. Policy punctuations and issue diversity on the European Council agenda. Policy Studies Journal, 40(1), 69–88.

[4] Alexandrova, Petya, Marcello Carammia, Sebastiaan Princen, and Arco Timmermans. 2014. Measuring the European Council agenda: Introducing a new approach and dataset. European Union Politics, 15(1): 152-167.

[5] Alexandrova, Carammia, & Timmermans, 2012, pg. 75.

[6] “The strengthening and extension of global carbon markets” (March 9, 2007) was categorized under energy policy.

The post The rise of climate change on the European Union agenda: 1988-2011 appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

As many of the Member States of the European Union painstakingly, and in many cases painfully, deal with the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the Commission attempts to facilitate and aid their recovery in any way it can.[1] The latest attempt to do so is the establishment of the European Fund for Strategic investment (EFSI). Unfortunately this new creation did not receive the collective round of applause across Europe that one might have expected. Quite the contrary. The reason is rather suspicious accounting. The money, apparently, not only has to come from somewhere, but rather astonishingly, from education. In the wake of last year’s internecine institutional strife in which many, including the Commission, battled valiantly to ring-fence key chunks of the education budget (ironically delaying 2014 Jean Monnet applications until the Parliament had approved the MFF), education and its ancillary R&D and innovations budgets appear to have become a prime target for ambitious, but as-yet ambiguous plans by Commission President Juncker. Is this particularly wise? The result may ultimately transfer €2.7 billion from Horizon2020 (currently 3.5% of the overall 2013-2020 budget), to the new EFSI to take effect between 2015-2020, with the apparently bulletproof intention of creating jobs, and boosting economic growth but at a cost of hundreds of millions of Euros to universities across Europe.

 Sustained growth and new jobs are, indeed, a key precondition for the wellbeing of all Europeans. There’s no argument there.  As Commission Vice-President Jyrki Katainen, responsible for Jobs, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness pointed out, “we need fresh investments in Europe and for this we need to mobilise extra private finance.[2]” The approach however, seems recklessly short-termist. Achieving investment, monetary fluidity and commercial momentum is a huge part of sustained attention to the education sector. Sustained investment of education is also a first-class method of in-house job creation in an ever-developing sector ultimately gives Europe a hard-won edge over other regions of the world, many of whom still focus on manufacturing rather than innovation and research. Achieving such benefits at the expanse of world-class research, teaching and learning, which itself is a genuine catalyst of EU innovation and competitiveness however makes little sense.

 So, congratulations to Britain. At a time when the UK is convulsing over its national future and international vocation, the danger to education funding, set against the backdrop of European recovery was the prime concern for the single largest UK delegation of university Vice Chancellors who at the end of April travelled without delay to Brussels to voice their concerns. Among them was Sir Ian Diamond, principal and vice-chancellor of the University of Aberdeen, who argued that “excellence in research is being challenged in every way by these cuts.” Sir Leszek Borysiewicz, Vice-chancellor of the University of Cambridge, stated that the cuts would hit pure research in UK universities, who would then be unable to borrow money to replace lost funds despite the existence of a loan scheme designed for this purpose. “There are programmes in Horizon2020 focused on pure research that cannot get this money back,” he said, adding that “€2.7 billion is a lot to give up from a programme we know works”[3]. Similarly, Kurt Deketelaere, Secretary-General of the League of European Research Universities, was involved in a similar lobbying effort in Brussels. “I’m not sure it’s going to end well,” he said. While lawmakers in the European Parliament are inserting text into the legal proposal to ensure a greater link between the fund and research and innovation spending, the window for finding a compromise on budget cuts is closing according to Deketelaere.[4] 

The British backlash is not, in this sense, an isolated one. A variety of other institutions lent their voices to the Commission’s proposal. A joint statement was released by Science Europe, the European Association of Research and Technology Organisations (EARTO), the European University Association (EUA), the League of European Research Universities (LERU) and the Conference of European Schools for Advanced Engineering Education and Research (CESAR), stating that while they supported the Commission’s actions to boost economic growth and job creation through R&I investment, Horizon2020 remained “the only strategic European-level instrument supporting R&I activities” and actors. As the joint statement made clear: “Horizon2020, much like national R&I funds, is based on granting funds recognising that R&I actors such as universities, research performing organisations (RPOs) and research and technology organisations (RTOs) have specific business models requiring strong public support (that cannot primarily come from loans).[5] 

What informs the Commission’s perspective on this latest funding fracas? According to Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, “if Europe invests more, Europe will be more prosperous and create more jobs – it’s as simple as that.“[6] Thus, by re-allocating funds from Horizon2020 to the EFSI, Europe will “attract much more important sums that will then be reinvested in innovation,” thereby “delivering higher returns” utilising the same amount of money. Moreover, the Commission argues that “the overall amount of investment on innovation mobilised by the EU budget in the next years will be higher than with Horizon2020 only”. More importantly,  funding initially foreseen for Horizon2020 will allegedly not be lost, that is “not lost for innovation.”[7]  The arcane mysteries of bookkeeping aside, one can argue that ESFI-branded funding, according to the Juncker proposal will now be dispersed amongst different projects, which in real terms dilutes the funding designed to underwrite Horizon2020 projects.

ESFI and Horizon2020 simply do different things, and neither they, nor their funding structures can realistically reinforce each other. EFSI primarily aims at attracting private investors, while Horizon2020 funds mostly research undertaken by universities and research institutes and centres, many of which are publicly funded and work on a different “business model” than private companies. Even the briefest of glances at how universities do, or indeed ought to operate, makes this much clear. Therefore, regardless of the Commission’s enterprise-led discourse, projects undertaken by higher education institutions across Europe are likely to be negatively affected. Ironically, more astute research could have enlightened the commission on this point: a decent assessment regarding the impact of funds diverted from Horizon2020 would indicate which projects could potentially benefit from EFSI funding, and which (arguably the lion share) of projects must be ring-fenced within the original structures of Horizon2020.

Retrospective accounting is never popular. And infrequently effective.  The creation of new jobs may yield higher employment in the short-term, but it does not ensure that these new jobs will not be subsequently reduced or re-located elsewhere, or indeed that the commercial boost of the ESFI will not fall onto the presently fallow commercial ground of the Eurozone. Research is project-specific, dedicated, rarely fungible given its capital-intensive nature and largely conditioned exclusively to the institutional dynamic from which it first emerges, i.e. the presence of faculty-based facilities and higher-education expertise. Its purpose is not to underwrite a faltering Eurozone in raw funding from the bottom up but to boost the top-down ideas, projects, dynamics and outputs that are themselves the catalyst to enhanced productivity, jobs and competition.

What now? The usual standoff between ardent voices from a key sector attempting to persuade the Commission and key Member State governments to block the re-allocation of funds? Our hope lies, for now, in the European Parliament, where a considerable number of MEP currently oppose the idea of hollowing out Horizon2020 funding. We should remember that MEPs backed amendments safeguarding research funding for programmes like Horizon2020 being used for EFSI-supported projects. As MEP Van Brempt argued, “our researchers, our universities around the EU, need this money if we want to keep our future-oriented vision and to enhance the EU’s competitiveness and global strength.”[8] Last ditch hopes rest also with a motivated educational sector, and key voices being heard. Unfortunately, apart from the charge of last week, and some immediate media coverage, there has been virtually no public discussion or sustained media attention regarding the proposed changes.

Funding reallocations are hardly glamorous, admittedly. But a full-frontal assault on the funding structures underwriting innovation (much of it connected to sustaining Eurozone industry and commerce) is worthy of attention. Insights beget illumination, illumination sustains innovation. And innovation keeps things efficient and effective. Not tinkering with the most important hands-off budget in Europe. Universities have survived the storm necessitating corporate benchmarking and impact and knowledge exchange in bidding for funding; but hollowing out Horizon2020 and any related educational budgets risks substituting instrumental forms of performance for genuine progress.

 Sources

http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/meps-back-ringfencing-juncker-plan-money-single-vote-313766

http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/jobs-growth-investment/plan/docs/efsi_qa_en.pdf

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2128_en.htm

http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/uk-v-cs-lobby-in-brussels-on-eu-research-cuts/2019698.article

http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/v-cs-go-to-brussels-to-lobby-against-cuts/2019654.article

http://www.sciencebusiness.net/news/76989/Big-guns-of-UK-universities-lobby-against-research-cuts-in-Brussels

http://horizon2020projects.com/policy-research/commission-faces-juncker-plan-backlash-by-research-community/

http://horizon2020projects.com/policy-research/eit-and-erc-expected-to-lose-millions-in-juncker-investment-plan/

http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/press/frontpage/2014/14_124_en.htm

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2128_en.htm

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-32257724

[1] With profound thanks to CCCU Politics/IR Graduate Michal Gloznek. Having gradauted with distinction from Politics/IR here at CCCU in 2014, Michal is completing the first year of his MPhil in Latin American Studies at the Latin American Centre, School of Interdisciplinary Area Studies, St Antony’s College, Oxford.

[2] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2128_en.htm

[3] http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/uk-v-cs-lobby-in-brussels-on-eu-research-cuts/2019698.article

[4] http://www.sciencebusiness.net/news/76989/Big-guns-of-UK-universities-lobby-against-research-cuts-in-Brussels

[5] http://horizon2020projects.com/policy-research/commission-faces-juncker-plan-backlash-by-research-community/

[6] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2128_en.htm

[7] http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/jobs-growth-investment/plan/docs/efsi_qa_en.pdf

 [8] http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/meps-back-ringfencing-juncker-plan-money-single-vote-313766

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Talking about climate change should be made a priority. Around the world, there are public outcries about a scarcity of water, which is a basic subsistence that no one should be deprived from. Temperatures across the globe are rising, the number of available farmlands is shrinking, and in California there is a relentless draught. The western side of the country is feeling the effects of climate change full-on, leading many to debate if we are taking water for granted out here.

In this area, specifically, another drought a few years back melted the snowpack in upper Colorado, which resulted in shrinking the levels of water available regionally. The reservoir witnessed a grand scale of loss of water, and sadly the situation has never been any better. Across the border, Mexico is revolutionizing its approach to climate change: clean electricity, grid modernization, a greater promotion of more fuel efficient automobile fleets, weather forecasting and early alert systems, are all on their new agenda.

This new commitment aims to reduce the country’s gas emissions, black carbon pollutants by 2030. Mexico as a country is not responsible for plenty of gas emissions but nonetheless its drive towards combating it, was a positive and welcoming move about helping Earth’s atmosphere. These proposals were launched in co-operation with the United States, which brings me back to the climate change agenda here.

President Obama’s latest plan reveals that there is an ambition to cut 26-28percent of harmful gas emissions by 2025. This is a good slow step to recovery for the atmosphere, because although the percentages aren’t huge, they are still significant and a definite improvement. United States is presently leading the way for battling climate change. There is more wind power, solar power, a greater energy efficiency, clean energy, but there are still many areas that need to be worked upon, such as limiting the amount of harmful gas emissions powerplants should be permitted to carry on with.

Back home, there is a greater degree of transparency than can be found amongst all of the hopefuls in America: the EU and China have both committed to cutting greenhouse gas emissions on the chart, but any higher involvement will mean that the United Kingdom, for one, will be left with nothing to contribute here, as a great use of carbon offsets begin to take precedence across its borders. The Labour Party, right before going to elections, clearly highlighted tackling climate change as a priority, quite unlike the remaining parties – they seem to find the concept of tackling climate change obtrusive. Plenty of new generation capacities are being built in the United Kingdom for the future, and Labour has pointed out that it stands on the side of renewable energies and clean coal.

The decarbonisation of the power sector is one key policy point that should be addressed, and the discussion here should be about the long-term cost involved: do we employ low carbon-deployment soon enough at the expense of a hike in energy bills? Providing a cleaner infrastructure should be more affordable than it is at the present. Energy bills for consumers can be brought down by employing energy efficiency practices at home. This would also help reduce fuel poverty, the need to pay for replacement infrastructure, alongside reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and effectively tackling climate change, much better.

The post Climate Change: Low-Cost Battles appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In a surprise to nearly everyone, the Conservatives have won the UK’s 2015 General Election with a (small) overall majority. Following his audience with the Queen after the election, David Cameron reiterated his commitment to holding an in/out referendum on Britain’s EU membership. It seems therefore that we can now expect several years of negotiation, campaigning and debate on the UK’s future in the European Union.

Maduarte, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Renegotiation

Central to the Prime Minister’s pledge is the promised renegotiation of Britain’s terms of membership in the Union. He has stated previously that he wants to be able to recommend a vote to stay in the EU. However, to date we’ve had only hints of what the government hopes to achieve from a renegotiation.

Opting the UK out of the aim of ‘ever closer union’ and increasing the length of transitional controls for new Member States (such as temporarily limiting free movement with those states) have come up as possible demands. We’ll need the details of what the Prime Minister aims to accomplish from these negotiations in order to judge whether they are a success. The absence of clarity of course brings with it greater room for manoeuvre should talks with EU partners prove more difficult than hoped.

Referendum

The proposed timeline is as yet unclear, but negotiations would have to start soon. It is now mid-2015 and the Prime Minister has pledged that the referendum will take place by the end of 2017, leaving at most a year and a half to successfully complete a renegotiation and hold a campaign and vote. David Cameron might also hold the referendum early to capitalise on his electoral success and to head off any demands from within his party, further limiting the window to negotiate with other Member States and the EU institutions.

The specific details of the referendum will also have to be decided. An EU referendum bill will need to go through Parliament and, while the PM has a thin majority in the Commons, he has no majority in the Lords, potentially making agreement on the bill more difficult. Parliamentary process aside, this EU plebiscite will be only the third nationwide referendum to take place in the UK (the others being the EC membership referendum in 1975 and the Alternative Vote referendum in 2011).

The Scotland independence referendum can undoubtedly provide insights into the mechanics of holding such a vote. However, in some key respects, an EU referendum will be completely different. In the Scotland debate, many organisations and individuals remained neutral on the vote – this would not be the case here. The vast majority of the political establishment, the business community and civil society is very likely to come out strongly in support of continued EU membership. In this sense, the official landscape will be very lopsided. At the same time, UK public opinion on the EU is mixed, but it’s also consistently higher under the hypothetical that the government is successful in its renegotiation (a seemingly rare moment of trust in political leaders).

If Britain votes to leave

Should the UK electorate choose to leave the EU, a process of negotiation will have to begin with the EU institutions on behalf of the remaining Member States to agree Britain’s future relationship with the rest of the EU. The EU treaties (Article 50 TEU) now set out a procedure for a Member State to withdraw from the Union, giving some clarity in this respect. Negotiations can last up to two years and must be approved by a qualified majority of EU members and by the European Parliament. Unless talks are extended, after time elapses the UK would leave automatically, even if no deal is reached.

A plethora of matters would have to be discussed, including the UK’s future participation in the single market, which of course incorporates the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. In the current political context, free movement of persons would likely be a particularly challenging issue, affecting the rights both of EU citizens in the UK and of UK citizens in the EU. Britain’s role in every other EU programme, such as Erasmus, would all need to be agreed.

Such negotiations would be time-consuming, difficult and costly and require a great deal of expertise. Interestingly, the UK is scheduled to hold the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU during the second half of 2017. Britain may find itself at the same time chairing part of an organisation it is debating or has decided to leave.

In these circumstances, the question arises of whether a second referendum would be held to approve the UK’s new relationship with the EU. Alternatively, a vote might be held in Parliament to endorse the negotiated terms for the UK’s EU exit and whatever relationship might replace it. A second referendum would provide an opportunity for the electorate to confirm their support for the proposed alternative to membership.

If Britain votes to stay

If UK voters decide to stay in the EU, Britain’s membership would apparently continue much as before. Any provisions secured as part of the renegotiation would presumably take effect, giving Britain additional opt-outs or other special arrangements or indeed changing how the EU itself works.

A renegotiation could range from modest to radical, depending on the appetite of the rest of the EU to compromise. If the result falls short of dramatic change, it is unlikely to be from a lack of desire on the part of the UK government. It would be extremely ambitious to expect full treaty change under the above timescale. A more likely scenario is an agreement on principles and a commitment to include them in future treaty reform where necessary (some points might be achievable within the current treaties).

Britain is not unused to confrontation on Europe. Nevertheless, this chapter in its relationship with the EU could prove particularly high stakes. Possible outcomes include a more sustainable EU membership, a more distanced relationship with the EU or a situation not dissimilar to the status quo. The EU referendum result could have constitutional implications as well, at a time when the UK’s constitutional future is the subject of ongoing debate.

The shape of Britain’s future relationship with the EU will have a profound impact on its economy and its place in the world. The consequences of this debate will be numerous, and many will only become apparent over time.

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Shortened link: britainseurope.uk/20150512

How to cite this article:

Salamone, A (2015) ‘Britain’s EU membership: The debate and the referendum, Britain’s Europe (Ideas on Europe), 12 May 2015, britainseurope.uk/20150512

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Since Ryan Heath‘s been kind enough to mention all the work I do on this site on Brexit, it seems like a good opportunity to mention a new project I’ve been working on.

‘A Diet of Brussels‘ is a podcast about the referendum here in the UK on EU membership. In it, I want to try and explore the issues, to help inform debate and produce a more considered outcome. It’s not aimed at being ‘yes’ or ‘no’ but rather that raising the level of knowledge about the process and the key issues.

Each podcast is 5 minutes – for everyone’s sanity – and if you have a question to be addressed, then you can just send in a request and I’ll try my best.

I’ll happily admit my technical abilities might not yet be up to much, but it’ll improve over time, plus you all get to enjoy Berlaymonster’s excellent logo at regular opportunities.

So have a listen in: any feedback most welcome.

The post A Diet of Brussels appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

“…and on the third day, he rose again.”

Last week was both a triumph and a disappointment for UKIP. On the one hand, they secured almost 4 million votes in the General Election, a performance almost unsurpassed for a third party in the UK. On the other, the inequities of the electoral system meant that those votes only translated into a single seat. More problematically still, that seat was Clacton, and not Thanet South.

Prior to the election, Nigel Farage had been very clear: failure to win Thanet South would mean that he would step down, since he could not credible lead a party with parliamentary representation if he himself did not have a seat. This was repeated several times, enough to confirm that it was not a slip of the tongue, but a definite personal policy. It reflected both his public confidence about the party’s breakthrough in the election and his long-running dislike of running a political party.

Those with longer memories will recall 2010, when Farage stepped down as leader to contest Buckingham, citing an inability to do both jobs at the same time. His failure and that of his replacement, Lord Pearson, brought him quickly back into the fold. But even before that, Farage had long resisted the pressure to take over the leadership, preferring instead the libero role of media terrier and back-stage influencer: his election in 1999 to the European Parliament has long provided him with an alternative power and resource base.

Thus, no one should have been surprised that Farage followed through on May 8th, stepping down almost within the hour of being beaten into second place in Thanet.

More surprising was the jujitsu move of announcing that he would take the summer to rest and relax, before considering whether to stand again in a leadership contest in the autumn. I’ll admit that I kicked myself a bit at this point, for not seeing this as a way around his commitment to resign. It all made sense, in that even if there weren’t the seats, there were the votes and with the unexpected arrival of a Tory single-party government, a referendum on the EU was also now on the cards. In short, the prefect situation for Farage, bar that one small problem of his absence from Parliament.

Through the weekend there has been discussion of who might take over. Suzanne Evans had been proposed as interim leader, and was one of a handful of potential candidates. Perhaps tellingly, none of them made a big push to sell themselves, either to the media or to the party. Douglas Carswell – once again, the only UKIP MP – popped up to remind everyone that he had absolutely no interest in the job. Evans herself talked about the strength in depth of the possible candidates. But nothing comparable to Labour’s exertions, or even the LibDems.

Now, today, the big(ger) twist.

The party’s NEC released a statement saying:

“As promised Nigel Farage tendered his official resignation as leader of UKIP to the NEC. This offer was unanimously rejected by the NEC members who produced overwhelmingly evidence that the UKIP membership did not want Nigel to go.

“The NEC also concluded that UKIP’s general election campaign had been a great success. We have fought a positive campaign with a very good manifesto and despite relentless, negative attacks and anastonishing last minute swing to the Conservatives over fear of the SNP, that in these circumstances, 4 million votes was an extraordinary achievement.

“On that basis Mr Farage withdrew his resignation and will remain leader of UKIP. In addition the NEC recognised that the referendum campaign has already begun this week and we need our best team to fight that campaign led by Nigel. He has therefore been persuaded by the NEC to withdraw his resignation and remains leader of UKIP.”

Typos (and a curiosity about what that ‘evidence’ might be) aside, the statement is very telling about the situation of the party right now.

Firstly, it calls into question the values that UKIP has fought on, of being different to other parties. It looks like a slippery way out of the situation: the NEC refusing his resignation, Farage changing his mind, expediency over principle. It is a gift to political opponents.

Secondly, it highlights the lack of options open to the party. Without Farage, they still lack anyone who is able to replace him. For all the growth in membership and the efforts to build more of a senior team (at least in terms of spokesmen), Farage remains indelibly linked to the party’s image. One might have imagined him taking a more independent role in the referendum campaign, but the party would have struggled enormously without him. The failure to get anyone apart from the one man who has been vociferous about not wanting to lead the party into the Commons means that will only continue.

Thirdly, it exposes the fragility more generally of the party. About a year ago, I wrote a piece wondering whether UKIP could survive 2015: the likely lack of representation, the absence of opportunities for making a mark. I’ve come back to this several times since, but today I find myself closer to sticking with that view than for a long while.

Momentum is a precious thing in politics, as much as it exists at all. The period since 2013 has been incredibly strong for UKIP, but without the bodies in Parliament to show for it, that momentum will be hard to maintain. Farage’s media charms cannot and will not last forever. Even the EU referendum risks pigeonholing the party back into its old form as a single-issue party, something it’s tried hard to combat. If Cameron does draw things out, then matters become even worse, as everyone struggles to interest the public in the details of a renegotiation.

Nothing last forever, and today’s events are only likely to make matters more difficult for both Farage and UKIP.

The post Nigel ‘Jesus’ Farage appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

A UK in-out referendum will soon be upon us. How the rest of the EU responds will be crucial to shaping the outcome in the UK and shaping the future of Europe.

The UK’s 2015 general election has been one of the most spectacular in the country’s modern history. Defying the polls, David Cameron managed to increase the number of Conservative MPs to secure a small majority in the House of Commons.

It means the UK and EU will soon face a make or break moment that many in both have quietly dreaded: a UK in-out referendum.

To borrow from US President Lyndon Johnson, the EU now has to decide whether it wants the UK inside the EU tent pissing out, or outside the EU tent pissing in.

For Cameron, the referendum is a commitment he made personally in January 2013 and which carries almost universal support in his Conservative Party. The question is no longer if but when the vote is held.

Whatever date Cameron goes for we can expect a tsunami of analysis and debate about what a Brexit would mean for the UK. This will add to the plethora of existing research on the subject.

But as I’ve argued before, this overlooks the equally big question of what a referendum and/or Brexit could mean for the EU. Understanding the EU’s reaction will also be crucial if we are to understand whether the UK can secure a renegotiation and remain a member.

Like it or not, Europe will soon witness the people of one of its largest states debating whether or not to quit the leading organisation of pan-European cooperation and unity. This is not an insignificant development for the EU, European geopolitics, the states of Europe, or how we study European politics and integration.

That might sound an obvious statement to make. It’s one you’ll find is raised over dinners in Brussels or coffee in Berlin. There has certainly been no shortage of informal chat about what a Brexit could mean for the EU.

But discussion quickly turns to what a Brexit might mean for the UK. The implications for the EU are pushed to the side. There have been only a couple of reports – SWP, DGAP, ECFR, Bertelssmann, Open Europe – analysing what such a big event could mean for the EU. Each ranges in size and focus.

In Britain it is hoped an open debate about Europe can lance the festering political boil Europe has become. It could provide a fresh start for everyone. A successful vote could also break Europe’s fear of referendums. It could show that the citizenry of member states can and should be engaged directly in discussing the future of the EU and their member state’s part in it.

However, a UK referendum could trigger calls for similar referendums elsewhere. Britain is not the only country to have a difficult relationship with the EU. Granted it is the one where an out vote is a distinct possibility. Nevertheless, some fear the UK is about to trigger a domino effect that brings chaos through more referendums. The outcome would be a slow weakening and unravelling of the union.

Even if the UK votes to stay in the EU, the issue of Europe in British politics is unlikely to be settled. Rather than cleanse British politics of a poisonous debate, the vote could merely be a placebo. The European question in British politics has long been about more than to be or not to be in Europe. It weaves its way into many of the problems and issues shaping the UK today. They are unlikely to go away whether the decision is to stay or leave.

Whether in or out the UK will therefore remain, as Stephen George once described it, ‘an awkward partner’. The rest of Europe should expect continued sniping and difficult times. So would it not be better then to banish Britain altogether to the outside of the EU tent?

The rest of the EU will play a central role in deciding whether Britain stays or goes. Those in the UK who seek a withdrawal would be served by an EU that is instead obstructionist, refusing to countenance much by way of renegotiation. This would be a ‘passive expulsion’, the EU doing little to keep Britain in because the members quietly want it to up and leave of its own accord.

In deciding whether to try to keep or let Britain go the rest of the EU will have to face three issues about a Brexit:

First, what could be the economic costs for the EU of the various possible trading relationships that would follow a Brexit? A UK on the outside would be the EU’s biggest trading partner. Would any special deal be offered to the UK, or would this risk complicating relations with other non-EU states to say nothing of compromising the single market?

Second, how would UK-EU relations on matters of security and defence be managed? Britain might have recently become more withdrawn from the world, but it retains a considerable punch. The UK will not be quitting NATO.

Third, who would benefit from the political changes to the EU brought about by a British exit? Or would there be little benefit? Would the damage hit everyone by triggering a series of changes that weaken the idea and direction of European integration?

The search is now on to decide what position the EU will take. Central to this will be the position of Germany. Others should not be overlooked. Cameron has often made the mistake of assuming all decisions are made in Berlin. That overplays Germany’s power, if only because any such decisions are made with a view to wider European politics and not simply bilateral relations with the UK.

In September 2014 the DGAP published a report (edited by myself and Almut Möller) made up of 26 views of a Brexit written by people from research institutions and universities from sixteen EU member states, nine non-EU countries, and a view from the EU’s institutions in Brussels.

Its conclusions were clear: while there is sympathy for some of the UK’s frustrations at the EU, there is equally a great deal of frustration at the UK’s attitude towards the EU and other member states. As the Dutch contribution put it, Britain suffers from a sense of ‘narcissistic victimization’ – of believing only it suffers from the EU’s failing and only it knows the way forward.

The report does not make for optimistic reading for a UK government hoping the rest of the EU will offer it much by way of a renegotiation to sell in a referendum. Yet there is some hope because the report shows the rest of the EU has not yet fully grasped where a Brexit may take them. Perhaps then Britain and the rest of the EU still have time to realise that a Brexit is not in the interests of either side.

The post Brexit: Europe’s Awkward Questions about its Awkward Partner appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

● Labour leader, Ed Miliband: if you are pro-EU what other choice is there?

Tomorrow, all citizens from the rest of Europe now living in the UK, and all citizens from Britain now living in the rest of Europe, can only hope for one outcome if they want to continue enjoying where they currently reside. 

Why?  Because unless Ed Miliband, leader of the Labour Party, is handed the keys to number 10 Downing Street, the traditional home of all UK Prime Ministers, the future of Britain in Europe; of Britons in Europe, and of Europeans in Britain, will be in doubt for at least a year or two, and maybe forever. 

Only the Labour Party has promised no referendum in the next five years (unless there are plans for a transfer of more powers to the EU – which is extremely unlikely in the course of the next Parliament).

Rightly in my opinion, Labour’s policy is that Britain should now be concentrating on re-building our economy, reducing our deficit, and strengthening our ties with Europe and our European allies. 

A referendum on whether the UK should stay in the EU will be an unnecessary distraction at a time when the country needs to keep its eyes on a more important prize: the well-being of ordinary, every-day citizens living in the UK.

The Conservative Party has promised an in-out EU referendum within the next two years if the party is elected to be the next government.   Although the party’s leader, David Cameron, says he wants the UK to stay a member, some Eurosceptics in the party state that most Conservative prospective MPs want the UK to leave the EU.  Furthermore, David Cameron’s proposals for EU reform would entail an EU treaty change requiring the agreement of all 28 EU members.  That would likely be impossible to achieve within two years, even if all the other 27 EU members agreed with Mr Cameron’s reform proposals (which they don’t).

If UKIP do well in the General Election and agree an alliance or coalition with the Conservatives to form a government, they have said they will demand as the price of co-operation a referendum before Christmas.  Such a hasty and premature referendum date would plunge the country and its economic progress into turmoil. 

The Lib-Dems, who like UKIP don’t have a chance to become the next government, swing both ways.  The party has said they are staunchly pro-EU, and they’d be happy to form a coalition with Labour (with a few red-lined caveats) and would willingly accept Labour’s stance of no referendum.  But the Lib-Dems are also happy to go to bed with the Tories – and although they’ve lipped their opposition to an EU referendum by 2017, this isn’t one of their red-lined pre-nuptial clauses.  As The Guardian commented yesterday, the Lib-Dem leader, Nick Clegg, may see an EU referendum “as the price he must pay to form a government.”

The SNP are also staunchly pro-Union – European, that is, rather than the Union of the United Kingdom.  Wanting to retain one union but undo another is not in the best interests of the UK or Europe.  Labour has ruled out a coalition or deal with the SNP, meaning that the more seats SNP gains, the less chance Labour has of forming a majority government and thereby preventing a possible fast-track exit from the EU.  In addition, the more seats won by the SNP, the more chance that the Eurosceptic Conservative party will win power.  The SNP cannot form a government for the entire UK.   The Labour party is the only pro-EU party that could form a government for all of Great Britain.

Only Labour offers Britain the chance to retain our membership of the European Union for the duration of the next Parliament, with a mission to concentrate our earnest efforts on building our economy as a member of the world’s biggest, richest economy (the EU), rather than throwing the country into two years of confusion and bickering on whether we should leave it, and with the greatest risk that we actually will. 

Furthermore, only Labour is likely to win concessions and reforms across the EU by working together with our EU allies, rather than threatening to turn our backs on them.

• If you are pro-EU and traditionally vote Labour, then your only choice is to vote Labour again.
  
• If you are pro-EU and traditionally a Conservative, then please, grit your teeth, vote Labour this time, in the interests of the country and our membership of the EU.
  
• If you are pro-EU and a Lib-Dem, unfortunately, your party hasn’t red-lined its opposition to an EU referendum; only a vote for Labour will ensure a safe distance from an EU exit.
  
• If you are pro-EU and an SNP supporter, please vote this time for a horizon wider than the highlands or lowlands: vote Labour to ensure our continued place in Europe.   

Only @UKLabour offers certainty on Europe. If you’re pro-EU, what other choice is there? Opinion piece: http://t.co/NLQyg2JZQG #GE2015

— Jon Danzig (@Jon_Danzig) May 7, 2015

Other articles by Jon Danzig:

• Russell Brand changes his mind on voting
  
• What Nigel Farage told British expats in Spain
• Who do you think you are kidding, Mr Farage?

The post Only Labour offers certainty on Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

As ‘the world’s most successful case of multilateralism the European Union (‘EU’ or ‘Union’) demonstrated since its early beginnings a commitment to multilateralism as the preferred form of global governance.

 Yet, it was only with the European Security Strategy (‘ESS’), adopted by the European Council in December 2003, that the EU endorsed its idiosyncratic concept of ‘effective multilateralism’ as the central guiding principle of its external action.

Recognizing that global problems require global solutions, the ESS states that European ‘security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system’ and proclaims the ‘development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order as a European objective. Importantly, the ESS highlights the pivotal role of the United Nations (‘UN’) in the global multilateral order. Recognizing the UN Security Council’s (‘UNSC’) ‘primary responsibility’ in the area of international peace and security and the status of the UN Charter as the ‘fundamental framework for international relations’, the ESS states that ‘strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority’. 2003 also saw the publication of a Commission Communication on ‘The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism’ which set out a general strategy for EU-UN cooperation. Again, the Union’s commitment to multilateralism as a ‘defining principle’ of its external action was reiterated, as was the importance of the UN as the ‘pivot of the multilateral system’.

EU commitment to multilateralism in general and to the UN as its principal forum was taken a step further in the 2008 Report on the implementation of the ESS. By declaring that ‘Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order’, the Union set itself apart from other actors in the multilateral system and took on additional responsibilities, committing itself to the aspiration of assuming a leadership role. While EU official statements and policy documents have since then contained an abundance of references to the concept of ‘effective multilateralism’,10 it was with the entry into force of the Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E Smith (eds), The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms (Palgrave Macmillan 2006) Jan Wouters, Sijbren de Jong and Philip De Man, ‘The EU’s Commitment to Effective Multilateralism in the Field of Security: Theory and Practice’ (2010) 29 Yearbook of European Law 164, 170. 3 European Council, ‘European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World’, Brussels, 12 December 2003. 4 Ibid 9. 5 Ibid. 6 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism’, COM(2003) 526 final, 10 September 2003.  European Council, ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World’, Brussels, 11 December 2008, S407/08. See for an analysis of the ‘effectiveness’ component of the concept Wouters, de Jong and De Man.

Lisbon Treaty that the Union’s commitment to multilateralism was considerably strengthened. Through a total of 15 references to the UN and the UN Charter,11 the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) and the accompanying Protocols and Declarations elevated the principle of multilateralism to the rank of primary law and enshrined the UN framework as the guide and benchmark of EU external action. Of particular relevance is Article 3(5) TEU which defines the ‘respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter’ as one of the foreign policy goals of the EU. Article 21 TEU provides additional detail, stating that the Union ‘shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations’ and affirming the promotion of an ‘international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance’ as an objective of the Union’s foreign policy. Other TEU and TFEU provisions oblige the EU institutions to comply with the commitments taken on in the UN system when implementing EU policies, and to cooperate with relevant UN bodies.

Although the UN, as the paramount institution of multilateral global governance, has been recognized as an organization which the EU seeks to support, with which it aspires to cooperate and through which it intends to pursue its policy objectives,13 the Union’s engagement with the UN has in practice been fraught with difficulties.

The EU, as a regional international organization with strong supranational features, has been faced with the challenges of multilateral diplomacy in a predominantly state-centric global institution. The acquisition of participatory rights in various UN bodies required an investment of considerable diplomatic and political capital, and the implementation of the obtained rights frequently led to additional controversies.

Despite its considerable economic and political clout, the EU has not – yet – been able to assume a leadership role in the UN framework. It frequently finds itself in a minority position, failing not only to build cross-regional coalitions but also to garner support among its close allies for its positions and initiatives. Among the culprits identified in recent scholarship are a lack of cohesion, the unclear division of external competences, as well as the time-consuming and inflexible internal coordination process.

The Lisbon Treaty attempted to remedy some of these shortcomings through extensive institutional reforms, including in particular the creation of the office of the multi-hatted High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (‘HR/VP’) and the establishment of the European External Action Service (‘EEAS’), but also by creating the office of a permanent President of the European Council and by limiting the role of the rotating Council Presidency. While the new external relations architecture of the EU has led to noticeable improvements in terms of continuity and effectiveness of the Union’s engagement with the UN, considerable challenges still remain. 11 Art. 3(5), Art. 21(1) TEU, Art. 21(2)(c), Art. 34(2), Art. 42(1) and (7) TEU, 7th recital of the preamble of the TFEU, Art. 208(2), Art. 214(7), Art. 220(1) TFEU, 3rd and 8th recital preamble, as well as Art. 1(b) Protocol No 10 on permanent structured cooperation, Declaration No 13 concerning CFSP, Declaration No 14 concerning CFSP; cf. Jan Wouters, Anna-Luise Chané, Jed Odermatt and Thomas Ramopoulos, ‘Improving the EU’s Status in the UN and the UN System: An Objective Without a Strategy?’ in Christine Kaddous. The European Union in International Organisations and Global Goverment. See e.g. TFEU arts 208(2), 214(7), 220(1). 13 Cf the three chapters of the Commission Communication ‘The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism.

The post The EU and the UN (I) appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The following is a guest post by Ben O’Keeffe

One ideological motif has run throughout this General Election campaign: Nationalism. From the rising force of the SNP and UKIP, to Labour and the Conservative’s pandering to calls for greater controls on immigration, an undercurrent of nationalism has made British identity a more prevalent election issue than in any other recent Westminster election.

The unforeseen swell in SNP support following their failed attempt at Scottish secession was arguably the catalyst for the question of nationalism to rear its head with such fervour. Their fellow left-wing nationalists, Plaid Cymru, can only dream of such gains in Wales, but they have received more media coverage than ever before during a UK wide election.

On the right-wing, we may have seen a crumbling of support for the British Nationalist Party throughout this parliament, but the more moderate right, both within the Tory Party as well as UKIP, have increasingly held the ear of the media (and seemingly the Prime Minister) over the last five years.

Labour equally have not eschewed the issues of national identity in their campaign. Both through their presence in the ‘No’ camp of the Scottish referendum and their fronting up to perceived previous failures on immigration (even if it was primarily done through a mug) Labour have exploited the national identity angle to support their message.

But nationalism’s prevalence raises a truly fundamental question. To whom does the ideology belong?

Received wisdom places it at the right of the ideological spectrum. However, the mere presence of left-wing-nationalist parties – the SNP and Plaid are often portrayed as the most left-wing of any of the established parties – puts this in serious doubt.

It may of course seem antithetical to attempt to merge left-wing ideas with a keen nationalist spirit for the many who cite the historical relationship between socialism and internationalism. And they may of course be right, there are clear incompatibilities with the fundaments of both ideologies. However, this has not stopped parties from simultaneously mobilising both.

The allure of nationalism as a concept is that it ostensibly transcends the left-right spectrum. The concept of the imagined community that is ‘the nation’ is so embedded, so ingrained, that the electorate fail to see its strategic political qualities. The national system of political economy goes broadly unquestioned in the UK.

Its uncontentious, unifying properties are therefore extremely valuable to any party seeking to maximise vote-share.

Parties who build their brand around this label also gain from an ability to manipulate their broader politico-economic standpoint to capture the zeitgeist of the moment or appeal to voters at both ends of the spectrum: The SNP have not always been the progressive party they portray themselves to be; and UKIP’s raw patriotism and anti-immigration standpoint is equally resonating with the Conservative Home Counties as well as the depressed Labour coastal towns.

So, in a very nationalist way, we might all own nationalism – well, as long as you don’t try and change things too much.

This of course begs a second question, from where does national identity arise? Unfortunately I cannot tackle this question now as I must take a phone call in a red box from the Queen as we are meeting for fish and chips after I finish my cup of tea.

Ben O’Keeffe graduated from King’s College London with an MA in International Political Economy in 2014. He currently works as a Consultant with Bellenden Public Affairs in London.

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At least that’s the forecast of ‘The Supplement’, a popular Sunday afternoon programme on French television (Canal+). Each week, it includes a trendspotting clip named ‘sexy tomorrow’, introducing a someone or something that may become a game changer.

In the edition of 26 April, the game changer was ‘Politico’, the American news site that just opened a Brussels office in Rue de la Loi (see the clip, in French of course, here). With a staff of more than 40, when most major traditional newspapers hardly have more than two permanent correspondents in the European capital, www.politico.eu certainly sees a future in Brussels for itself.

Some European media reacted with mixed feelings between scepticism and a bewildered welcome. The gist of reactions could perhaps be summed up as ‘Haven’t they understood that there is no European Public Sphere waiting for them?’ As a matter of fact, there is. One week of testing Politico suggests that it is very clearly aimed at the Brussels microcosm and hardly likely to be read beyond the bubble. Just subscribe to the ‘Brussels playbook’ sent out each morning and you will understand that this is for insiders. Who else would subscribe to a ‘Brussels playbook’ anyway?

For the anecdote, when one long-term Washington reporter of Politico told Barack Obama during a White House press conference that she would be moving to Brussels soon, his reaction was not to quip about how she would shake up the European Union, but a rather mediocre joke about how ‘Belgium must have been waiting for a good dose of Politico-style journalism’ (quoted from memory). Interesting to think that the American president spontaneously thinks ‘Belgium’ first, not ‘EU’. Maybe things have not changed so much after all since the days of George W. Bush? Obama’s recommendation to the lady about to leave for Brussels? ‘Try the waffles. They are delicious.’

Time will tell whether Politico will have a return on its remarkable investment. In order to be profitable, it will have to sell quite a few subscriptions to its professional information newsletters on healthcare, energy/environment and technology. If these pick up among the business and lobbying community, they may be indeed ‘sexy tomorrow’.

I wouldn’t bet on the tongue-in-cheek predictions of Canal+, though. In the edition of 22 March, the man hailed as ‘sexy tomorrow’ was Yanis Varoufakis, the Greek finance minister, who despite his seemingly limitless self-confidence may be more quickly ‘sexy yesterday’ than he thought. At least that’s what you can read in … Politico!

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As the climate continues to change at alarming rates, many have lost faith in traditional international approaches to address the issue. As a result, climate policy innovation and associated experimentation are en vogue.[1] The thinking goes that if old approaches are perceived to be failing, we need new and innovative ones. The hope is that successful innovations will spread as policy-makers, civil society and businesses learn from one another. But what do we know about climate change governance experimentation, and are these hopes justified?

On the face of it nobody directly opposes the idea of experimenting. After all, experimentation drives tremendous progress in the natural sciences, so why should we not apply the approach more widely to governance? The idea also fits well with the evidence-based policy-making agenda, another fashionable idea, holding that experiments may be a key source of evidence for policy-makers. However, there is more to experimentation than readily meets the eye. A recent workshop on “Climate Change Policy and Governance: Initiation, Experimentation, Evaluation” organised by the Innovations in Climate Governance (INOGOV) research network including 26 European countries, focused on how experiments materialise and challenge existing policies, practices and regulatory systems. Thirty scholars from Europe, the US and Australia discussed new empirical and theoretical analyses, showing how diverse the topic of experimentation is. The emerging discussions highlighted that conducting, interpreting and using experiments may not be as straightforward as one may think.

First of all: what are experiments? There were numerous partly conflicting ideas among the workshop participants. Some broadly viewed all policies as potentially failing experiments in the sense that no one can ever exactly foresee policy outcomes in complex socio-ecological systems. Others took more narrow definitions as a starting point with specific criteria that echo statistical experimental designs. Such experiments can, for example, explore a novel policy instrument that is applied and evaluated in restricted regions before being adopted nationally. Our understanding of experiments will affect how we approach and use them. Crucially, experimenting also raises tricky issues of risks, duties and wider social implications. For example, who is to blame if a governance experiment goes wrong and who will bear the consequences? Leaving a legacy, experiments are never fully reversible. They will, at the very least, provide a new perspective on what is doable, and after that the world is never completely the same.

In many cases the purpose of experimenting is nothing short of learning how to change the world. But a single experiment will not suffice – multiple and repeated experiments in different places may be necessary. Crucial issues thus relate to learning and transferability. How can the experiences gained in one experiment be transferred to another? Some will argue that the context is so decisive that possibilities for duplication are limited,[2] but we know from practical experience that policy solutions are copied and multiplied within and across sectors and countries. Thus ‘upscaling’ happens. The mechanisms of these ‘upscaling’ processes and transitions are an area of considerable theoretical and practical interest.

On the whole, the workshop highlighted that there are many outstanding questions to answer before we may experiment our way out of climate change. This is of course not stopping politicians from touting experimentation as a potential solution to various societal issues: for example, following a recent national election, Finland’s Prime Minister-elect Juha Sipilä has declared that Finland should become an “experimental society”. But what it takes for an experimental society to ‘come true’ and whether this is even desirable cries out for in-depth research and an informed public debate.

With this year’s climate summit in Paris rapidly approaching, the INOGOV network is a good place to nurture this debate. Focusing on where climate governance innovations originate, how they diffuse and what effects they have, it seeks to bring together communities of scholars, as well as civil society and businesses, in order to accelerate humanity’s search for solutions to address climate change. Whether experimentation is among these solutions is one of the critical questions the network will discuss.

[1] See also Castán Broto, V. &  Bulkeley 2013. A survey of urban climate change experiments in 100 cities. Global Environmental Change 23: 92–102

[2] This has been a lively debate in for example development studies. Thus D.K. Forbes in ‘The geography of underdevelopment’ (Croom Helm 1984) refers to the impossibility to replicate development success stories.

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This is the second of two blogposts on Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.
The first one is available here.

Only 6 cents the word!

Ten years after the premature death of his constitutional treaty, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, now aged 89, is still an undiscouraged believer in the European project. Concerned by the current crisis of the European Union, he proposes in a recent book a project names ‘Europa’, which an inspired plume – himself or the publisher? – felt the need to subtitle ‘Europe’s last chance’.

The utter cliché of this subtitle notwithstanding – after all, even Jean-Claude Juncker thought it was necessary to dramatize his mandate at the helm of the Commission with the same words – an essay by Giscard always deserves a look. He certainly has a record of European leadership that spans from the 1970s, when he was a driver of both enlargement – paving the way for Greece, Spain, and Portugal – and deepening of the community, through the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS).

It turns out that only one third of this already very thin book (184 pages printed in very large font, hardly more than 30,000 words sold at € 16.90, which makes roughly 6 cents the word) is actually dedicated to the ‘Europa’ project that gave the publication its title. The rest is a kind of recapitulative short-cut of how the EU got where it is today. Apart from some nice anecdotes – like the moment in Bremen in 1978 when he invented an English name for the forthcoming ‘European currency unit’ with the aim of producing an acronym that would recall a French medieval currency – there is strictly speaking no added value in these fireside souvenirs.

The ‘Europa’ project’ itself is, in a nutshell, yet another draft for a two-speed Europe, with a core of 12 in a Union of 28. The core would naturally work towards fiscal harmonisation by 2030, backed up by a European treasury (issuing Eurobonds) and based on a principle of redistributive solidarity. Note that Giscard does not anticipate any major popular resistance to fiscal union – on the contrary, he expects it to be very well received by the European people – and he foresees harmonisation of retirement age in the long run.

‘Europa’ would be run by a ‘directoire’ (in parallel to the EU and Eurozone institutions). For reasons of democratic legitimacy it would also convene a ‘Congress of the people’ composed of MEPs and national MPs. The tone of the proposal is itself very ‘directoire’-like, especially when it comes to identify the eligible members of the future core-Europa: ‘The participation of Ireland and Finland may also be envisaged’. Good to know! Envisaged by whom? Under what conditions? Would they even be asked?

The book is rife with self-congratulation: oh, the days when Helmut Schmidt and himself created and managed the European Council! Of course, their successors at the heads of today’s European governments entirely lack the necessary leadership qualities and the indispensible vision (he does not mention that his friend Helmut, who wrote the preface to the book, used to advise each politician with ‘visions’ to go and consult an ophthalmologist).

The author also has a strong tendency to over-simplify things (despite, obviously, better knowledge). Three examples: 1) Needless to say that Chirac and only Chirac is to blame for the French ‘no’ vote to the constitutional treaty in May 2005. 2) The resurgence of national identities is mainly due to the scapegoating of Brussels by the current generation of European politicians. 3) if Europe is perceived as ‘the sick man of the planet’, the main reason is ‘permanent Euro-bashing by the Anglo-Saxon press’.

It saddens me to write this, but reading this project is an experience that comes close to marking an undergraduate term paper while not being able to suppress some deep sighs. Had I to mark this text, what would I be supposed to put in the margin of sentences like: ‘Thus the project of Robert Schuman was approved by six states, more or less from the Holy Roman Empire. These were the founding countries. They have remained so until today.’

Unlike the average undergraduate student, however, Giscard is touring schools and media with his term paper, as if there was any serious chance of seeing his project only even discussed by any current European leader. He has also set up a website, as thin as the book itself, which even in the core-Europa of twelve, only Francophone readers will be able to consult (perhaps that’s because he is, as he proudly recalls on the front page, a member of the Académie Française). If you do happen to be among these, you can consult or download the book for free (click here).

This post should by no means be understood as cheap scorn or mockery. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing has great merits both for European integration and for modernising the French Republic without being prisoner to ideological dogma (some of his reforms were more leftist and lasting than Mitterrand’s!). And his advocacy in favour of European integration is sincere and wholehearted. One untimely, uninspired, and unnecessary book will not change this record.

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Changing working conditions at European universities are studied in a recent book ‘Academic Work and Careers in Europe – Trends, Challenges, Perspectives’, edited by Tatiana Fumasoli, Gaële Goastellec and Barbara Kehm. Tatiana Fumasoli tells about the main findings presented in the book.

Q1: What have been the rationales and origins of this book?

The book explores the impact of changes in governance, work and careers in European higher education. It observes empirically how and to what extent a European higher education profession is emerging through convergence, standardization and formalization of academic careers.  The book is an output of the project EuroAC – The Academic Profession in Europe: Responses to Societal Challenges, funded by the European Science Foundations and national research councils coordinated by University of Kassel (Germany). It originates from the qualitative data gathered in 8 European countries (Austria, Germany, Finland, Croatia, Ireland, Poland, Romania and Switzerland) by the 8 national partners. Around 500 interviews were conducted with university leaders, administrators and academics.

Q2: What are the main common trends in academic work and careers in Europe?

Standardization and formalization of recruitment, promotion and evaluation, as well as of PhD supervision is everywhere apparent and an international dimension is nowadays – at least ideally – integrated in European universities, for instance in hiring, conducting research, teaching.

Competition for academic positions, research grants, publications is increasing at all levels and takes place within and across universities and countries. Such competitive pressures shape increasing differences between global players (countries, universities, academics) and regional players. Thus elite universities, research groups and academics are connecting more among themselves and less within their institutional and national settings.

Q3: What are the main differences between the eight European countries you analyze in the book?

In general the increasing institutional autonomy of universities across Europe has shaped complex dynamics that are not completely under the control of states. The stagnating or shrinking public funding has created unequal distribution of resources among universities, which hold different adaptive capacities.

Concretely, national and local practices are still important in the organization of academic careers. In this sense, the landscape of a European academic profession is still rather fragmented. The recent financial crisis has affected European countries quite differently.

Q4: Are the main policies on academic careers made at national and institutional levels or does the European Union also play a role?

There is no doubt that the EU is influencing the restructuring of academic careers and work. First, the standards of research for participating in the Framework Programs (on-going Horizon 2020) have diffused across EU members and ERA associate members. Second, the Commission has been involved in the Bologna process quite early. Third, the EU has contributed to enhance an understanding (and a legitimating role) of higher education institutions in the construction of Europe of Knowledge. This has focused the public debate also on the role of academics and their contribution to societies. Finally, the idea of a free market of knowledge is met with a certain criticism by most academics, who have to balance personal and family life with long years of uncertainty before achieving a permanent position.

Q5: What are the main messages for policy-makers and practitioners?

Europe has excellent academics in all scientific fields, however their careers and trajectories are prone to chance and to sometimes idiosyncratic choices. There is a waste of resources in forming academics, having them compete for positions, publications, research funding, that is arguably not efficient. If the knowledge society is key to socio-economic development, the role and organization of academic careers should be addressed more structurally at European and national levels.

Professional organizations like universities rely on individuals (that is academics) for producing knowledge and not on technologies, structures, routines, which can be designed. From this point of view it is astonishing how few universities and higher education systems have addressed thoroughly academic careers in order to improve their performance. There is a tension between the traditional professional control on careers and the demands for more effective use of resources that should be addressed.

Q6: What would be interesting avenues for future research? 

Academics are professionals with multiple affiliations and loyalties, as they are embedded in higher education institutions and discipline-based communities; as such they strive to protect their academic freedom and control of their teaching and research activities.

The European dimension has become an arena where academic professional interests can be advocated and promoted. It is thus relevant to investigate how academics engage in European policy processes, how they link across Europe to other actors and arenas, and which factors empower and constrain them in protecting their professional interests. Given the increasing number of European academic associations, academies, scientific journals we should scrutinize how the integration of higher education and research at national and European level is affected.

Academics’ engagement in European policy processes will be the topic of the panel “Transnational actors in the multi-level governance of knowledge policies” in the section “The Global Governance of Knowledge Policies: Europe of Knowledge in Context” at the ECPR General Conference in Montreal, August 2015.

Dr. Tatiana Fumasoli is a Post-doctoral fellow at the ARENA Centre for European Studies, and an assistant professor at the Faculty of Educational Sciences, University of Oslo. Previously she was a researcher at the Institute of Management of University of Lugano (Switzerland), where she received her PhD with a thesis on strategy of higher education institutions. Tatiana presently works in the Flagship Project, funded by the Research Council of Norway, and investigating institutional change dynamics in European universities. Her interest lies on strategic agency of political and social actors and on its implications for policy and governance of higher education and research. Her work has appeared, among others, in Higher Education, Minerva, Higher Education Policy, International Journal of Public Administration, and with Springer and Palgrave.

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Giscard between two ESSCA students (14 April 2005).

Ten years ago, in mid-April 2005, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing came to Angers in order to exchange with ESSCA students. Just six weeks before the French referendum on the constitutional treaty his visit was part of a campaign for an increasingly uncertain ‘yes’ vote. Given his role in chairing – with diplomatic skills and political know-how - the European Convention between March 2002 and June 2003, his defense of the treaty was more than legitimate and the amphitheatre was crowded.

The former president of the Republic was visible delighted to find himself with a handful of young students who, in turn, were visibly very impressed with the charism of the 79-years-old elder statesman. After a bit of coquetry on his age, he staunchly defended his text,hiding his disappointment with the manner in which the substance of the original treaty had been watered down by the European Councils in 2003 and 2004. Rather helplessly, he had witnessed how the ‘big’ member-states wanted to modify the voting rights, how the ‘small’ member-states were all up in arms about ‘their’ commissioner, how the catholic member-states insisted on a reference to the Christian heritage of Europe, and how Poland, Spain and the UK went each on a major ego-trip. All that remained of the rather audacious ‘Constitution’ of the summer of 2003 was a much diluted and quite indigestible treaty, unreadable for every citizen who did not have the good luck to have doctorate in international law.

These weaknesses notwithstanding, Giscard d’Estaing played the true believer and defended the virtues of his ‘child’, as he called it, with conviction. He even went so far as to find this pseudo-constitution ‘as perfect as the French constitution’. A comparison, which in retrospect sounds like a Freudian slip of the tongue, given that both texts are at the origin of numerous and lasting deadlocks in France and Europe.

Moreover, this attitude of assimilating any criticism of the treaty, however well-founded and differentiated it may have been, to the old anti-European reflexes of the political extremes, could only be perceived, in the already tense atmosphere of the referendum campaign, as yet another evidence of élitist condescension. And, thus, contribute to strengthen the ‘no’ camp.

Needless to say, Giscard had no trouble convincing ESSCA’s students of the merits of both the constitutional treaty and European integration in general. Smart, young, multilingual individuals, with high-level academic training and an international mindset, are part of those Europeans for whom Europe (just like globalisation) does not stand for economic threat and identity angst, but for professional opportunity and cultural diversity.

On the same day, Jacques Chirac, French president for ten years already, convened a panel of 83 young citizens between 18 and 30 years old to the Elysée Palace in order to debate on Europe. It was a disaster. Far from preaching to an already convinced audience, the president had to resort to papal phrases like ‘Don’t be afraid!’. The sentence that more than any other gave evidence to his flagrant inability to understand the prevailing scepticism was his avowal of total lack of understanding of the young people’s ‘pessimism’ with regard to France and Europe: ‘Je ne le comprends pas!’, he sighed, incredulously and helplessly messing up a communication exercise that had seemed so simple and had turned so sour.

Could there have been a better illustration of the socio-economic and generational rift between the French élites and the people they were supposed to represent? Six weeks later, the constitutional treaty was voted into the dustbin of history with almost 55% of the votes.

Albrecht Sonntag, EU-Asia Institute, ESSCA School of Management.

This is the first of two blogposts on Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.

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Since 2010, the European responses to the global financial and economic crises have been dominated by a narrative of austerity. European governments have sought to bolster confidence in their economies by rolling back public spending. Austerity may pose an existential crisis for the European Union (EU), both regarding austerity-hit states being forced to leave the single currency (think Greece), and the EU’s willingness to be a global leader on key issues outside economic growth (think climate change). The extent to which austerity is necessarily a barrier to climate ambition is a crucial component of our research, funded by the Leverhulme Trust. The 2015 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) summit in the French capital, Paris, has been identified as a crucial opportunity to foster ambitious climate goals. Will the EU be a leader during the negotiations, or fade into the background?

The Barroso Commissions

While US leadership in environmental policy declined during the 1990s, the EU moved to position itself as a global pioneer of climate policy, particularly following the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 1997.[1] International climate policy provided the EU with a niche into which it could forge its global identity. The European Commission is the ‘commissioner’, or source, of all EU legislation. Under the guidance of José Manuel Barroso (2004-2014), the win-win objective of ‘green growth’ dominated Commission thinking around climate change. Here, the Porter hypothesis[2] underlined the belief that by stimulating innovation, environmental policy can be economically beneficial. The EU Climate and Energy Package, with its ‘20-20-20’ targets, was a notable centrepiece. In 2008, Barroso claimed confidently that the 20-20-20 targets were the most ambitious in the world; indeed, compared against other developed states, the EU’s targets remain world-leading. Moreover, the separation of the Commission’s Environment and Climate Change briefs in 2010 enabled Janez Potočnik and Connie Hedegaard, respectively, to push their remits onto the global political agenda. Thus, under Barroso, climate change leadership was a key signifier of the EU’s global identity.

The Juncker Commission

However, since the financial crisis of 2008, newer European states (such as Poland) have played an active role in blocking new proposals, while previously ambitious states (such as Germany) have shied away from leadership. (Moreover, officials within the Commission have also been known to block new legislation.) The narrative of climate change being a ‘win-win’ opportunity appears to have been replaced by a zero-sum framing of economy first, everything else second. Crucial to this new context were the changes of 2014, seeing the formation of both a new European Parliament and a new European Commission. Jean-Claude Juncker touted climate change leadership amongst his key messages during his successful election as the new Commission President during the summer of 2014. However, his pro-austerity leadership as President of the EuroGroup between 2011 and 2014 suggests that he will continue to favour austerity measures. As such, a reduction in ambition regarding climate change may not solely be a reflection of member state preferences, but also an indication of the new Commission expressing its own agency.

The new Commission and Paris 2015

The new structure of the Commission under Juncker appears to give a lower priority to climate change than under Barroso. So how will this reduced ambition manifest itself in the run up to the Paris climate talks? Let’s identify the internal and external impacts. Internally, the EU may formulate fewer and less ambitious climate policies, preferring instead to focus on facilitating economic growth. The Circular Economy bill, for example, was dropped in December 2014, shortly after the new Commission took office. By restricting new climate legislation, the EU may hold a less credible leadership position with which to participate in international negotiations. Moreover, under the auspices of austerity, the EU may reduce spending on its own climate projects, hindering the capacity of the EU to encourage other states to follow its lead. For instance, the EU will not ring fence funds to pay for projects that boost energy efficiency in buildings, instead encouraging the private sector to decide where funding should be allocated. The EU member states have committed, however, to a minimum 40% reduction of emissions by 2030, based on 1990 levels.  Although this 40% target is the overall percentage reduction to be met by the EU rather than an obligation for every state to achieve individually, it provides a relatively ambitious starting point for negotiations with states outside the EU.

Externally, the new structure of the Commission will allow less time for the Commissioner responsible for climate change, Manuel Arias Cañete, to build ambitious coalitions in the run up to the Paris talks. Also responsible for energy policy – a significant portfolio in its own right – Cañete is tasked with responding to fluctuating oil and gas prices, opposition across Europe to the construction of new nuclear reactors and energy security challenges. Overseeing these developments is likely to limit Cañete’s ability to prioritise climate change effectively. Second, with budgets squeezed within EU member states, the EU may feel unable to offer significant funding to developing states for climate change mitigation and adaptation. With the UN’s Green Climate Fund struggling to reach its $100 billion target, having been designed to release funds from developed to developing states for climate mitigation and adaptation, a lack of leadership from developed states could hinder significant policy action. As such, regardless of how much the Commission would wish to prioritise climate change, its hands are likely to be tied by its member states’ unwillingness to spend.

Next steps

2015 is a critical year for climate change mitigation. For the past 15 years, the EU has been at the forefront of climate negotiations. But with a new European Commission and austerity measures being implemented in EU member states, the EU may not assume its traditional leadership position at this year’s international negotiations. Will the EU be willing and able to lead in Paris? If not, which states will press for ambitious targets? And how will the EU define its international reputation going forward, if not through climate change? The answers to these questions will not only shape the future of the EU, but the future of the planet as well.

[1] Kelemen, R. D. (2010). Globalizing European Union environmental policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(3), 335-349.

[2] Porter, M. E., & Van der Linde, C. (1995). Toward a new conception of the environment-competitiveness relationship. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 97-118.

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