Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Die US-Wahl steht vor der Tür – das Ergebnis wird die transatlantischen Klimabeziehungen entscheidend prägen. Was von den beiden Kandidaten Donald Trump und Kamala Harris bei der Klimaaußenpolitik zu erwarten ist, analysieren Sonja Thielges und Laura von Daniels von der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

This policy paper explores Russia’s use of the Wagner Group in Africa, highlighting how the concept of plausible deniability allows the Kremlin to expand its influence in regions such as Mali and the Central African Republic. By distancing itself from direct responsibility for controversial military actions, Russia is able to exert significant geopolitical control. The paper also examines the continuation of Wagner Group operations following the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and discusses the broader implications of these developments for Africa and the Mediterranean region.

• The Wagner Group’s operations continued after the death of its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, with increased integration into Russia’s Ministry of Defence, signaling Russia’s deeper involvement in the continent’s security dynamics.
• Moscow’s activities in Africa signal a broader strategy to challenge Western influence by supporting local regimes and displacing Western control over critical resources, while securing Russia’s standing as a dominant player in the region’s security and economic landscape.
• Russia has secured access to valuable natural resources through its African interventions, extracting billions in gold and pursuing strategic control over uranium in countries like Niger. These resources likely help fund Russia’s broader geopolitical ambitions, including its war efforts in Ukraine.
• Russia offers “pragmatic engagement” as a substitute for dwindling Western aid in Africa, capitalizing on the gap left by reduced Western support to build influence through military assistance, resource extraction, and infrastructure projects.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Natalia Tellidou, Research Fellow at ELIAMEP’s Mediterranean Programme.

Russia’s Strategic Push into Africa

In 2020, the world witnessed a record 56 unique conflicts, the highest number in a single year since 1946.[1] Over half of these were internationalized civil wars, where external powers sponsor local actors to fight on their behalf. This practice, known as conflict delegation, has become a strategic tool for powerful states looking to extend their influence without direct involvement. As a result, geopolitical tensions have escalated, with proxy wars becoming a common feature of modern conflict.

One of the most prominent players in these proxy wars is Russia, which relies heavily on private military security contractors (PMSCs) like the Wagner Group. These contractors provide a range of services, including intelligence gathering, military training, logistical support, and infrastructure protection. Operating in countries like Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), the Wagner Group has supplied military training and assistance while enabling Russia to maintain plausible deniability. By relying on these contractors, Russia can distance itself from controversial actions, all while securing a foothold in these key regions.

Even after the death of Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group’s operations have continued, underscoring the strategic importance of their mission. Russia has adapted to ensure these activities persist, maintaining its involvement in ongoing conflicts and protecting its interests in Africa (Figure 1). Beyond military influence, Russia reaps significant rewards from these operations, including increased security leverage, access to critical natural resources, and the ability to offer African states an alternative to dwindling Western aid.

By multiplying risks in the Global South, Russia seeks to undermine the United States and its allies, positioning itself as a dominant force in the region.

By multiplying risks in the Global South, Russia seeks to undermine the United States and its allies, positioning itself as a dominant force in the region.

Considering all this, this policy brief will first explore how the Wagner Group became instrumental in providing military support to countries like Mali and the CAR followed by an analysis of the post- Prigozhin period and the operations. Finally, the discussion will focus on what Russia gains from these activities—enhanced security leverage, access to valuable natural resources, and a pragmatic engagement to the diminishing development aid offered by Western countries.

Figure 1: Where and How Wanger Group Has Engaged in Africa. Sources: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, ACLED, Kathrin Buchholz https://www.statista.com/chart/30665/wagner-group-engagement-africa/

Wagner Group in Africa: A Tool for Russia’s Military and Political Ambitions 

 

Long before the war in Ukraine, Russia was already actively expanding its influence in the Global South, particularly through the Wagner Group, that allows Moscow to operate in conflict zones with plausible deniability.

Long before the war in Ukraine, Russia was already actively expanding its influence in the Global South, particularly through the Wagner Group, that allows Moscow to operate in conflict zones with plausible deniability. Plausible deniability refers to a strategy in which a sponsoring state avoids direct responsibility for its involvement in foreign conflicts[2]. By covertly supporting proxies, as the Wagner Group, the sponsor-state can reap the benefits of a potential victory without facing the risks and costs associated with direct intervention, including defeat or international condemnation. This approach allows the state to distance itself from the consequences of its actions, evading criticism from both international and domestic audiences. As a result, plausible deniability becomes a key incentive for states to engage in proxy wars. By leveraging Wagner’s presence, Russia has been able to support regimes and shape outcomes while distancing itself from the group’s often controversial and illegal activities.

Take Mali, for example. Since December 2021, Wagner has been actively involved in the country’s security landscape, invited by the Malian government, which had grown frustrated with international forces like the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) and French troops. Wagner’s presence was intended to stabilize the country and support the peace process following the 2012 crisis. At its peak, over 2,000 Wagner personnel were stationed in Mali, providing military support, handling air force operations, and securing the ruling elite.

Wagner’s primary objective was to strengthen Mali’s offensive capabilities, particularly in the conflict-ridden northern region. Unlike international forces, Wagner and the Malian government reject population-centric, “soft” approaches to counterinsurgency. Wagner forces are notorious for their violent tactics, especially towards civilians, and they often coerce prisoners and locals into collaborating by providing intelligence or leading them to insurgent hideouts. While the French-backed reconciliation process with northern Tuareg rebels sought a more diplomatic solution, the Malian government—supported by Wagner—favored a military strategy, fueling renewed conflict in the north. Without Wagner, Mali’s armed forces would struggle to challenge insurgent control, and the demand for Wagner’s expertise in training and air force operations continues to grow.

Politically and socially, the group has exploited widespread discontent with the security situation and anti-French sentiments, positioning itself as a necessary force for stability.

Wagner’s impact in Mali is not confined to military efforts alone. Politically and socially, the group has exploited widespread discontent with the security situation and anti-French sentiments, positioning itself as a necessary force for stability. This multifaceted approach extends Russia’s influence far beyond the battlefield.

A similar pattern can be observed in the Central African Republic (CAR). Since January 2018, Wagner—alongside another Russian PMC, Patriot—has provided military training and security in exchange for access to valuable resources like gold, uranium, and diamonds. Wagner has been instrumental in bolstering the regime of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, particularly during a 2020 rebel incursion into Bangui, where the group played a critical role in defending the government. Wagner has since become a cornerstone of Touadéra’s war efforts, helping him reclaim rebel-held territories.

However, Wagner’s involvement in CAR has exacerbated violence and militarization, much like in Mali. Russian mercenaries have instructed local militias to merge with the national army and function as self-defense units. These units, however, soon became rogue, committing widespread human rights abuses against civilians. Wagner’s presence has not only intensified the violence but also fragmented the region’s security environment, further entrenching instability.

In both Mali and the CAR, Wagner’s role extends beyond providing military support—it is about leveraging local grievances, securing valuable resources, and deepening Russia’s influence while operating in the shadows. The group’s activities have serious implications for the stability of these regions and underscore Russia’s strategic use of conflict delegation to assert itself on the global stage. 

Post-Prigozhin Dynamics 

While disruptions following the group’s mutiny and Prigozhin’s death caused some temporary instability—such as delayed salaries and suspended missions—operations quickly resumed, signaling the group’s resilience.

Despite the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s operations across Africa have persisted, though not without adjustments. The “Expeditionary Corps,” Wagner’s key operational unit, continued its activities in countries like Sudan, Niger, and Burkina Faso, maintaining its original objectives and utilizing the same resources. While disruptions following the group’s mutiny and Prigozhin’s death caused some temporary instability—such as delayed salaries and suspended missions—operations quickly resumed, signaling the group’s resilience. 

In Mali, for instance, after internal disagreements, Wagner reached a new agreement to work directly under the Russian Ministry of Defence. This shift allowed the Ministry to supply Wagner with essential military assets—vehicles, planes, and ammunition—at no cost, reinforcing Wagner’s role in the region. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence has sought additional means of support, including potential collaborations with other groups like Redut, which operate similarly to Wagner.

Following Prigozhin’s mutiny, the Kremlin formally moved Wagner’s African operations under the control of Russian military intelligence, the GRU. This reorganization saw senior Russian officials, including General Averyanov and Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, visiting former Wagner strongholds in Africa in early September. Far from signaling the end of Russia’s involvement, Prigozhin’s death marked a deeper entrenchment of Russian influence in the region. Wagner’s activities have since been rebranded under the Ministry of Defence as the “Africa Corps,” reflecting this increased oversight[3].

Russia’s diplomatic engagement has also expanded. In January 2024, Chad’s junta leader, Mahamat Idriss Déby, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss strengthening bilateral ties. This meeting is particularly significant, as Chad had previously maintained a pro-Western stance. These developments indicate that Russia’s strategy in Africa, spearheaded by the Wagner Group and its successors, remains robust and continues to adapt to evolving geopolitical realities.

Strategic Returns: Russia’s Gains from its African Engagement

Russia’s involvement in Africa through the Wagner Group brings several strategic advantages. First and foremost, it strengthens Russia’s security posture. One clear example is Russia’s ongoing effort to establish a naval base at Port Sudan, which would grant Russia vital access to the Red Sea. Although the agreement has faced setbacks due to United States pressure, Russia remains determined to secure this critical foothold, signaling its broader ambitions in the region.

Secondly, Russia gains access to valuable natural resources. Over the past two years, Russia has reportedly extracted $2.5 billion worth of gold from Africa, with much of this wealth likely funding its war in Ukraine, according to the Blood Gold Report. Russian fighters, many of them former Wagner mercenaries, also took control of the Intahaka gold mine in northern Mali, a strategically significant asset long contested by various armed groups. In Niger, Russia is actively pursuing uranium concessions, aiming to reduce French influence over these critical resources. The broader pattern is clear: Russia seeks to challenge Western dominance over Africa’s minerals and energy reserves, positioning itself as a key player in this global resource competition.

Russia presents itself as a “pragmatic engagement” to diminishing Western development aid.

Lastly, Russia presents itself as a “pragmatic engagement” to diminishing Western development aid. With countries like the UK significantly cutting back on foreign aid, many African nations are turning to Russia as a reliable partner. By filling the void left by the West, Russia secures both influence and access to resources, while offering these nations military assistance, infrastructure projects, and less conditional diplomatic engagement. This approach allows Russia to build alliances, exert political influence, and further undermine Western presence in the region.

Implications for Global Security: Russia’s Growing Role in Africa

In conclusion, Russia’s strategy in Africa, executed largely through the Wagner Group and other proxies, represents a multifaceted attempt to enhance its geopolitical influence while undermining the global standing of the United States and its allies. By providing military support, gaining control over vital natural resources, and offering a pragmatic alternative to Western aid, Russia is positioning itself as a dominant force across the continent. 

Moving forward, it is crucial for policymakers and international actors to recognize the implications of Russia’s growing influence and to respond accordingly.

The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin did little to disrupt these plans, as Russia’s operations have not only persisted but have expanded under direct Kremlin oversight. This deepened involvement, combined with its strategic maneuvering in key areas like Mali, the Central African Republic, and Chad, ensures that Russia remains a pivotal player in the Global South. Moving forward, it is crucial for policymakers and international actors to recognize the implications of Russia’s growing influence and to respond accordingly. The stakes are not only regional but have far-reaching consequences for global security and resource access.

[1] Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020 is published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Figure 1, page 2, presents the number of battle deaths and conflicts.

[2] Mark Galeotti presents the benefits Russia reaps from covert proxy relationships highlighting how plausible deniability was expertly used in Ukraine, before the military invasion in 2022.

[3] Wagner Group is a reference to the composer Richard Wagner. The reasons why this name was chosen remains a mystery.

 

References

‘A Mixed Picture: How Mali Views the Wagner Group’. 2024. 11.10.2024. https://rusi.orghttps://rusi.org

Arduino, Alessandro. 2024. ‘Wagner Group Is Now Africa Corps. What This Means for Russia’s Operations on the Continent’. The Conversation. 14.02.2024. https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-is-now-africa-corps-what-this-means-for-russias-operations-on-the-continent-223253.

Bloomberg.Com. 2024. ‘Russia Raises the Stakes in Tussle Over Africa’, 30.01.2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-30/russia-raises-the-stakes-in-tussle-over-africa.

‘Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare’. n.d. New America. Accessed 11.10.2024. http://newamerica.org/future-security/reports/decoding-wagner-group-analyzing-role-private-military-security-contractors-russian-proxy-warfare/.

Doxsee, Catrina. 2023. ‘How Does the Conflict in Sudan Affect Russia and the Wagner Group?’, April. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-does-conflict-sudan-affect-russia-and-wagner-group.

Galeotti, Mark. 2016. ‘Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-Linear? How New Is Russia’s “New Way of War”?’ Small Wars & Insurgencies 27 (2): 282–301. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129170.

‘Infographic: Where & How Wagner Group Has Engaged in Africa’. 2023. Statista Daily Data. 24 August 2023. https://www.statista.com/chart/30665/wagner-group-engagement-africa.

Jones, Seth G., Catrina Doxsee, Brian Katz, Eric McQueen, and Joe Moye. 2021. ‘Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies’, July. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-corporate-soldiers-global-expansion-russias-private-military-companies.

Liik, Kadri. 2023. ‘From Russia with Love: How Moscow Courts the Global South’. ECFR. 21.12.2023. https://ecfr.eu/publication/from-russia-with-love-how-moscow-courts-the-global-south/.

‘Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies’. 2023. Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://russianpmcs.csis.org.

Reuters. 2024. ‘Putin Meets Chad Junta Leader as Russia Competes with France in Africa’, 24 January 2024, sec. Africa. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/putin-meets-chad-junta-leader-russia-competes-with-france-africa-2024-01-24/.

‘Russia Is Using the Soviet Playbook in the Global South to Challenge the West – and It Is Working | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank’. 2024. 16.05.2024. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/russia-using-soviet-playbook-global-south-challenge-west-and-it-working.

Saucedo, Natalia. 2023. ‘Russia’s Influence in Mali’. Human Rights Foundation (blog). 11.08.2023. https://hrf.org/russias-influence-in-mali/.

‘Stop Taking the Global South for Granted | Wilson Center’. 2024. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/stop-taking-global-south-granted.

‘The Blood Gold Report’. n.d. Blood Gold Report. Accessed 11.10.2024. https://bloodgoldreport.com/.

‘Wagner in Africa: How the Russian Mercenary Group Has Rebranded’. 2024, 20.02.2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68322230.

Watts, Stephen, Bryan Frederick, Nathan Chandler, Mark Toukan, Christian Curriden, Erik E. Mueller, Edward Geist, et al. 2023. ‘Proxy Warfare in Strategic Competition: Military Implications’. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA307-3.html.

 

[1] Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2020 is published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Figure 1, page 2, presents the number of battle deaths and conflicts.

[2] Mark Galeotti presents the benefits Russia reaps from covert proxy relationships highlighting how plausible deniability was expertly used in Ukraine, before the military invasion in 2022.

[3] Wagner Group is a reference to the composer Richard Wagner. The reasons why this name was chosen remains a mystery.

Based on 20 countries across Europe, North America and North Africa, this report synthesises key trends and patterns of national policy approaches towards migrant irregularity, highlighting commonalities and differences across various contexts. In particular, this report examines three key research questions: how have irregular migration policies evolved over time and in response to what; what pathways into and out of irregularity have these policies produced or aimed to address; and what challenges have hindered policy implementation. In doing so, the report aims to contextualise irregular migration policy changes, as well as how such policies can channel migrants into or out of irregularity.

 

Hendow, M., Qaisrani, A., Rössl, L., Schütze, T., Kraler, A., Ahmad Yar, A. W., Bircan, T., Oruc, N., Mohan, S. S., Triandafyllidou, A., Jauhiainen, J. S., Smolander, S., Toivonen, H., Cyrus, N., Nikolova, M., Desmond, A., Heylin, R., Cacciapaglia, M., Bonizzoni, P., … Sohst, R. R. (2024). Comparing national laws and policies addressing irregular migrants. In MIrreM Working Paper No. 6. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10782561

The Public Database on Irregular Migration Stock Estimates (the Database) provides an inventory and critical appraisal of country-level estimates of irregular migration stocks in 13 European countries, the United States and Canada for the period 2008 to 2023. It is a deliverable of the MIrreM project, which is a follow-up to Clandestino. Clandestino covered the period 2000-2008.

Kierans, D., Vargas-Silva, C., Ahmad-Yar, A. W., Bircan, T., Cacciapaglia, M., Carvalho, J., Cassain, L., Cyrus, N., Desmond, A., Fihel, A., Finotelli, C., Gonzalez Ramos, M. P., Heylin, R., Jauhiainen, J., Kraler, A., Leerkes, A., Nikolova, M., Rössl, L., Santos, S., … Sohst, R. R. (2024). MIrreM Public Database on Irregular Migration Stock Estimates (Version 2) [Data set]. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13856861

 

 

This brief provides an abridged overview of the national policy landscape on irregular migration in Greece, based on a more extensive policy analysis. It also provides an overview of the main types of migrant irregularity that emerge and the pathways into and out of irregularity, including regularisations as relevant. Annexed to this deliverable is also an overview of the mapped legal and policy frameworks.

Nikolova, M. (2024). MIrreM Country Brief on Migration Policy Context – Greece. In MIrreM Report. Krems: University for Continuing Education Krems (Danube University Krems). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.12606423

Im Juni 2022 veröffentlichte der Generalsekretär der Vereinten Nationen (UN) die »Action Agenda on Internal Displacement«. Sie zielt darauf ab, den Umgang mit Binnenvertriebenen grundlegend zu reformieren. Dafür ist zum einen der Schwerpunkt von kurzfristiger humanitärer Hilfe hin zu mehr entwicklungsorientierten Ansätzen zu verlagern; zum anderen müssen vor allem die direkt betroffenen Regie­rungen bei der Suche nach dauerhaften Lösungen stärker einbezogen werden. Mit der Umsetzung des Aktionsplans wurde ein UN-Sonderberater betraut. Er hat in den vergangenen zwei Jahren positive Entwicklungen in einzelnen Ländern angestoßen und zu einer besseren Koordinierung der mit Binnenvertreibung befassten UN-Orga­nisationen beigetragen. Über das Mandat des Sonderberaters hinaus, das zum Jahres­ende ausläuft, gilt es diese Fortschritte zu sichern. Zu diesem Zweck sollte Deutschland sich unter anderem für nachhaltige Governance-Strukturen einsetzen und dafür werben, dass Binnenvertreibung systematisch in der Entwicklungs- und Klimafinanzierung berücksichtigt wird.

Schon lange galt die Parlamentswahl in Georgien am Samstag als richtungsweisend. Seit Dezember 2023 ist Georgien EU-Beitrittskandidat, ein Großteil der Bevölkerung befürwortet die Mitgliedschaft in der Union. Doch der politische Kurs der georgischen Regierung in den vergangenen Monaten hat das Land einem Beitritt nicht nähergebracht. Im Gegenteil. Umstrittene Maßnahmen wie das Gesetz zur »Transparenz ausländischer Einflussnahme« haben zu einer rapiden Verschlechterung der Beziehungen zwischen Brüssel und Tbilisi geführt; diese befänden sich »auf einem historischen Tief«, so Paweł Herczyński, EU-Botschafter in Georgien, kurz vor der Wahl. 

Welchen Spielraum die EU für ihre Politik künftig haben und welche Rolle sie spielen kann, dürfte maßgeblich von den Entwicklungen der kommenden Wochen und Monate abhängen. Die Erfahrung der vergangenen Jahre zeigt, dass der auf eine langfristige Transformation ausgerichtete Ansatz der EU ohne entsprechenden politischen Willen auf der Seite ihrer Partner Grenzen hat.

Laut offiziellem Ergebnis hat die Regierungspartei »Georgischer Traum« (GT) die Wahl mit rund 54 Prozent der Stimmen gewonnen. Das stärkste Oppositionsbündnis erhielt rund 11 Prozent der Stimmen, insgesamt schafften vier Oppositionsparteien den Einzug ins Parlament. Das Ergebnis ist von Manipulationsvorwürfen überschattet: Sowohl die Staatspräsidentin als auch die führenden Oppositionsparteien bezeichneten die Wahl als illegitim; letztere lehnen ihre Mandate aus Protest ab und fordern Neuwahlen. Während die internationale Beobachtermission um ODIHR die ungleichen Bedingungen im Wahlkampf unterstreicht sowie die tiefgreifende politische Polarisierung im Land, gehen lokale Wahlbeobachter:innen einen Schritt weiter. Sie fordern die Annullierung der Abstimmung.

Kaum nur ein Déjà-vu 

Bereits bei der Parlamentswahl 2020 sprach die Opposition von Manipulation und boykottierte das Parlament. Damals gelang es unter Vermittlung der EU, die Krise zumindest temporär zu entschärfen – ein Szenario, für dessen Wiederholung die Voraussetzungen heute noch ungünstiger scheinen.

Zum einen hat die politische Polarisierung weiter zugenommen und erfasst mittlerweile auch Bereiche wie Kultur und Universitäten. Der »Georgische Traum« hatte gar angekündigt, im Falle eines Wahlsieges zentrale Oppositionsparteien gänzlich verbieten zu wollen. Die notorisch fragmentierte Opposition hatte sich im Vorfeld der Wahl unter der Schirmherrschaft der Staatspräsidentin der »Georgischen Charta« verschrieben, einer Roadmap für Reformen und den Weg in die EU. Unterstützung findet dieser Kurs insbesondere auf Seiten der liberalen Zivilgesellschaft, aber auch der jungen Generation. Wie geschlossen die Opposition letztlich in der kommenden Zeit agieren wird, bleibt abzuwarten. 

Zum anderen dürfte es der EU ungleich schwerer fallen, als Vermittlerin zwischen den politischen Lagern aufzutreten. Noch stärker als 2020 wird sie als Akteurin in der Auseinandersetzung wahrgenommen. Während der GT den westlichen Partnern Umsturzpläne und das Drängen Georgiens in einen Krieg mit Russland unterstellte, machte die EU deutlich, dass der vom GT eingeschlagene Weg nicht mit europäischen Werten und demokratischen Prinzipien vereinbar ist.

Fragen auch für die EU

Die Eigenstilisierung des Georgischen Traums als Antikriegspartei mit einer Kampagne, die auf Ängste vor einer möglichen Ausweitung der russischen Aggression setzte, mag wahltaktischen Erwägungen geschuldet sein. Nichtsdestotrotz weist dieser Fokus auf eine Leerstelle in den EU-Debatten hin. Diese betrifft Georgiens Sicherheit in einem äußerst prekären geopolitischen Umfeld, zumal das Land keine direkte Grenze zur EU hat. Auch der Umgang mit den ungelösten Konflikten um Südossetien und Abchasien, nicht zuletzt mit Blick auf einen EU-Beitrittsprozess, wird unzureichend thematisiert. 

Hinzu kommt, dass Georgien in den vergangenen Jahren ein wirtschaftliches Wachstum verzeichnete, die mit einer Annäherung an die EU verbundenen Hoffnungen auf Wohlstandseffekte aber hinter den Erwartungen zurückgeblieben sind. 2023 war die EU der wichtigste Handelspartner Georgiens, aber Russland spielt eine zentrale Rolle als Absatzmarkt für Georgiens Hauptexportgüter, wie Wein, Wasser und Spirituosen. Russland, so ein Ergebnis des Caucasus Barometer 2024, sehen nur verschwindend geringe ein Prozent der Befragten als Entwicklungsmodell. Doch auch die EU muss Lösungen und Angebote für die konkreten sicherheitspolitischen und sozioökonomischen Herausforderungen bieten, um attraktiv zu bleiben. 

In den letzten Tagen des Wahlkampfes in den USA verstärken die Rivalen Kamala Harris und Donald Trump ihre Kampagnen in den entscheidenden Bundesstaaten. Über den aktuellen Stand im US-Wahlkampf spricht Dr. Marco Overhaus, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, bei WELT TV.

Saudi-Arabien tritt entschlossen und finanzstark in den geopolitischen Wettbewerb um mineralische Rohstoffe ein. Im Rahmen der Vision 2030 sollen die lokale Weiterverarbeitung und die industrielle Wertschöpfung gestärkt werden. Derzeit verschafft sich Saudi-Arabien mineralische Rohstoffe durch internationale Beteiligungen und Abnahme­verträge, und langfristig soll auch der heimische Bergbau ausgeweitet wer­den. Viele Vor­haben befinden sich noch in der Konzeptionsphase. Für die Verwirk­lichung seiner Pläne ist Saudi-Arabien auf internationale Partner angewiesen. Als geopolitisch »neu­trales Bindeglied« zwischen den Großmächten sucht das Königreich die Annäherung an China, tritt zugleich aber in direkte Konkurrenz zur Volksrepublik. Parallel bietet sich Saudi-Arabien dem Westen als Partner für die Rohstoffdiversifizierung an. Für die EU erscheint eine Kooperation mit Saudi-Arabien als Option, um die eigene Roh­stoffversorgung zu sichern – doch wichtige Grundvoraussetzungen für eine stra­tegische Partnerschaft sind bisher nicht erfüllt.

As Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed continues to renege on the Pretoria Agreement that ended hostilities two years ago, infighting within the TPLF further threatens the tenuous stability in war-shattered Tigray.

Eine existenzielle Bedrohung nennt Kamala Harris den Klimawandel; Donald Trump sieht ihn als Hoax, also Schwindel, an. Während Trump versuchen würde, möglichst viele Maßnahmen rückgängig zu machen, würde Harris Joe Bidens Kurs wohl weiterverfolgen.

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IPI in partnership with Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, cohosted a policy forum on “National Action Plans for National Challenges: Addressing Environmental Crises through the WPS Agenda” on October 24th.

The women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda has recently expanded to include issues outside of “traditional conflict,” such as climate change and environmental disasters. As the agenda has evolved, this expansion has become a key part of contextualizing and applying WPS principles and priorities in different countries. However, despite recognizing that preparing for disasters and climate emergencies are gendered processes, few national action plans (NAPs) on WPS incorporate specific language about disasters. Incorporating disaster preparedness and climate considerations into NAPs is an important way to consider peace through a feminist viewpoint and define it as more than just the absence of violent conflict. NAPs should be tailored to a specific country’s context and integrating disaster risk reduction (DRR) or climate dynamics more broadly can be a powerful way to make an NAP relevant to a country’s internal dynamics. Panelists at the event explored how the WPS agenda has been expanded to include climate and environmental concerns and how different member states contextualize these issues within their NAPs.

Welcoming Remarks:
Adam Lupel, Vice President and COO, International Peace Institute

Opening Remarks:
Shanti Shoji, Director of Programs, Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA
Irene Fellin, Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, NATO 

Speakers:
Sho Ono, Minister, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN
Katrina Fotovat, Principal Deputy Director, Office of Global Women’s Issues, US Department of State
Japhet Eichel, Associate Expert, Climate, Peace and Security, UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
Maryruth Belsey-Priebe, Co-Founder, aXXelerate
Harriette Williams Bright, WPS Humanitarian Action Compact Lead, UN Women

Interventions from the floor:
Miwako Kitamura, Researcher (specially appointed), International Research Institute of Disaster Science, Tohoku University
Dalal El Taher, Board Member at Syria Civil Defence, The White Helmets (Virtual)

Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace and Security, International Peace Institute

The post National Action Plans for National Challenges: Addressing Environmental Crises through the WPS Agenda appeared first on International Peace Institute.

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IPI in partnership with the Berghof Foundation, cohosted a policy forum on “Building Bridges for Nonviolent Change: The Role of Women as Insider Mediators” onn October 23rd. This event was held the day before the UN Security Council open debate on women, peace and security (WPS) and focused on the vital need to increase women’s participation in formal mediation processes.

This policy forum exposed multiple stakeholders in New York to the crucial work of women as informal bridge-builders in conflict situations, and discussed strategies for including their expertise in formal mediation processes. At the event, the Berghof Foundation launched research reports and a policy brief on the role of women mediators in recent protests in Venezuela, Thailand, and Iraq. These reports offer specific and actionable recommendations for how international donors and practitioners can fulfill capacity building and support needs to empower these women to sustain and deepen their engagement, thereby expanding the potential for achieving peaceful change and conflict transformation.

Opening Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute
H.E. Jacqueline O’Neill, Canada’s Ambassador for Women, Peace and Security
H.E. Pascale Christine Baeriswyl, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the UN
H.E. Arlene Tickner, Ambassador-At-Large for Gender Issues and Global Feminist Politics, Government of Colombia

Speakers:
Rachel Gasser, Senior Adviser, Negotiation and Mediation Support, Berghof Foundation
Isabella Picón, Activist and Researcher (Venezuela)
Nang Raw Zahkung, Peace Practitioner and Facilitator (Myanmar)
Tahani Abbas Ali Balalelsheib, Women Activist and Human Rights Defender (Sudan)
Sarah Taylor, Policy Specialist, Women, Peace and Security and Resilience, UN Women

Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace and Security, International Peace Institute

The post Building Bridges for Nonviolent Change: The Role of Women as Insider Mediators appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Event Video 
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IPI in partnership with the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, and the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN, cohosted the launch event of the 2024 Multilateralism Index on October 17th.

IPI and IEP launched the Multilateralism Index in September 2022. Two years later, we launched a refined and updated version of the index to assess changes in international cooperation over the decade between 2013 and 2023. By providing a quantitative assessment of the multilateral system, the Index provides an analytic tool to inform decision-making and guide political attention.

This launch event presented the key findings of the 2024 Multilateralism Index. It also considered concrete ways to create a stronger, more nimble multilateral system.

Opening remarks:
H.E. James Larsen, Permanent Representative of Australia to the UN
Erik Laursen, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Denmark to the UN

Presentation of the 2024 Multilateralism Index:
Albert Trithart, Editor and Research Fellow, International Peace Institute

Panelists:
H.E. Maritza Chan, Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the UN
Minh-Thu Pham, Co-founder and CEO at Project Starling, Nonresident Scholar at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Moderator:
Adam Lupel, Vice President and COO, International Peace Institute

Closing remarks:
Volker Lehmann, Senior Policy Analyst, The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) New York Office

The post Tracking the Past to Chart the Future Through the 2024 Multilateralism Index appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Zu den Ergebnissen der heutigen Sitzung des Rates der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) ein Statement von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die EZB ist dabei, ihren Fehler zu korrigieren und nun schneller und stärker als bisher die Zinsen zu senken. Die jüngste Zinssenkung ist richtig und notwendig, denn die Wirtschaft der Eurozone – und insbesondere in Deutschland – entwickelt sich schwächer als gedacht, eine wirkliche Erholung kommt nicht in Fahrt. 

Die Inflation ist stärker als erwartet gesunken und vor allem die schwache Kreditvergabe an Unternehmen und Bürger*innen bleibt eine Sorge. Steigende Löhne und höhere Kosten bei den Dienstleistungen dürften die Inflation temporär zwar wieder etwas erhöhen, das sollte die Zentralbank aber nicht von ihrem Zinssenkungspfad abbringen. 

Die Wirtschaft der Eurozone wird von der Zinssenkung profitieren, die Geldpolitik allein kann die Wirtschaft aber nicht auf Trab bringen. Sie braucht in der gesamten Währungsunion und vor allem in Deutschland dringend stärkere Unterstützung durch die Wirtschaftspolitik. Die Finanzpolitik tut auch in Deutschland zu wenig, um Unternehmen und Bürge*rinnen in dieser schwierigen Transformation finanziell stärker zu unterstützen. Dies bedeutet, dass es für die EZB mittelfristig schwieriger wird, ihr Mandat der Preisstabilität zu erfüllen. 

Wir müssen uns auf zwei weitere turbulente Jahre einstellen. Die wirtschaftlichen Risiken sind enorm – durch eine mögliche erneute Präsidentschaft Donald Trumps, geopolitische Konflikte und hohe Unsicherheit. Dadurch dürfte sich auch die Inflation sehr volatil verhalten. 

Die EZB muss schneller und flexibler werden, um auf wirtschaftliche Entwicklungen zu reagieren und ihrem Mandat der Preisstabilität besser gerecht werden zu können. Unsere jüngste Studie am DIW Berlin zeigt, dass die EZB im Jahr 2022 zu spät die Zinsen erhöht hat und durch ein früheres Handeln einen Teil der hohen Inflation hätte verhindern können. 2024 nun agiert die EZB erneut zu zögerlich und muss jetzt die verlorene Zeit aufholen.