Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Re-elected French President Emmanuel Macron has lost his absolute majority in parliament. In the final stages of the parliamentary election campaign, economic policy had come into focus as Macron came under pressure due to the populist proposals of the left from the EU-sceptic Jean-Luc Mélenchon. The left-wing alliance is now clearly the strongest opposition camp, while Marine Le Pen’s party, “Rassemblement National”, increased its number of seats more than tenfold. This means that in the next five years, Macron will not only have to articulate his economic policy goals more clearly and campaign for greater understanding and acceptance among the population, but also build on the support of other political forces in parliament. This applies in particular to the planned pension reform, in which Macron wants to raise the retirement age from the current 62 in order to ease the pressure on public finances. For although the economic situation at the start of his second term in office has been better than expected, there is considerable social discontent, which was also reflected in the low voter turnout.

The Covid pandemic was the biggest economic shock to France since the Second World War. Overall, however, the country weathered it well. The combination of a high vaccination rate with generous fiscal policy support and a stable level of private investment has proved successful.

The EU has played a major role in this positive development. Together, the Member States have been able to drive vaccine development, create financial space in budgets with the suspension of the fiscal rules, and provide funding for investment through the “Next Generation EU” programme.

The French government has also taken numerous measures to cushion rising energy prices and inflation, especially for lower-income households, including a one-off inflation compensation payment and a cap on the gas price. As a result, the inflation rate in the second-largest EU state is one of the lowest in the Union. In terms of energy policy, France is significantly less dependent on Russia than other Central and Eastern European states, as the lion’s share of energy is generated in nuclear power plants.

At the beginning of this year, economic growth forecasts were far above what could have been hoped for at the start of the health crisis. Unemployment – a particularly important metric in French politics – has continued to fall during the pandemic. At 7.4 per cent, it is now at its lowest level since the 2008 financial crisis. Measured against these macroeconomic factors, Macron’s first term in office can certainly be viewed in a positive light.

A good economic situation should give an incumbent government a tailwind in elections, but the first round of presidential elections showed how fragmented the society is. Both the extreme right and the extreme left were able to record large gains. This was particularly evident among young and low-income voters. In both demographics, two-thirds cast their votes for Le Pen or Mélenchon.

This highlights the anger and disappointment with politics. There is a low level of trust in elites, politics, and the media, of which the two major national parties have been the latest victims. Both have almost slipped into political irrelevance. The low voter turnout confirms this development. After a historically low 47.5 per cent in the first round of parliamentary elections, not even half of those eligible to vote went to the polls in the second round.

With social spending of more than 30 per cent of gross domestic product, France was the OECD frontrunner in 2019. Nonetheless, there is a sense of gross social injustice that has triggered a desire for radical change. In a September 2021 poll by the Ipsos Institute, 75 per cent of respondents said France was in decline. It seems that the population does not feel that it is participating in the positive macroeconomic developments. This feeling was epitomised by the so-called Yellow Vests protests, which in 2018 were initially directed against a higher levy on fuel, but then expanded to oppose general tax policies and government. Macron, who presents himself as a president of the centre, is seen by many as the president of the rich.

In his second term, Macron’s biggest challenge will be the lack of a majority in parliament in addition to countering social discontent with his economic policy. In this context, the ability to reach political compromises in parliament will be a test for the French political system. If successful, it could increase citizens’ acceptance of the government’s measures. Macron has five years to overcome the ideological rifts in economic policy and convince society that the EU is not an obstacle but a means to ensure the prosperity of the French people. On the other hand, it is likely that the increasing political polarisation and threatened dysfunctionality of the parliament could hinder any reasonable dialogue on economic policy.

With this in mind, the external macroeconomic environment is becoming increasingly unfavourable, at least at the beginning of Macron’s second term, mainly because of the accumulating consequences of the war in Ukraine, such as inflation and economic slowdown. Debt financing costs are also likely to rise in the future. In addition, the EU is due to return to discussions on fiscal rules reforms in 2023. This will create fertile ground for populist forces to criticise Macron’s economic policy.

Der wiedergewählte französische Präsident Emmanuel Macron hat seine absolute Mehrheit im Parlament verloren. In der Endphase des Wahlkampfes war die Wirtschaftspolitik in den Fokus gerückt, da Macron durch die populistischen Vorschläge der Linken um den EU-kritischen Jean-Luc Mélenchon unter Druck geriet. Das linke Bündnis ist nun das deutlich stärkste Oppositionslager, während Marine Le Pens Partei »Rassemblement National« ihre Sitze mehr als verzehnfachen konnte. Damit muss Macron in den nächsten fünf Jahren nicht nur seine wirtschaftspolitischen Ziele klarer formulieren sowie für mehr Verständnis und Akzeptanz in der Bevölkerung werben, sondern auch auf die Unterstützung anderer Lager im Parlament bauen. Dies betrifft insbesondere die geplante Rentenreform, bei der Macron das Renteneintrittsalter von bisher 62 Jahren anheben will, um den Druck auf die öffentlichen Finanzen zu verringern. Denn obwohl die wirtschaftliche Lage zu Beginn seiner zweiten Amtszeit besser ist als erwartet, gibt es eine erhebliche soziale Unzufriedenheit, die sich auch in der geringen Wahlbeteiligung zeigte.

Die Corona-Pandemie war der größte wirtschaftliche Schock für Frankreich seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Insgesamt hat das Land diesen jedoch gut überstanden. Das Zusammenspiel von einer hohen Impfquote mit üppigen fiskalpolitischen Unterstützungen sowie einem stabilen privaten Investitionsniveau hat sich bewährt.

Bei dieser positiven Entwicklung hat die EU eine wesentliche Rolle gespielt. Gemeinsam konnten die Mitgliedsstaaten die Impfstoffentwicklung vorantreiben, mit der Aussetzung der Fiskalregeln finanziellen Spielraum in den Haushalten schaffen und durch das Programm »Next Generation EU« Mittel für Investitionen bereitstellen.

Die französische Regierung hat zudem zahlreiche Maßnahmen ergriffen, um steigende Energiepreise und Inflation vor allem für einkommensschwächere Haushalte abzufedern, darunter ein einmaliger Inflationsausgleich und eine Gaspreisdeckelung. Folglich ist die Inflationsrate des zweitgrößten EU-Staats eine der niedrigsten in der EU. In der Energiepolitik ist Frankreich deutlich unabhängiger von Russland als andere mittel- und osteuropäische Staaten, da der Löwenanteil der Energie in Atomkraftwerken erzeugt wird.

Zu Beginn dieses Jahres lagen die Wachstumsprognosen der Wirtschaft weit über dem, was man sich zu Beginn des Notstands hat erhoffen können. Die Arbeitslosigkeit – eine besonders wichtige Kennzahl in der französischen Politik – ist während der Pandemie weiter zurückgegangen. Sie liegt nun mit 7,4 Prozent auf dem niedrigsten Niveau seit der Finanzkrise 2008. Gemessen an diesen makroökonomischen Faktoren ist die erste Amtszeit Macrons durchaus positiv zu werten.

Eine gute wirtschaftliche Lage sollte einer amtierenden Regierung bei Wahlen Rückenwind verschaffen. Doch die erste Präsidentschaftswahlrunde hat gezeigt, wie zersplittert die Gesellschaft ist. Sowohl die rechte als auch die linke Extreme konnten große Zuwächse verzeichnen. Besonders deutlich war dies bei jungen und einkommensschwachen Wählerinnen und Wählern. In beiden Demografien gaben zwei Drittel ihre Stimme für Le Pen oder Mélenchon ab.

Dies verdeutlicht die Wut und die Enttäuschung über die Politik. Es herrscht geringes Vertrauen in Eliten, Politik und Medien, dessen Opfer zuletzt die zwei großen Volksparteien wurden. Beide sind fast in die politische Bedeutungslosigkeit abgerutscht. Die niedrige Wahlbeteiligung bestätigt diese Entwicklung. Nach einem historisch niedrigen Wert von nur 47,5 Prozent in der ersten Runde der Parlamentswahlen, ist auch in der zweiten Runde nicht einmal die Hälfte der Wahlberechtigten zur Urne geschritten.

Mit Sozialausgaben von mehr als 30 Prozent des Bruttoinlandsprodukts war Frankreich 2019 OECD-Spitzenreiter. Nichtsdestotrotz herrscht ein Gefühl grober sozialer Ungerechtigkeit, der den Wunsch nach einer radikalen Veränderung auslöst. In einer Umfrage des Ipsos Institut im September 2021 gaben 75 Prozent der Befragten an, dass sich Frankreich im Abstieg befinde. Es scheint, als habe die Bevölkerung das Gefühl, nicht an der positiven gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung teilzuhaben. Dieses Gefühl wurde durch die sogenannten Gelbwesten-Proteste verkörpert, die sich 2018 zunächst gegen eine höhere Abgabe auf Treibstoff richteten, dann aber gegen die allgemeine Steuerpolitik und Regierung ausweiteten. Macron, der sich als Präsident der Mitte präsentiert, gilt vielen als Präsident der Reichen.

In der zweiten Amtszeit wird die fehlende Mehrheit im Parlament für Macron nun die größte Herausforderung sein – auch um mit seiner Wirtschaftspolitik der sozialen Unzufriedenheit zu begegnen. In diesem Zusammenhang wird die Fähigkeit, im Parlament politische Kompromisse zu erzielen, ein Test für das französische politische System. Wenn dies gelingt, könnte es die Akzeptanz der Bürger für die Maßnahmen der Regierung erhöhen. Macron hat fünf Jahre Zeit, um die ideologischen Gräben in der Wirtschaftspolitik zu überwinden und die Gesellschaft davon zu überzeugen, dass die EU kein Hindernis, sondern ein Mittel ist, um den Wohlstand der Französinnen und Franzosen zu sichern. Andererseits ist es wahrscheinlich, dass die zunehmende politische Polarisierung und drohende Dysfunktionalität des Parlaments jeden vernünftigen Dialog über die Wirtschaftspolitik behindert.

Mit Blick hierauf wird das externe makroökonomische Umfeld zumindest zu Beginn der zweiten Amtszeit Macrons immer ungünstiger, vor allem wegen der zunehmenden Folgen des Krieges in der Ukraine wie Inflation und Konjunkturabschwächung. Auch die Kosten der Schuldenfinanzierung dürften in Zukunft steigen. Zudem steht der EU im Jahr 2023 die Diskussion über die Reformen der Fiskalregeln an. Dies ist fruchtbarer Nährboden für populistische Kräfte, um Kritik an der Wirtschaftspolitik Macrons zu üben.

Whereas South American countries are experiencing increased population movements in the context of climate change, the international climate governance agenda calls for the adoption of specialised legislation and for enhanced cooperation among different policy frameworks. The revision and update of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) provide a window of opportunity to mainstream human mobility discussions in climate policy frameworks and, thus, support the uptake of effective measures to address the topic.
This briefing paper provides an overview of how the climate change–human mobility nexus has been addressed in the NDCs submitted thus far by South American countries and identifies pathways towards improved management of population movements in revised NDCs. To date, a partial integration of the human mobility perspective prevails: References to the topic indicate a slow – but progressive – acknowledgment of the impacts of a changing climate in vulnerable communities, which may include human displacement. Given the urgent need to move forward from the recognition of the topic to the establishment of effective measures to tackle forced population movements associated with the impacts of climate change, the updating of NDCs – currently under way in the region – entails an opportunity to incorporate strategies aimed at enhancing the management of human mobility. Ongoing discussions linked to the inclusion of the human mobility dimension should happen in a holistic manner, taking socio-environmental approaches into consideration. Human displacement and adaptation to climate change are akin processes that need to be aligned with mitigation and related measures. An improved adaptation component of NDCs depends on the participation of distinct actors (such as national departments and agencies, as well as non-governmental and civil society organisations focussed on climate adaptation) at the national level, and not only those dealing with mitigation strategies. Likewise, it should take the incorporation of practical and evidence-based measures into account. These include, for instance, methods to promote the consultation and effective participation of affected communities and strategies to strengthen their resilience. Furthermore, revised NDCs should call for governance and legal frameworks that include a clear definition of roles and the establishment of effective measures, rooted in the commitment to protect the human rights of affected and vulnerable populations. Revised NDCs should set up policy options to prepare for and respond to human displacement, aiming to reduce communities’ vulnerability and exposure. The recognition of human mobility in the context of climate change as a common challenge faced by South American countries entails a window of opportunity to enhance the development of effective measures to address the topic, as well as to foster the implementation of coherent long-term strategies that go beyond short-term political priorities.

Whereas South American countries are experiencing increased population movements in the context of climate change, the international climate governance agenda calls for the adoption of specialised legislation and for enhanced cooperation among different policy frameworks. The revision and update of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) provide a window of opportunity to mainstream human mobility discussions in climate policy frameworks and, thus, support the uptake of effective measures to address the topic.
This briefing paper provides an overview of how the climate change–human mobility nexus has been addressed in the NDCs submitted thus far by South American countries and identifies pathways towards improved management of population movements in revised NDCs. To date, a partial integration of the human mobility perspective prevails: References to the topic indicate a slow – but progressive – acknowledgment of the impacts of a changing climate in vulnerable communities, which may include human displacement. Given the urgent need to move forward from the recognition of the topic to the establishment of effective measures to tackle forced population movements associated with the impacts of climate change, the updating of NDCs – currently under way in the region – entails an opportunity to incorporate strategies aimed at enhancing the management of human mobility. Ongoing discussions linked to the inclusion of the human mobility dimension should happen in a holistic manner, taking socio-environmental approaches into consideration. Human displacement and adaptation to climate change are akin processes that need to be aligned with mitigation and related measures. An improved adaptation component of NDCs depends on the participation of distinct actors (such as national departments and agencies, as well as non-governmental and civil society organisations focussed on climate adaptation) at the national level, and not only those dealing with mitigation strategies. Likewise, it should take the incorporation of practical and evidence-based measures into account. These include, for instance, methods to promote the consultation and effective participation of affected communities and strategies to strengthen their resilience. Furthermore, revised NDCs should call for governance and legal frameworks that include a clear definition of roles and the establishment of effective measures, rooted in the commitment to protect the human rights of affected and vulnerable populations. Revised NDCs should set up policy options to prepare for and respond to human displacement, aiming to reduce communities’ vulnerability and exposure. The recognition of human mobility in the context of climate change as a common challenge faced by South American countries entails a window of opportunity to enhance the development of effective measures to address the topic, as well as to foster the implementation of coherent long-term strategies that go beyond short-term political priorities.

Whereas South American countries are experiencing increased population movements in the context of climate change, the international climate governance agenda calls for the adoption of specialised legislation and for enhanced cooperation among different policy frameworks. The revision and update of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) provide a window of opportunity to mainstream human mobility discussions in climate policy frameworks and, thus, support the uptake of effective measures to address the topic.
This briefing paper provides an overview of how the climate change–human mobility nexus has been addressed in the NDCs submitted thus far by South American countries and identifies pathways towards improved management of population movements in revised NDCs. To date, a partial integration of the human mobility perspective prevails: References to the topic indicate a slow – but progressive – acknowledgment of the impacts of a changing climate in vulnerable communities, which may include human displacement. Given the urgent need to move forward from the recognition of the topic to the establishment of effective measures to tackle forced population movements associated with the impacts of climate change, the updating of NDCs – currently under way in the region – entails an opportunity to incorporate strategies aimed at enhancing the management of human mobility. Ongoing discussions linked to the inclusion of the human mobility dimension should happen in a holistic manner, taking socio-environmental approaches into consideration. Human displacement and adaptation to climate change are akin processes that need to be aligned with mitigation and related measures. An improved adaptation component of NDCs depends on the participation of distinct actors (such as national departments and agencies, as well as non-governmental and civil society organisations focussed on climate adaptation) at the national level, and not only those dealing with mitigation strategies. Likewise, it should take the incorporation of practical and evidence-based measures into account. These include, for instance, methods to promote the consultation and effective participation of affected communities and strategies to strengthen their resilience. Furthermore, revised NDCs should call for governance and legal frameworks that include a clear definition of roles and the establishment of effective measures, rooted in the commitment to protect the human rights of affected and vulnerable populations. Revised NDCs should set up policy options to prepare for and respond to human displacement, aiming to reduce communities’ vulnerability and exposure. The recognition of human mobility in the context of climate change as a common challenge faced by South American countries entails a window of opportunity to enhance the development of effective measures to address the topic, as well as to foster the implementation of coherent long-term strategies that go beyond short-term political priorities.

Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) are the second- and fourth-largest providers of official development assistance (ODA) worldwide and are key actors in driving international policy discussions on global development in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the G7, the G20 and other key groupings and platforms.
The development policies of both countries witnessed important convergence and detailed cooperation during the first decade of this millennium – a period when Western countries understood development cooperation as a source of considerable soft power, which was demonstrated in rising budgets and like-minded policy directions.
The austerity policies that followed the global economic and financial crisis, and the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) in 2016, have challenged the bilateral relationship in the development policy area between Germany and the UK. The UK’s departure from the EU has reduced the number of joint interactions and corresponding opportunities for identifying cooperation initiatives.
Halfway through the period envisaged for the completion of the 2030 Agenda, both countries are adjusting their development policies, seeking to determine their future European roles and global development ambitions, but they remain key partners in global development. Both the UK and Germany have recently revised or are in the process of preparing development policy strategies as part of their integrated foreign policies – a reflection process which in recent months has been challenged to adjust to the implications of the war in Ukraine. The case remains strong for regular exchanges and cooperation on development policy between both countries, including by intensifying dialogues and resuming formal secondments between the FCDO and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Two areas in particular offer good prospects.
First of all, the UK and Germany should closely work together to deliver on the current G7 Presidency agenda – including the key focus on infrastructure investment, as initiated during last year’s UK Presidency. Other key opportunities for cooperation include gender and climate action, as well as the provision of global public goods.
Secondly, Germany and the UK should seek to engage in and harness the role of the OECD as a provider of key standards for international development policy and as an important forum for peer learning. As key providers of global development finance, the legitimacy of its reporting system is essential to both countries’ influence and contribution to global development.

Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) are the second- and fourth-largest providers of official development assistance (ODA) worldwide and are key actors in driving international policy discussions on global development in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the G7, the G20 and other key groupings and platforms.
The development policies of both countries witnessed important convergence and detailed cooperation during the first decade of this millennium – a period when Western countries understood development cooperation as a source of considerable soft power, which was demonstrated in rising budgets and like-minded policy directions.
The austerity policies that followed the global economic and financial crisis, and the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) in 2016, have challenged the bilateral relationship in the development policy area between Germany and the UK. The UK’s departure from the EU has reduced the number of joint interactions and corresponding opportunities for identifying cooperation initiatives.
Halfway through the period envisaged for the completion of the 2030 Agenda, both countries are adjusting their development policies, seeking to determine their future European roles and global development ambitions, but they remain key partners in global development. Both the UK and Germany have recently revised or are in the process of preparing development policy strategies as part of their integrated foreign policies – a reflection process which in recent months has been challenged to adjust to the implications of the war in Ukraine. The case remains strong for regular exchanges and cooperation on development policy between both countries, including by intensifying dialogues and resuming formal secondments between the FCDO and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Two areas in particular offer good prospects.
First of all, the UK and Germany should closely work together to deliver on the current G7 Presidency agenda – including the key focus on infrastructure investment, as initiated during last year’s UK Presidency. Other key opportunities for cooperation include gender and climate action, as well as the provision of global public goods.
Secondly, Germany and the UK should seek to engage in and harness the role of the OECD as a provider of key standards for international development policy and as an important forum for peer learning. As key providers of global development finance, the legitimacy of its reporting system is essential to both countries’ influence and contribution to global development.

Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) are the second- and fourth-largest providers of official development assistance (ODA) worldwide and are key actors in driving international policy discussions on global development in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the G7, the G20 and other key groupings and platforms.
The development policies of both countries witnessed important convergence and detailed cooperation during the first decade of this millennium – a period when Western countries understood development cooperation as a source of considerable soft power, which was demonstrated in rising budgets and like-minded policy directions.
The austerity policies that followed the global economic and financial crisis, and the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) in 2016, have challenged the bilateral relationship in the development policy area between Germany and the UK. The UK’s departure from the EU has reduced the number of joint interactions and corresponding opportunities for identifying cooperation initiatives.
Halfway through the period envisaged for the completion of the 2030 Agenda, both countries are adjusting their development policies, seeking to determine their future European roles and global development ambitions, but they remain key partners in global development. Both the UK and Germany have recently revised or are in the process of preparing development policy strategies as part of their integrated foreign policies – a reflection process which in recent months has been challenged to adjust to the implications of the war in Ukraine. The case remains strong for regular exchanges and cooperation on development policy between both countries, including by intensifying dialogues and resuming formal secondments between the FCDO and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Two areas in particular offer good prospects.
First of all, the UK and Germany should closely work together to deliver on the current G7 Presidency agenda – including the key focus on infrastructure investment, as initiated during last year’s UK Presidency. Other key opportunities for cooperation include gender and climate action, as well as the provision of global public goods.
Secondly, Germany and the UK should seek to engage in and harness the role of the OECD as a provider of key standards for international development policy and as an important forum for peer learning. As key providers of global development finance, the legitimacy of its reporting system is essential to both countries’ influence and contribution to global development.

This article frames imperial lifestyles as a problem of global justice and discusses the spatial logic that engenders the actual discrepancy between this moral standard of equal rights and reality. It claims that the notion of ELSEWHERE, as Brand and Wissen (2022) put it, plays a central role in understanding the conditions that allow this grossly unjust global separation between responsibility and effect to be stable. In doing this, it establishes the concept of communities of justice that determine the boundaries of moral responsibility and analyses the global spatial logic that underlies the course of these boundaries, as they are experienced in everyday life. The Westphalian system of sovereign nation states is its main component but certainly not the only one. Finally, it sheds light on current attempts to challenge this spatial logic as well as their potentials and limitations.

This article frames imperial lifestyles as a problem of global justice and discusses the spatial logic that engenders the actual discrepancy between this moral standard of equal rights and reality. It claims that the notion of ELSEWHERE, as Brand and Wissen (2022) put it, plays a central role in understanding the conditions that allow this grossly unjust global separation between responsibility and effect to be stable. In doing this, it establishes the concept of communities of justice that determine the boundaries of moral responsibility and analyses the global spatial logic that underlies the course of these boundaries, as they are experienced in everyday life. The Westphalian system of sovereign nation states is its main component but certainly not the only one. Finally, it sheds light on current attempts to challenge this spatial logic as well as their potentials and limitations.

This article frames imperial lifestyles as a problem of global justice and discusses the spatial logic that engenders the actual discrepancy between this moral standard of equal rights and reality. It claims that the notion of ELSEWHERE, as Brand and Wissen (2022) put it, plays a central role in understanding the conditions that allow this grossly unjust global separation between responsibility and effect to be stable. In doing this, it establishes the concept of communities of justice that determine the boundaries of moral responsibility and analyses the global spatial logic that underlies the course of these boundaries, as they are experienced in everyday life. The Westphalian system of sovereign nation states is its main component but certainly not the only one. Finally, it sheds light on current attempts to challenge this spatial logic as well as their potentials and limitations.

Bonn, 20.06.2022. Die Bundesregierung startete Anfang 2022 mit einer ambitionierten Nachhaltigkeitsagenda in ihre G7-Präsidentschaft. Keine zwei Monate später sah sie sich einem russischen Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine gegenüber, der neue Prioritäten erforderlich macht und alte Gewissheiten in Frage stellt. Bundeskanzler Scholz hat deutlich gemacht, dass der russische Angriff eine Zeitenwende markiert. Auf dem G7-Gipfel, der vom 26. bis 28. Juni in Elmau stattfindet, wird die Kunst des Politischen darin liegen, kurzfristige Krisen zu lösen, ohne die langfristigen Herausforderungen aus dem Blick zu verlieren.

Während die Vereinten Nationen in ihrer Reaktion auf den russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine gespalten sind und die G20, mit Russland als Mitglied, mehr oder weniger paralysiert ist, präsentiert sich die G7 aktuell als eines der wenigen handlungsfähigen internationalen Foren. Die G7-Staaten haben nicht nur wirtschaftliche Sanktionen gegen Russland auf den Weg gebracht, sondern auch Finanz- und Unterstützungspakete für die Ukraine und deren Nachbarstaaten geschnürt. Die Entwicklungsminister*innen der G7 haben eine Globale Allianz für Ernährungssicherheit gegründet, welche die negativen Folgen des russischen Kriegs gegen die Ukraine abfedern soll.

So wichtig diese unmittelbaren Reaktionen der G7 auf den Krieg in der Ukraine sind, stellt sich vor allem die Frage, welche Antworten der Gipfel in Elmau auf die mittel- bis langfristigen Herausforderungen finden wird. Der Fokus soll im Folgenden auf der nachhaltigen wirtschaftlichen Erholung und der klimapolitischen Transformation liegen.

Für das Erreichen der globalen Nachhaltigkeitsziele zum Ende der Dekade ist es notwendig, einer „two-track recovery“ entgegen zu wirken, durch die Entwicklungsländer ins Hintertreffen geraten. Infolge der Covid-19-Pandemie waren die fiskalischen Spielräume vieler Entwicklungsländer bereits stark eingeschränkt. Es fällt ihnen daher schwer den sozio-ökonomischen Folgen der Pandemie zu begegnen und ihre Volkswirtschaften langfristig klimaneutral und -resilient umzubauen. Die Zahl der Länder, die vor Verschuldungsnotlagen stehen, hat sich seit 2015 verdoppelt. Die Folgen des Kriegs in der Ukraine und die Zinsanhebungen in den USA und der EU drohen diese Entwicklungen noch zu verschärfen. Zudem werden internationale Investoren die steigenden Klimarisiken in vielen Entwicklungsländern einpreisen, was deren Zugang zu internationalen Finanzmärkten weiter erschwert.

Die G7-Finanzminister*innen haben bisher nur auf das „Gemeinsame Rahmenwerk“ der G20 verwiesen, das helfen soll Schulden umzustrukturieren oder sogar zu erlassen. Eigene Initiativen der G7 zur Entschuldung von Entwicklungsländern sind bisher Mangelwahre. Der Verweis, dass auch China zur Entschuldung beitragen muss, ist richtig, aber nicht zielführend. Vielmehr sollten private Schuldner, die vor allem in den G7-Ländern ansässig sind, stärker in die Pflicht genommen werden. Zudem ist es geboten, Schuldenerlasse stärker an ökologisch-sozialen Transformationsprozessen oder Anpassungsmaßnahmen in vom Klimawandel bedrohten Ländern auszurichten.

Den Markenkern der im Januar vorgestellten Agenda der deutschen G7-Präsidentschaft bildete die klimapolitische Transformation. Auf ihrem Treffen Ende Mai haben die Klima-, Energie- und Umweltminister*innen der G7 sich darauf verständigt, eine überwiegend dekarbonisierte Stromversorgung bis zum Jahr 2035 zu erreichen und aus der Kohleverstromung auszusteigen, ohne sich bei letzterer aber auf ein konkretes Enddatum zu einigen. Von Bedeutung ist auch die Einsicht, dass es nicht ausreicht, die Klimakrise zu lösen, sondern dass im Rahmen eines integrativen Vorgehens auch die globale Biodiversitäts- und Verschmutzungskrise angegangen werden muss.

Im Bereich der internationalen Klimafinanzierung blieben die Finanzminister*innen bisher vage. Im Kommuniqué ihres Treffens im Mai findet sich nur der Satz, dass sie erwarten, das Ziel, jährlich 100 Milliarden US-Dollar zur Verfügung zu stellen, bis 2023 zu erfüllen. Mit Blick auf die zentralen Instrumente der G7 zur Förderung der klimapolitischen Transformation, vor allem eines offenen und kooperativen Klimaclubs und der „Just Energy Transition Partnerships“ mit ausgewählten Ländern, finden sich bisher auch nur Ankündigungen, aber noch wenig Konkretes.

Auf Ebene der Fachminister*innen wurden also wichtige Initiativen auf den Weg gebracht, trotz der notwendigen Reaktionen auf den Krieg in der Ukraine. Der Gipfel der Staats- und Regierungschefs in Elmau muss aber in zentralen Bereichen, wie der Klimapolitik oder mit Blick auf die Verschuldungskrise, konkrete Beschlüsse liefern, damit die G7-Präsidentschaft Deutschlands tatsächlich zur Erreichung der globalen Nachhaltigkeitsziele bis 2030 beiträgt.

Wichtig ist auch die multilaterale Einbettung der Initiativen der G7. Es ist daher gut, dass mit Indien, Indonesien, Südafrika und Argentinien wichtige G20-Mitglieder nach Elmau eingeladen sind und mit Senegal die aktuelle Präsidentschaft der Afrikanischen Union mit am Tisch sitzt. Mit diesen Ländern gilt es, konkrete Beschlüsse zu fassen, die dann in anderen, inklusiver zusammengesetzten Foren wie der G20 eingebracht werden können. Nur gemeinsam mit internationalen Partnern wird die G7 handlungsfähig sein.