Diplomacy & Crisis News

There’s little expectation the Taliban will make it easy to leave.

Michael Peck

World War II, South Pacific

American fighter planes took down Isoroku Yamamoto thanks to good intelligence, precise timing, and a little luck.

Here's What You Need To Remember: Yamamoto’s assassination is still significant because it has been cited as a precedent for today’s drone strikes. To be clear, there is no doubt that assassinating Yamamoto was legal according to the laws of war. He was an enemy soldier in uniform, flying in an enemy military aircraft that was attacked by uniformed U.S. military personnel in marked military aircraft.

Some sixty-eight years before U.S. special forces killed Osama bin Laden, America conducted an assassination of another kind.

This time, the target wasn’t a terrorist. It was the Japanese admiral who planned the Pearl Harbor operation. But the motive was the same: payback for a sneak attack on the United States.

In early 1943, Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Japanese Navy, was one of the most hated men in America. He was seen as the Asian Devil in naval dress, the fiend who treacherously struck peaceful, sleeping America. And when the United States saw a chance for payback in April 1943, there was no hesitation. Hence a code name unmistakable in its intent: Operation Vengeance.

As with today’s drone strikes, the operation began with an intercepted message. Except it wasn’t a call from a cell phone, but rather a routine military radio signal. In the spring of 1943, Japan was in trouble: the Americans had captured Guadalcanal despite a terrible sacrifice of Japanese ships and aircraft. Stung by criticism that senior commanders were not visiting the front to ascertain the situation, Yamamoto resolved to visit naval air units on the South Pacific island of Bougainville.

As was customary, a coded signal was sent on April 13, 1943, to the various Japanese commands in the area, listing the admiral’s itinerary as well as the number of transport planes and fighter escorts in his party. But American codebreakers had been reading Japanese diplomatic and military messages for years, including those in the JN-25 code, used in various forms by the Imperial Navy throughout World War II. The Yamamoto signal was sent in the new JN-25D variant, but that didn’t stop American cryptanalysts from deciphering it in less than a day.

Adm. Chester Nimitz, the U.S. commander in the Pacific, authorized an operation to shoot down Yamamoto’s plane. With typical spleen, Pacific Fleet commander William “Bull” Halsey issued his own unambiguous message: “TALLY HO X LET’S GET THE BASTARD.”

Yet getting Yamamoto was easier said than done. Navy and Marine fighters like the F4F Wildcat and F4U Corsair didn’t have the range to intercept Yamamoto’s aircraft over Bougainville, four hundred miles from the nearest American air base on Guadalcanal. The only fighter with long enough legs was the U.S. Army Air Forces’ twin-engined Lockheed P-38G Lightning.

But even the P-38s faced a difficult task. To avoid detection, American planners wanted them to fly “at least 50 miles offshore of these islands, which meant dead-reckoning over 400 miles over water at fifty feet or less, a prodigious feat of navigation,” according to a history of the Thirteenth Fighter Command, the parent organization of the 339th Fighter Squadron that flew the mission.

Even worse, the Lightnings had no AWACS radar aircraft or land-based radar to guide them to the target, or even to tell them where Yamamoto’s plane was. Nor could the U.S. aircraft loiter over Bougainville in the midst of numerous Japanese fighter bases. They would essentially have to intercept Yamamoto where and when he was scheduled to be.

However, by calculating the speed of the Japanese G4M Betty bomber that would carry Yamamoto, probable wind speed, the enemy’s probable flight path, and assuming that Yamamoto would be as punctual as he was reputed to be, American planners estimated the intercept would occur at 9:35 a.m.

The Americans assigned eighteen P-38s for the mission, of which a flight of four would pounce on Yamamoto’s plane, while the remainder would climb above as top cover against Japanese fighters. Two Lightnings aborted on the way to Bougainville, leaving just sixteen to perform the mission.

That the Americans arrived just a minute early, at 9:34, was remarkable. Even more remarkable was that the Japanese appeared on time a minute later. Flying at 4,500 feet were two Betty bombers, one carrying Yamamoto and the other his chief of staff, Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki. They were escorted by six A6M Zero fighters keeping watch 1,500 feet above them.

Still undetected, twelve Lightnings climbed to eighteen thousand feet. The remaining four attacked the Bettys, with the first pair, flown by Capt. Thomas Lanphier Jr. and Lt. Rex Barber, closing in for the kill. As the two bombers dived to evade the interceptors, the American pilots couldn’t even be sure which one carried Yamamoto.

Lanphier engaged the escorts while Barber pursued the two bombers. Barber’s cannon shells and bullets slammed into the first Betty, an aircraft model notorious for being fragile and flammable. With its left engine damaged, it slammed into the jungle. Then the second Betty, attacked by three of the P-38s, crashed into the water. The Americans had lucked out again: the Betty that crashed into the jungle, killing its crew and passengers, had carried Yamamoto. From the Betty that hit the water, Admiral Ugaki survived (hours after Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945, Ugaki took off in a kamikaze and was never heard from again).

A Japanese search party hacked through the jungle until they found Yamamoto’s plane. “Afterward the Admiral’s body and the others were cremated and the ashes put into boxes,” recounts the Thirteenth Fighter Command history. “His cremation pit was filled, and two papaya trees, his favorite fruit, were planted on the mound. A shrine was erected, and Japanese naval personnel cared for the graves until the end of the war.”

Yamamoto’s remains were returned to Japan aboard the super battleship Musashi in May 1943 for a state funeral that drew a million mourners. For the Americans, euphoria and satisfaction were dogged by postwar controversy that lasted for sixty years over who actually shot down Yamamoto’s plane: Barber and Lanphier were credited with a half kill apiece, though many critics said Barber should have received full credit.

The irony was that Yamamoto was not the worst of America’s enemies. He was no pacifist, but nor was he as militaristic as the hard-core Japanese hard-liners. Yamamoto opposed the 1940 alliance with Nazi Germany, which he feared would drag Japan into a ruinous war. While he didn’t oppose war as a means of saving Japan from a crippling U.S. oil embargo in 1941 (his depiction as a peacemonger in the movie Tora! Tora! Tora! is wrong), he did warn Japanese leaders that “in the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain, I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.”

Did Yamamoto’s death affect the war? His Pearl Harbor operation was audacious and brilliant, but his poor strategy at Midway six months later destroyed Japan’s elite aircraft carrier force (ironically, it was also U.S. codebreaking that set the stage for the Midway disaster). By 1943, he was a sick and exhausted man. Perhaps he might have come up with a better late-war naval strategy than the disastrous battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. Yet not even the architect of Pearl Harbor could save Japan from defeat.

Yamamoto’s assassination is still significant because it has been cited as a precedent for today’s drone strikes. To be clear, there is no doubt that assassinating Yamamoto was legal according to the laws of war. He was an enemy soldier in uniform, flying in an enemy military aircraft that was attacked by uniformed U.S. military personnel in marked military aircraft. This is nothing new. In 1942, British commandos unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Rommel, and modern militaries devote great efforts to locating enemy headquarters to kill commanders and staffs.

But what’s really interesting is that compared with the controversy over today’s targeted assassinations, there was remarkably little fuss made over the decision to kill Yamamoto. The U.S. military treated it as a purely military matter that didn’t need civilian approval. Admiral Nimitz authorized the interception, and the orders were passed down the military chain of command. There was no presidential decision nor Justice Department review. It’s hard to imagine that the killing of a top Al Qaeda leader, let alone a top Russian, Chinese or North Korean commander, would be treated so routinely.

Yamamoto’s death was significant on the symbolic level. But in military terms, he was just another casualty of war.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This first appeared several years ago.

Image: Wikimedia

Will Smith

Afghanistan, South Asia

Without an adequate examination of the twenty-year nation building and counterinsurgency project that preceded the withdrawal—which McMaster himself was intimately involved in—he may be able to deflect blame, but he will never develop a full understanding of the many factors that led to the heartbreaking fall of Kabul.

With the failure of America’s two-decade-long nation building project in Afghanistan on full display, an array of former officials have stepped into the spotlight to offer their thoughts on why the Taliban has been able to consolidate control over Afghanistan so quickly. Speaking at a recent Wilson Center event, H.R. McMaster, the retired U.S. Army lieutenant general who served in Afghanistan and was National Security Advisor to former President Donald Trump, attempted to place blame for the Taliban’s gut-wrenching victory on the “defeatists” who advocated for an end to America’s longest war.

Two key claims ran through McMaster’s talk at the “Hindsight Up Front: Afghanistan” event hosted by the Wilson Center. First, the United States had been “winning” in Afghanistan until it made unnecessary concessions to the Taliban during negotiations. Second, maintaining a “sustainable commitment” in Afghanistan in the years to come, rather than withdrawing, would have allowed America to ultimately achieve success at a low cost.

In light of Craig Whitlock’s publication of the “Afghanistan Papers,” which documented how U.S. officials systematically lied to politicians and the public about the progress of the war, it is perhaps unsurprising that McMaster’s analysis of the Taliban’s success devoted little attention to the two decades that the United States spent attempting to build a competent Afghan government. Conveniently, the starting point for McMaster’s analysis is the U.S.-Taliban peace deal—cynically referred to by McMaster as the “capitulation agreement”—that was negotiated after he left the Trump administration.

According to McMaster, “we’d won” the war in Afghanistan but then “inflicted defeat on ourselves” by pursuing a negotiated settlement with the Taliban. During the Wilson Center event, McMaster argued that if the Biden administration had continued the military mission in Afghanistan instead of withdrawing, the United States would have been able to protect its core interests at an acceptable cost. “I think what is important is for us to develop strategies that are flexible but are sustainable over time, whether it’s 2,500 or 8,500 or 12,000 [troops]. You know, we’re the United States of America man, if we were Ecuador, that might be a stretch. But we can sustain that commitment.”

McMaster spent no time explaining exactly how the U.S. military had previously “won” in Afghanistan or addressing what the Taliban’s rapid advance suggests about the nature of the victory purportedly squandered by “defeatists” such as President Joe Biden. Contrary to McMaster’s assertion that the United States was winning prior to the Trump administration’s “capitulation,” the fact is that the Taliban had been consistently gaining strength, leaving the Afghan government in control of just over half of the country when U.S.-Taliban negotiations began. While assuring his audience that the American public does not understand “how low of a cost it was to sustain [the] commitment," McMaster ignored the fact that the cost of a continued U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, in both American lives and taxpayer dollars, would undoubtedly increase if Biden failed to withdraw all U.S. forces by the current August 31 deadline.

Outside of mocking the idea that there is no military solution to the conflict and repeatedly stressing the necessity of a long-term U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, McMaster did not articulate how he would change U.S. strategy to reach key objectives—such as establishing a functioning Afghan state or eliminating conditions that foster support for the Taliban—that the twenty-year military mission failed to achieve. As McMaster asserted that a “sustainable commitment” in Afghanistan would have been capable of “prevent[ing] what is happening now,” but failed to convey what concrete objectives could be achieved by the continued deployment of U.S. forces, he gave the impression that his desired policy would be an open-ended policing mission aimed at maintaining the status quo in Afghanistan.

Toward the end of the discussion, McMaster identified a “terrorist ecosystem” that is supposedly waging “endless jihad” against the United States and is “connected from Southeast Asia, across South Asia, into the greater Middle East, into North Africa, into the G5 Sahel and the Horn of Africa.” In McMaster’s eyes, this network poses an omnipresent threat that necessitates “redoubl[ing] our efforts against jihadist terrorists” and can only be mitigated by an active U.S. military footprint throughout the world.

In his concluding remarks, McMaster expressed his frustration with the American public’s lack of support for “endless wars” and argued that U.S. officials must better inform the American people about the war in Afghanistan and other counterterrorism initiatives. In a peculiar aside intended to highlight how waning public support led the United States to talk itself “into defeat in Afghanistan,” McMaster claimed that Kim Il-sung decided to begin an insurgency against South Korea after seeing “American protests against the war in Vietnam” and sensing “American weakness.” 

“We had this defeatist narrative in Afghanistan, you know, ‘end the endless wars.’ Well first of all, it’s an endless jihad, waged against us, and we’d won,” McMaster said. “The whole narrative about it was wrong, so I think the first thing we have to do is inform the American people better … [about] what is at stake in the fight against jihadist terrorist organizations … and what is a strategy that will deliver a favorable outcome.”

Given the disturbing lengths that senior officials have gone to in order to hide the failure of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan from the public, one would hope that figures such as McMaster might have learned from the misdeeds documented in the “Afghanistan Papers” and will prioritize transparency in the future. Unfortunately, McMaster’s focus on informing the American people appears to stem from a cynical interest in ensuring higher levels of public support for the next open-ended conflict that the United States embarks on. Rather than attempting to educate the public on the purported necessity of continuing a continent-spanning war on terror, McMaster should reckon with why the American people “sadly … seem to be wanting to disengage from these endless wars.”

Without an adequate examination of the twenty-year nation building and counterinsurgency project that preceded the withdrawal—which McMaster himself was intimately involved in—he may be able to deflect blame, but he will never develop a full understanding of the many factors that led to the heartbreaking fall of Kabul. McMaster’s myopic analysis of the reasons for America’s failure in Afghanistan and his refusal to reflect on the roots of the Afghan state’s rapid collapse are emblematic of the inherent limitations in his approach to foreign policy. By reflexively turning to military force as a tool to achieve desired policy outcomes, McMaster fails to recognize the ways in which interventions—such as the U.S. interventions in Iraq, Libya, and Yemen—can ultimately undermine U.S. interests and benefit the very extremists that he views as an existential threat.

Will A. Smith is an editorial intern at The National Interest and a graduate student at American University's School of International Service. 

Image: Reuters

Trevor Filseth

Afghanistan,

The Taliban have surrounded Panjshir and brought heavy equipment to the region, utilizing their advantage in numbers and equipment in their offensive.

Days after cutting off the region’s telephone and Internet access, the Taliban has launched another series of attacks on the last remaining area of the country outside their control, the Panjshir Valley in northeastern Afghanistan. The valley is occupied by the “National Resistance Front,” (NRF) led by Ahmad Massoud, son of legendary guerilla commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, and Amrullah Saleh, Afghanistan’s former Vice President under President Ashraf Ghani. Following Ghani’s departure for the United Arab Emirates in mid-August, Saleh proclaimed himself caretaker president of Afghanistan, although in practice the internationally recognized Afghan government has ceased to exist.

While negotiations remain ongoing between the Taliban and the Panjshir resistance, and both Massoud and Saleh have expressed willingness to compromise if a multi-party government could be formed. However, an agreement seems unlikely to be reached. The Taliban have surrounded Panjshir and brought heavy equipment to the region, utilizing their advantage in numbers and equipment in their offensive. The situation on the ground remains unclear, and each side has claimed victories over the other.

A TRT reporter stated that the Taliban had attacked the valley from Andarab, to the valley’s south, and Badakhshan, to its north. Taliban spokesmen have described the offensive as largely successful, claiming that its fighters had entered the valley.

The Panjshir resistance, however, has denied this. “There is no fight in Panjshir and no one has entered the province,” Panjshir spokesman Mohammad Almas Zahid told TOLO News, an Afghan news channel.

Ali Nazary, the NRF’s head of foreign relations, tweeted that a Taliban attack had been driven back with the destruction of many of the group’s armored vehicles. The same statement claimed that the Taliban had retreated from Gulbahar to Charikar, capital of Afghanistan’s Parwan province—an area that Massoud’s forces had briefly captured earlier in August, only to retreat after Taliban reinforcements arrived.

The Panjshir resistance reportedly has between 7,000 and 20,000 troops defending the valley, including heavy equipment and Afghan special forces formerly in the now-defunct Afghan National Army.

While some U.S. officials, including Rep. Mike Waltz (R-FL) and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC), have advocated for political and military support for the Panjshir resistance, the Biden administration has made no steps toward doing so. The conventional wisdom suggests that the U.S. will attempt to build up its relations with the Taliban, rather than undermine it by backing Massoud and Saleh.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters

Christian Whiton

Foreign Policy, World

The collapse of the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan and the chaos in Kabul ahead of the August 31 evacuation deadline has called into question U.S. credibility to a degree unseen since the crises of the 1970s.

The collapse of the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan and the chaos in Kabul ahead of the August 31st evacuation deadline has called into question U.S. credibility to a degree unseen since the crises of the 1970s. Many analysts believe the consequences will affect American interests globally and raise questions about the management of foreign policy in Washington.

Enjoy the Center for the National Interest and Robert C. O’Brien's discussion on the state of U.S. power and credibility, lessons learned from running the National Security Council, and options for addressing emerging threats. Christian Whiton, senior fellow for strategy and trade at the Center, will moderate.

Robert C. O’Brien was the National Security Advisor from 2019 to 2021, coordinating policy on matters ranging from the Abraham Accords to reacting to the Covid-19 pandemic, and military action related to Iran and Afghanistan. He also facilitated successful diplomatic talks between Kosovo and Serbia and advocated a stronger posture against China. Previously, he was the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, arranging the release of several Americans detained abroad. O’Brien was a managing partner of the Arent-Fox law firm and a founding partner of Larson O’Brien LLP. He is currently the chairman of American Global Strategic LLC.

Image: Reuters.

Trevor Filseth

Middle East, Middle East

The meeting is taking place in the shadow of the U.S. drawdown in the region under President Joe Biden, who has castigated America’s traditional regional allies, including Saudi Arabia, and indicated that American troops should return home.

On Friday, the first officials from Saudi Arabia and Iran began arriving in Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, in advance of a summit between the two nations intended to promote a wider understanding across the region.

Iraq is a significant destination for a peace summit: following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion that deposed Saddam Hussein, the country became a battleground for regional rivalries, with Iran-backed political parties and militias exerting significant influence over Iraq’s politics. The nation has charted a largely independent course under the leadership of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who volunteered Baghdad as a site for neutral mediation.

The talks are happening concurrently with negotiations to renew the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement in Vienna, which the U.S. withdrew from in 2018 and Iran has largely stopped complying with in response to additional sanctions. While the outline of the agreement is known—sanctions relief in exchange for a renewed commitment not to enrich weapons-grade uranium—talks have made slow progress as both sides have asked the other to make the first concession. Biden has stated that a future JCPOA should have diplomatic input from regional nations, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who would be directly threatened by Iranian nuclear weapons.

Ebrahim Raisi, Iran’s newly elected president, was also invited to the meeting, but it is unclear if he will attend. The attendance of King Abdullah of Jordan and President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt has been confirmed, as well that of as French president Emmanuel Macron, the only European leader who will be present.

Topics of discussion for the wide-ranging meeting will include the war in Yemen, the political and financial collapse of Lebanon, the civil war in Syria, and the region’s ongoing water crisis, which has had particularly acute effects in Iran. The main topic, however, will probably be the ongoing tensions between Riyadh and Tehran, as the two nations have engaged in steadily escalating proxy conflicts since 2016 when they severed relations. In 2019, a drone attack briefly shut down Saudi Aramco’s ability to pump oil—an attack that Saudi Arabia accused Iran of perpetrating. Iran has denied these accusations.

The meeting is taking place in the shadow of the U.S. drawdown in the region under President Joe Biden, who has castigated America’s traditional regional allies, including Saudi Arabia, and indicated that American troops should return home. The most prominent consequences of this policy so far have been the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the ensuing collapse of the Afghan government to the Taliban, with uncertain consequences across the Middle East.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters

Ethen Kim Lieser

Coronavirus,

On Monday, officials in New Jersey confirmed that more than thirty-six thousand extra doses have been administered to immunocompromised individuals, frontline healthcare workers, and the elderly.

Nearly one million coronavirus vaccine booster shots already have been administered over the past two weeks in the United States, according to the latest data compiled by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

The new figures come after health officials authorized on August 12 to give extra shots of Pfizer or Moderna’s vaccines to those individuals with weakened immune systems.

On Monday, officials in New Jersey confirmed that more than thirty-six thousand extra doses have been administered to immunocompromised individuals, frontline healthcare workers, and the elderly.

“Nationally, we think about three percent of the population is immunocompromised, so we’re really asking particularly medical directors in long-term care to do a deep analysis of those medical records and identify individuals who should be queued up to get that third dose right now,” state health commissioner Judy Persichilli said during a coronavirus media briefing.

“When we know whether we’re dosing at eight months or six months, our hope is that we will have mega-sites, county sites, available sites so that anyone who is available to get the vaccine can get the vaccine. I don't think we’ll be—we would rather get it all done in a very quick period of time,” she added.

Timeline to Change?

President Joe Biden’s administration has said that it would rely on officials at the CDC and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration if there is any need to adjust the previously planned rollout of booster shots at eight months after receiving two coronavirus vaccine doses. It had noted that there is a possibility that the timeline could be moved up by three months.

“So, I want to be very clear on that. If they were to change their guidance based on data for any particular group, he would, of course, abide by that,” White House spokesperson Jen Psaki said during a recent press briefing.

“But for people watching at home, for you all who are reporting out this nothing has changed about the eight-month timeline as it relates to the boosters,” she continued.

Limited Data

A new CDC presentation, however, asserted that the data needed to properly evaluate booster shots for the general population in the United States has been found to be limited—which might suggest that the agency’s panel could limit its initial endorsement of booster shots to only vulnerable groups and health-care workers.

The presentation noted that vaccine efficacy for the highly transmissible Delta variant has ranged between thirty-nine percent and eighty-four percent.

It is “important to monitor trends of effectiveness by severity of disease over time,” it said, adding that inoculating the unvaccinated must continue to be a “top priority.”

More than fifty-two percent of the U.S. population is fully vaccinated, while about sixty-two percent have had at least one shot, according to data compiled by the CDC.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

Image: Reuters

Rich countries must share their supplies of COVID-19 vaccines quickly, in line with recommendations made earlier this year by an independent panel appointed by the World Health Organization (WHO), the former co-chairs said on Tuesday.  

The failure of the Afghan army is a reminder that Pentagon-led security cooperation programs are more expensive and less effective than those led by spies.

The United States has leverage over the new Afghan government. Here’s how to use it.

Beijing is trying to shape the academic and political conversation.

Stephen Silver

Social Security, Americas

They also had fake licenses and forged U.S. Treasury checks.

Following a fraud investigation, police in Oklahoma City arrested a man and woman, and found a huge cache of stolen material in their car, including checks, licenses, and Social Security numbers. Now, the investigation is ongoing, with searches of other locations. 

According to OKC Fox, a warranted search of the pair’s car back in late June turned up over thirty Social Security numbers that belonged to other people, as well as hundreds of fraudulent checks and over 350 stolen credit cards. They also had fake licenses and forged U.S. Treasury checks.

The pair, per the report, “were using the fraudulent documents along the I-40 corridor in Western Oklahoma for several months with several agencies doing their own investigations.” 

The two are facing multiple felony charges, including “use/possession of license or ID card, conspiracy to unlawfully manufacture LIC/ID card, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia.” 

The Watonga Republican reported that the man and woman had been arrested “on suspicion of conspiracy, identity theft, possession of counterfeit checks and possession of drug paraphernalia,” while a third man had also been arrested, on suspicion of meth possession and destruction of evidence.

“They were in possession of what we believe to be methamphetamine, as well as several checks and IDs, and the equipment to make IDs,” Blaine County Sheriff Travis Daugherty told the Watonga Republican. “It appears to be very organized, and we have turned it over to the White-Collar Crimes division of the OSBI.”

He added that the checks included forged stimulus checks, as well as some that came from major oil and gas companies.

“They would make the check to this fraudulent name and then they would take the driver’s license, and they would put the picture of them with the fake name so they could cash the check,” Daugherty told the newspaper, “It was hard to distinguish whether it was a real ID or a fake ID. They’ve come so far with printers these days.”

Another report, by KFOR, stated that the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI) had obtained additional warrants related to the traffic stop investigation, of an apartment complex.

Daugherty told people in the area to be diligent with their banking information. 

 “We would like to tell the citizens that, if they have any loose checkbooks laying around with routing numbers – that’s all they need to get, is your routing number, to make you become a victim of this,” Daugherty told the newspaper, “So if you have any checkbooks, don’t leave them around. Don’t leave them in your car. If you leave your car unlocked somewhere, that’s all they need to do is get a hold of that routing number.”

Stephen Silver, a technology writer for the National Interest, is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.

Image: Reuters

Trevor Filseth

Afghanistan,

How much of a danger ISIS-K really poses to the United States is unclear.

A suicide bombing on the Kabul airport Thursday claimed the lives of thirteen U.S. soldiers and, as of the latest tally, more than 170 Afghan civilians. The culprit for the attack was quickly identified as “ISIS-K,” or the Islamic State terror group’s faction in "Khorasan Province" in Afghanistan.

ISIS has largely remained out of the news since its loss of territory in 2017 and 2018 and the death of the group’s self-proclaimed “caliph,” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in a U.S. military raid in 2019. However, the main “state” in Iraq and Syria established a number of affiliate groups around the world, including in Yemen, West Africa, and Afghanistan, which the group describes as Khorasan, a historical name for the region of Afghanistan and eastern Iran.

The latter province, dubbed ISIS-K, was created in 2015 and has continued to operate in Afghanistan, even after the territorial defeat of the parent group in Iraq and Syria. While it has largely played a minor role in the conflict between the Taliban and the Afghan government, it has been the target of military action before, notably President Donald Trump’s decision to drop a “massive ordnance air blast” (MOAB) bomb, the largest non-nuclear explosive in the U.S. arsenal, on a cave complex belonging to the group in 2017.

ISIS-K has been strongly opposed by the Taliban in Afghanistan. A major point of contention between the two sides has been the issue of nationalism, as the Afghan Taliban is committed to governing the nation of Afghanistan rather than taking the more extreme position of attempting to eliminate national borders and create a worldwide caliphate, the stated objective of ISIS.

Despite these disagreements, ISIS-K is known to have had ties to Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a terror group that has sought to establish an “Islamic state” of its own in Pakistan. As the TTP is nominally loyal to the Afghan Taliban, and its leaders pledged their allegiance to “Commander of the Faithful” Haibatullah Akhundzada, it is unclear whether these ties will be maintained. However, many Pakistani Islamists have joined ISIS-K, and the group has at times had a presence in Pakistan’s largely ungoverned western areas.

How much of a danger ISIS-K really poses to the United States is unclear. The group appears to be primarily focused on expanding its presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, rather than attempting to launch high-profile terror attacks, as ISIS did during its existence. The Kabul airport bombing appears to be an exception to this rule, and the U.S. has already launched reprisal attacks targeting the group’s positions.

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters

Kris Osborn

military, Americas

Two words: sensing and computing.

The state-of-the-art F-35 stealth fighter is truly one of a kind and well known for its stealth characteristics, weapons, costs, extensive development, and multinational force. The jet, however, has many lesser-known attributes which could arguably serve as a defining reason for its superiority. 

Two words may sum this up almost completely: sensing and computing.

I recently had a chance to do some exclusive interviews with several F-35 pilots. Each of the pilots overwhelmingly explained that the sensing, computing, and data “fusing” on board the jet is truly the way in which the aircraft separates itself from others. 

The F-35’s “sensor fusion” refers to a data analysis and organization process that uses early iterations of artificial-intelligence-enabled computing and integrates key information from otherwise separated data streams onto a single screen for the pilot. The computerized process enables pilots to view navigational data, mission details, targeting information, and threat data all on a single screen for the pilot, thus easing the cognitive burden.

Several of the pilots I spoke with had extensive experience flying fourth-generation aircraft and were, therefore, well-positioned to understand how the F-35 jet might compare. 

For instance, Chris “Worm” Spinelli, an F-35 test pilot for Lockheed Martin, spent twenty-four years in the Air Force. 

“When I first got into the F-35—and even still today—the biggest, game-changing difference that I've seen specifically for the person in the cockpit, the decisionmaker, the pilot is the F-35’s fusion and integration of all of the different sensors from the aircraft,” Spinelli said. “It brings together a holistic picture that's quite amazing. This was never, never seen before on any fourth-generation platform. I don’t care what people say, or what widgets or gizmos they have. I would even say it rivals the F-22. Although I haven’t seen everything that the F-22 has on it. . . . When you look at the radar for the F-35, the electronic warfare (EW) system and then, of course, the Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL) combining it all together, that to me was the biggest difference between the F-35 and the legacy F-16s or F-18s.”

Another F-35 pilot told me that the “sensor fusion” process enables pilots to take on additional tactical functionality because much of the procedural work is automatically done for them. Sensor fusion, F-35 pilot Tony “Brick” Wilson told me, “reduces pilot workload and allows the pilots to have a situational ‘bubble’ so that they’re more than just a pilot and they’re more than a sensor manager. They’re true tacticians. The fact that the pilot has the spare capacity increases survivability and makes them more lethal,”  Wilson is Lockheed Martin’s chief of Fighter Flight Operations.

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Flickr / U.S. Air Force

Kris Osborn

F-35B China, Asia

Beijing has yet to master the engineering feat required to provide its jets with a vertical-takeoff ability.

The first-of-its-kind F-35B fighter jet with short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing capability is now a threat factor possessed by U.S. Navy amphibious assault ships across the world. The jet has many merits yet one key factor eclipses all of the others: China does not have an equivalent. 

Why China Fears the F-35B

It is well known that China is rapidly developing an aircraft-carrier-launched variant of its fifth-generation J-31 aircraft to perhaps rival the F-35B and F-35C jets when it comes to maritime warfare power projection. But there does not appear to be any kind of vertical-takeoff capability emerging within the Chinese military. This is important because a vertical takeoff and “hover” ability bring an entirely new dimension to maritime warfare. The technology allows a smaller ship (such as an amphibious ship) to operate with the kind of fifth-generation fixed-wing fighter jet support typically thought of as only being possible with aircraft carriers. That would allow an amphibious assault operation to rely on its own organic fifth-generation air support. 

Should amphibious assault vehicles, ship-to-shore transport landing craft, Osprey helicopters, and attack drone vessels all launch from an amphibious ready group, then the military force would not need to rely upon fighter jet support from aircraft carriers within striking range. The USS America, the first of the Navy’s now emerging America-class amphibious ships, has traveled long distances of key deployments carrying as many as thirteen F-35B jets on board. The America-class amphibious ships have been specifically modified and engineered to house and operate F-35B jets. 

Hovering Matters 

The F-35B jet’s ability to “hover” can bring previously unanticipated advantages to an amphibious assault given the aircraft’s “drone-like” ability to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Its 360-degree cameras, long-range, targeting technology and onboard computing enable the aircraft to gather and disseminate various video feeds from great distances. This, combined with its ability to hover above the surface in support of an approaching amphibious operation, might provide an attacking force with new levels of forward visual “scouting,” threat assessments or close-air-support capability. Of course, that hover ability, assisted by advanced automation and software, is what enables an F-35B jet to perform a vertical landing on an amphibious ship without needing a runway. 

The F-35B jet is able to hover due to through the construction of a “lift fan” technology that was built into the center fuselage, which is just behind the pilot. This generates massive downward vertical thrust, sending horsepower to the LiftFan from the main engine through a “spiral belevel gear system,” according to Rolls-Royce, which has a division dedicated to making engines for military equipment.

The LiftFan looks like a square door on top of the fuselage behind the pilot intended to generate the downward airflow needed to enable vertical landing. The LiftFan feeds air into the engine much like any aircraft engine would in some respects. Air ducts on either side of the nose “suck” in air to the engine, the air is then compressed before being ignited with gas—generating what looks like a controlled explosion of fire coming out of the back. The force generated through this process enables the speed, maneuverability, and acceleration of the aircraft. Mechanical information provided by Rolls-Royce, which makes the F-35B engine, states that “to achieve STOVL, the lift fan component of the LiftSystem operates perpendicular to the flow of air over the aircraft.” The LiftFan can operate in crosswinds up to 288mph, according to Rolls-Royce data.

Given all this, if China were to rely on an aircraft carrier capable of launching fifth-generation fighter jets during a military mission, then the country would likely operate at a significant deficit when it comes to countering an amphibious assault or conducting attack operations requiring smaller ships. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Kris Osborn

F-35 South Korea, Asia

It is clear that a stealthy fifth-generation fighter jet could give South Korea an increased ability to destroy North Korean air defenses--and much more.

Although the unstable North Korean regime could test some kind of nuclear weapon or new ballistic missile to intimidate South Korea, the possibility of the Hermit Kingdom launching massive, mechanized ground assault across the DMZ cannot be fully discounted. Clearly, South Korea should be prepared to repel some kind of armored assault from the North.

This kind of deterrence could be achieved by simply maintaining a modernized, trained, and well-equipped army to defend the border. But it also stands to reason that preventing this kind of attack could be the main reason why South Korea is acquiring the F-35 fighter jet. 

Why North Korea Hates the F-35

It is clear that a stealthy fifth-generation fighter jet, such as the F-35 jet, gives South Korea a massively increased ability to destroy North Korean air defenses, achieve air superiority or even track and attack the North’s known arsenal of road-mobile missile launchers. Beyond that, a fleet of F-35 jets could prove decisive and impactful in any kind of defensive stand against a North Korean invasion.  

This is particularly true given the glaring discrepancy between the North and South Korean armies. Globalfirepower.com lists North Korea as now operating a sizeable 1.3 million man active-duty force, with millions more in paramilitary support. Their military reportedly operates as many as six thousand tanks and ten thousand armored vehicles alongside a well-known arsenal of medium-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching major South Korean cities. South Korea, by comparison, is listed by Global Firepower as having only six hundred thousand active-duty forces as several million fewer paramilitary capable soldiers, when compared with North Korea. Perhaps of even greater consequence, Seoul is cited as operating only twenty-eight hundred tanks, less than one-half of North Korea’s six thousand tanks. 

Why Seoul Needs the F-35

What this means is that having massive air superiority in the form of an F-35 force gives South Korea a very credible and realistic chance of destroying an invasion from a much larger North Korean Army. North Korean troops could be killed from the air. Also, ideally, any mobile ballistic missile launcher on North Korean territory could be destroyed from the air by South Korean F-35 jets. Accordingly, would it be a stretch to suggest that having a fleet of ready F-35 jets might actually save South Korea? Maybe. It would seem that given the known capabilities of the F-35 jet and the obvious absence of any kind of North Korean equivalent, a South Korean F-35 force might make a North Korean invasion far less likely. 

Add to this overall equation the networking and allied advantages associated with the F-35 jet. South Korea’s deterrence posture will be greatly fortified and strengthened by a large Japanese F-35 force along with a regular U.S. presence of F-35C-armed carrier aircraft and F-35B-armed amphibious ships. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Kris Osborn

F-35 Technology, Americas

This powerful combination presents potential warfare dilemmas likely to cause Russia pause should it contemplate any kind of an attack in Eastern Europe. 

Some people believe that the fast-modernizing Russian military, complete with fifth-generation aircraft, tactical nuclear weapons, hypersonic missiles, T-14 Armata tank and large standing Army presents an extremely serious threat to the United States, NATO and Eastern Europe.

If this threat already exists, then what danger would Russia pose should the United States and its coalition of allied European partners not have F-35 jets? How much would that change the threat equation? Would the absence of F-35 jets catapult Europe into new dimensions of vulnerability? The answer is obvious. It’s clear that the collective impact of a multinational F-35 force may be sufficient to deter potential Russian aggression. 

The question seems quite relevant to the threat equation for Europe and may explain why more countries such as Switzerland are acquiring F-35 jets. There are many reasons for this. First and foremost, there is the networking potential among allied F-35 nations—to include the UK, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Poland and Switzerland. Of course, the stealth and fifth-generation characteristics of the F-35 jet present attack possibilities as well as a counterbalance to Russia’s Su-57 fifth-generation stealth fighter jet. 

A networked web of European F-35 jets, integrated through a common Multifunction Advanced Datalink could cover an expansive geographic scope potentially sufficient to thwart any kind of large-scale Russian land advance. Russia’s land army is known to be quite large and technologically sophisticated. While that army may be matched or outgunned by a NATO ground force of M1 Abrams tanks and multinational troops, artillery, drones, helicopters, and armored vehicles, the existence of a combined F-35 air assault might prove to be the most decisive factor in preventing a Russian attack. 

Without a coalition of F-35 nations, NATO could wind up being extremely vulnerable and cede air superiority to the Russian Su-57. The F-22 Raptor is arguably unparalleled but it is only available to the U.S. Air Force and there may not be enough of them to thwart Russian aggression. Also, the absence of the F-35 jet would deprive NATO of some very key surveillance, networking, and air-ground coordination. The jet’s sensors and drone-like surveillance technology are formidable. Thus, a fleet of F-35 jets could be key to multi-domain operations in any kind of combat circumstance. The jet’s ability to share information and support ground forces from the air changes the deterrence equation. This presents potential warfare dilemmas likely to cause Russia pause should it contemplate any kind of an attack in Eastern Europe. 

Kris Osborn is the defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Master's Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

Image: Flickr / U.S. Air Force

Michael Peck

Russia, Americas

Calls for Russian missiles in Venezuela could trigger conflict between the United States and Russia.

Here's What You Need to Remember: If this sounds familiar, it should. Moscow placed nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in Cuba both to deter the United States from invading the island, and to compensate for the American missiles and bombers that ringed the Soviet Union. Russian commentators seem to be suggesting that Venezuela could also serve the same purpose.

With the United States developing a new generation of cruise missiles in response to alleged Russian arms control violations, a response from Moscow was inevitable.

But Russian missiles in Venezuela? That’s what some Russian commentators are calling for in retaliation for the Trump administration withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The Pentagon has already tested a new ground-launched cruise missile with a range of 500 kilometers (311 miles), which exceeds INF Treaty limits.

“Russia has legal grounds, in response to the emergence of new weapons from the USA after leaving the INF Treaty, to deploy their submarines and ships with medium and shorter-range missiles in relative proximity to the U.S. borders,” Major General Vladimir Bogatyrev, a reservist and chairman of the National Association of Reserve Officers, told Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta.

Bogatyrev suggested that Russian warships equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles could operate from Venezuela. The Kalibr is a family of naval cruise missiles, including the SS-N-30, a subsonic weapon equivalent to the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile. The SS-N-30, carried by surface ships and submarines has an estimated range of up to 2,500 kilometers (1,550 miles). Like the Tomahawk, the Kalibr is typically armed with conventional warheads for missions such as attacking Syrian rebels. But the missile can be armed with a nuclear warhead.

Russia recently signed a naval agreement for port visits with Venezuela, whose embattled and impoverished government relies on Russian support. “Venezuela has excellent seaports, in which ships and submarines of the Russian Navy can regularly enter, replenish supplies, and then perform combat missions off the coast of North America,” Bogatyrev said. There is also a naval agreement between Russia and Nicaragua.

Bogatyrev also pointed to the Zircon, a hypersonic anti-ship missile with an estimated speed of between Mach 6 and Mach 9. “One of the measures to neutralize potential threats from new U.S. weapons, including the recently tested U.S. cruise missile, could be a hypersonic weapon. In particular, it is the Zircon missile, capable of hitting ground and surface targets at ranges of over a thousand kilometers [621 miles].”

Significantly, a member of the Russian parliament’s defense committee also favors deploying missiles in Venezuela—even if it risks another Cuban Missile Crisis. “Maybe there will even be a Caribbean crisis 2, but it was the Caribbean crisis that allowed the Americans to cool off for a long time,” said Alexander Sherin, First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense. “If such a system is deployed in Venezuela, the U.S. will behave more accurately.”

That the Soviet Union withdrew its ballistic missiles from Cuba in 1962 is well known. And also well known is that in return, the United States quietly agreed to withdraw its Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

Oleg Shvedkov, a retired submarine captain who is chairman of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Military Forces Trade Union, argued that Latin American bases would ease deployment of Russian submarines near the United States. “The possible permanent presence of Russian warships off the U.S. coast equipped with medium- and shorter-range missiles will certainly be a headache for them."

If this sounds familiar, it should. Moscow placed nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in Cuba both to deter the United States from invading the island, and to compensate for the American missiles and bombers that ringed the Soviet Union. Russian commentators seem to be suggesting that Venezuela could also serve the same purpose.

But Russia ultimately had to withdraw its missiles in the face of a threat to use overwhelming U.S. force, especially given the inability of the Soviet Navy to confront the U.S. military in Caribbean waters. Nor was Moscow prepared to risk nuclear Armageddon over some distant island.

Which naturally raises the question of how the United States would respond to nuclear-armed Russian ships operating from Venezuela. Or rather, what U.S. administration could dare refrain from acting forcefully against such a threat.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook. This article was reprinted due to reader demand.

Image: Reuters.

Trevor Filseth

Afghanistan,

Although doubts were raised by Western experts and commentators about the feasibility of a full withdrawal by that date, as of 12:00 noon on August 31 in Kabul, the last U.S. flight has left the country, withdrawing the last remaining foreign troops.

After the fall of Kabul to the Taliban militant group, the United States occupied the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, using it as a staging ground for their withdrawal from the country. The Taliban did not contest the withdrawal but insisted that it be completed by August 31, President Joe Biden’s revised deadline for withdrawal from the country.

Although doubts were raised by Western experts and commentators about the feasibility of a full withdrawal by that date, as of 12:00 noon on August 31 in Kabul, the last U.S. flight has left the country, withdrawing the last remaining foreign troops.

The Taliban, whose spokesmen have claimed in statements that the presence of foreign troops represented a major challenge to the country’s stability, celebrated the withdrawal. Suhail Shaheen, one of the group’s long-time spokesmen, tweeted, “Tonight 12:00 pm (Afghanistan time) the last American soldier left Afghanistan. Our country gained full independence.”

The group has indicated that its next major challenge is asserting full control over the country, including defeating the presence of the Islamic State’s “Khorasan Province,” or ISIS-K, which was responsible for a high-profile terrorist attack on the airport that claimed the lives of more than a dozen U.S. troops and more than one hundred Afghan civilians. The group is also widely expected to intensify its military operations against the Panjshir Valley, which has held out against the group and remains the only province outside of the Taliban’s control.

Videos are already circulating of Taliban soldiers entering hangars at the airport, which U.S. and Afghan civilians had occupied hours earlier.

The final departure of U.S. troops from Afghanistan closes the book on America’s twenty-year war in the country, which has cost the lives of more than 2,400 American soldiers and tens of thousands of Afghans. According to official sources, at least 122,000 people have been evacuated from the Kabul airport since August 15, making the events of the past two weeks the largest known human airlift in history.

In Monday remarks, Marine Corps Gen. Kenneth McKenzie acknowledged that the Taliban had been “very helpful” in providing security at the airport during the withdrawal.

While it is unclear if all U.S. and European civilians have left the airport, and roughly 300 Americans are estimated to remain in Afghanistan, the Taliban has committed to allowing foreign nationals to leave the country. McKenzie underlined that while the military mission had ended, “the diplomatic mission to ensure additional U.S. citizens and eligible Afghans who want to leave continues.”

Trevor Filseth is a current and foreign affairs writer for the National Interest.

Image: Reuters

The risk of a terrorist resurgence comes primarily from the Taliban’s Islamic State rivals.