Defence`s Feeds

The LAV Demonstrator 8x8 combat vehicle was displayed at IAV 2016 with remote weapon station for small caliber m

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory (JDEAL) was delivered to Soesterberg, the Netherlands at end of last week. The deployable laboratory was financed through the European Defence Agency and is now ready for deployment to operations to counter-IED threats on the request of the JDEAL Contributing Members.

JDEAL was facilitated by the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the lead nation The Netherlands. The JDEAL programme is now counted as a fully operational training facility and a deployable capability. Moreover, JDEAL is now seeking to acquire a second deployable capability.

JDEAL also makes use of equipment and knowledge gained from the EDA-developed Counter-IED Technical Exploitation Laboratory (MNTEL) which was previously deployed with ISAF in Kabul.

The laboratory works across the entire spectrum of technical IED exploitation. This includes detailed visual examination and high quality image capture; technical exploitation reporting; biometric analysis (latent finger print recovery); electrical circuitry (primarily radio parts); document and media recovery (focused on the mobile phones often used as IED triggering devices); chemical analysis; mechanical exploitation as well as other materiel exploitation.

Major Geert-Jan Verkoeijen, JDEAL Manager in Soesterberg, and his team received the deployable facility on 10 February. Major Verkoeijen answers to three questions on the laboratory and possible future deployment here below.

 

• What does the Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory (JDEAL) mean for C-IED capability in Europe?

JDEAL is an EDA Cat B project that started in September 2014 for the duration of three years. After the opening ceremony, on 4 November 2014, JDEAL has proven to be a good example for how cooperation between European nations can be arranged. The gained experience so far shows that it takes time to change, adapt current approaches, doctrines and even processes on (C-IED) technical exploitation. In some cases we see and experience that we don’t  have this time. In my opinion the JDEAL concept can be seen as an example in current European political-military discussions: the current review of the ‘C-IED concept in EU-led military operations’ could benefit of the lessons identified and learned or even the cooperation approach as a whole.

The JDEAL concept is already used in other cooperation developments, thus, this is a huge compliment for what we have achieved so far. In case the JDEAL concept is used for future cooperation plans, the main and most important issue is commitment. With commitment and willingness it’s ‘easy’ to start in a short time. This JDEAL concept approach (could) benefit future decision making processes and eases supporting but ‘mandatory’ issues like budget, equipment and personnel.

After executing several JDEAL basic courses we enter now the ‘next’ stage in the project. On 10 February we received our deployable laboratory in Soesterberg. JDEAL is now in the position to fulfill and execute its main tasks: (1) execute trainings, (2) deploy the laboratory and (3) maintain knowledge & research developments. JDEAL can contribute to trainings, operations and discussions related to our specific C-IED technical exploitation work field.  Either way JDEAL demonstrates that ‘pooling and sharing’ of capabilities and capacities are beneficial for contributing countries. This knowledge will be used for the discussion, the continuation of JDEAL after 2017.

 

• How do you see the readiness of the staff and laboratory for deployment?

The challenge is to create a pool of experts that fulfills continuation in future deployment(s). This pool must consist of military staff who are able to use the available equipment, material and procedures. Importantly, the staff has to work in a team. Right now we don’t have a deployment or mission and it’s difficult to anticipate needs and consequences. In my opinion JDEAL is flexible and modular enough to adapt and fulfill  future needs. From this perspective JDEAL is in the position  to influence the decision making process. Before the actual deployment JDEAL analyses with the lead-nation how to support the deployment. JDEAL is able to prepare and execute the necessary means for deployment and make sure that the assigned crew is trained by the JDEAL permanent staff.

The delivery of the first deployable laboratory JDEAL allows us to focus on the possible operational consequences of getting deployed in the upcoming months.  We are now preparing for the C-IED training exercise ‘Bison Counter’ in Sweden (August 2016). The Bison Counter ’16  exercise will also be a test for the technical exploitation ‘chain’ and JDEAL will benefit also from the knowledge/ procedures  of operational units and collection / level 1 tactical exploitation. This exercise will connect the several technical exploitation steps. 

 

• When do you see the first opportunity for the laboratory for deployment?

As stated in the JDEAL Programme Arrangement the contributing members states can claim the deployable facility. Now we have the deployable laboratory I can imagine (my assumption) that nations are considering JDEAL deployment. The JDEAL permanent staff has the challenge to make sure that when the time comes, we are ready to support the lead nation.

 

More information:

• Counter IED project page

The objective for the cyber situation awareness package (CySAP) is to provide commanders and other decision-makers with information to develop a clear understanding of the cyber-attack threat landscape.  Also, it aims to equip them with the tools (competent personnel, effective procedures and technology platforms) to manage risks during the planning and conduct phases of a military operation. This will improve the resilience of military information infrastructure and other networked systems in the event of a cyber-attack. 

The official endorsement of the Business Case by EDA Steering Board on the 12 February 2016 and the military requirements based on the Common Staff Requirement on the 27 November 2015, marks the initiation of an ad hoc project through the negotiation of a Project Arrangement. 

The project will be carried out under the EU Pooling & Sharing agenda and aims to develop a modular capability within the goal ‘to mitigate the risk of a cyber-attack on Communications and Information Systems and other network capabilities used within the planning and conduct of CSDP operations’.  

The agreed milestones will progress through simultaneous activities comprising:

• Requirements and Architecture Development by 2016
• Definition of work package options within a Programme Arrangement by 2017

Background 

The EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework, as adopted by the Council on 18 November 2014, states that “Cyberspace is often described as the fifth domain of military activity, equally critical to European Union (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) implementation as the domains of land, sea, air, and space. The successful implementation of CSDP has been increasingly dependent on the availability of, and access to, a secure cyberspace. Robust and resilient cyber defence capabilities are now required to support CSDP structures and CSDP missions and operations”. 

More information:

• Cyber defence programme

 

Russian RPG-16 Anti-Tank Grenade Launcher

The NATO Allied Maritime Command based began the submarine warfare training exercise Dynamic Manta 2016 (DYMA 16) off the Sicilian coast in Italy on 22 February. The submarines, surface vessels, aircraft and personnel from eight NATO nations are converging on the central Mediterranean

Raytheon has joined the team of Finmeccanica, Honeywell Aerospace and CAE to offer the T-100 as the next-generation training solution for the U.S. Air Force's Advanced Pilot Training competition, known as the T-X program. The company is stepping into the prime c

In this Long Post, Ragnar Weilandt argues that it is in the West’s interest to provide far more substantial support to Tunisia in order to consolidate its democracy and make it an example for other states in the region.

The post The West and Arab democracy: time for a Marshall Plan for Tunisia? appeared first on European Geostrategy.

EU and NATO coordination has started to tackle the refugee crisis and will be further deepened, EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told MEPs and national MPs in the Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday.
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Security and Defence

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The European Defence Agency (EDA) currently has several job openings in the different directorates: Corporate Services Director (TA, AD14), Head of Unit Information Superiority (TA, AD12), Project Officer Components Technologies (TA, AD11), Programme Manager Satellite Communication & Project Officer Radio Spectrum (TA, AD11), Policy Officer Industry Relations and Support - SMEs (SNE), Project Officer Communication and Information Systems (SNE), IT Developer  (CA, FGIV). Candidates must apply via the EDA website.

The Agency is an “outward-facing” organisation, constantly interacting with its shareholders, the participating Member States, as well as with a wide range of stakeholders. It works in an integrated way, with multi-disciplinary teams representing all the Agency’s functional areas, to realise its objectives including its annual Work Programme and its rolling three-year Work Plan. Its business processes are flexible and oriented towards achieving results. Staff at all levels need to demonstrate the corresponding qualities of flexibility, innovation, and team-working; to work effectively with shareholders and stakeholder groups, formal and informal; and to operate without the need for detailed direction.

 

More information:

• Access the vacancy notices through our job portal

 

Presentation by Shingo Yamagami, Director General, Japan Institute of International Affairs
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Presentation by General Ramirez and General Pfrengle, Eurocorps
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Les 181 essais nucléaires menés en Polynésie française entre 1966-1996 ont eu un « impact environnemental » et « provoqué des conséquences sanitaires », a admis le président François Hollande, lors de son déplacement à Papeete, lundi 22 février. Cette reconnaissance était une revendication ancienne des associations de défense des victimes et des élus locaux. Le chef de l’Etat a annoncé une révision du traitement des demandes d’indemnisation des victimes des tests. La loi du 5 janvier 2010, dite loi Morin, du nom de l’ancien ministre de la défense, a apporté des « avancées », mais seule « une vingtaine » de dossiers − sur un millier − ont abouti, a-t-il justifié.
Les Polynésiens considèrent que les essais sont la cause de nombreux cancers dans l’archipel. François Hollande s’est engagé à ce que l’Etat accompagne le développement du service d’oncologie au centre hospitalier de Tahiti.

« Tourner la page »
La « dette nucléaire » ou « milliard Chirac » (en francs, soit l’équivalent de 150 millions d’euros aujourd’hui), une dotation annuelle qui visait à compenser la perte d’activité économique engendrée par la cessation des tests en 1996, « sera sanctuarisée ». « Son niveau sera dès 2017 rétabli à plus de 90 millions d’euros », a aussi promis M. Hollande, répondant, là encore, à une demande pressante des élus locaux.
« Les conséquences environnementales devront également être traitées » sur les atolls qui accueillaient les installations nucléaires, a-t-il poursuivi. L’Etat achèvera notamment « le démantèlement des [infrastructures] et la dépollution de l’atoll de Hao ». Ceux de Moruroa et Fangataufa feront l’objet d’une « vigilance méticuleuse ».
Plus généralement, le chef de l’Etat a reconnu « solennellement » la contribution de la Polynésie à la force de dissuasion nucléaire du pays.

Parmi les 181 essais qui ont donné lieu à une explosion, deux en 1968 ont eu pour but de tester des bombes soixante fois plus puissantes que celle larguée sur Hiroshima le 6 août 1945 : plus de 1 000 kilotonnes, contre environ 15 kilotonnes pour la bombe américaine « Little Boy ». Jusqu’en 1974, les essais étaient « aériens », autrement dit menés à l’air libre : ainsi, quarante et un ont été effectués soit d’une barge, soit d’un ballon, ou largués des avions. Passé 1975, ils n’ont plus été que « souterrains », d’un puit creusé dans l’atoll, ou directement sous le lagon. L’armée a reconnu qu’au moins un tir, celui du 17 juillet 1974, avait produit des retombées sur l’île de Tahiti. Mais il n’est pas impossible que les quarante précédents aient fait pareil, d’autant que ce tir en particulier n’était « que » de 20 kilotonnes (pour équivalent en kilotonnes de TNT). Pourtant, à ce jour, seules dix-neuf victimes ont été indemnisées par le ministère de la défense ou le Comité d’indemnisation des victimes des essais nucléaires (Civen) sur 1 024 dossiers déposés.
La loi Morin adoptée en 2010, qui encadre les indemnisations, était très attendue en Polynésie, mais n’a pas atteint ses objectifs : « La loi ne fonctionne pas », écrivaient les sénateurs dans un rapport en 2013. Les projections sur les indemnisations réalisées faisaient « état de dizaines de milliers de demandes », et « de 2 000 à 5 000 dossiers indemnisables », selon les sénateurs. Elles sont loin d’être atteintes.

Source

Tag: François Hollandenucléaire

Airbus A330 MRTT Aerial Refueling and Transport Aircraft

For several weeks, the Sudanese army led a deadly offensive to people in Darfur. And, until now, in general indifference. The Sudanese warplanes bombed continuously the mountainous plateau Jebbel Marra, causing many civilian casualties. The military strategy remain the same: once the bombs from the sky hit the villagers, the militias of the regime kill, rape, plunder and the survivors or neighboring villagers flee en masse. In a few days, according to the head of humanitarian affairs in Sudan Marta Ruedas, 34 000 people have been forcibly displaced. Several villages have been attacked, burned, destroyed.

The violence in Darfur erupted again in 2013, moving about a half million people, bombings and attacks continue without international echo. In February 2015, HRW alleged that 221 women and girls were raped by Sudanese forces during an organized attack in October 2014 against the city of Tabit, North Darfur. The activity of UNAMID staff on site (15 784 people in January 2015) is contested, the mission "spend more time to protect itself against attacks from pro-government militias, as acting with civilians. "

Nowadays the results of the EU support the AMIS mission, (one of the firts EU missions) are completly annulated. Read the CERPESC Analysis on Darfur in French (soon in English). This report has kept its relevance

See our book on the first EU missions in Africa here
Second, updated edition coming soon!

Tag: Darfur

With more than 11,000 aircraft currently stationed in Europe, the military are Europe’s biggest airline. Europe’s armed forces operate more than 150,000 flights per year. The Single European Sky initiative and its technological pillar, the Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research (SESAR) programme, thus have considerable implications for the military. The European Defence Agency (EDA) will outline the military perspectives on SESAR at a seminar at the World ATM Congress in Madrid on 8 March.

EDA supports its Member States in the identification of the military operational and financial risks expected with the implementation of SESAR. The Agency facilitates also the coordination of military views by gathering input and requirements from Ministries of Defence.

At the World ATM Congress in Madrid, the European Defence Agency organises for the first time a seminar to outline military perspectives on SESAR. High-level speakers from the Agency, the Spanish Air Force, SESAR Joint Undertaking, SESAR Deployment Manager, EUROCONTROL and NATO will discuss challenges and opportunities stemming from SESAR for the armed forces. The seminar will take place on 8 March, 14:30 – 16:00, in the Delegate Theatre. To attend the seminar, you need to register for the World ATM Congress (free, see link below). More details on the agenda and speakers are available here.

In addition to the EDA led seminar, Agency staff will also provide contributions to the following seminars taking place during the World ATM Congress:

• The European ATM Standards Coordination Group (EASCG), Tuesday, 8 March, 10:30-13:30 
• SESAR JU seminar on the ATM Master Plan 2015, Wednesday, 9 March, 15:30-17:30
• SESAR JU seminar on “SESAR and the military”, Thursday, 10 March, 11:30-12:30

 

More information:

• EDA seminar at World ATM Congress - agenda
• SESAR and the military - project page
• SESAR JU at the World ATM Congress website and full agenda
• World ATM Congress

Want to keep up to date on the SSR field? Once a week, the CSG’s Security Sector Reform Resource Centre project posts pertinent news articles, reports, projects, and event updates on SSR over the past week. Click here to sign-up and have the SSR Weekly News Roundup delivered straight to your inbox every week!   SSR Resource Centre

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The lower house of the Afghan parliament, the Wolesi Jirga, will end its winter recess and begin its next sitting on 6 March 2015. With elections delayed, the current group of MPs is likely to be in place for some time. This seemed like a good time, then, to review the lower house’s performance in 2015. AAN’s parliamentary reporter, Salima Ahmadi, reveals issues such as low attendance, a preoccupation with presidential decrees and only a nominal oversight of the executive. MPs’ most interesting work, she noted, usually occurred during the hour-long open discussions when constituents’ concerns were raised.

(This dispatch is AAN’s second look at parliament. The first, published on 4 February 2016, looked at how the upper and lower house are set up and function.)

What are MPs supposed to do?

The Afghan constitution (article 81) stipulates that the Wolesi Jirga, “as the highest legislative organ, shall manifest the will of its people as well as represent the entire nation.” Like parliaments throughout the world, it has three principle roles: law making, overseeing the government’s actions and activities, and representing the people. (1)

By way of example, the tenth sitting (from 6 September 2015 to 20 January 2016) provides a useful insight into the workings of the parliament. 51 sessions were held, including two interpellations (in Dari and Pashto, isteza), when a minister is summoned for questioning, after which MPs can dismiss him or her, in a vote of no confidence. There were also 15 questioning sessions (istejwab) when ministers and other senior officials, such as the directors of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and the Central Bank, are summoned for questioning (but without the threat of a no-confidence vote) and three presentations of reports (istema), when ministers are asked to tell the house about their ministries’ activities. (2) The house also held 30 plenary sessions, which are the general sessions, which all MPs should attend where there is a set agenda followed by an hour-long open discussion. A closed session was also held in which the devaluation of the Afghani compared to the US dollar and other foreign currencies was discussed.

During this tenth sitting, MPs approved a total of 39 pieces of legislation, including ten laws, nine international agreements, six presidential legislative decrees, the annual national budget for the fiscal year 1395 (20 December 2015 to 20 December 2016) and amendments to the Internal Rules of Procedures of the Wolesi Jirga. (3) MPs also rejected six presidential decrees. Several were left pending when MPs went into their winter recess and are due to be considered in March, when the lower house reconvenes.

At first glance, it may look as if the parliament worked hard throughout 2015. Whether any of it amounted to much, though, is open to debate. There were serious flaws in the carrying out of MPs’ legislative and oversight roles. Moreover, one major underlying problem must be highlighted: the low attendance rate. For the most part, there was no quorum of MPs, which meant that issues could not be voted on and the work of the house frequently ground to a halt.

Where were the MPs?

There are currently 240 MPs. (4) The required minimum number of MPs for a quorum to vote on legislation is a simple majority, in other words 121. On most days, however, this reporter noted attendances as low as 68 and 76. In October 2015, for example, out of 14 sessions, a quorum was scraped together on only six occasions. The best attendance that month was 131. (5) In the last three months of 2015, the house was relatively full on only three occasions, with the best turnout 184. Generally, more MPs showed up for the ‘big occasions’, such as when a minister was summoned or the votes on candidate ministers (although far fewer turned up for the earlier sessions when MPs grilled the candidates), or when the budget was discussed. “The reason for MPs’ low attendance,” a member of the parliamentary affairs office, an employee of the parliament, told AAN, “is that most of the current MPs have businesses and therefore they attend to their own matters, rather than focusing on the national issues.”

This failure to reach a quorum sabotaged important work. Voting and discussions had to be postponed on issues such as the proposed amendments to the Rules of Procedures of the Wolesi Jirga (4 November 2015), the SAARC agreement for the prevention of natural disasters and the Convention of Islamic Organizations on Food Security (both on 18 November 2015), as well as on presidential decrees pertaining to nuclear energy and agricultural pesticides (11 January 2016). The persistent low attendance of MPs also slowed down the overall performance of the Wolesi Jirga, as MPs were unable to deliver what had been planned in the legislative calendar. On occasions when there was a quorum, there would often be rushed, mass voting. On 13 January 2016, for instance, the Wolesi Jirga discussed and voted on five pieces of legislation in less than two hours. (6) MPs have occasionally been known to work harder. They extended parliament’s eighth sitting (July 2014-January 2015) by a week (under government pressure), delaying the winter recess so that they could vote on candidates for the cabinet and on the budget. Likewise in January 2016, some MPs wanted to extend the tenth sitting saying they were needed to closely monitor the quadrilateral meetings trying to start a peace process. However, they were unable to collect enough signatures for this motion.

The same pattern of poor attendance was noted in the meetings of the dozen or so specialised commissions (such as for security, development, complaints and the budget) and joint commissions that review draft legislation before it goes to the house. According to the Free and Fair Election Forum of Afghanistan (FEFA), most of the commissions’ decisions were taken without the necessary quorum, sometimes with as few as two or three members. (7) However, for a commission decision to be valid, a majority of its members have to be present (article 28 of the Wolesi Jirga Rules of Procedure). The attendance rate of the administrative board of the Wolesi Jirga (MPs who are elected to organise the business of the house) was no better. On 28 January, for example, MP Abdul Rahim Ayubi was scheduled to reveal to the administrative board a list of MPs whom he claimed had received bribes. On the scheduled day, the administrative board members did not show up and no session was held (see the report here).

No serious measures have been taken against MPs who are constantly absent from the plenary and commissions sessions. Articles 111, 112 and 113 of the Rules of Procedures of the Wolesi Jirga prescribe a range of measures depending on the number of days (or months) of unexcused absence, from salary reduction, withholding salary to the suspension of privileges. (8) These rules have never been enforced. From the pattern of (non-)attendance, it would appear that many MPs show up to parliament only in order to collect their wages or to question ministers.

What did MPs actually achieve?

Representing their constituents

Starting with the function of the house where MPs seemed to perform best – representing their constituents’ views – it appeared that the one-hour open discussion in every plenary session is the most relevant forum for MPs to air and debate citizens’ current concerns. For example, during the tenth sitting (September 2015 to January 2016), MPs discussed the alarming security developments in various provinces, the targeted killings of journalists and analysts, the critical situation of the economy, the date for the upcoming parliamentary elections, the presence of Islamic State (Daesh) fighters in Zabul and Nangrahar provinces, human rights issues, the peace process, the security of roads and various important infrastructure works. Unlike the time allocated for issues on the agenda, MPs frequently use more than the designated one-hour slot for the open discussion. Often, so many MPs put their names on the Speaker’s list for the open discussion that their time has to be limited to three minutes in order to accommodate all those who want to raise an issue.

Such issues have a real impact on constituents’ lives and are discussed on a regular basis, but rarely find their way into the legislative agenda. When it comes to law-making, MPs are reactive. They also appear to be overwhelmed by having to review and vote on the plethora of presidential degrees issued from the Palace.

Law-making

Members of the Wolesi Jirga have the authority to propose legislation (a privilege they rarely exercise) and to consider and endorse or reject legislation from government ministries or in the form of presidential legislative decrees. It was the decrees that were most commonly discussed and voted on. According to the constitution, these need Wolesi Jirga endorsement to become law.

During the tenth sitting, for example, the lower house received approximately two dozen presidential decrees for consideration. It approved six, rejected six and the remaining ones were left pending for after the winter recess. (9) Those rejected included two decrees, in November 2015, relating to electoral reforms. According to article 109 of the constitution, the Wolesi Jirga should not be deliberating on issues related to elections in the last year of its term. The lower house is, however, already outside of its constitutionally mandated term, so there was already a prior constitutional violation.

Oversight role

The other core duty of the Wolesi Jirga is to oversee the executive branch of government. It has to give a vote of confidence to government nominees for cabinet ministers and several other senior offices of state, as well as approve the budget. It also has the power to summon ministers to present an account of what they have done (hearings or istema in Dari and Pashto), for questioning (istejwab) and, most seriously, interpellation (isteza) when MPs can dismiss ministers for poor performance. However, in 2015 there was little sign of MPs investigating candidate ministers’ backgrounds or ministers’ performances or, indeed, of calling the government to account much at all. Voting on serious matters often appeared to have taken place along party or ethnic lines. Not every MP is swayed by such factors, of course, but the actual matter at hand frequently appears to be less important than group solidarity – or not – with the minister concerned. There are also frequent accusations of money changing hands ahead of major votes, something that is difficult to prove, although AAN did uncover evidence of this in 2010.

Endorsing and rejecting candidates

In 2015, parliament questioned and then approved or rejected two groups of candidates for cabinet minister posts, in January (at the end of parliament’s eighth sitting) and then in April (during its ninth sitting). AAN’s reporting noted the candidates’ extremely weak presentations and, in turn, weak questioning by MPs, few of whom had actually turned up to the chamber. Among those rejected were some very feeble candidates. However, the overall pattern – the rejection of all the women, Hazaras and Uzbeks – gave the appearance of party, ethnic or tanzim politics at play. (In the vote on the second group of candidates, MPs accepted all of them.)

After the summer recess, the Wolesi Jirga approved six nominees, including one woman (Ghezal Hares), for the Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution, but rejected a nominee who would have become the first female member of Afghanistan’s Supreme Court, Anisa Rasuli. President Ghani was criticised by conservatives for putting forward a woman for this position:

Menstruating women were considered unclean in Islam and were not allowed to touch the Quran, Qazi Nazir Hanafi [an MP for Herat] said. As judges put their hands on the holy book every day, and it was unfeasible for a Supreme Court judge to take a week off every month, ran his logic, Rasuli’s appointment should be opposed.

(For additional media reporting on this matter, see here.)

Rasuli narrowly missed out on the vote (she received 88 of the 94 votes needed). Ghani then put forward a male judge, Abdul Hasib Ahadi, whose nomination was approved (see here).

Calling ministers to account

The Wolesi Jirga summoned two ministers for interpellation sessions: Interior Minister Nur ul-Haq Ulumi and Minister of Communications and Information Technology Abdul Razaq Wahidi. Ulumi was summoned on 2 November 2015 and ordered to answer questions on the deteriorating security in the country and, in particular, how Kunduz had come to fall to the Taleban at the end of September. MPs accused the leaders of the National Unity Government of being “incompetent” as they had failed to protect people’s lives or the national interest. Ulumi was asked to explain the reasons behind the fall of several districts to insurgents. He blamed “countries in our neighbourhood,” singling out Pakistan, saying they did not want a sovereign Afghanistan. He attributed the fall of Kunduz to the Taleban as “a failure of government leadership.” Ulumi further noted “the withdrawal of international troops and a poorly equipped air force as being factors in the country’s deteriorating security situation.”  He retained his position after MPs were apparently satisfied with his explanations and received 131 out of 151 votes.

Some ministers alleged that this support was not due to the fact that MPs had been convinced by his answers. MP Qais Hassan claimed, “A third hand is behind the 180 degrees change in lawmakers’ view,” adding, “Ulumi was not a good minister and did not properly manage his ministry.” In a Pajhwok article, MP Aziza Jales referred to “a door-to-door campaign in favour of the minister” and claimed that appointments based on “nepotism and misuse of tribal rivalries” had saved Ulumi from a vote of no confidence. “The same MPs who collected signatures to impeach the Interior Minister,” MP Rahman Rahmani from Balkh afterwards told AAN, “then became his defence lawyers during the interpellation session.”

On 4 January 2016 the Minister of Communications and Information Technology, Abdul Razaq Wahidi, was also summoned to give answers on alleged corruption charges and illegal appointments within the ministry, as well as a ten per cent tax collection on mobile phone credit. The presidential decree ushering in the ten per cent tax had been endorsed by the Council of Ministers while the Wolesi Jirga was in its summer recess. When they returned, MPs said it contravened article 79 of the constitution and, on 14 October 2015, voted it down. MP Ghulam Hussain Nasiri from Maidan Wardak said, “We must not discuss unlawful decrees.” “In the devastating economic situation of Afghanistan,” MP Ghulam Faruq Majruh from Herat told AAN, “imposing a ten per cent tax on telecom companies would be another burden on the nation.” There was no transparency in the tax collection process, he claimed, or where the money would be spent. Despite its rejection, telecom companies obeyed the decree and continued to enforce the ten per cent tax.

During his interpellation Wahidi rejected these allegations, calling them baseless. As for the tax, he said it “goes to the finance ministry budget and this ministry should be interrogated on how and where the budget is spent.” Wahidi added that in the first ten days of the decree being enforced, approximately 80 million Afghanis had been collected. Wahidi survived his vote of no confidence by a wide margin. (10)

On 13 January 2016, less than two weeks later, on their first day back in session and after the interpellation of Wahidi took place (see AAN analysis here), MPs inexplicably approved the tax in spite of their initial outcry. One MP, Shahidzada from Herat, said during the hour-long open discussion following the vote, that the sudden approval of the same decree (without any amendments) “shows the double standards of the Wolesi Jirga.”

While it may be that MPs were either satisfied with Ulumi and Wahidi’s explanations or had simply wanted to make their concerns known (and were never intent on sacking either minister), it should be noted that these same MPs, on 9 November 2013, endorsed the (now former) Minister of Refugees and Repatriation Affairs, Jamahir Anwari, who was publically accused of being involved in administrative corruption, fraud and land grabbing. Investigative reporting by the Independent Media Consortium on 28 September 2013 revealed detailed accusations that Anwari had UNHCR, the UN’s refugee agency, transfer tens of thousands of dollars into the personal accounts of family members and others (see reporting here, here in Dari and here). A month later, in October 2013, the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption and Evaluation Committee, a leading anti-corruption monitoring and evaluation body in Afghanistan, released its ‘vulnerability to corruption’ assessment on the process of land distribution for repatriations and displaced people led by the Ministry for Refugees (available here). The report detailed widespread administrative corruption, bribery, forgery, nepotism, embezzlement and poor customer service in the ministry. (11)

On 10 October 2013, 57 MPs requested that Anwari come forward to explain these allegations in an interpellation hearing. On 9 November 2013, the minister was subjected to a rigorous cross-examination (see here and here). He survived a vote of no confidence.

Approving the budget

As with the mobile phone tax vote in the autumn, MPs’ reluctance to endorse the budget dissipated eventually for no apparent reason. The Minister of Finance, Eklil Hakimi, had submitted the national annual budget on 25 November 2015 after it was approved by the Council of Ministers and discussed by the upper house, the Meshrano Jirga, which had made certain recommendations. The draft was then reviewed by the standing commissions and discussed in joint commission meetings, in accordance with the law. On 21 December 2015 (within the month allowed for by law, but already into the new fiscal year), the draft was presented to the lower house, which rejected it by a majority vote. The Wolesi Jirga members of the finance commission said both the budget and the proposed allocation of the budget for the provinces were unacceptable. MPs said the budget was “unbalanced” and accused the government of considering their own priorities and not the national interest (see here). The draft was sent back with comments and proposed amendments to the Ministry of Finance. The budget is one way MPs can put pressure on the government, which is has done in the past. In 2013 the Wolesi Jirga sent the 2014 budget back to the Ministry of Finance twice (see here and here).

With the Wolesi Jirga’s winter recess fast approaching, the government needed to react and press MPs to approve the budget. The initial draft budget had been 461.8 billion Afghanis (6.70 billion USD): 283.3 billion for ordinary expenditure and 178.5 billion for development (see here). During its second review of the budget, the Finance Ministry added just over 2.5 per cent to the budget (12 billion Afghanis – 17.4 million USD – of which 1.8 billion was allocated for ordinary expenditure and 10 billion for development). The head of the Wolesi Jirga Budget and Finance Commission, MP Ahmadyar Khan, who briefed MPs, claimed the new budget was more balanced because “18 different parts have been amended.” This time, MPs gave an overwhelming majority, with only six out of 146 members voting against the virtually unchanged budget.

MPs not going anywhere fast

In 2015, the Wolesi Jirga struggled to fulfil its constitutional function. Its current legality is also questionable, as it continues to sit beyond the constitutionally mandated end date of June 2015 (as analysed in the first part of this dispatch). The Independent Election Commission may have announced that parliamentary elections will take place on 15 October 2016, but that has not been generally endorsed. However, this batch of MPs will be with us for some – as yet unspecified – time to come. It is hard to see where an improvement on the 2015 performance could come from.

Edited by Lenny Linke

(1) In particular, the National Assembly holds the powers to: ratify, modify, or abrogate laws and/or legislative decrees; approve plans for economic, social, cultural, and technological development; approve the state budget, give or withhold permission for obtaining and granting loans; create and modify administrative units; ratify international treaties and agreements, or abrogate the membership of Afghanistan to them (see article 90, clause 1 of the Afghan Constitution). Based on the provisions of the Afghan Constitution, the Wolesi Jirga has some additional authorities compared to the upper house (Meshrano Jirga): deciding on the interpellation of each of the ministers; taking the final decision on the state’s development programs and state budget if there is a disagreement between the Wolesi Jirga and the Meshrano Jirga; approving the appointments according to the provisions of the constitution.

(2) Presentation of report (istema): listening to the report presented by the government to the plenary or commissions upon the request of the Wolesi Jirga;

Questioning session (istejwab): oral or written questions which are asked by the members of parliament in the commissions or in the plenary, which require responses from government officials during the session;

Interpellation sessions (isteza): the process of requiring a minister to provide an explanation for their actions in accordance with article 92 of the constitution, which can lead in the dismissal of a minister (see here).

(3) The 39 pieces of legislature approved during the tenth session included decrees related to electoral reform (two), the ten per cent tax on mobile users, agricultural pesticides, nuclear energy, procurement and transportation tolls, as well as decrees on amendments to the civil service law, the law on service management of electricity and amendments to the income tax law. See report “Wolesi Jirga performance in the tenth sitting” (6 September 2015 to 20 January 2016) by the Directorate of Legislative Affairs of Parliament, Kabul: 2016 (no web link).

(4) During the 2010 elections, 249 MPs were elected (according to the Afghan Constitution, there should not be more than 250 MPs in the Wolesi Jirga) for a period of four and a half years, or nine parliamentary sittings. This number of MPs has dwindled over the years to 240. In the last two sittings (January 2015 to January 2016), five MPs died (three in an explosion and one by natural causes). However, one of them, who died in a car accident, was replaced. Other MPs resigned from the Wolesi Jirga in order to take up positions in the government. Those MPs who died or resigned in the final year of the parliament, as per the rulebook, were not replaced.

Apart from the individuals officially recognised as no longer part of the Wolesi Jirga, there are also several MPs who are nominally still holding their mandates as MPs but who have refused to attend the Wolesi Jirga sessions due to their objection to the extension of the parliament’s terms beyond 22 June 2015. Despite their absence from the plenary sessions for the tenth sitting, they are still considered part of the Wolesi Jirga for the purpose of determining the quorum. During the last session of the tenth sitting, the Speaker of the House, Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, singled out the following MPs, Ramadan Bashardost, Bakhtash Siawash and Farkhunda Zahra Naderi, as not having officially resigned from their positions. Therefore they need to be included in the number of active MPs. This means the total of 240 MPs in a plenary session can never been reached, hence the quorum technically should be adjusted to account for these ‘ghost’ MPs. However, given that parliament never comes near to being full, it is less significant than it might be.

(5) The Institute for Women, Peace and Security, a parliamentary oversight organisation, found that, on average, 57 per cent of parliamentarians were absent in the plenary sessions during the ninth sitting in 2015. In 2014, two out of three plenary sessions lacked a quorum (see Dari report here).

(6) When there is no quorum to vote on the draft laws then the scheduled draft laws and decrees are postponed until the next session. On some occasions there was mass voting. For example, on 13 January 2016, MPs voted and approved the following presidential decrees and laws in under two hours:

1. The law of regulating the telecommunications services charge

2. The legislative decree on agricultural pesticides

3. The legislative decree on nuclear energy

4. The toll taxes on gas and fuel law

5. Amendments regarding the procurement law

(7) “Wolesi Jirga Monitoring of Ninth Session of 16th Legislative Term: 16 Hut 1393 – 31 Saratan 1394,” Fair and Free Election Forum of Afghanistan (FEFA), Kabul: 2015 (see page 61).

(8) Rules of Procedures of the Wolesi Jirga

Rule 111

In case of a member’s absence in the plenary session or committee session, for each day of absence his or her monthly salary shall be deducted.

Rule 112

If a member cannot attend the sessions due to business related to his/her post [as MP] or because of lawful leave, his/her salary shall not be deducted.

This includes trips inside and outside the country relevant to the member’s job and the duties that are assigned to him/her at the time of conducting the sessions in the capital.

Rule 113

1. If a member is absent for one consecutive month, his/her main salary shall not be paid.

2. If a member is absent for two consecutive months, his case, based on the report of the administrative board, shall be investigated by the committee on rights, privileges and immunity of Jirga members. The committee shall put forward its opinion to the plenary session and in line with the article 108 of the constitution, the Jirga shall make the appropriate decision.

(9) Approved decrees:

1. 60th Presidential decree about telecommunication tax

2. 67th legislative decree about the ratification of law on service management of electricity

3. 82nd legislative decree about the ratification of some amendments in services of civil servants

4. 80th legislative decree about the rights of academic cadre for the institute of legislative affairs and academic research by imposing some amendments in this regard.

5. 71st presidential decree about agricultural pesticides

6. 69th presidential decree regarding nuclear energy

Rejected decrees:

1. 58th presidential decree about some amendments in the income tax

2. 75th presidential decree about the amendment regarding transportation tolls

3. 70th presidential decree about the addition of a second annex regarding a draft law on acting ministers or other officials.

4. 75th presidential decree regarding Structure, Authorities and Duties of Electoral bodies at the Independent Election Commission.

5. 74th presidential decree about the ratification of some amendments and the addition of some materials to the election law.

6. 70th presidential decree on the addition of a 2nd annex to the fifth article of the law on acting ministers

(10) Out of a total of 184 MPs present at Wahidi’s interpellation session, 104 MPs voted against his dismissal, 71 MPs voted in favour and nine votes were annulled (see here). Wahidi’s survival of the vote of no confidence was not without controversy, Kamal Nasir Osuli, an MP from Khost during the interpellation session for Abdul Razaq Wahidi, claimed that Wahidi had promised him 100,000 US dollars not to dismiss him. He also said that Wahidi had bribed another sixty MPs with 2,000 US dollars in order to also secure their support (see Dari report here).

(11) Earlier, UNHCR’s own evaluation of its Shelter Assistance Program conducted in the autumn of 2012, had also found the ministry to be an ‘unreliable partner’ due to corruption, inefficiency, mishandling of funds, lack of human resources, and an inability to demonstrate technical or thematic knowledge of the people under the ministry’s responsibility. In 2014, it was also revealed that a 2013 investigation by the United Nations Inspector General’s Office had found the ministry had misappropriated approximately 117,000 US dollars of UNHCR funds for staff bonuses, reimbursements to officials supported by forged documents and property rentals. Finally, the allegations were backed up by a report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in August 2015.