European Union

DRAFT OPINION on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Fund
Committee on Foreign Affairs
David McAllister

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Committee and political group meetings, Brussels

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

DRAFT OPINION on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Juliana
SERV
A vehicle which is not formally withdrawn from use and which is capable of being used must be covered by motor vehicle insurance against civil liability even if its owner, who no longer intends to drive it, has chosen to park it on private land

The European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs held an exchange of views with Nikola Dimitrov, Foreign Minister of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 29 August. Members praised the progress made by the country and the historical agreement with Greece.
They urged all political forces to support the referendum due on 30 September, raised concerns about foreign interference and appealed for continued judicial and anti-corruption reform. Mr Dimitrov underlined the importance of reconciliation and unification through the EU accession process, naming corruption and clientelism as key problems of the Western Balkans. He asked members belonging to different political families to push for unity in support of the referendum in order to unlock the country's transatlantic integration.
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Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

It’s turning into a bit of a tradition.

I go to a UACES conference, talk with a range of European Studies colleagues, then write a long post, usually with a sweary title.

This year it’s Bath, and whereas London in 2016 I was angry (twice) and in Krakow in 2017 I was despairing, this time I’m going to be all about not just taking it.

That feeling comes re-reading those pieces and finding that we still have the same basic issues we had back then – a lack of strategic planning, compromised political leadership and a lack of comprehensive scoping of what’s involved – but also a growing appreciation that the incompleteness of things also generates an opportunity for our own agency.

That was brought home to during a roundtable yesterday, where that opportunity got tackled from a range of perspectives.

The question that discussion generated – for me and which I asked the panellists about – was simply one of how much have we already travelled down any particular road, be that on the form of Brexit, on the practice and notion of democratic debate or on the reformation of gender regimes.

And now, because I blog, I’ve reduced that to the more provocative title you see above (and which might have brought you here).

Fundamentals

Reflexively, I get the impression that it’s easier for academics to talk about the past than the future, because of our proclivity for evidence. Indeed, those who become politicised (in the most general of senses) and advocate future paths are often treated with a degree of scepticism: isn’t our job to help people understand their situation, rather than to advance our preferred change? Especially if that change isn’t directly in our field of research?

As a result, we often fixate on how we got here and on what costs have been sunk.

My thought, however, is that in so doing, we sometimes fail to consider how much isn’t locked in or set in stone.

Personally, that grates, if only because I have a real problem with the notion of inevitability in political settings: the point at which we declare that there’s nothing to be done, is the one at which we secure whatever latent agency we might have.

More importantly, it’s also the point at which we find ourselves having things done to us, by those who feel that things aren’t inevitable (or are inevitably going their way). And that’s not a healthy situation, especially in a democratic setting.

Therefore I always ask people to consider what they can do, because there is always something.

The openness of Brexit

And in the case of Brexit there is very much indeed that can be done, by all of us.

As I listened to that roundtable, I tried to note what was already fixed and I struggled.

Certainly, the invoking of Article 50 in March last year is a decision that is not easily changed, grounded as it is in the referendum of the year before, so in very many ways it is locked into the political environment. Those who would challenge its status still have yet to find a line of argument that resonates sufficiently with public opinion to seriously reopen the matter, although if I stick with my line of reasoning then it’s in their interests to keep trying.

But beyond that, there’s not much.

the Withdrawal Agreement – as seems to be forgotten all too often – isn’t a plan for a new EU-UK relationship, but a wrapping up of the old one. Its content focus on tidying up liabilities and providing mechanisms to bridge to the future situation.

That’s worth stressing, for two reasons.

Firstly, it means that what needs to be locked into that document in the next couple of months is a much more manageable list than all of ‘Brexit’. The Irish dimension is crucial here, but so too governance issues.

Secondly, the British obsession with future models – Canada, Norway, Jersey, etc – means that there’s less political attention or heat on the list of things to be done now. Cynically, I might wonder whether that’s intentional – distract from the coming compromises on Ireland by fighting about future customs models – but that bangs up against another of my basic assumptions, namely that it’s almost always cock-up rather than conspiracy.

In any case, there is still space to input to the WA debate, without loosing one position to get into that future relationship debate.

And that’s a debate that will roll on for a good long time yet.

If one makes a working assumption that the UK is leaving next March, then you have all the reason you need to go and try to shape what might come next, because that isn’t on a clear track to anywhere.

And, importantly, it’s even less clear how Brexit rolls back into the domestic arena and shapes the entirety of the body politic. All week, I’ve found myself talking with colleagues who see wide open spaces where “policy area X in the light of Brexit”  debates might be happening. A lot of people seem to be waiting for more clarity on the WA and on the future relationship, thereby letting opportunities to set agendas and promote ideas now.

Your agency

To come back to the title, it’s a provocation, because it implies that are indeed fucked*, which communicates a particular view on Brexit.  It’s worth saying now that that view is one that’s focused on the poor pursuit, rather than the notion in general. It’s not that it’s happening, but that it’s happening so chaotically.

In that, I find that I’m joined by more and more colleagues. Yes, there’s still a block that wants it to just go away and not to have happened. But as Heraclitus noted, we can never step in the same river twice: there is no status quo ante option here, because things have moved on.

And more basically, it can’t be enough to just stand there and hope things will change, however it is that you want them to change.

We have to work to secure it. You have to work for it.

The micro-personalisation of economic activity means that – for a price – you can get what you want, how you want it. But politics doesn’t work like that: it depends on us, as citizens, engaging with each other, to find ways forward towards our idea of the good life. And if we don’t do that, then others will do it for us, and not necessarily in a good way.

So I will leave this conference determined to encourage you all to make the most of the many opportunities for contribution that Brexit still contains. And that will be part of my own contribution.

All of which is to say that we’re only fucked if we let ourselves be, which might not be the grandest of sentiments, but then I’m not a very sentimental type.

 

* My working assumption as ever is that our social media people will assume I asterisked all the way through, not just the title. We’ll see.

The post So, just how f*cked are we? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

OPINION on the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2019
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Brando Benifei

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Opinion on the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2019 (2018/2046(BUD))
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

‘The Politics of Higher Education, Research and Innovation’ Standing Group @ ECPR 2018 in Hamburg. Photo credits: Mari Elken

Martina Vukasovic

This year’s ECPR (European Consortium of Political Research) General Conference took place at the University of Hamburg (Germany) August 22-25. The conference included 520 panels on a wide array of topics and representation from more than 2,000 academics from around the world. The ECPR Standing Group on the Politics of Higher Education, Research and Innovation, for the seventh time in a row (following Oslo 2017,  Prague 2016, Montreal 2015, Glasgow 2014, Bordeaux 2013 and Reykjavik 2011) organised a section with a total of six panels covering various themes related to knowledge policy governance.

 

European integration in the area of higher education and research continues to be in focus, and this year one panel explicitly focused on differentiated integration, specifically (1) the varied nature of policies and instruments on the European level, and (2) the varied national and institutional adaptation to these instruments. The panel opened with the presentation by Natalia Leskina on several overlapping initiatives in the post-Soviet countries aiming at establishing the Eurasian Higher Education Area and how European integration initiatives (specifically the Bologna Process) have been used as a model by the post-Soviet countries. Simona Torotcoi took the domestic side of differentiated integration as her point of departure and explored compliance and implementation of recommendations concerning two Bologna Process aspects – quality and social dimension – in Portugal and Romania. This was followed by Tim Seidenschnur and Jens Jungblut who identified four distinct narratives – concerns, hopes, beliefs and silent opportunism – that permeate German higher education perspectives on what the consequences of Brexit might be for, among others, student mobility (and in particular mobility of students preparing to be language teachers) and research cooperation. Brexit was also the topic of the paper by Amelia Veiga, who juxtaposed the reflections of academics from 10 European countries (Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Republic of Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, United Kingdom) concerning Brexit with the European Commission’s scenarios for 2025. Finally, Mari Elken and Martina Vukasovic discussed the European side of differentiated integration in higher education, in particular the implications of the existence of several overlapping policy arenas at the European level, how EU initiatives get diluted over time (shifting from big political aims to rather technocratic considerations) and what is the role of regional level integration (e.g. within the Nordic region) in the overall process of European integration.

 

The second panel went beyond Europe and explored issues of global knowledge governance. Meng-Hsuan Chou focused on recruitment of academics globally, specifically analysing, on the one hand, the policies and incentives developed in Singapore to attract more academics and, on the other hand, the rationales and motivations of academics themselves to choose Singapore as their academic home. Tero Erkkilä discussed the ideational linkages between the rise of numerical governance (i.e. governance by global indicators) and knowledge based competitiveness, stressing the role international organizations have in promoting these policy scripts. Janja Komljenovic presented her paper (co-authored by Eva Hartmann) on the role of global private actors in governing higher education, with a specific focus on graduate employability and skills and what are the actual practices and measures used by higher education institutions to mediate the transition of students into employment. These global private actors were also discussed by Miguel Antonio Lim, who highlighted how companies and individuals involved in the business of university ranking build their expertise and legitimate themselves and their products to a global audience, specifically positioning themselves as weak experts.

 

The next panel was dedicated to neo-institutional approaches to analysis of higher education, research and innovation. Jens Jungblut explored the diffusion of innovations from universities to pharmaceutical industry and hospitals and translation challenges that exist both between sectors characterized by different institutional logics as well as between different countries. Georg Krücken and Tim Seidenschnur presented their analysis of why management consultancy projects in universities are not particularly successful, in particular the role of different actors and communities within universities in ascribing or denying legitimacy to management consultants. Emma Sabzalieva presented her review of the concept of major institutional change in higher education, utilizing both the more generic literature on the topic and the higher education specific insights, and exploring the extent to which these perspectives can be utilized beyond its original Western context, e.g. in relation to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and implications this had for higher education systems and institutions. Alexander Mitterle focused on whether and how neo-institutional approaches can be used not only to study similarity, but also stratification in higher education, specifically contrasting several approaches to field theory, in particular how Bourdieu’s and Fligsten/McAdams’ concepts of fields can be enriched by a more phenomenological perspective to actorhood.

 

The fourth panel focused on a major intersection of science and politics – distribution of funding for research and innovation and is a follow up to a previous panel on research executive agencies in Oslo. Four papers were presented. Stefan Skupien discussed choices and tensions concerning asymmetrical research collaborations, such as the one concerning European cooperation (supported by both public and private partners) with African partners in the field of renewable energies. Thomas Palfinger and Peter Biegelbauer compared 12 innovation agencies operating in Europe and their 18 programmes, specifically discussing legitimacy of their funding decisions in relation to how evaluators are selected, what is their role, what project selection criteria they use, how are projects ranked and what are the decision-making procedures. Emina Veletanlic and Creso Sá focused on the Canadian largest research-funding agency (The Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council) and how the shifts away from support for basic research and towards targeted programmes affects basic research in these fields. Thomas König and Sarah Glück concluded the panel with an exploration of agencification of EU research policy, specifically what is the relationship between European executive agencies and (1) the European Commission, (2) other EU institutions and (3) national administrative agencies and ministries involved in research and innovation.

 

Nicolas Rüffin presenting at the panel on Politics of Big Science and research infrastructures. Photo credits: Mari Elken

The fifth panel continued the focus on research, namely the politics of Big Science and research infrastructures. It was organised by recently launched Big Science and Research Infrastructures Network that brings together researchers and practitioners interested in large-scale research facilities and international scientific collaboration. Nicolas Rüffin presented his research on unanimity in decision-making at two large intergovernmental science organizations – CERN and European Space Agency. Isabel Bolliger in turn compared research infrastructure policies in Switzerland and Sweden demonstrating differences in development of their national research infrastructure roadmaps. Finally, Inga Ulnicane discussed political and scientific changes in research infrastructures highlighting that in addition to ‘good old’ intergovernmental large-scale facilities such as CERN new types of digital platform infrastructures are emerging according to differentiated integration approach that involves a number of EU member states as well as associated countries.

 

The final panel highlighted the normative power of Europe in shaping higher education and science policy environments, as well as the complex relationships between instruments and institutions in higher education, research and innovation. Que Anh Dang addressed theoretical and empirical challenges in using the ‘normative power’ approach for analysing developments in Asia. Specifically, she addressed the roles EU and China played, in particular the differences between a rather high-level promotion of European approaches and the people-to-people exchange policy within China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Claudia Acciai compared developments in innovation policy in France and Italy, primarily addressing the heterogeneity of actors and the implications this has for choice of policy instruments and the overall policy design. Elizabeth Balbachevsky highlighted the nested character of science as an institution, the implications this has for the institutional resilience of the University and what are the similarities and differences in how University of Sao Paulo in Brazil and University of Tampere in Finland responded to environmental expectations.

 

Standing Group meeting. Photo credits: Mari Elken

Apart from lively discussions within panels, the Standing Group also had its annual meeting focused on planning future activities, including ECPR 2019, which will take place in Wroclaw. The meeting was also marked by the Award for Excellent Paper from an Emerging Scholar to Olivier Provini for his paper “Transnational circulations of university reforms: the policy-making of the LMD in Burundi”. ECPR 2018 was another successful year for our Standing Group, gathering researchers currently based on three continents (Asia, Europe and North America). See you at the next ECPR General Conference in Wroclaw in September 2019!

 

The post ECPR 2018 – Politics of higher education, research and innovation appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1084 of 30 July 2018 updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2018/475

Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/964 of 5 July 2018 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine.

Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1006 of 16 July 2018 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in the Republic of Maldives.

Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1085 of 30 July 2018 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1000 of 16 July 2018 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 concerning restrictive measures against ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them

Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1087 of 30 July 2018 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1086 of 30 July 2018 implementing Decision (CFSP) 2015/1333 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya

Last week, the pound briefly jumped 1% against the US dollar when the EU’s Chief Negotiator, Michel Barnier said, “We are prepared to offer Britain a partnership such as there never has been with any other third country”.

His comments boosted hopes that a Brexit deal can be struck after all – maybe even along the lines of Theresa May’s beleaguered Chequers plan.

Under that plan, the UK would benefit from a kind of cherry-picked, quasi-access to the EU’s Single Market for our traders in agricultural and industrial goods only, along with a friction-free customs border.

But the reality soon dawned when Mr Barnier gave more details in an interview with the German radio station Deutschlandfunk. He told the station:

“We have been willing to form a strong relationship from the beginning.

“Twenty-seven heads of state and government, including Angela Merkel and the French president and other heads of state, have proposed a unique partnership with the United Kingdom.”

The new arrangement between the EU and the UK could be unprecedented, he said, in that it went further than just an agreement on tariff-free trade.

The new arrangement could also take in areas from “aviation to university and research cooperation, to internal and external security and foreign policy”.

And then came Barnier’s big BUT:

“It cannot be built to the detriment of who we are. The internal market, the home market, is indeed our most important asset…

“We respect all the red lines of the United Kingdom. They do not want to abide by the rules of the court of justice, they do not want to follow our legal framework, they do not want to pay, they do not want freedom of movement.

“All of these are the cornerstones of the single market and the EU.

“So we have to preserve and protect what makes us.”

This should come as no surprise. At the beginning of August, Mr Barnier already explained at a press conference that Theresa May’s proposals for a new customs arrangement and trade in goods represented a threat to the integrity of the EU.

Essentially, Mr Barnier forensically tore apart the Prime Minister’s white paper into little pieces – and in doing that, he has the solid and unanimous backing of all the other EU27 countries (of course he does: he was appointed by them and works for them).

So where does that leave Mrs May’s Chequer’s proposal?

It’s ‘dead’, wrote Daniel Boffey in The Guardian, their Brussels bureau chief. ‘The zombie white paper just doesn’t know it yet,’ he added.

There are others who don’t know it yet, most especially Theresa May herself. Writing for today’s Sunday Telegraph, she insisted that she will, “not be pushed into accepting compromises on the Chequers proposals..”  The Telegraph ran the headline:

‘Theresa May declares she won’t surrender to Brussels over Chequers plan’ 

That approach was reflected last week in a speech in France by David Lidington, Theresa May’s ‘de facto’ deputy Prime Minister, who warned EU leaders to accept the Chequers plan, or face the UK leaving the EU without any deal.

The Guardian ran the headline:

‘No-deal Brexit is only alternative to Chequers plan, says Lidington’

Reported The Independent: ‘His speech marked part of a concerted effort by the UK government to persuade EU member states to back the Chequers plan despite opposition from officials in Brussels.’

During the summer, the Prime Minister sent her cabinet ministers across the EU to sell her Chequers Brexit plan, but it really was to no avail.

What our government – and many Brexiters – simply don’t get, or don’t want to get, is that it’s pointless going around the backs of the EU Commission officials to try and do a side-deal with the heads of EU states.

That’s because the Commission is the servant of the EU, not its master. Their masters are the EU27 (along with the European Parliament) – so whatever the stance of Michel Barnier, it’s what the EU27 have instructed.

This was confirmed earlier last week by French President, Emmanuel Macron, when he gave a speech to a gathering of French ambassadors from around the world. Mr Macron told the diplomats:

“Brexit is a sovereign choice which must be respected, but it is a choice which cannot be made at the expense of the European Union’s integrity.

“It is what the British people have chosen for themselves, not for others, and France would like to maintain a strong, special relationship with London, but not at the cost of the European Union breaking up.”

He added:

“…we have to defend the integrity of our values, of our foundations and of the European Union.”

(All accurate, except for two key points:

Brexit is NOT the ‘sovereign choice’ of the UK – our Parliament in Westminster has never actually debated, or voted, on the specific question of whether the country should leave the EU.

 Brexit is NOT “what the British people have chosen for themselves”. Most voters in the UK did not vote for Brexit – only a minority of voters chose ‘Brexit’ for Britain).

So, here’s the bottom line (which I have written many times before, and post it here again, because nothing, absolutely nothing, has changed):

Last May in Parliament, Theresa May, summed up her promises for Brexit: “no hard border on the island of Ireland” and “as frictionless trade as possible with the European Union”.

Of course, we already have that now. And of course, this cannot be delivered after Brexit.

The Brexit promised by Theresa May and her government – to offer the same benefits of EU membership as an ex-member – is impossible to deliver

The EU27 are not going to allow an ex-member to have the same or better benefits as themselves (something that Theresa May actually said before the referendum).

Their Union, their Single Market, their customs union, that took decades to create, is more important to them than it is to us. And that’s something many people in Britain, especially Brexiters, simply don’t understand.

The only countries that enjoy frictionless trade with the EU are those countries that are EU members, or part of the EU Single Market, or in its customs union.

The EU has already stated from the start that the UK cannot cherry pick.

If the EU allowed the UK frictionless access to its market, without being subject to all the EU rules and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (all red lines of the government), it would unravel the entire raison d’être of the European Union, and put at risk all its existing agreements with other ‘third countries’.

It’s not going to happen.

Of course, the UK could have a free trade agreement with the EU similar to the ones it signed recently with Canada and Japan. The EU has already offered us that.

But those agreements don’t include frictionless access to the EU’s cherished Single Market, and those agreements don’t cover all the goods that go between the UK and the EU, and they don’t cover services, or free movement of people.

All vital to tens of thousands of British businesses and hundreds of thousands of British jobs.

It begs the question as to why we are leaving, as clearly we already have the best deal now, as a full member of the EU.

So, let’s repeat it, and shout it loudly. EU membership is best.

It’s not too late for Britain to agree to a democratic U-turn on Brexit. All we need is a #PeoplesVote.

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The post Michel Barnier’s big BUT appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Es ist 6 Uhr morgens in Boston. Ich bin seit über einer Stunde wach. Jetlag. Zeit, um eine Replik auf “Das Ende der Geduld” von Dr. Hannah Bethke – selbst Politikwissenschaftlerin – in der FAZ zu schreiben. Eine Replik mit Blick auf unser Fach und die Natur von wissenschaftlichen Großkonferenzen wie die ECPR.

Ich bin in Boston auf dem Jahrestreffen der American Political Science Association (APSA). Getagt wird, nicht wie bei der ECPR-Konferenz, die in dem Beitrag kritisiert wird, in Universitäten in ganz Europa, in den gleichen Räumen wo auch Studierende tagtäglich lernen und wo Kolleginnen und Kollegen normalerweise lehren. Getagt wird hier stattdessen in einem überdimensionierten Tagungszentrum zwischen zwei Konferenzhotels. Aber das weiß man, bevor man hierher kommt.

Ähnlich ist es mit der ECPR-Konferenz, wie sie gerade in Hamburg stattgefunden hat. Man weiß, was man bekommt, bevor man hinfährt, außer man fährt zum ersten Mal hin. Man kann trotzdem, wie Hannah Bethke, das Format und die Größe und den Rhythmus der Konferenz kritisieren. 10-Minuten-Vorträge zu spezifischen Forschungsthemen, zum Teil fünf an der Zahl, dazu eine Diskussion durch eine Fachkollegin, und dann noch ein kurzes Q&A, alles in knapp über 1 1/2 Stunden, sind eine Zumutung.

Sie sind aber auch eine Chance. Die Chance, nicht nur ein Duzend Kolleginnen und Kollegen zu treffen wie auf einem klassischen Workshop, versteckt in den kleinen Nischen unserer Forschungsfelder. Hier trifft sich das weitere Forschungsfeld und die Profession. Auf Empfängen lernt man neue Kolleg*innen kennen, oder trifft diejenigen, mit denen man an anderer Stelle mal gearbeitet hat und wo sich die Wege in den verwobenen akademischen Karrieren verlaufen haben.

Eine Großkonferenz ist dabei von ihrer Natur her auf den ersten Blick wie das Fastfood in der Shopping-Mall des Wissenschaftsbetriebs.

Genauso, wie ich manchmal einen vegetarischen Döner zu mir nehme, höre ich mir da auch gerne Vorträge in Forschungsfeldern an, in denen ich vielleicht nur lehre aber nicht forsche. Als Ideen-Happen für zwischendurch. Aber auch um mir über neue Methoden Gedanken zu machen, denn Innovation lebt davon, dass man über den eigenen Tellerrand guckt. Dann sind die Happen weniger Fastfood als die Gänge in einem Gourmet-Restaurant, wo ich auch nicht verstehe, wie der Koch das macht und ich trotzdem das Ergebnis mit einem Bissen genießen kann.

Aber die ECPR-Konferenz ist auch nicht das einzige Format, in dem wir Wissen austauschen. Allein bei der ECPR gibt es das Konzept der “Joint Sessions“, eine jährliche Multi-Workshop-Konferenz, in der man bis zu einer Stunde Zeit pro Forschungspapier hat. Dazu zig Spezialist*innen-Workshops. Aber selbst auch ohne diese Alternativen und ohne die Fastfood-Metapher ist der Blick von Bethke auf die ECPR zu eng.

Gleiches gilt für die Kritik, unser Fach wolle nur “quantitativ orientierte Sozial-, nicht ideengeschichtlich fundierte Geisteswissenschaft sein.”

In unserer Sektion “21st Century International Bureaucracy” mit acht Panels, die an zwei der drei Tagen der ECPR-Konferenz stattfanden, gab es quantitative Studien genauso wie ethnographische Forschung; es wird auf die Ideen von Max Weber genauso verwiesen wie auf Modelle, die hier in den USA als “formal theory” bezeichnet werden; es gab extrem kurze Vorträge von unbekannten Kolleg*innen, die nur kurz da waren, aber auch detaillierte Nachgespräche mit Kolleg*innen, mit denen man seit Jahren zusammenarbeitet, lose oder eng, in Deutschland, Europa und darüber hinaus.

Das ist keine “kalte Wissenschaft ohne Herz – und manchmal auch ohne Verstand” wie Bethke schreibt.

Es ist liebevolle Politikwissenschaft zwischen ehrlicher und konstruktiver Kritik, auf der Suche nach Lösungen für schwierige Forschungsfragen, mit Zeitknappheit ringend, aber das beste daraus machend. Wir schreiben uns nach der Konferenz Emails und bedanken uns für gute Kritik, machen Pläne für neue Forschung und freuen uns auf das Wiedersehen.

Das hat nichts mit Methoden zu tun, die warm oder kalt sind, es hat etwas mit einem modernen Wissenschaftsverständnis zu tun, wo die meisten von uns wissen, dass bei allem Wettbewerb wir nur arbeitsteilig Wissen sammeln können – da ist die Politikwissenschaft nicht anders als die Physik oder die Linguistik oder die Humanbiologie.

In unserer Sektion zu internationalen Verwaltungen – wie in vielen anderen Sektionen auch – zeigt sich dabei über alle Panels hinweg die Vielfalt der modernen Politikwissenschaft, die sich nicht in ein Korsett von “Quanti“ oder “Quali”, und in alte Debatten zwischen “Ideengeschichte ohne Methode” oder “ideenlosem Methodenfetischismus” drängen lässt.

Klar gibt es Grabenkämpfe und Wagenburgen, Begriffsstreitigkeiten und Methoden-Kleinklein. Einzelne Vorträge sind besser als andere. Manche sind innovativer, kreativer, eingängiger, andere sind es nicht.

Aber selbst hier, auf einer amerikanischen Großkonferenz, wo die quantitative Politikwissenschaft noch mehr Gewicht hat als in Europa, könnte ich vier Tage lang nur auf ideengeschichtliche oder stärker geisteswissenschaftlich orientierte Panels gehen und gibt es Panels, wo ein quantitativer Survey mit syrischen Flüchtlingen im Libanon genauso in 12 Minuten präsentiert wird wie handgezeichnete ethnographische Karten von Post-Konflikt-Gemeinden in Burundi.

Das einzige Lob für die ECPR-Konferenz in Hamburg, das Bethke einfällt, richtet sich ausgerechnet auf den Plenar-Vortrag von Rainer Forst. Forst stelle “im einzig langen Vortrag der Konferenz die alte Frage neu, wie die Politikwissenschaft die Kluft zwischen ihrem normativen und ihrem empirischen Selbstverständnis überwinden kann“.

In diesem Vortrag zitierte Forst über 45 Minuten nur tote weiße Männer aus Europa und Amerika, knapp 15 an der Zahl. Keine einzige Frau wurde erwähnt, keine Idee ausgeführt, die die vielfältigen Erkenntnisse und Perspektiven der modernen empirischen und normativen Politikwissenschaft aufnahm, deren Erkenntnisse es über Weber und Foucault hinaus geschafft haben. Kein signifikanter Verweis auf Ideen von außerhalb des Westens.

Wer sich nach Alte-Weiße-Männer-Ideengeschichte sehnt, ist aus meiner Sicht in der modernen Politikwissenschaft noch nicht angekommen.

Meine Politikwissenschaft ist vielfältiger, mit tollen Kolleg*innen, die zwischen intersektionalem Feminismus und quantitativen Großstudien zu Krieg und Gewalt gegen Frauen keine Barriere sehen. Ich sehe Kolleg*innen, die sich für ein halbes Jahr in eine eine internationale Organisation begeben, um den Zynismus der dortigen Mitarbeiter zu erleben, während andere Kolleg*innen mit statistischen Daten zu verstehen versuchen, wie postkoloniale Machtverschiebungen in den Vereinten Nationen passieren oder warum an mancher Stelle immer noch das Verhältnis von Globalem Süden und Globalem Norden aufrecht erhalten wird. Andernorts wird die (Ideen-)Geschichte populistischer Politik genauso analysiert wie der Wahlerfolg rechtspopulistischer Parteien.

Das heißt nicht, dass Politikwissenschaft in 2018 keine Probleme hat. Dass es nicht hunderte Baustellen gibt, an denen wir tagtäglich arbeiten sollten. Dass es keine Verteilungskonflikte oder keine seltsamen Moden oder keine schlechten Arbeiten gäbe.

Aber Politikwissenschaft ist eben auch nicht das, was man auf 1-2 Tagen ECPR-Konferenz bekommt, schon gar nicht, wenn man nicht sieht, dass ein 10-Minuten-Vortrag einer jungen, innovativen Kollegin – mit einem prekären Vertrag – mehr Gehalt und Veränderungspotenzial haben kann als 45 Minuten philosophisches Namedropping von einem Professor, der das Privileg des Plenarvortrags nicht für Veränderung sondern nur zur Reproduktion der bestehenden Verhältnisse nutzt.

Und noch eine letzte Anmerkung: Etwas kulturpessimistisch wird im Beitrag von Hannah Bethke der Blick auf das Smartphone oder den Laptop während der ECPR-Vorträge  kritisiert. Den Beitrag “Zum Ende der Geduld” habe ich auf Facebook gefunden, geteilt durch eine Kollegin aus München. Gelesen hab ich ihn während der Konferenz hier in Boston. Auch Wissenschaftskommunikation findet in 2018 nicht nur physisch im Raum sondern auch digital statt. Deswegen teile ich diesen Blogpost jetzt auch auf Twitter und hoffe auf viel Kritik. Oder Ignoranz.

Es ist jetzt 7:30 Uhr in Boston. Um 8 Uhr beginnt der zweite von vier Konferenztagen der APSA-Konferenz. Ich freue mich drauf. Genauso wie auf den DVPW-Kongress Ende September in Frankfurt.

NB: Die aktuelle Fassung ist im Vergleich zur ersten Version um einige Rechtschreib- und Grammatikfehler ärmer.

The post Replik auf “Das Ende der Geduld” (FAZ): Ein anderer Blick auf die ECPR-Konferenz und moderne Politikwissenschaft appeared first on Ideas on Europe.