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The Brexit plan she set out yesterday includes historic judgement calls on how to approach Britain’s most important postwar negotiation. Her speech mixed optimism, realism, veiled threats, open threats, clear red lines, blurred red lines, all cut with some creative (and some would say implausible) ideas to soften a hard Brexit. Sterling rallied, and so did the Tory party. The right-wing press was not far behind:
Read moreWhile most of the current Brexit discussions concern whether British Prime Minister Theresa May and her government will opt for a hard or soft exit, it is relevant to think a step further. Since Theresa May’s announcement to go with the so-called hard Brexit, both the British government and the European Union will need to reconsider relations with international organisations. The United Kingdom plays a vital part in the EU’s interorganisational relations, most importantly in foreign, security and defence issues.
Despite its ongoing aversions to further EU integration in the realm of security and defence policy, the UK has played an important role as a driver with signing the bilateral Franco-British agreement in St. Malo in 1998. Also, thanks to its long-lasting partnership with the United States, it has often served as a bridge over the Atlantic. It also maintains close trade relations with Asian countries, especially with Commonwealth countries such as India and Malaysia, but also with China, because of the regions’ increasing economic importance.
The gains and losses of Brexit for both the EU and the UK
Prior to the UK’s EU referendum and the subsequent decision to leave the Union, the British government has strengthened its bilateral relations with international organisations such as ASEAN and WTO. However, with Brexit not only will the UK’s relations with international organisations change, but also the EU’s international agreements. While the UK government will have to re-negotiate economic agreements with the EU’s Free Trade Partners (e.g. Canada and EFTA countries), it will also have to re-negotiate its status within WTO. Being outside the EU, the UK will no longer benefit from the special rules for trading blocs under WTO regulations.[1]
On the other hand, there is no need to re-negotiate international agreements and Brexit will not affect negatively in this sense. Yet, the EU will have to miss out on a significant security partner and the most important defence capabilities. As a member state, the UK has contributed vitally to military operations under the framework of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. With Brexit the Franco-British driver and motor will be lost[2], since the capabilities of both member states account for 40%.
On a positive note, the EU will also loose a veto player with Brexit. This might enable the EU to finalise its security and defence project. In the weeks after the referendum outcome, renewed ideas of an EU army emerged. Brexit might open new avenues and opportunities for the EU, such as stronger EU defence as proposed by Germany and France[3].
Implications for the EU-NATO relationship
Yet, the implications of Brexit for the EU’s interorganisational relations with crucial partners, such as NATO, will not be this positive. As outlined by former Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer[4], Brexit was sad news for both security actors, and will hurt the EU-NATO relationship. As a bridge and advocate of EU-NATO cooperation, this relationship needs to be re-considered. The UK is amongst a few states that have achieved a 2% defence spending. Additionally, it possesses nuclear assets, a large military force and, above all, the motivation to conduct military crisis management operations.
The future EU-UK relationship will be important for shaping EU-NATO cooperation. Whether the UK will be an integrated, associated or detached partner[5] will affect interorganisational relations. It is suggested that Brexit can lead to three possible scenarios for the EU-NATO relationship: (1) The UK continues to contribute to CSDP operations through a special agreement that would allow to further strengthen the EU-NATO relationship. In this case, the UK would also need a special status with the EU, i.e. a EU+1 partnership which would enable the UK to participate in CSDP operations. (2) The UK withdraws completely and the EU lacks financial contributions to CSDP and becomes more reliant on NATO through Berlin Plus. Accordingly, the UK would be more autonomous, but the EU-NATO relationship would suffer more asymmetry. (3) The UK withdraws completely and EU member states are able to compensate for the financial loss and establish stronger capabilities including EU OHQ. This would contribute to the EU’s autonomisation as well as to a more equal and symmetric EU-NATO relationship.
Implications for the EU’s interorganisational relations
While Brexit would have a detrimental effect on the EU-NATO relationship, this will not be the case as such with the EU’s interorganisational relations with organisations such as WTO and the UN. In the case of WTO, the EU will still be considered a trading bloc, and thus benefit from WTO’s specific regulations as regards tariffs for international trade. In the case of the UN, some member states, e.g. Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland, would favour a permanent EU seat in the Security Council. In addition, due to the Franco-British Lancaster House Agreement, the UK government will continue to cooperate with at least France in matters of security and defence, which can then be related back to the EU and its interorganisational interaction with the UN.
The extent of Brexit’s implications for the EU-UK relationship and for the EU’s interorganisational relations with international organisations such as NATO, will hopefully be determined in the upcoming months. The decision by Theresa May and her government to opt for a hard Brexit have important effects on the future of the EU’s interorganisational relations and the strength (or weakness) of European security. With a strong British engagement, the EU might be better off due to the UK’s capabilities, but without a close relationship, new avenues might be open for the EU to finally strengthen and expand its security and defence policy.
Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters is PhD Candidate and Teaching Assistant at the University of Kent, Canterbury.
[1] https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/07/wto-chief-brexit-trade-talks-start-scratch-eu-referendum
[2] https://www.ceps.eu/publications/implications-brexit-eu’s-common-security-and-defence-policy
[3] https://www.euractiv.com/section/security/news/germany-and-france-seek-stronger-eu-defence-after-brexit/
[4] http://www.friendsofeurope.org/security-europe/brexit-britain-nato-and-the-eu-will-now-be-diminished-on-the-global-stage/
[5] http://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/The-UK-and-EU-foreign-security-and-defense-policy-after-Brexit.pdf
The post ‘Brexit’s Implications for the EU’s relations with international organisations’ by Nele Ewers-Peters appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
A tumultuous 2016 and uncertainty over the United States’ future role in global climate change action may have cast a shadow over the start of 2017, but there are reasons for optimism too.
Whether reading about the launch of Bill Gates’ $1bn Breakthrough Energy Ventures Fund, China’s plans to plough $430bn into renewable fuel by 2020, Tesla’s Gigafactory moving up to full production or solar power becoming the cheapest form of new electricity, it’s easy to see why US President Barack Obama believes momentum towards a clean energy future is irreversible.
Figures from Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) show that the world passed an important turning point in 2013, and is already adding more capacity for clean energy each year than for coal and natural gas combined. Peak fossil fuel use for electricity may be reached by 2025.
Our transition to a clean energy future, coupled with rapid advances in technology and innovation, are transforming how electricity systems operate. Grid agility and flexibility are essential as we move from traditional models of centrally dispatched generation – available at the flick of a switch – and incorporate more intermittent renewable generation into the system.
Energy storage is a key part of this transition, helping to integrate wind and solar generation efficiently and provide the instantly-dispatchable power needed to reduce our reliance on fossil fuels and maintain energy security.
“Strategies to store energy and manage consumption in a smart way give the businesses and households control over how, when and from where they consume their energy”
Most people associate energy storage with batteries, but storage exists in many forms, from pumped hydropower and compressed air to demand-side response (DSR). The latter takes advantage of thermal storage (heating or cooling) in industrial processes or water pumped and stored in reservoirs to provide much-needed flexibility for electricity systems.
For example, on a windy day, when too much energy is being supplied, industrial processes can adjust their consumption patterns to absorb surplus power, whether by switching air conditioning units on, pumping water or heating liquid bitumen. Similarly, when there is not enough power, demand can be delayed temporarily rather than asking a battery to discharge.
This flexible demand is ideally suited to heating and cooling assets that have the characteristics of stored energy devices. The ‘thermal inertia’ in these devices means that the amount of energy they use can be adjusted without immediately affecting their performance. By invisibly switching them on or off for a few minutes at a time, energy demand can be adjusted to meet available supply in real time, creating a distributed storage technology.
To capitalise on the potential of this demand-side flexibility – which can be provided by both battery storage technologies and DSR – it is important that policymakers do not discriminate between energy stored in a fridge or a heated liquid and energy stored in lithium ion cells. A technology-agnostic approach to the energy system, free of subsidies and long-term contracts, will enable technologies to prosper based on their merits, in terms of both the carbon and consumer cost of these offerings.
Either way, consumers should win. For businesses and households, strategies to store energy and manage consumption in a smart way – powered by smart technology platforms – will not only deliver income and savings but – more importantly – give them control over how, when and from where they consume their energy.
“We are moving to the point where sustainably-driven energy decisions are no longer uncompetitive or inconvenient, but are boosting productivity and enhancing standards of living”
Right now, businesses are leading the way, displaying best practice with regard to sustainability and developing strategies to maximise the value of their total flexibility. Through a combination of battery storage and DSR they are cutting costs during peak price periods, earning revenue, unlocking value from assets with zero flexibility and beginning to trade their capacity in wholesale electricity markets.
Every megawatt of demand-side flexibility they provide to help manage fluctuations in electricity supply and demand is a megawatt that doesn’t have to come from a fossil-fuelled power station. In the UK alone, it is estimated this smart power can deliver consumer savings of up to £8bn ($9.6bn) a year.
This behind-the-meter approach to battery deployment makes the smartest use of existing infrastructure, using established grid connections and land already controlled by the consumer. But grid-scale energy storage is also being deployed at scale and speed.
In 2015 Californian policymakers were faced with a shutdown at the state’s biggest gas storage facility, threatening peak shortages and blackouts. To solve this immediate challenge with an immediately-available solution, policymakers fast-tracked 64.5MW of electricity storage and approved $11.5m for DSR and dynamic pricing. Energy storage projects were constructed in less than four months, compared to a previous average of three-and-a-half years.
In 2016 more than one gigawatt of energy storage prequalified for National Grid’s Enhanced Frequency Response tender in the UK, of which some 210MW was purchased. Globally, BNEF analysis suggests 780MW of energy storage will have been installed in 2016.
Moving to a clean energy future that is more decentralised and more consumer-focused is going to take time. But it’s clear that there is appetite from investors to bring innovation to market. As technology advances continue to drive down costs, we are moving to the point where sustainably-driven energy decisions are no longer uncompetitive or inconvenient, but are boosting productivity and enhancing standards of living. Here’s to 2017.
IMAGE CREDIT: Bigstock.com – zhudifeng
The post Energy storage – unlocking flexibility to deliver a clean energy future appeared first on Europe’s World.
Citizens want to know what the EU is doing to reduce the consumption of plastic bags given the negative impact on marine wildlife and the environment.
In the EU, plastic carrier bags are considered as packaging under Directive 94/62/EC. The use of plastic carrier bags result in littering and an inefficient use of resources. Moreover, the unmanaged disposal of these bags leads to environmental pollution and aggravates the widespread problem of litter in water bodies, threatening aquatic eco-systems worldwide.
Legal frameworkRichard Carey / Fotolia
The Directive 94/62/EC on packaging and packing waste, and the successive amendments, aim to harmonise national measures concerning the management of packaging and packaging waste in order, on the one hand, to prevent any impact thereof on the environment of all Member States as well as of third countries or to reduce such impact, thus providing a high level of environmental protection, and, on the other hand, to ensure the functioning of the internal market and to avoid obstacles to trade and distortion and restriction of competition within the Community.
Directive (EU) 2015/720 amending Directive 94/62/EC, defines measures to reduce the consumption of lightweight plastic carrier bags, including imposing charges or setting national maximum consumption targets.
Objective of EU directive on lightweight plastic bagsDirective 2015/720 entered into force on 26 May 2015 and deadline for transposition in Member States was by 27 November 2016.
The objective of the directive on lightweight plastic bags is to limit negative impacts on the environment, in particular in terms of littering, to encourage waste prevention and a more efficient use of resources, while limiting negative socio-economic impacts. More specifically, the proposal aims at reducing the consumption of plastic carrier bags with a thickness of below 50 microns (0.05 millimetres) in the European Union. There is an exemption for very light bags, intended for the protection of fresh produce.
The measures must include either one or both of the following:
By 27 May 2017, the Commission should present a report to the European Parliament and to the Council, examining the impact of the use of ‘oxo-degradable’ plastic carrier bags on the environment and present a legislative proposal, if appropriate.
Parliamentary questionsMEPs have put several parliamentary written questions to the Commission on plastic bags. In its answer of 16 June 2015, the Commission stated that the ‘directive requires Member States to implement a predefined maximum national consumption objective and/or to put in place instruments ensuring that lightweight plastic carrier bags are not provided free of charge. The measures adopted by Member States have to be proportionate, non-discriminatory and non-protectionist.’
In its answer of 13 June 2016, the Commission sets out that it ‘is preparing an implementing act laying down the specifications for labelling or marking home-compostable lightweight plastic carrier bags. Furthermore, studies are being carried out on behalf of the Commission on the impact of the use of oxo-degradable plastic carrier bags on the environment and on the life cycle impacts of alternatives to very lightweight plastic carrier bags. Results are expected in the second half of 2016’.
In an answer of 1 July 2016, the Commission also explains that ‘Measures to be taken may involve the use of economic instruments and marketing restrictions. Measures may vary depending on the environmental impact of the lightweight plastic carrier bags when they are recovered or disposed of, their composting properties, durability or specific intended use’.
Further informationMore details on packaging and packaging waste is available from the European Commission. The European Parliamentary Research Service keysource product highlights links to the views of stakeholders entitled ‘Plastic Bags, Forever?’.
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Politicians across the EU were left to come up with a response to the president-elect actively championing the continent’s disintegration: many opted for anger and incredulity.
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