European Union

will take place on Thursday 9 March 2017, 9:00-12:30 in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply for access to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

Further information
watch the meeting live
Access rights for interest group representatives
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The government’s new White Paper on Brexit is optimistically described as meant to achieve a new partnership with the European Union. But before that can happen, the terms of divorce must be negotiated, and that is never easy.

The first goal of the government’s Brexit White Paper is to introduce certainty and clarity, subject to the qualification ‘wherever we can’. Insofar as a policy is negotiable, the outcome can hardly be certain at the start of negotiations. Limited clarity and certainty allows both hard Brexiteers and the salvage squad of the remain campaign to project their own hopes onto the government’s plans for Brexit.

To achieve an agreement, the UK government must be prepared to accept compromises. When a new policy is proposed, a member state in good standing can expect to get about two-thirds of what it wants. EU negotiators have made clear that since the UK has chosen to leave the EU it will be given less than any member state gets.

The likelihood of achieving the government’s goals varies from goal to goal. Each can be classified on a simple scale ranging from 0 (impossible); 1 or 2 (achievable with difficulty or only partially); 3, (amenable to bargaining and compromise); and 4 (readily achievable).  They rank as follows:

4 Cooperating in the fight against terrorism. When a terrorist threat erupts, security services are always willing to work together to prevent or apprehend terrorists.

4 Securing rights for UK nationals now resident in Europe and EU nationals now resident in the UK. This is a win-win policy for both the UK and the EU since it will confirm the status quo.

4 Protect and enhance existing workers’ rights. Repatriating EU laws to Britain will leave existing standards in place. Enhancing rights will be disputed in the British Parliament; foreign voices will hardly matter.

4 End the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union over the UK. This can be achieved by unilateral British action, but at a price. It jeopardizes agreement on trade and finance because the EU wants its Court to adjudicate any disputes arising from an agreement.

3 Controlling the number of European nationals coming to the UK. A law or a ministerial statement can set a numerical limit on EU migration but the Home Office has a long record of failing to meet numerical limits. Brexit will free the Mayor of Calais to put refugees there on a train to Britain without any obligation to accept their return from a non-EU state.

2 Protecting historic ties and the common travel area with the Republic of Ireland. Given the negative impact on security of a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic, the EU may make concessions to the Republic that the UK could not achieve on its own. The scope for maintaining free trade between England and Ireland is much more limited once the UK becomes a non-member state. Britons flying from London to Dublin or vice versa may have to join long passport queues with foreigners before be crossing the sea border between Ireland and Britain.

2 Securing new trade agreements with non-EU countries. Leaving the EU will give the UK the freedom to negotiate agreements with other countries.  President Trump shows that major countries can have national leaders that are less keen on trading with the UK than the UK is on trading with them and negotiating details of a trade agreement cannot be done in a flying trip or a phone call.

2 Seeking collaboration with European partners in science and technology. Collaboration could be maintained by agreement with the EU – subject to the British government making a cash contribution to the EU research fund and leaving in EU hands the power to decide which British proposals are funded and which are not. People are required to do research and many research workers in Britain are from EU countries. Because of Brexit, some are preparing to return to the continent and immigration controls will make it more difficult to hire replacements.

1 Securing the freest trade possible between the UK and Europe. Not a lot is possible without the British government making a U-turn, because the EU’s requirements for participating in a single European market are unacceptable to the British government’s current position. The UK government’s hopes of “cherry-picking” existing rights of the City of London are also unacceptable to EU leaders.

1 or 0 Strengthening the Union. The Scottish government’s stated goal is to remain an economic and political partner with the EU. Calling and winning another independence referendum is its hoped for means of achieving Scotxit, that is, leaving the Union. If Scottish voters rejected independence, this would preserve the UK as a four-nation Union; whether it would strengthen it is a moot point.

1 or 0 Delivering a smooth, orderly exit with agreement within two years plus a limited transitional period for implementing what Brexit requires. The White Paper recognises the need for an additional period of time to implement a new partnership and avoid a cliff-edge leap from membership to non-membership. To achieve any agreement within a tight deadline will require substantial compromises. Since the impact of Brexit is much greater on the UK than on the 27 states that will remain in the EU after Britain leaves, this increases the risk that the British government will reject the only transition deal on offer as a bad deal and head for the cliff-edge with no deal.

The outcome of negotiations cannot be assigned a numerical mark; it will be graded politically. The Prime Minister can hail whatever is achieved as a great success, whether it is a full loaf, a panini, a few slices of bread or just a biscuit. By contrast, many Conservative MPs will view the results as a curate’s egg, good in some parts and bad in others. They will want the red meat alternative of exiting without any deal.

The White Paper leaves this possibility on the menu. In a European political context, EU negotiators see no settlement as preferable to making concessions that would call into question the authority of the EU in relation to its 450 million citizens and 27 member states.

The post How achievable are the UK’s 12 goals for Brexit? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Pity the European Union’s top officials as they contemplate next month’s sixtieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome.

Planned as a glorious popular celebration, it’s shaping up to be a political embarrassment. The EU is caught between two conflicting pressures: it wants to showcase the Union’s achievements at the 25 March informal summit in Rome, but is also committed to producing a white paper that promises genuine progress on the future of the euro.

Now that the anniversary is looming large, the upper echelons of the European Commission are grappling frenziedly with the text. Billed as the roadmap for securing economic, financial, fiscal and political union by 2025, it in fact risks revealing the true extent of European disunity.

There’s no doubt that Europe needs a morale booster. The EU’s sinking popularity and the further destabilisation threatened by Brexit and President Trump’s dystopian agenda should be countered by a clear-eyed assessment of the EU’s worth – past, present and future.

A few politicians have said so, though softly. France’s President, François Hollande, has suggested that the informal European Council in Rome “should open a new page for the future of Europe”. Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has spoken rather vaguely of the need for a future “two-speed Europe” to be discussed at the Rome meeting.

“There’s no doubt that Europe needs a morale booster”

The icing on the EU’s sixtieth birthday cake was to have been a show of unity on Europe’s economic and monetary union (EMU) and the future of the euro.

But discussions on how to strengthen the eurozone in the wake of the sovereign debt crises that have shaken Greece, and also Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy, have been a saga.

In mid-2015 the so-called ‘Five Presidents’ Report’ (involving the European Central Bank and Eurogroup heads, as well as those of the three main EU institutions) set out a fairly tentative blueprint for completing EMU. The report pushed to one side the thorny questions of mutualised debt and fiscal transfers from richer to poorer eurozone members.

Last September, EU leaders meeting in Bratislava declared the EU’s determination to make progress on eurozone governance and a range of other issues, including refugees.

But Bratislava was widely judged to be a damp squib, and in concrete terms did little more than kick the can down the road, especially on the eurozone’s future. This increased the pressure for a white paper with enough muscle to reassure Europeans that political momentum in the EU isn’t slowing to a halt.

The waters of the EMU debate have been muddied further by the Commission’s desire to beef-up its EMU paper by tacking on a ‘European Pillar of Social Rights’.

This pillar sees the eurozone’s future depending significantly on developments in national employment and welfare policies, but there is a risk that the profound divisions over improving eurozone governance will be obscured by social policy issues and the Commission’s brainchild of a ‘Competitiveness Board’ in each member state to assess reforms for speeding economic convergence.

“Discussions on how to strengthen the eurozone in the wake of the sovereign debt crises that have shaken Greece, and also Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy, have been a saga”

The Commission has so far been hugging the white paper’s text to its chest. Some EU ambassadors believe that they may not catch sight of it until early March, by when there will be little time to do more than fine-tune a fait accompli. It is generally acknowledged that the timing is made tricky for the Brussels executive by elections this year in France and Germany. If the white paper inflames controversy, it could do more harm than good.

The big question is what the proposals will say about the steps that would lead to EMU’s scheduled completion in 2025.

These are dangerously toxic decisions as they span common eurobonds to ease the problems of deficit countries, an EU-level reinsurance scheme to underpin national bank deposit guarantees, and a macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism to deal with severe economic shocks. Over them all hangs the mooted creation of a single eurozone treasury in the hands of an EU ‘finance minister’.

These matters divide Europe’s rich north and poor south – and in some eyes, the frugal from the spendthrift. With Berlin at the EU helm there will be no swift resolution, and that cold reality is already casting a pall over the Rome Treaty’s sixtieth birthday party.

Related content:

• Friends of Europe: European Young Leaders (EYL40) Lisbon seminar
• Europe’s World: Why is Europe so silent on Syria? by Franziska Brantner
• Debating Europe: 25 years since Maastricht, where does the EU go from here?

The post Eurozone proposals will be Rome party pooper appeared first on Europe’s World.

To receive the Brussels Briefing in your inbox every morning, register for a free FT account here and then sign up here.

After months out of the limelight, Greece has crept back up financial traders’ worry list.

Read more

Carrefour Hypermarchés SAS v ITM Alimentaire International SASU

Comparative advertising based on prices as between shops having different formats and sizes is unlawful in certain circumstances

New rules allowing EU citizens with subscriptions for online music, games, films and TV shows to access this content while staying temporarily in another EU country, were informally agreed by Parliament and Council negotiators on Tuesday.
Committee on Legal Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

New rules allowing EU citizens with subscriptions for online music, games, films and TV shows to access this content while staying temporarily in another EU country, were informally agreed by Parliament and Council negotiators on Tuesday.
Committee on Legal Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

https://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_7e18a1c646f5450b9d6d-a75424f262e53e74f9539145894f4378.r8.cf3.rackcdn.com/20d45ba4-ed1c-11e6-84f8-bc764e092fac_11.41_thumb_169_1486461956_1486461956_129_97shar_c1.jpg

The relations between the EU and the Republic of Moldova are based on the Association Agreement which was signed on the margins of the EU summit held on 27 June 2014. 

Download this video here.

RECOMMENDATION on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Canada, of the other part
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Charles Tannock

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

ERRATUM to the report containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Mongolia, of the other part
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Helmut Scholz

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

On 8 February 2017 member states' ambassadors endorsed the deal on wholesale caps that will put an end to retail mobile roaming charges in the EU on 15 June this year. The presidency reached a provisional agreement on the wholesale rules with the European Parliament on 31 January. 

As the culmination of a 10-year process to push down roaming fees, people will finally be able to travel across Europe and stay connected just as they do at home, without paying extra.

The successive decisions that the EU has taken, first to reduce retail roaming charges, and now to abolish them, are underpinned by a set of rules governing operators when they do business with each other. In particular, these rules cap how much operators may charge each other when consumers call, text or surf in another EU country. 

The new, significantly lower caps are designed to allow mobile phone operators to offer surcharge-free roaming to their customers without increasing domestic prices. Together with the retail fair use policy, the wholesale rules help ensure that the abolition of roaming charges is sustainable throughout the EU. 

Dr Emmanuel Mallia, the Maltese Minister for Competitiveness and Digital, Maritime and Services Economy, said: "Ending roaming fees is very good news for all Europeans. I am pleased that the Maltese presidency has brought this file to a successful close. It is key to making further progress towards achieving a European Digital Single Market. Malta will be celebrating this achievement with its fellow EU member states on the 15th and 16th of June during the Digital Assembly 2017 event, which will be held in Malta." 

What next? 

The agreed text will now undergo technical finalisation. It must then be formally approved first by the Parliament and then by the Council (agreement at first reading). 

It is envisaged that the Parliament will adopt the regulation in April and the Council at the latest in May. Adoption by the Council does not need to take place in the Telecom Council: any Council configuration has the power to adopt the legal act. 

The adopted regulation will be signed by both institutions. This could take place at the Parliament plenary session in Strasbourg in May. The signed text will be published in the EU Official Journal and will enter into force three days later. 

The new wholesale regulation must be in effect by 15 June 2017 so that retail roaming fees can be abolished as laid down in the roaming regulation adopted in 2015.

For more information and the agreed caps, see our press release from 31 January 2017 (link below)

General : Amid temperatures of -20°C people in Eastern Ukraine were cut off from electricity, heating and water after pro-Russian rebels broke the ceasefire and started shelling the area last week. Another sign that managing EU-Russia relations remains a challenge especially in view of the country's assertiveness and uncertainty surrounding the future of US foreign policy. The security and defence subcommittee discussed on Monday Russia's influence in Ukraine and Southern Caucasus and how to react to it.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

General : Amid temperatures of -20°C people in Eastern Ukraine were cut off from electricity, heating and water after pro-Russian rebels broke the ceasefire and started shelling the area last week. Another sign that managing EU-Russia relations remains a challenge especially in view of the country's assertiveness and uncertainty surrounding the future of US foreign policy. The security and defence subcommittee discussed on Monday Russia's influence in Ukraine and Southern Caucasus and how to react to it.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

This post first appeared at The Academic Research Network on Agencification of EU Executive Governance (TARN)

 

As a result of the migratory crisis, the transformation of Frontex into a European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) became a political priority for both the EU and the Member States (MS). Regulation 2016/1624 aims to strengthen the position and independence of the EBCG from the MS, which have not always fully cooperated with Frontex. Frontex was established in 2004 to coordinate and provide operational assistance to the MS in the management of their external borders. The powers initially delegated to Frontex to enhance a uniform and effective implementation of EU border management gradually expanded with the adoption of Regulations 863/2007 and 1168/2011.

Regulation 863/2007 introduced the rapid intervention teams and a Central Record of Available Technical Equipment (CRATE). While this equipment was intended to be used on a bilateral basis between MS, it provided a limited inventory of equipment that could also be used in joint operations. Regulation 1168/2011 reinforced the operational capacity of Frontex and its autonomy. Article 7 ordered that “the Agency may acquire (…) technical equipment for external border control to be deployed during joint operations, pilot projects, rapid interventions, joint return operations or technical assistance project (…)”. Moreover, Regulation 1168/2011 created the European Border Guard Teams. Particularly, article 3b(3) established that Frontex “shall also contribute to the European Border Guard Teams with competent border guards seconded by the Member State as national experts”. For a period of up to six months, Frontex was competent to decide where and for how long the seconded guest officers were going to be deployed (see, Commitments of MS to the European Border Guard Teams and the Technical Equipment Pool).

Despite these developments towards a more independent and effective support to the MS when implementing EU border management rules and policies, the Commission argued that Regulation 2016/1624 would provide the EBCG “the additional competences needed for it to effectively implement integrated border management at Union level (…)”. The Commission stressed that notwithstanding the fact that the EU designed a policy enabling MS to build and maintain sound external borders, the discrepancies in implementation at the national level still remained. However, while the European Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos referred to the new agency as “a fully-fledged European Border and Coast Guard system”, Regulation 2016/1624 has not created an agency with exclusive powers in the management and surveillance of the European borders. Rather, it expands the supervisory and operational functions originally delegated to Frontex, which may enhance a uniform and efficient implementation of EU laws and policies.

Source: http://frontex.europa.eu/pressroom/

First, article 3(2) of Regulation 2016/1624 grants the EBCG a supervisory role to ensure a common integrated management of the EU’s external borders. If certain weaknesses were identified at the national external borders, the executive director of the EBCG shall recommend the adoption of specific measures by the concerned MS. Supposing these measures were not implemented in an effective or timely matter, the management board of the agency would adopt a binding decision setting out the necessary measures that the MS must implement (article 13(8)).

Secondly, Regulation 2016/1624 delegates the EBCG greater technical and operational competences (article 18(2)). In order to effectively assist the MS, the EBCG may acquire its own technical equipment (article 38) and it will have at least 1,500 border guards at its disposal to be immediately deployed in joint operations or rapid border interventions (article 20(5)). This new possibility delegated to the EBCG to acquire its own equipment may pose legal and fundamental rights challenges, for instance if the EBCG decides to conduct border surveillance using its own aerostats (blimps), un­manned drones or optionally-piloted aircrafts.

The most contentious competence is what has been referred as the EBCG’s intervention capacity. The new agency is empowered to monitor the effective functioning of the external borders of the MS, carry out vulnerability assessments, verify whether a MS is able to effectively enforce EU law and detect deficiencies in the management of its borders. If a MS either fails to take the measures recommended in its vulnerability assessment or does not request or fails to take the necessary action in the face of disproportionate migratory pressure, the EBCG shall adopt a unified and effective EU approach, since the functioning of the Schengen area might otherwise be jeopardized.

How will this new intervention power delegated to the EBCG work in practice? Article 19(1) of the Regulation 2016/1624 states that “the Council (…) may adopt (…) a decision (…) identifying measures to mitigate those risks to be implemented by the Agency and requiring the Member State concerned to cooperate with the Agency in the implementation of those measures (…)”. Subsequently, the director of the EBCG must, after reaching an agreement with the MS concerned, “determine the actions to be taken for the practical execution of the measures identified in that decision (…)” (article 19(4)). That is, the MS must consent and agree to the operational plan before the EBCG implements it. If the MS neither implements the decision taken by the Council, nor agrees with the director of the EBCG on an operational plan within 30 days, the European Commission may authorize the other MS to reestablish border controls at the Schengen area (article 19(10)). Hence, it is debatable to what extent the new agency will be capable of imposing the execution of certain measures to a MS that completely resists such measures. In this case, the only feasible solution seems to be the exclusion of the non-complying MS from the Schengen area.

Therefore, the implementation powers delegated to the EBCG are still very limited since border management is a distinctive competence related to state-centered matters such as sovereignty, fundamental rights or trade. The EBCG constitutes another necessary and timid step towards an effective and uniform implementation of an integrated management system for external borders. The deliberately ambiguous text of the Regulation 2016/1624 aims to find a balance between the increasing need for an effective and uniform European strategy at the external borders and the resistance of the MS to further delegate sensitive competences closely linked to their national sovereignty. Yet, the emerging shared implementation powers between the EBCG and the MS may lead to important accountability and fundamental rights issues that must be assessed as they arise.

The post The European Border and Coast Guard: Towards the Centralization of the External Border Management appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On 7 February the Maltese presidency reached a provisional agreement with European Parliament representatives to remove barriers to cross-border portability of online content services in the internal market.

The agreement, which still needs to be confirmed by both the Council and the European Parliament, will allow consumers who have subscribed or bought online content services in their home country to access it when temporarily present in another country within the EU. 

"Europeans travelling within the EU will no longer be cut off from online services such as films, sporting broadcasts, music, e-books or games they have paid for back home. Together with the ending of roaming charges, this is important progress in creating a digital single market which benefits everyone."

Chris Cardona, Minister for the Economy, Investment and Small Business of Malta.

https://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_c96321.r21.cf3.rackcdn.com/15285_169_full_129_97shar_c1.jpg

The EU seeks to develop particular close relationship with Morocco, its geographical neighbour, and to support Morocco's economic and political reforms. The relationship emphasizes close cooperation on democratic reform, economic modernization, and migration issues.

Download this video here.

AMENDMENTS 1 - 325 - Draft report Report on the 2016 Commission Report on Serbia
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 55 - Draft opinion Towards a new trade framework between the EU and Turkey and the modernisation of the Customs Union
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

X and X
DFON
According to Advocate General Mengozzi, Members States must issue a visa on humanitarian grounds where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that a refusal would place persons seeking international protection at risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment