European Union

Nato has a new member: Montenegro. The country's accession has drawn harsh criticism from Russia and is also a bone of contention in the country itself, which is home to many pro-Russian Serbs. For some commentators the decision reflects an outdated bloc mentality. For others, Montenegro was the natural choice for enlarging the Alliance.

The EU Commission wants to establish a defence fund into which all members pay, prompting member states to up their defence spending while making Europe less dependent on the US. Some commentators say such a move is long overdue while others see the Commission's plans as unrealistic.

With the takeover of Banco Popular the Spanish bank Santander has saved its former rival from collapse. New Eurozone regulations on bank resolution foreseeing investor participation were used for the first time in the bailout. Taxpayers were spared. Commentators see the move as a success.

King
Freedom of movement for persons
Advocate General Tanchev considers that it is incompatible with EU law to require a worker to take leave first before being able to establish whether he is entitled to be paid for it

Dextro Energy v Commission
Environment and consumers
The Court confirms that a number of health claims relating to glucose cannot be authorised

A.S.
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
In the exceptional circumstances of the refugee crisis, Advocate General Sharpston considers that the Member States in which applications for international protection were first lodged are responsible for examining those applications

And so the latest disruption to the process of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU draws to a close. Much like the delay in Article 50 notification before it, this General Election has achieved little, except to underline that the British political system still hasn’t got its head around the entire matter.

While there will be countless pieces exploring what the results mean for Brexit, the basic message is going to be that they don’t mean much. If the Tories are returned, then there is no sign of any plan beyond the banalities that litter the White Paper: If Labour pull a surprise victory out of the bag, then they look no more able to fashion a coherent set of objectives. Only in the event of a hung Parliament, where the SNP and LibDems hold the balance of power, might something come of it all, but even then one hesitates at the thought of the media onslaught that would ensue.

Underlining all of this confusion is the passionately held belief that Brexit shouldn’t be the key debating ground for this election. Certainly, May called it on the basis of needing a strong mandate, but the real focus has been on the character of the leaders: if there was a visible policy, there is was social care that has stuck out. There is something of a sense that Brexit is important, but there’s nothing to be gained by talking about, as it’s a giant bear-trap, and one that many voters lack interest in.

Thus we end up where we left off, in April at the start of this election: with confused policies and confused politicians.

And the clock ticks down all the while.

If there is a winner from all this, then it is the EU. It has been able to work on its positions, fleshing out ideas without direct challenge from the UK, building consensus for the Commission team.

Neither side gains from a non-deal, but the onus is much more clearly on the UK to secure a package, so the ability to pull something together as the EU has done can only be to its advantage. As I have suggested before, May is best understood as someone who recognises that a deal on EU terms is coming down the line, so it makes sense to gather as much political capital as possible in anticipation of the storm. Sadly, that approach looks much less viable today.

There is a certain calmness in the EU’s actions. Part of that comes from the necessity of patience in an organisation that often takes a very long time to make any decision. But it also reflects the strong negotiating position that it holds in these talks: there have not been the tensions between the EU27 that many – including myself – anticipated, and all of the likely outcomes are ones that the EU can live with. Either the UK abandons leaving, or it agrees to an EU-designed deal, or it falls out without a deal: the first two axiomatically work for the EU, while the final path at least looks not to contaminate the rest of the EU.

In short, this general election has been a distraction: as we head to 19 June and the start of substantive negotiations, that will become even more apparent.

The post The Brexit non-issue appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Two years ago the European Commission published its Communication on the Energy Union, marking a new approach to the European energy sector.

It was based on an accurate diagnosis of the challenges facing the sector: a high dependency on fossil fuel imports; ageing infrastructure; a major crisis in markets that delivered high retail prices but low wholesale prices, thereby discouraging investment in carbon-free power generation.

The Communication also identified the winning strategy for Europe. Decarbonise the economy to reconcile sustainable development, security of supply and competitiveness. It announced consistent policies and measures regarding the five dimensions of energy and climate policy: security of supply, market integration, energy efficiency, decarbonisation and research and development.

EDF Group, as a leader in low-carbon electricity generation and in R&D, welcomed this initiative and its ambitions for innovative low-carbon growth.

The Communication logically suggested that some sort of governance should be implemented to ensure that national policies would lead to compliance with the European objectives. With the ‘Clean Energy for all Europeans’ package, we now know how this governance could be organised.

But does the proposal accurately address the main issues facing the European Union? As is often the case, the glass is half-full and half-empty.

“We can be confident that the target of 27% of renewable energy sources will be met”

We need an institutionalised dialogue between member states and the European Union, and more transparency regarding national energy policies. To some extent, the Communication achieved this, launching a process of continuous discussion and triggering visits by Maroš Šefčovič, the Commission’s Vice-President for the Energy Union, to the European capitals to discuss the role of member states in the Energy Union.

The future national plans will ensure wider long-term visibility for member states’ projects. If such a dialogue had occurred earlier, we might have developed renewable sources of electricity more efficiently. And we might have prevented stop-and-go policies that induced serious shocks on the renewables sector and tensions that resulted from the impact of variable energy on power trade.

Furthermore, greater consistency has been introduced in energy and climate policy since the Energy Union was created. Before, many initiatives were developed separately and the impact of new draft legislation on existing texts or on legislation in progress was not always taken into account. The Clean Energy Package aims at consistency by launching simultaneously interlinked pieces of legislation based on a common approach. This is a positive move.

But there are downsides. The glass is half-empty in the sense that one very important element of energy and climate policy is not part of the package: the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) Directive.

The ETS Directive was launched before the Communication was released and it will be adopted before the political discussions on several elements of the package are complete. This is extremely concerning since the package’s provisions regarding renewable energy sources and energy efficiency have a major impact on the carbon market. The higher the ambition and the less flexible the governance, the higher the risk of depressed carbon prices – and possibly even a breakdown of the ETS, Europe’s main tool for cost-effective decarbonisation.

This is why the governance aspect of the package must be further enhanced. Some of the key performance indicators should measure the efficiency of energy and climate policies. It is also necessary to identify where policies may overlap and interfere with each other, to prevent any negative consequences.

It is possible, for instance, to neutralise the impact of increased energy efficiency on carbon markets. Some amendments are currently being prepared to this end, and they merit serious discussion.

“We need an institutionalised dialogue between member states and the European Union”

It is also possible to allow for enough flexibility to be able to cope with a potential crisis. The 2008 recession proved that the carbon market was not robust enough to adapt to a shock if the rest of the energy climate framework remained rigid. The ETS is under particular threat in the next five or ten years and we must introduce enough flexibility, in particular by avoiding rigid trajectories, to protect it.

We can be confident that the target of 27% of renewable energy sources will be met; most member states are sufficiently ambitious. Should any doubt arise, the mid-2020s will be the right moment to decide how to deal with any difficulties. Let us not waste time anticipating problems that may not occur.

One more point is worth mentioning: the new target to ensure that every member state reaches an interconnection capacity with networks in other countries that is equivalent to 15% of its installed capacity. This target does not fully take into account that energy policies must necessarily be cost-effective. In this particular case decentralisation is preferable to governance: Europe is better off having interconnectors with a positive cost-benefit ratio rather than sticking to precise targets.

The proposed Governance Regulation appears at first sight more political than other elements of the package. In a sense this is true: we are about to define the respective roles of the member states and the Union and the organisation of their dialogue.

But governance is also about meeting targets at optimum cost and contributing to an efficient functioning of markets. Governance is an essential element of a cost-effective European energy and climate policy, and decision-makers must keep this in mind.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – Håkan Dahlström

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The Council added 14 persons and 4 entities to the lists of those subject to an asset freeze and  travel restrictions, transposing new listings imposed by UN Security Council resolution 2356 (2017). This resolution was adopted on 2 June 2017in response to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)'s ongoing  nuclear-weapon and ballistic missile-development activities, in violation and flagrant disregard of previous UN Security Council resolutions. 

The Council  decision brings the total number of persons under restrictive measures against the DPRK to 53 persons and 46 entities as listed by the UN. In addition, 41 persons and 7 entities are designated by the EU autonomously.  

The EU is implementing all UN Security Council  resolutions adopted in response to the DPRK's nuclear and nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes. In addition, the EU has also imposed autonomous restrictive measures against the DPRK, complementing and reinforcing the UN sanctions regime. 

The legal acts were adopted by written procedure. They will be published in the Official Journal of 9 June. 

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

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EU Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs meet on 8 and 9 June 2017 in Luxembourg to discuss a number of legislative files on the Justice topic (EPPO, supply of digital content, money laundering, etc.) as well as on the Home affairs one. Home affairs ministers are also expected to focus on migration, counter terrorism and improving interoperability of information systems. Both ministers meet to debate on issues related to criminal justice in cyberspace.

Download this video here.

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EU Ministers for Transport, Infrastructure, and Communications meet in Luxembourg on 8 and 9 June 2017. They are expected to agree on a general approach on a draft regulation on cross-border parcel delivery services. Ministers take stock of progress and hold a policy debate on the revision of the EU telecoms rules. They are also looking at progress made on proposed new rules for ePrivacy.

Download this video here.

On 25 May 2017, NATO leaders met in Brussels to celebrate the opening the new headquarters in Boulevard Léopold III. The location of the new headquarters is historically very significant: during construction four unexploded bombs from both the First and Second World Wars were found underneath. This should serve as an excellent reminder for what NATO stands.

While the official opening ceremony was a good occasion for the heads of state and government to come together, one issue – or rather, the presence of one person – surpassed the significance of the meeting: it was the first visit to Brussels by the 45th President of the United States of America, Donald J. Trump. Prior to the NATO meeting, much debate surrounded his visit. The stakes were high, because NATO has to face international disagreements and challenges as well as external threat that require urgent responses. As Sophia Besch, Research Fellow at CER, has outlined the task for the European allies was to contain Trump and to convince him about their efforts and contributions to NATO. On the other hand, Jeremy Shapiro, Research Director at ECFR, gave a more sober outlook for the meeting: ‘Trump will give an ordinary speech, make various extravagant promises, and the meeting will pass with neither incident nor substance.’

 

 

Besides the opening ceremony, the thematic focus centred around the issue of burden-sharing among NATO allies. Already during previous meetings with allies, Trump emphasised that European countries owe his country vast amounts for paying for European security. In one of his Tweet storms, he summarised his claim after the meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in April 2017: ‘Germany owes vast sums of money to NATO & the United States must be paid more for the powerful, and very expensive, defence it provides to Germany’. At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO allies already agreed on the target of 2 percent of GDP towards NATO defence. However, this target is not only far from realistic and appropriate for some nations. It could also spur new suspicions, especially in Europe. If one imagines that Germany met this target any time soon, as of current, 2 percent of its GDP would amount to $75 billion (€67 billion, £58 billion). Surely, some of its neighbours would become worried.

In addition, this approach to burden sharing does not reflect the actual needs to make the Alliance more flexible, responsive and overall more secure. It is acknowledged that a contribution to collective defence is vital for its survival. But the 2 percent goal does not measure well the actual needs. Instead, it is suggested that a more accurate measure of both burden and risk sharing is required. The more worrying problem is not how to meet this target, but how the money is spent. For a robust and capable Alliance, its members should focus on acquiring capabilities reflecting the current security environment, i.e. one that requires tools and capabilities that respond to cyber threats and hybrid warfare. Further, they should focus on creating deployable militaries that can contribute effectively to NATO’s major operations. Lastly, allies’ contributions to burden sharing should take into account a country’s overall contribution to international and Euro-Atlantic security, i.e. its participation in non-NATO security and defence frameworks.

The outcome of the NATO meeting last month the recommitment of the allies to the 2 percent target as well as the decision to join the counter-terrorism coalition against Daesh. NATO leaders agreed on an action plan enabling states to participate in the fight against terrorism through the coordination of training and capacity building. Yet, as stressed by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, this would not translate into engagement in combat operations.

Despite the importance of the meeting and the allies’ recommitments, NATO leaders neglected one pressing issue. How will they deal with one of their members – Turkey? Prior to the meeting in May, clashes between Turkey and other allies, most outspokenly with Germany as well as Austria, which is one of NATO’s partners through the Partnership for Peace programme, have troubled internal politics within the Alliance. Since the slash over campaign visits by Turkish officials in the light of Turkey’s referendum, German-Turksih relations have been tense. Then, for the second time within one year, Turkey has denied German officials access to the air base in Incirlik. These internal troubles and scuffles indicate the incoherence and diminished trust among members. Though both Germany and France voiced complaints over Turkey’s recent behaviour during the meeting, these have not received much attention and have been pushed into the shadow of Trump’s limelight appearance.

It has long been argued that NATO is only a defence alliance. Yet, with its transformations in the last three decades, it has become a truly political organisation as well. In this regard, NATO has to step up and improve its internal coherence alongside its defence capabilities. Only in a joint and collective fashion it is able to face its external threats and security challenges. It is therefore at stake and in the hands of NATO leaders as well as the Alliance as a whole to come together and revive common interests and values. This is far more significant and pressing than to denigrating and pointing fingers at each other as well as more important than shining light on those allies whose current policies and statements have been vague, ambiguous and not very trustworthy.

 

 

Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters is a PhD Candidate and Teaching Assistant at the University of Kent and a Visiting Scholar at KU Leuven.

The post NATO, Trump and Turkey: The Alliance needs more coherence appeared first on Ideas on Europe.