European Union

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The Council has extended the mandate of the EU co-ordinating office for Palestinian police support (EUPOL COPPS), as well as the mandate of the EU border assistance mission for the Rafah crossing point (EU BAM Rafah), until 30 June 2018. These missions are part of wider EU efforts in support of Palestinian state building in the context of working towards a comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on a two-state solution.

EUPOL COPPS has been assisting the Palestinian Authority in building the institutions of a future state of Palestine in the areas of policing and criminal justice since January 2006. Through its contribution to security and justice sector reform, the mission supports efforts to increase the security of the Palestinian population and to reinforce the rule of law. € 12.372 million have been allocated for the mission's activities between 1 July 2017 and 30 June 2018.

The Council also extended the mandate of EU BAM Rafah until 30 June 2018. The mission is mandated to provide a third party presence at the Rafah crossing point to contribute to building confidence between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, including through building up the Palestinian capacity on all aspects of border management at Rafah. The mission maintains a readiness to redeploy to the Rafah crossing point once the political and security situation allows. The mission's budget for the period between 1 July 2017 and 30 June 2018 amounts to € 1.98 million.

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Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

The efforts of NATO and the European Union to address hybrid warfare are unlikely to succeed. While promising, their efforts are neither broad enough in scope nor sufficiently integrated.

This is because both NATO and the EU see hybrid warfare as a new set of techniques for aggression rather than what it really is: a comprehensive offensive approach. In the meantime, Russia and China have been using hybrid warfare to expand their influence and gain territory.

The so-called comprehensive approach is a way to achieve a common understanding and approach among all actors of the international community. This is possible through the coordination of political, development and security efforts.

The comprehensive approach focuses on building a shared understanding of the problem, developing a shared overarching vision of the solution and facilitating coordination of effort while respecting the roles and individual mandates of multiple entities.

The concept of hybrid warfare, in turn, is broadly defined as the mix of conventional and unconventional, military and non-military, overt and covert actions employed in a coordinated manner to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare.

Since 2014 Russia has used these broad-spectrum tactics to wrest Crimea from Ukrainian control and subsequently annex it into the Russian Federation. More recently, China has been employing a similar approach in the South China Sea.

Looking through the military and security lens, hybrid warfare appears to target critical vulnerabilities and seeks to create ambiguity to hinder swift and effective decision-making.

“Both NATO and the EU see hybrid warfare as a new set of techniques for aggression rather than what it really is: a comprehensive offensive approach”

Taking a broader perspective, hybrid warfare is actually a comprehensive approach in the offence. While the comprehensive approach seeks to create space for friendly actors to strengthen governance, hybrid warfare seeks to shrink it. While the comprehensive approach seeks to heal a society’s divisions and seek reconciliation, hybrid warfare targets a society’s deepest historical wounds to make them bleed again.

There are a wide range of applicable measures in hybrid campaigns: from cyber-attacks on critical information systems and the disruption of critical services, such as energy supplies or financial services, to undermining public trust in government institutions and exploiting social vulnerabilities. Once a state is weakened sufficiently, the aggressor’s strategic aims can, if necessary, be consummated by the use of conventional or paramilitary forces.

Both Russia and China have employed hybrid warfare in recent years, often successfully achieving their political aims.

It was used by Russia against Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and eastern Ukraine in 2014.  China has gradually expanded its control and influence in the South China Sea by constructing artificial islands, sending armed fishermen to patrol claimed territorial waters, and declaring an air identification zone. It is easy to conclude that their next steps will be to establish military bases on these islands, thereby cementing their claim to the territory ‒ without firing a shot.

In both cases, the countries applied a full spectrum of economic, legal, informational, cyber and paramilitary means to achieve their objectives in a slow and ambiguous manner, so as to not cross any threshold that would trigger collective military action in response. As recent history tells us, hybrid warfare lowers the political price for aggression, making regime change and territorial annexation possible ‘on the cheap’.

While Russian hybrid warfare does present a new challenge to NATO, the EU, and their member states, they are in a much better position to address it if they work together effectively.

In response to Russian hybrid warfare in 2014, NATO adopted the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) as a means of responding rapidly to new threats as they present themselves along the eastern and southern flanks.

In December 2015 NATO adopted a Hybrid Warfare Strategy, and a few months later the EU adopted its Joint Framework for Addressing Hybrid Threats. Both documents speak of working in conjunction with a variety of actors in order to improve resilience, security and continuity of governance in the face of hybrid threats.

So, what would a comprehensive approach to hybrid warfare look like?

It is hard to know for certain unless a diverse comprehensive approach working group can work on it together, but building on the previous work on hybrid warfare within NATO, the EU and their member states, a comprehensive approach could seek to more coherently contain the Russian use of organised crime as an instrument of state power.

A comprehensive approach would address how to prevent Russia from moving money and buying influence within the European countries. It would rely on many of the same techniques used to contain and disrupt organised crime as the Kremlin, like organised criminal groups, relies on the use of the legitimate economy to move money to achieve many of its aggressive aims.

“Hybrid warfare appears to target critical vulnerabilities and seeks to create ambiguity to hinder decision-making”

The inclusion of real estate, business law, and transparency expertise could help to identify ways to thwart the Russian use of front companies and real estate holdings in major European capitals, which launder money and support destabilising elements. In many cases, transparency can prove to be a helpful offset.

To be prepared for extreme cases, contingency plans could be formulated to ban Russian financial institutions from the SWIFT network that processes global secure financial transactions.

A comprehensive approach to address Russian hybrid warfare will require a more extensive assessment phase than when conducting this process for crisis response. This involves a brutally honest self-assessment of the weaknesses, vulnerabilities and historical grievances of the government as well as the society. By seeing our vulnerabilities and weaknesses through our adversaries’ eyes, we will be more able to target our resilience efforts and leave far fewer blind spots.

It is also important to recognise the vital role of law enforcement, the private sector (including banks and financial institutions) and strategic communications, as well as cyber, media and energy sector collaboration, but also to integrate their efforts with broader economic, communication and security measures.

Good progress has already been made on addressing Russia’s ability to use of energy as a weapon. However, it remains unmoored from a broader comprehensive approach that includes how to convince Russia to abandon aggression and to reintegrate into the international community as a trusted partner.

The views presented in this paper represent the author’s personal opinion and findings and not the official views or policy of the United States government.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – 7th Army Training Command

The post Russia and China take the lead in hybrid warfare while West struggles to respond appeared first on Europe’s World.

will take place on Wednesday 12 July, 9:30-13:00 and 15:00-18:30 in Brussels.

The meeting slot on Thursday 13 July 2017, 9.00-12:30 is cancelled.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply for access to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

Further information
watch the meeting live
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By Mehreen Khan

Emmanuel Macron’s honeymoon may soon face its first test. As the new president prepares for his state of the nation address at Versailles today, an old political bugbear will be preying on his mind: France’s public finances.

Read more

Dear Prime Minister, dear Shinzo, dear Jean-Claude, I am very happy to welcome you in Brussels today for our extraordinary EU-Japan Summit. Actually, we planned this some time ago, when we promised to do everything in our power to conclude political and trade talks between Japan and the European Union on the eve of the G20 summit. And we did it. 

Please let me refer briefly to the political context. Less than two weeks ago, here in Brussels, European leaders discussed how to defend ourselves against unfair trade practices. How to reconcile free trade and fair trade. Of course, we were not thinking about Japan or the ongoing negotiations. But bearing in mind the fears and anxieties of our people, which are often justified, we made decisions about how to improve our trade defence instruments. Not to cut Europe off from the rest of the world, but to be able to conduct effective trade. Because we, as the European Union, firmly believe in the political purpose of a world which is built on openness, cooperation and trade. 

In the context of the discussion about Brexit, we have heard statements claiming that it isn't worth being in the European Union, as it is easier to do global trade outside of the EU. Today we have shown that this is not true. The EU is more and more engaged globally. And ahead of the EU are negotiations with Mercosur countries, Mexico, New Zealand, Australia and others.   

Although some are saying that the time of isolationism and disintegration is coming again, we are demonstrating that this is not the case. That the world really doesn't need to go a hundred years back in time. Quite the opposite. It doesn't have to be so. As we are proving with Japan. And do you know why this agreement was possible? Because it's not just about common trade interests. It is, above all, about the shared values that underpin our societies, by which I mean liberal democracy, human rights and the rule of law. This basis of shared values, which we not only respect, but which - in accordance with the Strategic Partnership Agreement - we have committed to promote, has allowed us to conclude these negotiations. And most importantly, no-one lost. 

Let me also thank Jean-Claude and his team, as well as the Japanese negotiators, for their excellent work. Congratulations, well done! 

Finally, let me focus on North Korea. Today, we agreed to call on the international community to strengthen measures aimed at further restricting the transfer of relevant items and technologies, as well as funding, for North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. In this regard we appeal for the early adoption of a new and comprehensive UN Security Council Resolution.

Dear Colleagues, 

Europe's role in the World and our responsibility at the international level in these turbulent times are growing. More than ever the EU has become a global point of reference for all those who value the principles of liberal democracy and human rights, free and fair trade or concrete actions in facing global challenges, such as climate change, poverty, terrorism and illegal migration. A strong and determined Union is the best way to promote our values and interests, to support a rules-based multilateral system, and ultimately to protect and defend citizens. With this in mind we will participate in the G20 Summit in Hamburg later this week. As usual, we would like to inform you about the key issues that we will discuss at the summit. 

1.      The G20's key role in making the global economy work for all

The global economy is gaining momentum. With economic growth expected to approach 2 per cent this year and next, the EU is making a robust contribution to global economic activity. However, many citizens in Europe and elsewhere still feel left behind by the economic recovery and are apprehensive with globalisation. 

The G20 has played a critical role in bringing the global economy back to its feet after the crisis. Now it must ensure the global economy works for everyone. We will present the European internal and external responses to shape globalisation in line with our shared interests and values. We will also reaffirm the EU's commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as the reference point for the efforts we must undertake together, and our readiness to lead these efforts. 

Strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth relies on multilateral cooperation and a rules-based order. It also requires that we put all economic policy tools to work - monetary, fiscal and structural. The Hamburg Action Plan will be a key deliverable of the summit in this regard. It will put forward a set of policy measures to make G20 economies more resilient to shocks, enhance social cohesion and foster confidence. It will also convey a common determination to improve the efficiency and composition of public finances so that they are conducive to growth and equity. We will call for swifter implementation of G20 members' growth strategies, especially regarding structural reforms, in view of the Brisbane objective to increase the level of the combined G20 GDP by an additional 2 per cent by 2018. Investment in infrastructure, skills and effective social security systems need particular attention. 

2.      Bolstering an open and fair rules-based multilateral trading system

Concerns about job losses and erosion of standards attributed to trade will be at the top of the agenda. These concerns must be addressed, not by erecting protectionist barriers, but by making trade and investment both free and fair. The EU will advocate three strands of action. First, the G20 must adhere to its anti-protectionism pledge and strengthen the rules-based multilateral trading system anchored in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which is our best chance for a global level playing field. This means filling gaps in the rulebook. We will urge G20 members to contribute to concrete results at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires next December, including on e-commerce and subsidies. All parties must implement agreed rules. We will be clear that the EU will defend its industry robustly when other countries refuse to abide by the rules. Second, it is critical that G20 members implement domestic policies which empower workers and companies of all sizes to benefit from open markets and help them to make the most of opportunities offered by the global economy, and adjust to change. Third, we need to engage in an honest, fact-based conversation with citizens to take stock of globalisation and its effects on producers and consumers. We will also underline the responsibilities of the private sector to address concerns about globalisation, and will welcome collaborative efforts to improve labour, social and environmental standards in global supply chains, as a contribution to a level playing field. 

We will insist on further efforts to tackle production overcapacity, especially in the steel sector, as a matter of utmost priority. We expect all members of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity, launched at the last G20 summit, to cooperate in good faith with a view to removing the subsidies and other government-imposed distortions at the root of the problem.   

3.      Demonstrating that ambitious climate action is good for economic growth and jobs

We regret the decision by the US Administration to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The Agreement remains a corner stone for global efforts to effectively tackle climate change and implement the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development and we consider that it cannot be re-negotiated. We will reassure the international community that the EU remains steadfastly determined to swiftly and fully implement the Paris Agreement and accelerate the low-carbon transition, as well as to support our partners, in particular the vulnerable countries in the fight against climate change. We will work with all partners who share our conviction that the Agreement is necessary to protect our planet, is fit for purpose, and is good for economic growth and future jobs. We will support an ambitious G20 Joint Action Plan on Climate and Energy for Growth. We will also welcome further work on green finance and a dialogue on ways to improve resource efficiency and to tackle marine litter. 

4.      Tapping the potential of the digital revolution

With accessible, open, reliable and secure internet, digitisation can drive productivity and sustainable development. We will seek G20 cooperation to develop common standards for the fifth generation of mobile communication networks and interoperable digitised products and services; promote free flow of information while respecting applicable legal frameworks for privacy and personal data protection; uphold fair competition in the digital environment; and tackle cyber threats. We will also underline the need to prepare for the profound impact of digitalisation and automation on labour, by investing in digital skills and adapting social security systems to benefit workers in all work arrangements. 

5.      Advancing the global fight against tax avoidance and evasion

The recent signature of the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting marks another milestone in the international fight against tax avoidance and evasion. These practices undermine our tax bases, fair competition and trust in globalisation. Having led these global efforts, the EU expects wide and effective implementation of the agreed standards on tax transparency and good governance. Those not ready to cooperate should bear the consequences. This is why we have a firm stance on a common list of non-cooperative jurisdictions with regard to tax transparency, including defensive measures. We will call for improving authorities' access to information about ultimate beneficiaries of legal persons and arrangements, as well as cross-border exchange of this information, to improve detection of abusive tax behaviour. Furthermore, the G20 should monitor and evaluate developments related to the digitalisation of the economy with a view to a consistent approach to taxation. 

6.       Stepping up efforts to fight terrorism and terrorist financing

Recent attacks have again sadly underlined the need to further strengthen the global fight against terrorism and violent extremism, and to adapt it to the evolving threat. The G20 must remain united in these efforts. We will welcome a G20 Action Plan on Countering Terrorism to enhance cooperation based on our international commitments. We will advocate particularly further steps to ensure full implementation of international standards on counter-terrorist financing and money laundering, as well as on beneficial ownership transparency to prevent the misuse of companies, trusts and funds to finance terrorist activities. We will also support reinforcing the Financial Action Task Force. All G20 members must take strong steps to combat terrorists' misuse of the Internet and social media. As agreed in the European Council we should work with industry and encourage the development and sharing of new technologies and tools to enhance automatic detection and removal of terrorist content online. 

7.      Aiming for a more resilient international monetary and financial system

Through joint action after the crisis the G20 has significantly improved global financial stability. This cooperation must continue. The Basel Committee has worked to complete the Basel III post-crisis reform, but has yet to produce a final agreement. The G20 should encourage a swift outcome that promotes a level playing field and does not lead to significant increases in overall capital requirements for banks. We will reiterate that agreed reforms must be implemented in a timely and consistent fashion, and should not be rolled back. At the same time, we will support the work of the Financial Stability Board to evaluate the effects of the regulatory reforms and monitor emerging financial risks and vulnerabilities. Enhanced international coordination on cybersecurity in the financial system is a priority going forward. In addition, we will support a more stable and resilient international financial architecture with a strong, quota-based and adequately resourced IMF at its centre. 

8.      Sharing responsibility for refugees and migrants

Forced displacement and irregular migration remain major global challenges. We will emphasize the  importance of effective border management and control as well as of swift and humane return of migrants who have no right to remain or who are not eligible for international protection. We will also encourage concerted action at the global level to disrupt the smugglers' and traffickers' networks. At the same time, we must improve global governance based on shared responsibility and partnership among countries of origin, transit and destination to protect refugees and migrants in need, and to alleviate the pressure on affected communities. 

We will call for support to the United Nations process to develop the Global Compacts on Refugees and on Regular, Safe and Orderly Migration, and underline the importance of enhancing legal pathways for migration, including refugee resettlement. We will welcome the exchange of good practices for integrating regular migrants and refugees in labour markets. 

9.      Partnering with Africa for investment, growth and jobs

As we prepare for the Africa-EU Summit, we will welcome the new G20 Africa Partnership to promote investment, jobs and sustainable development in the continent, and thereby also contribute to tackling the root causes of irregular migration and radicalisation. Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal and Tunisia are already engaged in setting out Investment Compacts, committing to improve their investment environments working together with international organisations, G20 partners and the private sector. The EU is participating actively and will seek synergies with our initiatives, notably the proposed External Investment Plan that aims to leverage at least EUR 44 billion of investment in Africa and the European neighbourhood by 2020.   

For the European Council                                           For the European Commission

 

The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Muslim communities in the UK face integration issues

In the United Kingdom, Muslims should have equal access to opportunities in the labour market and this would greatly contribute to an integrated social atmosphere in the country. The top professions, more often than not, don’t have diversity present and the chances of ethnic minorities, with a Chinese or an Indian background, are far greater in rising to the top than those with a Muslim background, such as for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.

The reasons behind this disparity is attributed to poverty and insufficient economic mobility. Integration issues happen because ethnic minorities can be looked upon as a socially excluded diaspora, which experiences issues of poverty, discrimination, culture as well as issues with language in the country. The top jobs, such as those in the media and politics, have a mere 16percent of representation by British Muslims, who are more than sixteen years of age, which is a worrying contrast to the 30percent demonstrated by the British population. British Indians naturally outperform British Whites at the top jobs – the social segregation issues faced by Muslims in Britain, such as poverty because of a no open approach to allowing Muslim practices, whilst employed, makes it a diaspora, with greater integration problems than the British Indian population.

The issues of cultural barriers faced by the Muslim community in the United Kingdom is further getting worse because the media often speaks about British Muslims largely within the topic of extremism. These cultural barriers, such as Muslim women associating motherhood with caring for children, instead of doing that plus earning an income through a job, aside from producing low economic outputs, also exacerbates the social exclusivity problem. In the United Kingdom, gender equality is considered a norm – it’s visible in all areas of life, from getting a job to individuals’ idea of dress codes, so when a culture like that collides with another relatively primitive culture, there will be hard-to-overcome differences.

Furthermore, there is also grave concerns that Sharia Courts (in the United kingdom) are upholding extremist values and permitting wife-beating. Part of this problem lies with the atypical problem with Muslim communities and their observance of patriarchy, which in itself, apart from being an incredibly primitive thing to do, is also the most wrong thing to do because it’s very much in the nature of patriarchy to pluck out societal rights of women.

Muslim communities (in the United Kingdom) should be looked upon as contributors to British culture. There is definitely no pressure over religion, because a majority of the British population are Christians, and both Christianity and Islam have roots in the Middle East. It’s more of a cultural problem, and Muslim communities need to advance from primitive outlooks, to ones which are more beneficial to their circumstances, whilst at the same time, preserving a diversified British culture.

The post The Muslim Question appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

I’ve spent the day down at Sussex, talking euroscepticism and Brexit with a highly-informed group of colleagues. As our debate ranged over a wide terrain (see my live-ish tweeting here), several questions kept recurring, first and foremost of which was whether the UK was a special case, or a potential model of Eurosceptic activists to follow.

As you might expect in an academic setting, opinions differed, although partly this came down to definitions (again, academics).

Unusually, I found myself at one end of that range, arguing that there was a high degree of transferability inherent in Brexit, while others took the view that there was so much that was specific about the case that it rendered any mimicry both theoretically unlikely and practically impossible.

The argument here is that the use of a referendum to secure withdrawal from the EU is simply not an option in other member states, be that due to constitutional constraints or the use of referendums within a polity. Clive Church rightly pointed to Switzerland as an example of how all the advantages that Leave were able to gain in the UK would not apply, from the absence of designated lead groups to the lack of purdah and the citizens’ initiative pathway to holding a vote.

Others pointed to the structure of party politics, the additional complication of Euro-membership, the absence of a strong and critical media, or the framing of European debate within a country as reason to doubt that the success of Leave could be replicated. Indeed, listening to Matthew Elliott speak, almost of the critical junctures that he saw were ones that spoke to the particularities of the British system: Boris Johnson’s role as a spokesman to the middle ground, the Sun’s endorsement, and George Osborne’s punishment budget, to pick just three.

As Nick Startin noted, while last summer saw a massive proliferation of neologisms – Frexit, Dexit, Swexit, etc. – none has caught, because none has triggered a comparable groundswell of action comparable to that found in the UK.

All of this I accept and agree with, but also suggest is beside the point.

Ultimately, we can view Brexit as a relatively empty signifier: it means pretty much what you want it to mean.

However, where it is not empty is in establishing a new potentiality for political action: the potential – indeed, the reality – of leaving the European Union.

I’ve been using the metaphor of an ice-breaker when I talk about this: the UK has broken a new path that was not there previously, which others can chose to follow to. It broke that path with a particular set of tools and circumstances, but others do not have to use those same tools.

Indeed, the key point is precisely that each national situation will be different and will change over time. It will depend on constitutional, institutional, political, social and economic factors, not to mention the role of key individuals (this isn’t meant to be exhaustive, but rather to illustrate the profound variability involved).

However, one goes about it, the existence of the UK as an example of a country that has gone through to the same destination provides a validation. In fact, I’d go further and argue that through its example the UK will show both how to and how not to go about leaving: as Article 50 unwinds, so costs and trade-offs will become clearer to observers, suggesting ways to mitigate. No longer will leaving be a theoretical noodling, but a concrete reality.

Of course, in all this there is another question, namely whether any other Eurosceptic movement in the EU wants to leave. Fittingly, with both Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart in the room, there was reflection on the balance of hard and soft euroscepticism. If the UK hard element had managed to reach deep into the mainstream – to use Paul’s idea – then it is important to remember that the hard element is not always present elsewhere.

This matters, because even if exit is now possible, it does not mean that others want to do it. Indeed, the hallmark of euroscepticism elsewhere has been that it seeks reform, rather than rejection.

On this, I am less certain, but I would suggest that one possible effect of Brexit will be to make harder positions more attractive than they have been to date. As we move into a medium-term perspective on Brexit, so the chances that the UK looks successful enough for someone to claim leaving was A Good Thing will increase.

Similarly, if the EU looks to be unable to accommodate reform – in either a usual, mainstream, way or a more radical direction – then the soft option will look less credible. In short, the balance of the perceived chance of success of hard and soft positions might move in the former’s favour.

Of course, this is in the future and, as also came out today, there is more volatility in politics than for quite some time. As such, we should be hesitant about what we think might come.

With that in mind, we really only wait and see whether the Brexit baton is picked up by anyone else.

The post How transferable is the EU referendum and the Brexit experience? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Next week I embark on my new research project examining the impact of Brexit on UK local government. This is obviously quite broad but I’m essentially interested in three things:

• Why was the local dimension largely overlooked in the EU referendum campaign?
• What challenges and opportunities do local authorities believe Brexit presents them with?
• How are local authorities preparing for Brexit (if at all), and how are they trying to influence the process of Brexit and its potential outcomes?

For the moment, the focus is engaging in a pilot study to help refine these broad objectives. But at this stage it helps to explain why this research agenda is worth pursuing.

 

A lot of academic interest on the subnational dimensions to Brexit has focused on its impact on the devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (see this special interest section in the Journal of Contemporary European Research for a flavour). This is for good reason, given the various constitutional and political implications present here, such as debates about Scottish independence, or the role of the border in Northern Ireland. However, for a variety of reasons, the impact of Brexit on the local level has been unfairly overlooked.

 

The EU has a significant impact on local authorities. The Local Government Association estimates they are directly responsible for the implementation of around 70% of EU legislation and policy. EU rules, such as on procurement and state aid, affect the way they deliver services and operate on a daily basis. Local authorities are the main beneficiary of the EU’s Structural and Investment Funds, from which the UK stood to benefit from £5.3billion between 2014 and 2020. Local authorities are formally recognized in the EU’s institutional structure in the Committee of the Regions. The EU also provides opportunities to engage beyond local territorial limits. Local authorities have taken advantage of these, setting up offices in Brussels to lobby EU institutions (such as Birmingham’s or Cornwall’s), and engaging in transnational networks with other local authorities (such as Eurocities or the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions), providing platforms to access EU funding, influence EU policy and share policy innovation and best practices with European partners.

 

All of this arguably gives local government the status as the most ‘Europeanized’ part of the British state. And yet we heard relatively little about the local dimension to Brexit during the EU referendum campaign. Over a year since the referendum result, we’re still largely in the dark on what Brexit means for local government. The government’s white paper on the UK’s withdrawal and new partnership with the EU managed only 28 words on the subject, and this is vague at best:

 

We will also continue to champion devolution to local government and are committed to devolving greater powers to local government where there is economic rationale to do so.

 

On the ground, local authorities are already trying to get to grips with Brexit and its implications. This includes collectively through organizations such as the Local Government Association, but also several local authorities have taken the initiative to explore the impact of Brexit, its challenges and its opportunities with their local communities. Examples include the Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Futures Group, or Bristol’s Brexit Response Group. But a wider lack of attention given to the local level impact of Brexit leaves important questions about the future of local governance in the UK left unanswered. How will local authorities continue to deliver projects which have so far relied on EU funding? Will EU funding to the local level be replaced after the UK leaves the EU. Will local authorities be able to make their voice heard and influence the process or outcome of Brexit? Will powers repatriated from Brussels be devolved to local government, or simply be re-centralized in Whitehall? And how will this affect the communities local authorities serve?

 

The EU’s impact on local authorities means Brexit matters to them, and Brexit’s wider impact on the UK will inevitably have local level consequences. Investigating the local level impact of Brexit therefore not only tells us how local authorities are adapting, but also sheds light on the ever fraught relationship between local and national politics.

The post The overlooked dimension? Brexit and local governance appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

By James Politi in Rome

Italy has been fed up for a long time with the lack of help from fellow EU countries in dealing with the migration crisis in the central Mediterranean. But this week, it’s safe to say Rome’s frustration boiled over.

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Roaming charges end on 15 June 2017. Europeans travelling within the EU countries will Roam Like at Home and pay domestic prices for roaming calls, SMS and data.

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Plenary session and committee meetings in Strasbourg

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When I tell in Europe that I come from Estonia, most people react by saying something like, “Oh you are the digital natives!”, or “I know, it’s the digital country”.

Given that Estonia is a very small country of just 1.3 million people, it is definitely our strength to be known as a digital society. But how has Estonia reached this status? How have we built the digital state?

In Estonia the state has been the driver of digital development. The process started in 2000 with the creation of digital identities in cooperation with banks. To ensure that people would take up digital identities, the state needed to provide services where citizens had to use them. So the government simultaneously created both demand and supply.

The starting point was tax declarations. People started declaring their taxes online and would receive their tax returns by online transfer a few days after filing the declaration. Nowadays, Estonia is probably the only country in the world where people actually compete in how fast they do their taxes ‒ the record is currently under two minutes. Considering that over 95% of the overall population do their taxes online, we can say that people have taken up digital identities quite well.

“In Estonia the state has been the driver of digital development”

People in the 21st century are increasingly living neither online nor offline but are rather engaged in what we now call ‘onlives’. This lifestyle is largely dependent on the ability to identify oneself in the online world. Creating secure and encrypted digital identities that enable people to identify their communication or business partners, sign agreements and communicate with the state is crucial.

We know that countries compete for people and investment. Small countries with a relatively bad climate don’t have much to attract investments and people. During the years after the introduction of digital identities, Estonia acknowledged that our digital services have made doing business in Estonia a lot easier. But only Estonian residents could access these services. So we decided to create the e-residency programme that allows foreigners to become e-residents of Estonia, establish their companies there, and enjoy our digital services even if they do not live in our country. Since the introduction of the e-residency programme, almost 20,000 people have become e-residents.

The digital revolution has brought many changes to the way we behave and live our lives. Any kind of disruption brings opposition, but the state has different ways to react: it may try to abolish or to not allow the changes, or it can go with the flow and make the transition as easy and smooth as possible. Estonia has chosen the latter.

If the accusation against the collaborative economy is that they don’t pay taxes, then it is up to the administration to come up with solutions so that they can easily pay those taxes. The collaborative economy is all about the digital world and it only needs a platform where taxes can be filed with one click. The state has to be a partner of companies and citizens, not their supervisor.

“Don’t try to reinvent the wheel ‒ use the solutions Estonia has already tested”

To avoid a digital divide, it is also the state’s obligation to come up with an educational response to the changes that are taking place. How to improve people’s digital skills is a big and worrisome question that needs an answer. Humans will never be better in computing than a computer, but it is important that people feel comfortable with technology. For that purpose, Estonia has included coding and robotics in pre-school activities (it’s a great way of playing too) and we teach our children how to behave and stay on the safe side of the internet.

Teachers have to use digital tools in their curricula and our e-school system allows parents to follow their children’s results, homework and teachers’ comments via an app. We also have professional educational technologists who can help teachers find the right tools.

There are many more examples from different areas of life where we have decided to deploy digital solutions in our governance. But the key is that governments need to understand that the technical transformation is not going to stop and we should take the necessary decisions to help our people adapt to the digital age.

If your country is still hesitant, Estonia can help you. Don’t try to reinvent the wheel ‒ use the solutions we have already tested.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – © European Union 2011 PE-EP/Pietro Naj-Oleari

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Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

On 28 June 2017, the Maltese Presidency of the Council and the European Parliament representatives reached a broad political agreement ad referendum on all twelve chapters of the regulation on the European Union Agency for Asylum on the basis of the mandate given by Coreper on 20 December 2016.

The agreement is subject to endorsement by Coreper in the near future following further work on the recitals. Furthermore, the agreement excludes  some parts of the text which are related to other legislative proposals in the package on the revision of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) which have not yet been finalised. An overall agreement will only be possible once the linkages with the other legislative proposals in the CEAS package have been resolved.

The proposal for a European Union Agency for Asylum aims to improve the implementation and functioning of the CEAS by building on the work of the current European Asylum Support Office (EASO).

“This is part of the EU's efforts to have a fully-fledged EU Agency for Asylum that can respond better to the evolving irregular migration challenge and to reflect its enhanced role in a reformed Common European Asylum System.”

Michael Farrugia, Maltese Minister for Home Affairs and National Security

The new regulation will transform EASO into a fully-fledged Agency responsible for facilitating the functioning of the CEAS, ensuring convergence in the assessment of applications for international protection across the Union, and providing operational and technical assistance to member states.

Next steps

Work will continue during the incoming presidency to finalise the text. The agreement will then be submitted to Coreper for endorsement on behalf of the Council.

Background 

Following its Communication of 6 April 2016 on the reform of the CEAS, the Commission presented in May and in July seven legislative proposals, including the above-mentioned proposal for a regulation on the European Union Agency for Asylum, with a view to:

• improving the functioning of CEAS by eliminating differing treatment of asylum seekers and varying recognition rates among member states
• reducing secondary movements and contributing to a fairer distribution among the Member States of the responsibility to offer protection to those in need.

The next AFET meetings are scheduled to take place in Brussels, room JAN2Q2:

- Monday, 10 July 2017, 15:00-18:30
- Tuesday, 11 July, 09:00-12:30, and 15:00-18:30

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Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP