European Union

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EU Foreign Affairs ministers meet on 16 October 2017 in Luxembourg to discuss Iran, North Korea, and the EU policy on human rights. Over lunch, foreign affairs ministers are discussing the political situation in Turkey. The Council is expected to adopt conclusions on Myanmar, as well as on the EU strategy on Afghanistan.

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Within the known as the “procés”, or the “Catalan question”, on 10th October 2017 the President of the Catalan Government participated in a regular session of the Catalan Parliament in order to give an balance of the political situation in the region.

In his speech Mr. Puigdemont reported the positive results of the alleged referendum of 1st October 2017. However the words he used were full of confusion about whether or not the declaration of independence took place at the Catalan Parliament

In any case, Mr. Puigdemont stated:

“Arrived to this historical moment, as President of the Generalitat, I assume to present the results of the referendum to the Parliament and our citizens: the mandate that Catalonia becomes an independent State in the form of a republic.

That is what I have to do today. For responsibility and respect.

And with the same solemnity, the Government and me too propose the Parliament to suspend the effects of the independence declaration in order to start a dialogue in the following weeks without which is not possible to reach an agreed solution”[i]

 

These words have created some confusion regarding the existence or not of an implicit declaration of independence since, although such a declaration didn’t properly take place, the Government and the President proposed to the Parliament “to suspend the effects of the declaration of independence”.

Certainly, the independence declaration corresponds to the Parliament of Catalonia, according to art. 4.4. of Law 19/2017, of 6 September, on the referendum of self-determination, law suspended by the Spanish Constitutional Court:

“If in the count of valid votes there are more affirmative than negative votes, the result implies the independence of Catalonia. To this end, the Parliament of Catalonia, within two days following the proclamation of the official results by the Electoral Syndicate, will hold a regular session to carry out the formal declaration of the independence of Catalonia, specify its effects and initiate the constituent process.“

It is important, from the Catalan secessionist legal perspective to comply with the provisions of this article because, although suspended by the Spanish Constitutional Court, it is the one that determines – from the perspective of the alleged legality of the new Republic – the entry into force of Law 20/2017, of 8 September, on Legal Transitoriness and on the Foundation of the Republic, third final provision, also suspended by the Spanish Constitutional Court.

Thus, from the perspective of the alleged legality of the Catalan Republic, this is born – materially – with the positive result of the vote of the Referendum on October 1st  (“the result implies the independence of Catalonia”), although “to this end” , within two days of the proclamation of the results, the Parliament must hold a regular session to carry out the formal declaration of independence, specify its effects and initiate the constituent process.

However, although the session of the Catalan Parliament took place on October 10th, there was no formal declaration by the Catalan Parliament, nor the concretization of its effects and the beginning of the constituent process.

In fact, what happened was that Mr Puigdemont reported the positive results of the Referendum and immediately requested to the Parliament to suspend the effects of a declaration which had not yet taken place. Moreover there was not any answer or agreement of the Parliament in this sense.

However, after the Parliament session, the deputies of the secessionist groups proceeded to sign a document in another room containing a declaration of independence[ii]:

“… We, democratic representatives of the people of Catalonia, in the free exercise of the right of self-determination, and in accordance with the mandate received from the citizens of Catalonia,

WE CONSTITUTE the Catalan Republic, as an independent and sovereign State, State of right, democratic and social.

WE MAKE AVAILABLE the entry into force of the Law of Legal Transitoriness and on the Foundation of the Republic.

WE INITIATE the constituent, democratic, citizen-based, transverse, participatory and binding process ”

Now, has there been a declaration of independence? If we understand that from the point of view of the alleged legality of the Catalan Republic the independence started with the positive results of the referendum, they don’t need a declaration for it. However article 4.4 of Law 19/2017, key to interpret this, is clear requiring a formal statement from Parliament that has not been adopted.

This document is a clear commitment to independence, and in itself can be considered as the intended statement whose effects are requested to be suspended.

Moreover, declarations are regulated in the article 166 of the Catalan Parliament Regulation, establishing three types of declarations: declarations of the Parliament of Catalonia (which require the unanimity vote of the Board of Spokespersons), declarations of the Board of Spokespersons (which require a majority vote of the Board of Spokespersons) and Declarations of the Presidency of the Parliament[iii].

It is true that art. 4.4 of Law 19/2017 does not state what kind of declaration should be made. We can think on a statement of the Board of Spokespersons by majority, and a Presidential Statement or a Declaration by Parliament itself. However it would be logical to think, due to its relevance, that the best way is to vote Declaration of the Parliament; therefore a unanimous consent of the Board of Spokesmen would be required. Or in a non legal way -breaking the Catalonian Parliament Regulation- a vote of the Parliament itself.

Therefore, it can be understood that, from the point of view of the alleged legality of the Catalan Republic, there was no declaration of independence, nor suspension of the effects of it. And in this sense what took place from the legal point of view – of that supposed legality – is rather an independence – born ex art. 4.4 of Law 19/2017 with the positive result of the referendum – whose formal statement by the Parliament was omitted or suspended, even though that a declaration was signed in document by some Members of the Parliament, but outside the session and therefore without legal value.

In reaction to this situation, the Government of Spain activated the possible application of art. 155 of the Spanish Constitution (EC) sending a request to the President of the Generalitat of Catalonia, dated on October 11, to clarify the situation and to confirm whether or not the independence of Catalonia has been declared, awaiting an answer tomorrow 16 October; stating that an affirmative or ambiguous answer will imply the application of art. 155 EC, which can be use to intervene and obligate the Autonomous Community to return to the Spanish Constitutional Order[iv].

Although I am not able to anticipate the answer of President Puigdemont, I understand -from my point of view- that there was no declaration of independence of Catalonia, although the process of independence has begun and is actually in suspense, which undoubtedly also affects and breaks the Spanish Constitutional Order.

[i] Compareixença del president Puigdemont davant del ple del Parlament, Barcelona, 10 d’octubre de 2017, Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament de la Presdiència, Oficina del President, Gabinet de Comunicació del President.

[ii]Declaració dels Representants de Catalunya, available at:  https://es.scribd.com/document/361241376/Declaracio-Independe-ncia#from_embed

[iii] Reglament del Parlament de Catalunya, available at: https://www.parlament.cat/document/cataleg/165484.pdf

[iv]Requerimiento de 11 de octubre de 2017, accesible en http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/Documents/11102017-requerimiento.pdf

 

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EU Ministers for Environment meet on 13 October 2017 in Luxembourg to discuss the effort-sharing regulation and the regulation on land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) with a view to agreeing on a general approach for each of the proposals. It is also adopting conclusions on the preparations for the COP23 Climate change conference and on the EU priorities for the United Nations Environment Assembly.

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EU Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs meet on 12 and 13 October 2017 in Luxembourg to adopt the regulation establishing EPPO under enhanced cooperation, as well as to discuss proposals on mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders and the exchange of information on third country nationals on ECRIS. Justice and home affairs ministers are expected to discuss criminal justice in cyberspace. On Friday home affairs ministers are expected to focus on migration and on counter-terrorism.

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Informal Meeting of Trade Ministers, taking place on 13 October, in Brussels.

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Committee and political group meetings, Brussels

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Elections in Austria? Again?

Most non-Austrian react with bewilderment when they take note of the forthcoming Austrian elections on 15 October: elections, now? Have they not just voted?

Indeed. On 4 December 2016 Austria had to re-run its presidential elections, with the quasi-Green candidate Alexander van der Bellen winning by a really small margin of 50.3% against Norbert Hofer, the candidate of the (very) right-wing FPÖ. Even though presidents play a marginal role in everyday Austrian politics, this battle of ideas attracted much international attention.

What is happening next Sunday, 15 October 2017, is actually more important. Early elections for parliament have been scheduled, and they are very likely to follow the trend towards the right, which was visible in the recent German elections.

Why early elections?

Sebastian Kurz

In May 2017, the governmental coalition of Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Conservative Party (ÖVP) decided to support the request submitted by the opposition in parliament and call for early elections. At this point, not much love was left between the two coalition partners, after months of conflict and open disagreement. The resignation of the ÖVP party chair and Vice-Chancellor Reinhard Mitterlehner gave the last push for the break-up of the coalition, undermined by internal fights within both parties. The ÖVP begged their young and successful foreign minister Sebastian Kurz, boosted by incredible approval rates in opinion polls, to take over the role as party chair. Kurz gracefully accepted, but only under his own conditions, such as full autonomy in staff matters and running under the label ‘List of Sebastian Kurz – the new ÖVP’ (instead of simply “ÖVP”).

No more grand coalition!

Results of Austrian parliamentary elections.

That is the main tenor of the current political discourse. Citizens are fed up with the idea of yet another boring, fighting, stagnating Grand Coalition of the two major traditional parties. What in September 2013 had seemed like the lesser evil – as compared to another FPÖ participation in government after the one in 1999 which had raised so many eyebrows and even sanctions within the EU), turned into a permanent bickering between two government parties openly fighting each other’s policies over the past year. Not ideal for realizing the objective of winning back citizens’ trust, after the 2013 results had already been the worst ever for both SPÖ and ÖVP in the Second Republic.

Not to mention the scandals!

The dirtiest election campaign in Austrian history!

Scandals are the second main issue currently associated with the election campaign. To everybody’s surprise, it is not the usual suspect (the far-right FPÖ) that breaches with acceptable practices, but the big coalition parties SPÖ and ÖVP! All throughout the campaign, they have been navigating from one scandalous ‘Breaking News’ to the next. The tip of the iceberg is the ‘facebook scandal’ that transpired within the SPÖ last week: a few weeks ago the SPÖ campaign advisor Tal Silberstein (an Israeli consultant) was fired due to allegations of money laundering. When journalists started investigating Silberstein´s practices, they discovered dirty campaigning on social media on an unimagined scale. Silberstein had set-up a whole office (interestingly enough staffed with collaborators close to the conservative party) that ran two facebook groups apparently in support of the ÖVP rival Kurz, but then discrediting the ÖVP party leader with disdainful, personal attacks. The SPÖ election campaign manager resigned immediately, although the SPÖ leadership is still claiming that they were not informed about those practices. The question remains how much SPÖ party leader and Chancellor Kern knew about these practices. And the general conclusion is that even if he did not know, it was his job to know (especially if he wants to lead this country).

Other, smaller scandals shake the political establishment on a daily basis: how come the ÖVP has been using campaign slogans that had been initially developed but not publicized by the SPÖ? At the same time, the Greens’ prospects have been damaged by internal quarrels, which had one of their longest-serving members, Peter Pilz, leave the party to create his own list in opposition to Green party leaders.

Clarification of positions

The one positive side effect of the 2017 election campaign is that parties are forced to be clear on their main policy priorities.

SPÖ Chancellor Kern, stemming from the business-section of the Social Democrats, is considered a calm, well-respected and experienced intellectual. During the last year, the SPÖ was tempted internally to consider a coalition with the FPÖ, but Kern and his team managed to re-focus it on its core topic: sustainable state institutions that ensure a just, fair and protective society through state intervention. Just how this is a shift from what the SPÖ government was supposed to be doing over the last years, is less clear, although some observers point out that the SPÖ became more edgy in pursuing social-democratic economic policies lately.

Sebastian Kurz and his ‘new’ ÖVP, on the other hand, are pushing the idea of breaking up old state and party structures to bring in a ‘new social justice’. The latter is defined by enabling hard-working Austrians to be able to make a living for themselves; by getting rid of too much regulation and state intervention; and mostly by cutting off ‘benefits parasites’ (and foreigners) from state support. Kurz is slightly less eloquent in providing details of how exactly he would achieve his declared goals. In the latest TV debates he resorted to bashing European politics and other European leaders´ decisions (read: Merkel´s refugee policy) for their negative impact on Austria, instead of providing clear policy strategies himself.

FPÖ campaign poster

The FPÖ and their party leader Heinz-Christian Strache have one clear priority: Austria for Austrians (translation: kick migrants out of Austria!). Strache keeps attacking Kurz for not having reacted more decisively in closing Austrian borders during the Syrian refugee crisis, while for the rest the two-party leaders showed so much unity in the TV debates that many observers already refer to the ‘Chancellor and his Vice-Chancellor to be’.

In the current political climate, marked by a clear shift of the main parties towards the right, the Greens are the last party on the left of the political spectrum. In economic, societal and European topics they stand for clear left-wing positions, and they are the only party that has climate change and environmental impact high on their agenda. The economic-liberal NEOS still confuse voters with the variety of their positions, but they earned some respect for having many experienced entrepreneurs in their ranks. And they got the presidential candidate and respected lawyer Irmgard Griess on their party list, which provided them with visibility.

So, what are the expectations?

Latest polls. Source : www.profil.at

The latest polls confirm the trends of the last years: the ÖVP is expected to get a boost by its charismatic young party leader. Sebastian Kurz is appreciated by many Austrians for his youth, his image as everybody’s perfect ‘son-in-law’, and his promise for change (even though most people do not seem to care or realize that the promised change is likely not to be in their favour). The ÖVP thus clearly leads the polls. What is unclear at the moment, is who will come second: will the FPÖ manage to overtake the SPÖ?

What the polls show quite clearly, though, is that there will be a very meager amount of coalition options available: the visible disdain that emerged between Kurz and Kern in the past months makes a revival of the Grand Coalition impossible. For the ÖVP, Kern would have to step down for the SPÖ to even being considered a potential partner. More likely is a coalition ÖVP-FPÖ, although this will also depend on whom the president (one of his rare powers!) will mandate with forming a government.

The expected center-right victory at these parliamentary elections will not come as a surprise. Like in Germany, the Social Democrats have lost profile by participating in the Grand Coalition. Like in Germany, the political discourse has been continuously shifting towards the right over recent years: the moderate right takes ever tougher positions on migration issues, and the Social Democrats sometimes follow suit in fear of alienating too many worried voters.

The SPÖ is only just starting to pull back to the left, but with the considerably weakened Greens left as only partners, a center-left coalition is simply not realistic this time around.

The post Following the German trend? Austria votes on Sunday. appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Que Anh Dang 

• How might we understand the changing governance of scientific research at national, regional and supranational levels in Europe?
• What are the prevailing and conflicting political, economic, cultural and ideational discourses, discursive contexts and rationales for constituting and governing intermediary research executive agencies? How do they operate?
• What are the consequences/outcomes caused by the tensions and compromises between these supposedly independent agencies and the national governments or regional institutions?
• What are the implications for research policies and academic practices at higher education institutions?

 

Panel chair Sarah Glück

These are some overarching questions addressed by the panel ‘Research Executive Agencies – between Independent Organisations and Governments’ organised by Lisa Kressin and Sarah Glück in the Section on the Politics of Higher Education, Research and Innovation at the European Consortium for Political Research ECPR General Conference 6-9 September in Oslo. The papers in this panel examine the historical trajectories, discursive contexts in the institutionalisation processes and the actual workings of the research funding executive agencies in Germany, Austria, the Nordic region and the European Union.

 

National Contexts: Agencification and Autonomy

In some German-speaking national contexts, there is a practice of agencification in which the principals (ministries) play the role of defining political strategies, framework and rules, and let the agents (the executive agencies) be in charge of implementation processes and manage public research funds on the government’s behalf. Rupert Pichler and Sascha Ruhland, in their paper titled ‘The role of research funding agencies in policy discretion and coordination in Austria’, examined multiple funding agencies and focus on the case of the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG) – a merger of several fragmented funding organisations. FFG has a legal form of a limited company and has the mandates to serve many ministries, provincial governments and the EU. They argued that the very nature of multi-principal and multi-sector agency has put FFG in a position to propose strategic plans that are to be approved by the various ministries. Sometimes the inter-ministerial negotiations are outsourced to FFG. In essence, the principals are coordinated by the agent rather than being in the driver’s seat, thus blurring the boundaries between principal’s and agent’s tasks and roles. They concluded that although principals and agents are deeply entangled, there are always ‘lasting tensions’ oscillating between agency capture and government interference. Therefore, the principal-agent relationship is constantly adjusted.

 

Regional Contexts: Changing Governance Architecture

Que Anh Dang presented the paper ‘Nordic Umbrella Organisations for Higher Education and Research: Region-building and Market-making’ and highlighted the case of the Nordic research funding executive agency – NordForsk. Although NordForsk was established in 2005 in the aftermath of the Lisbon Strategy with a competitiveness boosting agenda, it was rooted in the long-standing Nordic regional cooperation in many sectors. NordForsk is ‘old wine in a new bottle’ and it represents a continuation of previous regional initiatives and the Nordic informal and pragmatic approach to cooperation. However, NordForsk has constituted new spaces for policy making which alter regional governance pattern. She argued that, in the Nordic case, these new spaces are not located above the state, rather, regional frontiers are created within the national policy-making apparatus including its political institutions. NordForsk is not about the emergence, consolidation or sustainability of the supranational authority but about the rescaling of governance and pubic authority to regional spaces – a politics of regionalism that is simultaneously regional and national. The legitimacy of intermediary agencies, like NordForsk, is secured through various forms of accountability. Such accountability is ensured by ‘accountability communities’- a complex ensemble of public and private organisations endowed with capacities to perform legislative, monitoring and compliance activities. Que Anh concluded that these communities also possess particular understandings of accountability (soft law of standards and codes) and provide the basis for new ways of region-building and market-making.

 

Que Anh Dang. Photo credits: Thomas König

Inga Ulnicane presented her research on Grand societal challenges asking if challenge-orientation represents a new policy paradigm in science, technology and innovation policy. She compared recent challenge-orientation with earlier mission-oriented science, technology and innovation policies and discussed a number of policy initiatives to address societal challenges launched by NordForsk, European Union and Sweden’s innovation agency Vinnova.

 

Thomas König, one of the panellists, launched his new book ‘The European Research Council’ (ERC) during the conference. This book is a comprehensive research into the creation and development of the ERC. With an ethnographic method, Thomas gives a detailed account of how a group of strong-minded European scientists succeeded in establishing the ERC by pushing for a single goal: more money for scientific research with fewer strings attached. The book also critically analyses the achievements and challenges faced by the ERC and engages with a broader question concerning the relationships between politics, science and public money.

 

Some Reflections

Presentations in this panel prompted some reflections and ideas for further empirical studies:

-          The classical principal-agent theory is deficient in explaining the complex relationships between the research funding executive agencies and their founders and funders (be it national or regional bodies). We need new theories and novel ways of understanding the power relations between the principals (ministries, group of states, supranational union) and the agents (intermediary agencies);

-          Although the agents derive their authority from their expertise, they have to constantly negotiate and secure their legitimacy and autonomy in various ways and with a range of actors including the principals, academic communities, the society and the wider public (tax-payers);

-          Neoliberalism constitutes the hegemonic economic discourse within science and innovation which introduces a new mode of regulation premised on the belief that competition – in the name of ‘Excellence’– is the most efficient and a morally superior mechanism for allocating resources and opportunities. The workings of all these agencies are governed, albeit at varying degrees, by this economic discourse and its accompanied contractual relations;

-          The research funding executive agencies take on multiple identities depending on which actors they interact with. Despite their motto to uphold academic freedom and support investigator-driven research, they often act as translators and mediators between politics, science and administration.

In summary, the panel provides deep insights into concrete case studies and offers new ways of understanding intermediary agencies and the implications for research policies in the complex governance structures in Europe. We wish to exchange ideas and learn from more case studies in other national and regional contexts to broaden our scholarship.

 

Dr. Que Anh Dang is a researcher at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. Her research interests include higher education and regionalism, the role of international organisations in policy making, higher education in the knowledge economy, and education diplomacy. She is a co-editor and an author of the book ‘Global Regionalisms and Higher Education’ (2016).

 

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will take place on Wednesday 22 November, 9:00-12:30 and 14:30-18:30 and Thursday 23 November, 9:00-12:30 in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply for access to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

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I’ve talked before about how negotiation theory might throw some light on the Article 50 process, but it seems useful to return to the subject, given the continuing difficulties that the sides are encountering: might the literature offer some insights?

Today, it’s Zartman who springs to mind. He writes on the conflict management side of negotiation, which might appear to be a bit heavy-handed for this situation, but his analysis of the basic mechanics is one that I (and my students) offer find helpful in more mundane situations.

Zartman argues that negotiation is about the resolution of structural differences between negotiating parties and his big thing is about reducing differences: the more you can close the gap between parties, the more likely you are to find space for a mutually-acceptable agreement.

He suggests there are four ways that differences get reduced; two softer options, and two harder ones, with each pair being the opposite of each other.

The soft pair is about making options look more or less attractive. You might suggest that taking a particular option will produce benefits, or that taking another will come with costs.

The hard pair finds parties arguing that they either have to take an option, or it is impossible to take it, because their hands are tied in some way.

The soft pair is ubiquitous in politics and in Brexit: everyone’s telling us how option X will lead to sunlight uplands or the end of civilisation as we know it, so I don’t care to revisit all of these.

But what we’re seeing in recent weeks is more of the hard option, on both sides.

For the EU, there has always been some element of this, from the insistence that Article 50 is the only legal framework for departure negotiations, to the Commission explaining that its mandate doesn’t let it talk about transition before sufficient progress has been made on Phase I issues.

For the UK, the original hard position – Brexit has to mean leaving the EU – has faded over time, but now it creeps back into discussion.

This was most vividly seen in this week’s mixed messages on a no-deal scenario. First, Philip Hammond told the Select Committee that there was no money yet for such a situation, before his boss popped up in PMQs to say that there was money already committed.

What seems to have passed most media comment on the spat of the day by is that both of them were essentially working towards a position of making no-deal ever less of an option, through incapacity.

Money is obviously important here, but more important is how that money is used. In a no-deal scenario, there will be an immediate requirement for substantial increases in border controls for customs, much regulatory uncertainty and a wealth of other impacts (see this for an overview).

None of those gaps can be closed immediately: to take the most obvious example, if customs controls are needed, then land has to be secured, built upon, and staffed by people you’ve trained.

As of the moment, none of the necessary procurement activity for this to happen has begun, and even on the most ambitious timetable that would take 18 months to do, which is about now.

Thus while May might seem to be taking a more conciliatory line with her party’s hardliners, she actually looks to be providing cover to a push on working towards a deal, since if the UK is simply incapable of policing a non-deal, then that might encourage domestic opinion to accept the need for a deal.

But this incident also raises another perspective that ties back to Zartman’s model, namely May’s seeming unwillingness to reduce alternatives at all.

May remains a very elusive figure, refusing to tie herself down to any one option; or, more accurately, tying herself to many, simultaneously-inconsistent options.

As has been widely discussed, her apparent lack of a desired end-state makes it almost impossible to reach any kind of agreement in Article 50: you can’t negotiate with someone who doesn’t know what they want.

Perhaps the best way to understand this is to see May’s position as one where she’s running two sets of negotiation at the same time: one with the EU and one with her party.

While Article 50 points to a need for a strategic objective from the UK, party management points to a need to keep options open (or at least fudged) so that she isn’t removed from office or defeated in the Commons.

Seen in this light, May’s actions make more sense, as she tries to engineer faits accomplis in Article 50 while arguing for much more back home.

Whether this is a viable long-term strategy is doubtful, especially as we move towards the European Council’s decision next week on ‘sufficient progress’, where rhetoric is going to become a big factor once more. Adding that to an already-deeply-suspicious Tory party and it’s not too hard to imagine someone pushing the leadership challenge button more firmly.

And at that point you can expect a whole lot more examples of why contender X is good/bad or must/mustn’t lead the country at this critical juncture.

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The Committee of the Regions is the voice of regions and cities in the European Union. The members are regional and locally elected representatives from the 28 EU countries.

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On 11 October, SEDE will hold a public hearing on the militarisation in the Black Sea. The hearing is timely, as the regional security situation on the eastern flank has become very challenging for the EU and NATO. It will focus on the security situation following the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, the hearing will analyse the military strategic consequences of the conflicts and the possibilities to foster stability and cooperation.
Location : Paul-Henri Spaak 5B001
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On 11 October, SEDE will hold a public hearing on the militarisation in the Black Sea. The hearing is timely, as the regional security situation on the eastern flank has become very challenging for the EU and NATO. It will focus on the security situation following the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, the hearing will analyse the military strategic consequences of the conflicts and the possibilities to foster stability and cooperation.
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EU Finance ministers meet on 10 October 2017 in Luxembourg to adopt conclusions on the financing aspects of climate change. They are discussing the preparation of the autumn G20 and IMF meetings and lessons learned from the 2017 European Semester.

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