European Union

On 4 June 1920 Hungary reluctantly signed the Treaty of Trianon, one of the treaties that formally ended the First World War, and lost more than sixty percent of its territory. For some this is still an open wound, for others it's a closed chapter.

In the aftermath of Arkady Babchenko's staged killing the Russian journalist and Ukraine's intelligence agencies and political leadership are still under fire. Kiev argues that the operation was necessary to prevent a real murder. Europe's journalists remain divided about the episode and recall a similar case in France in 1982.

The US has now imposed tariffs on steel and aluminium imports from the EU, Mexico and Canada. Several of the countries affected by the measure have already made it clear that they plan to take concerted action against the measures. In Canada too, journalists are calling for a tough stance against Trump. But one European country is particularly concerned about the situation.

France v Parliament
Law governing the institutions
Advocate General Wathelet proposes that the Court should annul only the act by which the President of the Parliament declared in Brussels, and not in Strasbourg, that the general budget of the EU for 2017 was definitively adopted

Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein
Approximation of laws
The administrator of a fan page on Facebook is jointly responsible with Facebook for the processing of data of visitors to the page

Coman and Others
Citizenship of the Union
The term ‘spouse’ within the meaning of the provisions of EU law on freedom of residence for EU citizens and their family members includes spouses of the same sex

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Angola's partnership with the EU is based on the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement which aims to reduce poverty by developing the Angolan economy and gradually integrating it into the global economy. The Joint Way Forward promotes more active political cooperation, especially Angola's active involvement in the different regional and multilateral fora, and prioritises key areas of common interest from the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy (security, governance, human rights, economic growth, energy, transport, environment, science and technology, training and education).

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The European Union’s (EU’s) relations with Rwanda focus mainly on development cooperation in areas of rural development, energy and governance but also include an increasing emphasis on trade and investment as well as a regular political dialogue covering issues of home affairs, human rights and regional cooperation.

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After being busy getting elected in May 2017, Emmanuel Macron used the traditionel French ‘Bridges of May‘ in 2018 to take a trip to Aachen in order to accept the so-called ‘Charlemagne Prize’ that the city bestows each year on a prominent individual ‘for work done in the service of European unification’.

Some might argue that Macron has actually not yet had the time to do much for European integration, but it seems that in the troublesome period we are currently going through, winning an election with a distinctly pro-European agenda  already qualifies.

Macron interviewed (in French!) by Tagesthemen.

For Macron the trip was an opportunity to hammer some messages home to his German audience in the largest sense. And he seized it in his typical manner: not only in his acceptance speech – broadcast live, then quoted and commented upon by the entire media spectrum – but also in a television interview for the renowned evening news show ‘Tagesthemen’. And, of course, in a friendly meeting with the crowd at a street festival in the city centre, and a more focused visit to the (reputed) University to meet and exchange with students.

But since his visit coincided with the first anniversary of his coming to office, it was also an occasion for the Germans to take stock of his first year in the Elysée. For instance, the prime-time geopolitical TV magazine ‘Weltspiegel’ dedicated an entire (well-balanced) special issue of 45 minutes to the French citizens’ perception of their new President.

As Voltaire’s Professor Pangloss would have concluded, everything was fine ‘in the best of all possible worlds’. There are still some TV journalists around who do high-quality work and have an international mindset – how many of the Parisian know-all pundits would have been able to interview Angela Merkel in German? Just asking. And the ease with which Macron adapts to different settings and interlocutors without reducing the quality of his spoken language remains amazing. Add to this the tangible sincerity of Franco-German friendship that can be felt on such occasions among all audiences, and you have a perfect little spring break.

And yet, even though Macron himself seems to be appreciated by the Germans (including Mrs Merkel), despite his very frank messages about the need to stop procrastinating and clinging to budgetary ‘fetishism’ at a historical moment of European integration, there is a strange atmosphere in Germany these days, as if the new government was paralysed under a lead blanket.

True, quite a few quality media acclaim the European plans of this both ‘uncomfortable and praiseworthy’ friend. But this does not really come as a surprise: rather than being populated by the losers of globalisation and European integration, these editorial offices are staffed with enlightened liberals, who would have massively voted for Macron if only the German political system allowed for the emergence of such a Maverick.

And now – surprise, surprise! – the Chancellor has gone so far as to formulate a prudent response to Macron in a Sunday paper interview. It is unclear, however, whether her proposals are simply politely put red lines disguised as constructive compromises, or pseudo-offers that she expects to be diluted anyway in the domestic and European debate. Perhaps she simply wants to recover leadership on the domestic debate again, after the publication last week, in the same newspaper, of a manifesto against the deepening of monetary union signed by 154 professors of economics (whose predictions are, as we all know, always right on target).

Overall, the political class seems to be well in line with the professors and responds with a wall of silence. They listen politely to what Macron has to say about their ‘taboo on financial transfers’ and their lack of will and capacity ‘to project themselves’ towards a common future, ‘like our founding fathers were capable of doing’, but it’s evident they don’t hear a word. At the same time, they are forced to recognise that Macron’s domestic reforms robs them of their good old pretext of sending the French back to their own failings and request they ‘do their homework’.

Their attitude was summed up recently by Daniel Cohn-Bendit, who diagnosed a flagrant ‘intellectual laziness in Germany that blocks them from addressing Macron’s proposals’.

It might be even more appropriate to quote Bob Dylan, according to whom ‘we live in a political world, where courage is a thing of the past.’ In GroKo Germany this definitely seems to be the case. The political élite, is not only ‘slumped on the sofa of complacency’ (Timothy Garton Ash in The Guardian), but actually afraid of the electorate that renewed their mandate. They cannot imagine that the public would be ready to accept the simple truth that Germany has been and still is the biggest beneficiary of the monetary union and the single market altogether. Some of them may realise that it’s about time this truth is spoken out – and some of them, once out of office like Sigmar Gabriel, actually say it out loud – but they all know it is utterly incompatible with the traditional home-grown narrative of Germany as Europe’s ‘cash cow’. And they are convinced it would provide the AfD with even more momentum.

This is no longer ‘intellectual laziness’ but ‘intellectual panic’.

And it is deeply dishonest, after having published a solemn coalition agreement that starts with the very commitment to ‘A new awakening for Europe’. I would be glad to be told wrong by a sudden ‘new awakening’ in German politics, but for the time being, this is nothing short of hypocrisy.

The only encouraging variable in this strange configuration is that the German political class, after having successively dealt with Chirac, Sarkozy and Hollande, totally underestimate Macron’s capacity of opposing them with a rare mix of compelling intellectual persuasiveness and pig-headed obstinacy. Remember my football metaphor of Gegenpressing !

Macron may be imbued with his own brilliance and so much convinced by his own ideas that it borders on arrogance. But his character is a glimpse of hope for Europe.

The post Mr Macron goes to Germany appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

This post first appeared at the EU Law Enforcement Blog

 

The “refugee crisis” has led to the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) (the successor of Frontex) in 2016 and the transformation(still under negotiation) of the European Asylum Support Office (Easo) into a European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). The expansion of the operational tasks of the EBCG and the future EUAA in comparison to Frontex and Easo is clear. While Frontex and Easo have traditionally been characterized by their operational role and assistance to the frontline Member States on the ground, Europol under the recently adopted Regulation 2016/794 has also started to assist those national authorities subject to the extraordinary and sudden arrival of mixed migratory flows.

Europol is a hub of information and intelligence that is starting to develop a significant presence on the ground by providing operational support to the national migrant smuggling and human trafficking investigations. Nonetheless, the extent of Europol’s involvement and assistance to the Member States remains unclear. The recently adopted Regulation 2016/794 neither refers to the operational tasks of the agency, nor the deployment of staff of Europol in the hotspots. Hence, in this blog post the emerging operational role of the agency in migrant smuggling matters is examined. In particular, the participation of Europol in Joint Investigation Teams (JITs), the establishment of the European Migrant Smuggling Center (EMSC), and the tasks that the agency undertakes in the Greek and Italian hotspots is analyzed.

Firstly, according to article 6 Regulation 2016/794, Europol is authorized to request the competent authorities of the Member States to initiate, conduct or coordinate a criminal investigation. Interestingly, in the case that the concerned Member State decides not to accede to such a request, the competent national authority is required to inform Europol of the reasons for their decision within one month of receipt of the request (article 6(3) Regulation 2016/794). Regulation 2016/794 vests a nascent operational role to Europol by determining that the agency may coordinate, organize and implement investigative and operational actions to support the Member States. Europol is, however, not authorized to apply coercive measures to conduct any of its operational tasks (article 4(5) Regulation 2016/794), which would ultimately contravene article 88(3) TFEU (“the application of coercive measures shall be the exclusive responsibility of the competent national authorities”).

In particular, Europol may participate in JITs and coordinate, organize and implement investigative and operational actions in order to support the national enforcement authorities (article 4(1)(c) and (d) Regulation 2016/794). According to article 5(1) Regulation 2016/794, “Europol staff may participate in the activities of joint investigation teams dealing with crime falling within Europol’s objectives”. Although the agency no longer needs the authorization of the concerned Member States to take part in a JIT, Europol remains unable to independently initiate a JIT, and may only propose such a measure to the Member States and take actions to assist the competent national authorities in setting up the team (article 5(5) Regulation 2016/794) (see, Council Resolution on a Model Agreement for setting up a JIT and the JITs Practical Guide).

Since Regulation 2016/794 entered into force on 1 May 2017, Europol participated in several JITs (see here or here). For instance, Europol coordinated an investigation regarding an organized criminal group that was illegally transporting migrants from Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Syria to the EU through the Balkan route. Europol also took part in a JIT that dismantled a migrant smuggling network operating across Europe. Specifically, the agency facilitated the investigation’s information exchange, provided extensive analytical support, deployed its mobile offices to Belgium and the UK, and analyzed, exchanged in real-time and immediately cross-checked against Europol’s databases the information gathered.

Moreover, article 4(1)(l) Regulation 2016/794 states that Europol shall “develop Union centers of specialized expertise for combating certain types of crime falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives (…)”. These centers aim to coordinate, organize and implement investigative and operational actions to assist the Member States in combating transnational crime and terrorism. On22 February 2016, Europol launched the EMSC. This center aims to proactively support EU Member States in dismantling criminal networks involved in organized migrant smuggling, and to be a single entry point for inter-agency cooperation on smuggling.

Since February 2016, the EMSCassists the competent national enforcement authorities by providing secure-information, sharing opportunities and strategic and operational analysis, gathering evidence, and undertaking investigations against the smuggling networks facilitating illegal entry, onward secondary movement, and the residence of migrants in the EU. The assistance of the EMSC is divided into five main areas for action: 1) Operational support, coordination and expertise; 2) Strategic support to EU Member States and partners; 3) Platform for EU Member States and partners; 4) Support to the European Union Regional Task Force (EURTF) and Hotspots; 5) Deployments on-the-spot via Europol Mobile Investigation Teams (EMIST) and Europol Mobile Analysis Teams (EMAST).

According to the first EMSC Activity Report, the leading role of the Center is assisting and coordinating cross-border, anti-smuggling operations, which requires close coordination with partner agencies (namely, Eurojust and the EBCG). The second activity report of the EMSC further details that the Center assists the competent national enforcement authorities in cases related to migrant smuggling and document fraud through forensic support in relation to questioned documents and materials used to produce suspicious documents, on-the-spot support to provide technical assistance and expertise in investigating forged documents and dismantling illegal print shops, and permanent deployments in the hotspots. As of September 2017, the EMSC had supported 68 investigations against criminal networks in 2017 and 93 in 2016, 3 JITS in 2017 and 2 in 2016, and identified and monitored 830 vessels that may be involved in illegal migrant smuggling (Commission, “Communication on the Delivery of the European Agenda on Migration”, COM(2017) 558 final, 27.09.2017, p. 7).

The key operational novelty of the EMSC consists in deploying investigative and analytical support teams (EMIST and EMAST) and guest officers to undertake systematic secondary security checks and support frontline Member States in the hotspots. Europol’s Review 2016-2017highlights the strong operational capacity provided by the agency in the hotspots and specially the secondary security checks undertaken by the deployed officials: “Europol experts worked side-by-side with national authorities at the EU’s external borders to strengthen security checks on the inward flows of migrants, to disrupt migrant smuggling networks and identify suspected terrorists and criminals”.

Europol’s core mission at the hotspots consists in reinforcing the exchange of information, verifying such intelligence within the relevant databases, improving the national investigations, conducting operational and strategic analysis through the deployment of teams of experts on the ground, being present at the screening of the arrived migrants and, providing forensic support. The officials of Europol that are deployed in the hotspots thus offer expertise, coordinate operational meetings, provide analytical support and cross-check against the databases of the agency (see here, here and here). They aim to ensure a comprehensive EU law enforcement approach and operationally assist the concerned frontline Member States in averting and combating migrant smuggling, human trafficking and terrorist networks. As of March 2018, 19 Europol’s guest officers and 2 Europol staff were deployed in the Greek hotspots,and 16 guest officers and 2 Europol staff were deployed in the Italian hotspots to conduct secondary security checks (Commission, “Communication on Progress report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration”, COM(2018) 250 final, 14.03.2018, pp. 5 and 9).

Not only is the EMSC active in supporting the national authorities in exchanging intelligence and investigating existing criminal networks operating in the Mediterranean, but Europol’s officials, jointly with the EBCG and the concerned Member State, also debrief the arrived migrants at the hotspots and assess the data gathered from the interviews and investigations. However, while Regulation 2016/794 of Europol explicitly indicates that the agency may establish centers of specialized expertise like the EMSC, it does not further clarify the specific and significant operational tasks that Europol may conduct through these centers. Furthermore, unlike the EBCG and EUAA Regulations that expressly cover the support of the agencies to the Member States in the hotspots, Regulation 2016/794 on Europol does not mention the operational role that the agency plays in the hotspots.

To conclude, while it is true that Europol still plays a secondary operational role in comparison to the EBCG or the future EUAA, the agency conducts tasks on the ground that may affect the individuals’ fundamental rights. In fact, only during October 2016, the guest officers deployed by Europol in Greece checked 1,490 persons. Currently, there is a lack of transparency regarding the specific operational support of Europol to the national enforcement authorities in their illegal migrant smuggling and trafficking of human beings investigations, which makes it almost impossible to effectively monitor the activities undertaken by the agency. If the operational role of Europol keeps expanding, the appropriateness of creating a Consultative Forum, a Fundamental Rights Officer and an individual complaint mechanism within Europol should be examined. These fundamental rights structures, which are already established within the EBCG, might be a useful way of mainstreaming fundamental rights and adding transparency to Europol’s operational tasks.

 

The post An Enforcement Role for EUROPOL in the Aftermath of the “Refugee Crisis”? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Weekly schedule of President Donald Tusk 4-10 June 2018

The African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states and the EU adopted a joint declaration on climate change during the ACP-EU Council of ministers that took place in Lomé (Togo) on 31 May and 1 June 2018.