Europe's World

2016 was the year when the ‘establishment’ was shaken time and again.

The old order, political rules of engagement and the very idea of liberal democracy were hit by a ferocious wave of populism that washed over Britain, Europe and the United States. Can Europe turn the tide in 2017?

The European project has been in free-fall throughout this year, so the big question is whether 2017 will see an EU recovery of some sort, or an unending vista of political and economic disintegration, writes Giles Merritt.

Brussels has been watching helplessly from the sidelines, underlining the realities of intergovernmentalism. The erosion of the EU’s ‘Community method’, and notably the Commission’s role, has contributed to a sense of impotence among Eurocrats, MEPs and the business and civil society players who do so much to help shape policy.

Many Europeans welcome the rise of intergovernmental authority as opposed to power wielded by the EU institutions. They see the Council as preferable to having the EU run by faceless and unelected bureaucrats who seem indifferent to the needs of ordinary people and are immune to democratic controls.

But that’s an inaccurate and prejudiced view – even if EU officialdom has straitjacketed itself in unnecessarily rigid rules and procedures and has neglected to communicate the value of its work to the general public.

“A new solidarity on immigration and institutional reform would demonstrate that unity is European countries’ only viable option”

It’s also a view that has done much damage in recent years, with national politics turning desirable intergovernmental oversight and decision-making into a tangle of hopeless deadlocks.

Tentative reforms that moved away from unanimity in ministerial councils to more qualified majority voting have helped, but it’s clear that the Europe’s longer-term interests are being trumped (so to speak) by member governments’ short-term domestic political concerns.

So where does this leave the EU, and its uncertain future?

To begin with, it’s vital and urgent that the EU’s institutions square up to their perception problem and launch all-out information campaigns.

The European Union has remarkable achievements under its belt, and despite the present atmosphere of crisis and despair is still forging ahead in crucial areas. But the EU does next to nothing to convince public opinion that, from research and development to humanitarian aid, and from support for struggling regions and industries to global development, it performs roles that no single country can fulfil on its own.

The other development needed to keep the EU on the rails is for national leaders to capitalise on intergovernmentalism as a means of protecting themselves against populism. A new solidarity on challenges ranging from immigration to EU institutional reform in the wake of Brexit would demonstrate that unity is European countries’ only viable option.

Do this, and things can improve. Fail, and 2017 could turn out to be worse that 2016’s annus horribilis.

2016 has been a pretty terrible year for European politics. And 2017 has all the makings of being equally gruesome, writes Shada Islam.

Let’s take a deep breath and think of some of the good things still happening across Europe. And importantly, let’s try to make sure hate doesn’t trump love and tolerance in the coming year.

It will be difficult. But there is reason to hope.

True, the political fate of Italy remains uncertain and far-right populists are riding high in the opinion polls in the Netherlands, France and Germany ahead of elections in all three countries.

But there are bright spots. First, Austria. After Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as the next president of the United States, many assumed that Austria would also opt for a populist politician with a message against the European Union, Islam and globalisation.

The far-right candidate for the country’s presidency, Norbert Hofer, was buoyed by the success of Trump and of Nigel Farage of the UK Independence Party. But this time things turned out differently, with Austrians rejecting Hofer in favour of the left-leaning Alexander Van der Bellen.

“Recent developments should encourage Europe’s liberal democrats to stop being defeatist”

Second, after making people wait for much too long, Angela Merkel launched her bid for re-election as German Chancellor despite criticism from within her own Christian Democratic Union party and the rising popularity of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party.

Echoing many, Joseph Daul, President of the European People’s Party, to which the CDU is affiliated, underlined: “Angela, you are needed in Europe”.

Third, Britain’s Liberal Democrats notched up a stunning by-election victory in Richmond Park in west London that the new MP Sarah Olney said was a rejection of the “UKIP vision” of Britain and its politics of “anger and division”.

And finally, a court in Amsterdam found Geert Wilders guilty of public insult and incitement to discrimination over a speech in which he called for “fewer Moroccans” in the country. No punishment was decreed, however.

Separately and even together, these developments do not signal a major setback for the populist lurch in European politics. But they do stand in contrast to the unrelenting waves of bad news – including Brexit – that has dominated Europe’s political agenda for the last twelve months.

Most importantly, they should encourage Europe’s liberal democrats to stop being defeatist and try harder – much harder – to win the upcoming elections.

Europe does not yet have a national politician like Canada’s Justin Trudeau who is unapologetic about celebrating diversity. But who knows what can happen next year?

In this unpredictable world, perhaps there is a charismatic European politician out there who is ready to discard hate and venom and come out strongly and convincingly for a diverse, tolerant and open Europe in 2017.

Related content

• Friends of Europe: Meet our 40 European Young Leaders in the Class of 2017
• Europe’s World: Can France and Germany lead European defence?, by Daniel Keohane
• Debating Europe: Was the world safer during the Cold War?

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – European Council

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Space matters for the world and for Europe. Over the last 60 years it has become an increasing presence in our society, supporting telecommunications and broadcasting, weather forecasting, Earth observation and environment monitoring. We rely on space activities for positioning, navigation and timing, and increasingly for security and defence. Space is radically transforming our daily lives.

Imagine the disturbance, even paralysis, which our society would experience if satellites were shut down for an hour, a day or a week: an enormous slice of human activity would just come to a standstill.

To underline such dependence on space assets, it’s worth noting that each European ‘uses’ about 50 satellites every day. Today, ten per cent of European activity depends on navigation satellite systems. This is expected to reach 30% in 2030. 80% of data required for accurate weather forecast originates from weather satellites. 26 out of the 50 parameters needed for global climate monitoring can be measured only from space. Hundreds of millions of broadcast receivers are satellite dependent.

The recent communication from the European Commission on ’Space Strategy for Europe’ stresses the importance of space for economic growth, innovation and new services, and calls for Europe to take a much stronger role on the world stage when it comes to space matters. This will be possible only if, in parallel to delivering new and improved services to an ever-widening community of users, Europe is able to ensure a safe, secure and sustainable environment for its space activities. Regrettably, this central element is missing in the proposed strategy.

“Each European ‘uses’ about 50 satellites every day”

The increasing level of space dependency means that our society is more vulnerable to the space environment, which has become congested and contested over the years.

It is congested with over 1400 active satellites and an increasing amount of space debris that can severely damage or destroy valuable space assets. There is also an increasing risk of radio frequency interference due to the increase of the number of satellite transponders and the low Earth orbit constellations of thousands of small satellites destined to bridge the digital divide experienced by isolated and/or low-income populations.

It is contested in all orbits by man-made threats that may deny, degrade, deceive, disrupt or destroy one or several assets. These threats include jamming telecommunication satellites or taking control of one of several satellites. China, Russia and the United States have also demonstrated their anti-satellite weapons and robotic inspector capabilities for a variety of orbits. Competing for such limited orbital and radiofrequency resources will demand more innovative and high-performing satellites, setting the bar higher when it comes to their reliability and efficiency.

Moving from a handful of players in the 1970s, when the Outer Space Treaty (1967) seemed sufficient to regulate space activities, to a complex present and future requires adapted governance schemes and some greater awareness, control and ability to manage space traffic – via technical, political and legal means.

Space surveillance and tracking (SST) data are mainly provided to European satellite operators by the US Space Surveillance Network (USSSN), part of the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The USSSN helps to build up space situational awareness of the different space objects in question.

In that respect, the EU is almost blind, but considering its increased involvement in space matters and the security dimension of space activities (one in six active satellites are European-operated), a consortium was eventually created in 2014 under the EU’s auspices, with five countries putting together their own national capabilities. These may be used to provide common services that can assess collision risks and re-entry-related events.

“So far, nations have been able to maintain safe, secure, and sustainable activities on land, on sea and in the air”

The EU Satellite Centre (SATCEN) can act as the implementing body, providing SST services by connecting the national operation centres. Currently a modest €70m has been allocated for the period from 2015 to 2020 to cover expenditure related to existing infrastructure and new developments.

On the political side, in December 2008 the EU presented an International Code of Conduct for outer space activities (ICoC). While not legally binding, it proposes a series of transparency- and confidence-building measures to promote international cooperation and help prevent an arms race in outer space.

Despite three open-ended multilateral consultations which brought interest from many nations, the negotiations on a revised draft failed in July 2015. Although the ICoC initiative remains stalled, it is worth noting that major European space-faring nations are actively involved within the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN-COPUOS) to adopt a set of guidelines that should ensure the long-term sustainability of activities in outer space.

Enhancing Europe’s role in space security, as part of a collective security endeavour, could mean building on the undergoing consortium to develop and operate a significant and credible set of national and European SST capabilities, moving Europe to a full partner status with the USSSN. In parallel, the EU could prepare a joint proposal with the United States for a revised Code of Conduct that could then be introduced by several member states for discussion at the UN. This would improve inclusiveness and maximise the chances of a successful negotiation and the adoption of a workable Code.

So far, nations have been able to maintain safe, secure, and sustainable activities on land, on sea and in the air. It ought to be done now in space too, and Europe can be instrumental in that work.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – – François –

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The mass-casualty attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016, as well as the plethora of self-starter plots uncovered in countries like Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom over the last few years, have highlighted the extent of the terrorist threat across Europe.

Terrorism has illustrated that it is borderless, and the cooperation between the European Union’s 28 member nations has to seamlessly confront that reality. But the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy has not reached its full potential and significant challenges still remain despite the great steps taken since 2002.

The EU first established a mutually-agreed definition of terrorism in 2002. This was a significant moment in cooperation as up to that moment only five member states – the UK, Germany, France, Spain and Italy – had detailed legislation on terrorism. As the threats evolved, the EU updated its list of terrorism-related offences to include public provocation, recruitment and training for terrorism.

Another step forward was the EU’s current counter-terrorism policy, agreed in November 2005. It has four principal aims, to be achieved by cooperation on both domestic and international levels. These include preventing the radicalisation of individuals, protecting the public from attacks, pursuing terrorists within the EU and, finally, responding to terrorist attacks whenever they occur.

Another important element has been the European Arrest Warrant, which was introduced in 2002 but has been operational only since January 2007. Under the previous extradition procedure, the process could last more than a year. Now the average length is between 16 and 48 days.

The procedure is better at extraditing suspected terrorists such as Salah Abdeslam, accused of plotting the November 2015 attacks in Paris. During the attack, Abdeslam fled to Belgium. He was eventually captured by police on 18 March 2016 and extradited to France within six weeks.

But the words of the EU and its member states are often not matched with action. This is largely illustrated by the unwillingness of member states to share intelligence and exchange information on security issues within the EU framework, including through institutions such as Europol. Instead, some nations opt for bilateral agreements to share intelligence outside EU structures.

The G6 group – an unofficial group of interior ministers from Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and Poland – works closely together and shares information due to its dissatisfaction with the workings of the Justice and Home Affairs Council.

Although Europol, which doesn’t have powers of arrest, has attained significant support from member states to facilitate the exchange of information, its operational role is limited. This, in turn, results in a restricted role and less influence for the EU institutions.

In 2014, Europol launched the Focal Point Travellers scheme, which is designed to hold information about individuals suspected of traveling across borders to participate in terrorist activities. The intention was to help European countries by collecting, analysing and sharing information on the recruitment and movements of outgoing and returning terrorists. But Europol never received across-the-board support, with only half of the EU’s 28 members registering their respective nationals on the Europol Information System database by the day of the Paris attacks.

Another problem has been that Europol principally interacts with national and federal police forces rather than intelligence agencies. This restricts access to potentially significant information. To try to mitigate this, in 2016 Europol announced the formation of the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) to combat terrorism in Europe, act as a central information hub and boost cooperation. Its success will take time to judge and assess.

The Schengen Agreement preserves the principle of no checks on internal borders across 26 countries, 22 of which are within the EU. However, if ever there is a serious threat to internal security, such as the one resulting from the November 2015 Paris attacks, internal border controls can be temporarily re-introduced for a limited period of time. Two of the suicide bombers behind the Stade de France attack used the migrant route from Turkey, Greece and the Balkans and continued across western Europe to orchestrate the attack. Both had falsified Syrian passports. Several of the individuals involved in the Brussels attacks on 22 March 2016 had also travelled across Europe using the migrant trail.

The threat of foreign terrorist fighters, either as returnees or from countries outside the EU, makes in-depth real-time exchange of information on individuals entering and leaving the Schengen zone essential. Frontex, the European border agency, is responsible for the supervision of operational cooperation on EU member states’ external borders. Although Frontex is not a counter-terrorism organisation, it needs to become an information provider and exchange intelligence with other EU agencies and national authorities.

In April 2016 the European Parliament and the Council adopted the European Air Passenger Name Record proposal, which had been under discussion since 2011. It will allow EU agencies and national law enforcement authorities to identify individuals whose methods of travel are unusual and unconventional, and to monitor their itineraries and contacts should they be suspected of involvement in terrorist activities.

Achievement of the EU’s counter-terrorism goals is beset by slow bureaucratic progress and tends to only take a degree of momentum in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Because of the reluctance of member states to transfer sovereignty to the EU’s supranational institutions, and factoring in Brexit, a more effective and practical response could be achieved by continuing national policies, with bilateral agreements on information-sharing.

To achieve practical cooperation, the EU should assist and coordinate national efforts − not to replace them.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – frankieleon

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Soon after Britain voted to leave the European Union in June, Ursula von der Leyen, the German Defence Minister, said that Germany and France would lead talks with other EU member states to assess their appetite for closer defence cooperation.

Speaking at the launch of a new German defence white paper, she added that the UK had “paralysed” progress on these issues in the past, but now the rest of the EU should move forward.

Partly based on subsequent practical Franco-German proposals — such as sharing more of the costs of military logistics, medical assistance, and satellite reconnaissance — EU foreign and defence ministers agreed on a new EU security and defence plan in mid-November. EU heads of government should approve this plan at a summit in December.

But while they agree on much on paper, there are some major differences in strategic culture between these two EU heavyweights.

France, which is a nuclear-armed permanent member of the UN Security Council, has a special sense of responsibility for global security. The French Defence Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, proposed in June that the EU should send naval ships to ensure open waterways in the South China Sea. Germany, by contrast, is not yet in the habit of initiating international military operations anywhere, let alone in faraway East Asia.

Berlin is still more reluctant than Paris to deploy robust military force, partly because of cautious public opinion. A series of Koerber Stiftung opinion polls from January 2015 to October 2016 shows an increase in the willingness of Germans to take a more active role in international crisis management (from 34% to 41%), but a majority still prefer restraint.

Germany did beef up its support to the anti-Daesh coalition following the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. It will lead one of four NATO battalions soon to be stationed in Eastern Europe. Berlin has also promised to increase its defence spending, and its new white paper says that it wants to boost its military contribution to international security.

But Germany will act only in coalition with others. France, by contrast, is not only prepared to bomb the self-styled ‘Islamic State’, but it will also act unilaterally if needed — consider the robust French military interventions in Mali and the Central African Republic in 2013 and 2014.

Berlin and Paris do not necessarily agree on the end goal of EU defence policy. The new German white paper says that EU members should aim to create a ‘European Security and Defence Union’. Even though von der Leyen has ruled out an EU army for the foreseeable future, some German politicians understand a European defence union to mean the creation of a common army in the long term.

It is not entirely clear who would command such an army — national governments or the Brussels-based EU institutions — nor what it would do in practice. But the idea has a lot of appeal in Germany for a host of historical and political reasons (54% of Germans support the idea according to a Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung poll taken in September). An EU army would be the ultimate expression of European political unity: in other words, EU defence is primarily an integration project for some in Berlin.

The French are more interested in a stronger intergovernmental EU defence policy than a symbolic integration project (albeit one that has its own political value for some in Paris as well as in Berlin). France perceives acting militarily through the EU as an important option for those times when the United States does not want to intervene in crises in and around Europe. This was the main strategic rationale behind the 1998 Franco-British Saint-Malo agreement, which resulted in an EU defence policy — but which has since consistently failed to realise its potential.

Before Brexit, and despite the ever-intensifying security challenges, EU governments had progressively lost interest in the Union’s defence policy. As a result, the French do not assume that their EU partners will always rush to support their military operations. In general, they haven’t robustly supported France in Africa in recent years, although Germany has enhanced its presence in Mali since the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks. But if acting through the EU could help ensure more military support from other EU members, France would find that preferable to acting alone.

In a speech on 6 October French President François Hollande said that there are European countries “that think the United States will always be there to protect them…if they don’t defend themselves they will no longer be defended”. Hollande added “Europeans must realise…they must also be a political power with a defence capability”.

In comparison, the German white paper says that “only together with the United States can Europe effectively defend itself against the threats of the 21st century and guarantee a credible form of deterrence… NATO remains the anchor and main framework of action for German security and defence policy”.

The election of Donald Trump as US president has a greater potential to transform Europe’s strategic landscape than Brexit if he scales back American military commitments in Europe. But unless and until that happens, France and Germany may struggle – despite their sensible joint proposals – to develop a substantially more active EU defence policy, because of their very different strategic cultures.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC Flickr – Herman Van Rompuy

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The surge in right-wing and anti-immigrant movements sweeping central and Eastern Europe doesn’t seem to have caught on in Romania, with the country following its tendency to align its interests with those of the EU’s older member states.

As a relatively new member state, Romania appears to have held on to its optimism for the European project. It falls behind the EU’s decisions even when it doesn’t agree with them. A case in point is the acceptance of the refugee reallocation quotas. It initially voted against the quotas, but decided – unlike Hungary and Slovakia – not to seek a judicial review. In the end, Romania promised to take in 6,205 refugees over the next two years.

And Romania is in a good position to do this. Not being a member of the Schengen area, and located away from the main migratory channels, refuges generally do not treat Romania as a transit or destination country. The most recent Eurostat data points to only 1,260 asylum applications in Romania in 2015, compared with 177,000 in Hungary and 12,000 in Poland. Romania can, therefore, afford to take its time in figuring out how to best manage its allotted refugee intake.

But one of the reasons behind these statistics is the relatively low standard of living compared to other member states, and the perception that Romanians are hostile to immigrants (and refugees in
particular). That perception is not entirely unfounded: immigrants make up only 1.1% of the country’s population, more than half of whom come from the culturally and linguistically akin Republic of Moldova. The local population isn’t used to foreigners, and the s ignificant cultural differences of refugees have given rise to fear and distrust.

But while recent national polls have revealed that three-quarters of Romania’s population is against the EU’s policy of reallocating refugees, most individuals surveyed agreed that refugees are a vulnerable population that must be helped. What’s more, while some political parties – the Popular Movement Party in particular – have taken an anti-refugee stance in an effort to broaden their electorate base, the largely welcoming National Liberal Party and Social Democratic Party are leading the polls ahead of December’s general election. These main political parties aren’t catering to the still feeble anti-immigration voices of some segments of the population and a handful of scholars.

It remains to be seen what strategy Romania’s next government will adopt, but as things stand today, we should expect continuous support for the EU’s measures and a relatively positive stance on refugee resettlement.

IMAGE CREDIT: outchill/Bigstock.com

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Once again, European arms exports are contributing to crisis in the Middle East, and war in the Middle East is creating a crisis of European public policy. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait using weapons supplied by all five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as a host of other weapons producers. Today, European-supplied weapons are playing an important role alongside those of the US and Russia, not only in the Saudi-led war in Yemen, but also in Syria.

One of the outcomes of the 1990 scandal over arms to Iraq was the agreement of the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports – a multilateral regime that bound European suppliers, politically at least, to respect regional stability and human rights when assessing their arms exports. Since 2008, those rules have been legally binding in the form of a Common Position. EU arms exports are governed by the national implementation of the Common Position, which requires countries to refuse to authorise arms exports if there is a clear risk they may be used to violate international humanitarian law, for internal repression, or be diverted to unauthorised end-users. Institutional mechanisms to promote information-sharing and circulate notifications of denials of arms exports are meant to prevent a race to the bottom, as seen in the 1990s. But there is now a significant body of thought that sees these commitments as having more rhetorical power than regulatory purchase. EU member states regularly violate the spirit, if not the letter, of their commitments. Nonetheless, common EU rules have created a yardstick by which member states can seek to improve and harmonise their practices, and parliamentarians and activists can attempt to hold states to account.

The EU’s common rules have been thrown into crisis by controversy and disagreement over the supply of weapons to Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states. Although they lag a considerable way behind the United States as the most ardent supporter of the Saudi regime, Britain and France have increased arms exports exponentially during the war in Yemen, despite widespread allegations of war crimes committed by the Saudi-led coalition. Taking a more restrictive approach are the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Germany and Flanders, which licences its own arms exports from inside Belgium. The strongest position has come from the Netherlands, whose Parliament passed a bill in March calling for the government to halt arms exports to Saudi Arabia, citing violations of international humanitarian law in the war in Yemen. This move gives practical effect to the European Parliament’s call for an embargo, made in February.

“The EU’s common rules have been thrown into crisis by controversy and disagreement over the supply of weapons to Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states”

Arms exports to Saudi Arabia are playing a role in another Middle Eastern crisis as well, causing a split between EU member states and a problem for common European controls. Arms supplies to
Saudi Arabia – as well as to Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey – are being “re-transferred” to armed groups fighting in Syria. This not only includes the Free Syrian Army units, whom
Western states support, but groups fighting for the Assad regime and Islamist groups such as Ansar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra. Between May 2011 and May 2013, there was an EU embargo
on arms exports to Syria, including both the regime and rebel groups, but France and the UK pushed to lift it. Their aim was to supply rebels – in line with their support, alongside the US, of
groups fighting both the Assad regime and, more recently, against Daesh. Other EU countries such as Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands were reluctant to lift the embargo, in part because of the risk of escalation, and in part due to the potential for diversion that arms supplies to rebel groups could cause.

The divisions in the EU have now been exacerbated by revelations of a significant increase in arms exports from Balkan and Central European states – themselves EU members or candidate countries, and thus bound by the EU Common Position. Research by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network and the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project has found that weapons worth almost €1.2bn have been licensed by states such as Bulgaria, Croatia and Serbia to the Middle East since winter 2012. Almost 70% of them went to Saudi Arabia. There is considerable evidence that these weapons have been re-transferred to armed groups operating in Syria and Yemen, and are contributing to human rights violations in the course of the wars in those countries. The common European controls, designed to prevent another race to the bottom and human catastrophe, are in disarray.

“The impact of Brexit on European arms export controls will depend on the level and type of British access to the single market”

The impact of Brexit on European arms export controls will depend on the level and type of British access to the single market. Institutionally, some things will be more challenging once the UK
withdraws from the EU and is no longer party to the harmonisation and information-sharing mechanisms that have been painstakingly built. And there are a host of technical regulations at the EU level – such as the Dual-Use Regulation, Firearms Directive, regulation on torture goods, and the Intra-Community Transfer Directive – that will be very difficult to unpick and rework from outside the EU. On the other hand, the UK is already party to the Arms Trade Treaty, a legally-binding treaty that sets common international standards for the regulation of arms exports and contains many similar restrictions to the EU Common Position. In this sense, there is no reason why UK standards should suddenly drop, especially given the UK’s vocal leadership in the negotiation of both the EU regime and the Arms Trade Treaty, and its claim that its national standards exceed them.

But the UK, while a prominent proponent of supposedly progressive standards, is also a violator of said standards. Its sales to Saudi Arabia since the war in Yemen began are the most recent and notable example of the way arms exports repeatedly make cracks in the façade of a European public policy based on values of liberal democracy and human rights. While over-inflated economic arguments about the benefits of arms exports to the UK economy could encourage even greater sales, such a move would need to be accompanied by the abandonment of the rhetoric of restraint or common European policy.

IMAGE CREDIT: Homeros/Bigstock.com

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The last few weeks have seen military and paramilitary operations intensify in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. But is this liberation or a land-grab?

Daesh – the self-styled ‘Islamic State’ terror group – has kept a tight grip on Iraq’s second city for more than two years now, and it is clear they have been able to entrench themselves and prepare for the current assault.

Fortunately, Iraqi government forces have been able keep the perilous Mosul Dam from the clutches of Daesh. If the dam were to be destroyed, it would unleash devastation throughout Iraq, potentially killing more than a million people in a short space of time.

Since emerging from al-Qaeda and other terror groups around 2012, Daesh has led a campaign of torture, murder and subjugation across Iraq and Syria. It has enslaved thousands, created an unprecedented refugee crisis, and brutally killed anyone who disagrees with its retrograde ideology. They have inspired terror attacks all over the world and pushed policymakers into unprecedented international cooperation and action.

Over the last year Iraqi forces, assisted by international support, have been able to push Daesh back from the gates of Baghdad. Now they are ready to push Daesh out of Mosul.

“This assault should not be called liberation – it is a seizure of land and the imposition of Iranian hegemony”

While these simple facts should be welcome news in Western capitals, it is deeply concerning how these feats have been achieved, and what they mean for Iraq in particular and the region in general.

Iraq weaves together tribes, cultures, ethnicities and religions. Since 2003 the political structure has been based on cementing these differences rather than uniting disparate factions of Iraq under a truly national umbrella. It is this socio-political fact that has allowed Daesh to grow and expand its foothold in Iraq.

Unfortunately, the international community has allowed this problem to get worse in the pursuit of a quick so-called victory against Daesh.

The rejection of political compromise, devolution and power-sharing from Baghdad to Sunni Muslims in particular has left this community isolated, repressed and vulnerable to a Daesh takeover.

On many occasions Sunni leaders and other tribal chiefs pleaded with Baghdad to help them defeat Daesh. They called for military support and weapons, and for work on an inclusive non-sectarian political settlement. These Sunni groups know the area, know the people, and could gain wide support for a complete defeat of Daesh and its ideology.

Baghdad rejected this approach and rejected political inclusion. The Iraqi government, composed of Iranian-backed ethnic parties, instead sent in the heavily artillery of the Iraqi army and summoned airstrikes by the international coalition. More worryingly, they called on paramilitary groups supported by, staffed by and directed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its leader, Qasem Soleimani.

Over the last year, many human rights groups have reported on and complained about the actions of these paramilitary groups. The Tehran-sponsored groups are causing destruction and starvation; they are displacing and terrorising local communities. News organizations have recently reported that tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians are fleeing Tal Afar, a city on the outskirts of Mosul, as a result of the onslaught of Iranian-backed groups.

“Without concerted efforts to tackle the underlying causes of Daesh, we will only displace the problem – the threat will remain”

Daesh will be pushed out of Iraq, probably at the cost of thousands of ‘human shields’. Iraqi government and Iranian-back forces will take Mosul and the rest of Iraq.

All of this means that this assault should not be called liberation. The Baghdad government will call it that; so will the voices from Tehran. But it is not.

Instead it is a seizure of land and the imposition of Iranian hegemony. Groups like Daesh will be defeated, but their ideology and their inspiration will be displaced and survive. Their threat will go on.

Western cities and interests will not be safe until that ideology and inspiration is defeated and we are able to stop recruitment and eliminate the core threat.

The challenge for all leaders in 2017 will be to understand two key elements about the true nature of the threat and how to work to rid the world of it.

First, we may think that Daesh survives only because it controls and occupies actually territory. In reality, we know groups such as Daesh survive because of ingrained resentment and ideological support.

Second, while many governments and organisations around the world support countering Daesh, their very actions feed and nurture the resentment and ideology of such groups.

Western policymakers face the huge challenge of pushing for and creating political inclusion in both Iraq and Syria. This would greatly help the region economically and support the resettlement of the millions of refugees locally and in Europe. But the West will also have to counter Iranian support of terror and destabilisation.

2017 will see Daesh pushed from Iraq. It will probably also be destroyed in Syria. But without concerted and real efforts to tackle the underlying causes of the growth of such groups, we will only displace the problem – the threat will remain.

IMAGE CREDIT: Homeros/Bigstock.com

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Liberal democracy is in a parlous state. In America, Donald Trump is making his mark even before he enters the Oval Office. In Europe – despite heartening news from Austria – demagogues have the wind in their sails.

Meanwhile, free-thinking, liberal Muslim thought leaders and reformers are struggling to live and work in peace at home. Muslim-majority nations are either ruled by nasty autocrats, military strongmen or flawed and fragile democrats. In many places, to speak up is to find yourself dead or in prison. If you are lucky, you can go into exile – but perhaps not for long.

Escape routes to the West are closing fast. Islam-bashing has become the favourite sport not just of Trump but also of populist parties across Europe. Rants against Islam unite members of the ‘populist international’ on both sides of the Atlantic. As the far right looks set to perform well in elections in many Western countries in the coming months, expect the anti-Islam vitriol to get nastier.

Europe should indeed focus on keeping out Muslim extremists. But it must not ignore the plight of Muslim reformers who are caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. Speak up at home, and they are likely to be branded ‘kafir’ (unbeliever). Head for shelter abroad, and they turn into potential troublemakers or even terrorists.

“Space for freedom of expression has been shrinking in the Muslim world,” says Surin Pitsuwan, Thailand’s former foreign minister and a much-respected former secretary-general of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

“Speak up at home, and you are branded ‘kafir’. Head for shelter abroad, and you turn into a potential troublemaker or even a terrorist”

“Muslim intellectuals cannot pursue their examination of laws and principles at home… they have to do that outside the Muslim world,” he told a World Forum for Muslim Democrats meeting in Tokyo last month. “Academics have to migrate in order to do their job. Muslim democrats feel the space for exercising their role is being limited… they cannot visualise their future.”

The Muslim world is suffering from a severe democratic deficit. Muslims long for freedom, the rule of law and representative government, said Nurul Izzah Anwar. She is Vice-President of the People’s Justice Party of Malaysia, which was set up by her father, Malaysian opposition politician Anwar Ibrahim (who is still in jail).

“There is confusion about how Muslims relate to democracy and to the challenge of facing extremism,” said Nurul Izzah. Muslims have to deal simultaneously with “fanatic ideologies and kleptocratic regimes”.

For many Muslims also, the struggle centres on efforts to reclaim their religion from the stranglehold of Saudi-based Wahhabist interpretations of Islam.

“It’s a fight that is long and difficult. Wahhabism is a dirty word in Indonesia. It is considered to be primitive,” said Indonesian scholar of Islam Azyumardi Azra. Unlike other countries, Indonesia is not dependent on money from Saudi Arabia, he said. “Our flowery Islam is embedded in our local culture.”

Yet for all its traditional tolerance and openness, Indonesia faces the challenge of protecting its minorities. Indonesian police has opened a criminal investigation into Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, better known as ‘Ahok’, for alleged blasphemy.

Ahok, a Christian, is the first member of Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese community to be elected as the capital’s governor. The investigation shows the authorities are “more worried about hardline religious groups than respecting and protecting human rights for all,” according to Rafendi Djamin, Amnesty International’s Director for Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

“As the extremists gain traction, the welcome for Muslims will wear even thinner in Europe.”

What happens in Indonesia is particularly relevant given the country’s reputation as a role-model for other Muslim countries.

Muslim reformers and intellectuals could once find shelter and asylum in the West. And while many have benefited from such protection and continue to do so, extremists in the United States and Europe are making clear that Islam is their new enemy.

As the extremists gain traction, the welcome for Muslims will wear even thinner in Europe. As former Egyptian member of parliament Abdul Mawgoud Dardery told the conference, “We feel betrayed by the US and Europe”.

Tragically, such betrayals are likely to become the norm. The US President-elect is likely to side with fellow ‘strongmen’ in the Muslim world. Europe’s populists can be expected to be just as indifferent to the plight of Muslim human rights defenders and democrats.

But Europe must keep its doors open to those in the Muslim world who want change, reform and democracy. As Surin underlined, “Muslim democrats have to face a dual challenge: we have to fight extremism in our midst and Islamophobia outside”.

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IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Friends of Europe

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Donald Trump has no experience in public office. He has no public record upon which to judge him. So it is difficult to determine the likely foreign policy of the United States President-elect. But we can analyse him based on his campaign rhetoric, his choice of personnel and his personality.

Adopting a strong Republican posture, Trump has been quite consistent in terms of his opposition to Iran. He has selected a team that is strongly against Iran and the 2015 nuclear deal.

During the presidential campaign, Trump variously called the deal – aimed at limiting Iran’s nuclear capacity in return for an end to sanctions – as “incompetent”, “dumb” and a “nuclear rip-off”. But when it comes to criticism based on the terms of the agreement, Trump is short on specifics. Instead, he simply claims that he can renegotiate a better deal.

Mike Pompeo, Trump’s pick to lead the Central Intelligence Agency, is against uranium enrichment on Iranian soil – a core element without which there would be no negotiated settlement. But neither Pompeo nor like-minded Republicans have proposed an alternative to the 2015 agreement.

“Trump is short on specifics about his opposition to the Iran deal. Instead, he simply claims that he can renegotiate a better deal”

Despite his complaints, Trump will probably not walk into the Oval Office and scrap the deal on Day 1. This is primarily because even some of the deal’s most ardent opponents in Washington DC, and across the Middle East, are now arguing that the agreement is useful. It is, after all, constraining Iran’s nuclear enrichment capacity and activities.

The United States cannot single-handedly destroy the deal or reinstate international sanctions because the agreement is between the United Nations Security Council veto powers plus Germany, and Iran. Without a consensus, the US can at most withdraw from the agreement and try to sabotage the provisions of the agreement by using its political and economic leverage. The notion of renegotiating the agreement is a fallacy, since none of the other signatories have any incentive to do so.

So the opponents to the deal are undertaking a different approach to undo President Barack Obama’s engagement with Iran. They argue that Iran is already violating the agreement.

The Republicans quickly jumped on reports that Iran had been stockpiling heavy water in greater quantities than those permitted by the agreement. However, Iran quickly rectified such slips, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has found Iran to be complying with the agreement.

This shows that the agreement is working – Iran’s nuclear programme is constrained, capped, and under constant surveillance by the IAEA. In the rare instance that Iran does make a slip, the US Congress is in any case not the arbiter because the deal provides the necessary mechanisms for resolving any disputes that may arise between the signatory powers. All of this demonstrates the agreement’s steady and sturdy nature.

The deal’s opponents aim to re-impose Congressional – and possibly multilateral – sanctions against Iran via the deal’s ‘snapback’ mechanism. In the first instance, there is a danger that the Trump administration will renege on the lifting of US Congressional nuclear-related sanctions. As part of the deal, the US president is periodically required to waive these sanctions if Iran abides by its obligations under the deal. Failure to do so constitutes a violation of implementation of the deal.

“The EU needs to work with Iran to ensure its reintegration into the world economy and address the broader security dilemmas affecting the Middle East”

For its part, the snapback mechanism, enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, allows for reinstatement of seven former Security Council resolutions against Iran that imposed the stringent multilateral sanctions regime. So far there has been no reason to invoke this mechanism as Iran has not violated the agreement.

The US Congress has just extended the Iran Sanctions Act, originally adopted in 1996. The Republicans’ argument for the extension is to have in place a statutory foundation for snapping the US sanctions back “to keep Iran in check”. It is likely to adopt further sanctions against Iran as admonishment for its non-nuclear activities, including ballistic missile activities, support for armed groups across the Middle East and human rights abuses. Trump is likely to back these sanctions, having promised to act against such conduct during the campaign.

As has been proven in the past, sanctioning Iran leads to economic pressure on the country that risks empowering the hardline elements of the Tehran elite who oppose engagement with the Western world. A wiser course would be to seek greater interaction with Iran as this will bolster the credibility of the moderates who oversaw the nuclear negotiations and who favour engagement with the international community. Under a more hardline government, the Iranians may pull out from fulfilling their obligations under the current deal.

To secure the nuclear agreement, the EU needs to work with Iran to ensure its reintegration into the world economy and address the broader security dilemmas affecting the whole of the Middle East region. Otherwise, the now shaky-looking deal is at risk of being seriously undermined.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – European External Action Service

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Shortly after the UK referendum, EU leaders met Western Balkan leaders in Paris. The EU message was clear: enlargement would continue as usual. But in the Balkans, fears abound that their region may slip off the radar, as the EU gets mired in the unprecedented task of British withdrawal.These fears accurately reflect the relationship between the EU and its Balkan partners. Balkan countries want EU membership, but the driver of change is still the EU.

Europeanisation in the Western Balkans has been equated with building regional peace and stability. The EU made integration conditional on cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), tackled the region’s political and economic fragmentation through a policy of regional cooperation, and took the lead resolving outstanding conflicts, such as over
Kosovo. Yet Croatia is the only Western Balkan nation to reach the final destination, leaving five countries – all at different stages of integration – now making up a non-EU enclave inside the EU. The Balkan states’ long road to the EU suggests a need for vigilance of two risks: benign neglect and geopolitics.

Political declarations by local elites favouring European integration haven’t necessarily been accompanied by deeds. The political vision is not yet a reality. Countries have shied away from implementing EU laws, causing delays in visible improvements to people’s lives. In recent years, months and weeks, people in all five Balkan countries outside of the EU have held public protests over poor governance, corruption and abuse of the law. Their ire has been directed at local political elites, but the risk is that it may also damage trust in the European project’s ability to improve their societies. The EU’s biggest ally in the Balkans is the people who demand the rule of law and a better quality of life. That is why the EU shouldn’t allow Brexit to divert its attention from the Balkans. Benign neglect may allow elites to subvert the European project permanently by eroding popular attraction to a future in the EU.

The related risk of Brexit for the Western Balkans is the ascendance of geopolitics. European integration as a political project is based on the idea of interconnectivity, and the conception of power
as cooperation. Europeanisation of the Western Balkans entails forging political, economic and cultural connections with the EU, as well as between Balkan states. But the geopolitical outlook is its
antithesis – all about going it alone, and the conception of power as a threat. The Balkans has been a geopolitical battleground throughout history, and its position as a non-EU enclave within the EU makes it particularly conducive to the logic of competition and protection. Russia and Turkey have each stamped their mark on the region while the EU tries to exercise its magic power of
attraction and transformation. But unlike the EU’s vision, which is future- and norms-orientated, Russia and Turkey have drawn on historic links reinforced by religious affinities. Russia appeals to
the idea of Slavic brotherhood – a notion that resonates with large sections of the population in the Christian Orthodox areas. Turkey is seen as a natural guardian of fellow Muslims.

Russia and Turkey’s economic investments in the region have been on the increase, but they are still dwarfed by those of the EU. But this fact barely affects popular perceptions that Russia and Turkey can better understand – and possibly better protect – people’s interests.

Such sentiments persist despite Russia’s use of the Balkans to assert its own position towards the West. Russia has been seen to deliver when Serb nationalist interests are at stake. Its opposition to Kosovo’s independence in the UN is only one example. Brexit has been embraced by nationalists in the region, who interpret the UK’s departure from the EU as a blow to interconnectedness and a vindication of their Euroscepticism. Brexit leaves open the risk that both Russia and Turkey may increasingly provide a vision of an alternative future, exposing the region to open geopolitical competition.

If Brexit forces the EU’s Balkan involvement to stall, the critics will have a field day. They already say that Europeanisation has created weak states that are producers of instability and insecurity,
through illegal people trafficking and trade, organised crime and the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism. But EU membership is a goal that continues to unite all Balkan states despite their divisions
– both within states and between neighbours. In the post-Brexit climate, the EU needs to step up its engagement. Alternative visions for a non-EU future for the Balkans are as perilous for the security of the region as they are for the EU.

IMAGE CREDIT: F. De la Mure/MAEDI

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Brexit“ and ”austerity“ are two of the most controversial subjects of recent times. Brexit is a political challenge stemming from an EU membership referendum; austerity is an economic challenge stemming from the political short-sightedness of pro-cyclical policies. But both phenomena have a direct effect on businesses and households across the European Union.

The Brexit vote, and Euroscepticism more generally, have come together with lengthy and hotly-disputed austerity policies in some countries to burden Europe’s economic revival by limiting the
influx of private money into the economy. The uncertainty caused by both Brexit and austerity is a key reason for the ineffectiveness of the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing policies. But how do Brexit and austerity interrelate? And what economic challenges can be expected from the referendum result?

One major impact relates to the EU’s multiannual financial framework (MFF) – for both the current (2014-2020) and next planning period. When Article 50 is invoked, the negotiations around and adoption of the 2021-2027 MFF will become more stressful and challenging than before. The withdrawal of Britain’s contribution will give greater power to net contributors and reduce the opportunities for net recipients. The decades of success stories that arise from EU funding is the primary argument for Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. The fundamental importance of an
influx of capital into smaller, peripheral economies is visible in the Baltic states, and elsewhere too. Ireland may, yet again, be one of the best examples. Small newcomers to the EU rely on financial assistance – help that would otherwise have to be found in national budgets or on international bond markets. This alternative would invariably create new pressures and calls for austerity, meaning spending cuts to long-term projects such as preventive healthcare or fixing structural unemployment.

Should the Brexit negotiations result in a swift removal of contributions from the UK, we may even see austerity pressures and a sudden need to redistribute fiscal capacity away from projects
financed under the 2014-2020 MFF. The current British input to the EU budget is substantial. With the European project on a less-than-stable footing at the moment and the economic recovery not
as fast as had been hoped, expecting ad hoc contributions from other member states to make up the missing funds resulting from Brexit appears to be wishful thinking.

Two other aspects are trade relations and financial market interdependence. Both could lead to prolonged or re-introduced austerity policies in EU countries. The operations of British financial service providers in other EU members (and vice-versa) will need to be addressed during the renegotiation process. The relocation of financial services and workers will bring shifts in tax revenue streams, and some countries could lose out. The high degree of mutual exposure to financial services, along with the economic uncertainty and currency fluctuations that the Brexit referendum has brought about, are set to cause damage to national budgets and limit the room for fiscal manoeuvring.

This is most evident for trade in goods and services. Austerity measures will have to be undertaken because of falling trade – not only real, but projected. The UK’s economy is closely tied to those
of other EU member states. Many of these countries – including my own – could suffer or are already suffering losses due to the result of the referendum and the depreciating pound sterling. Falling
export values and smaller tax revenues from exposed industries are already affecting planning for 2017 national budgets.

These are the current and most immediate consequences of Brexit for the macroeconomic situation and budgetary planning. Additional costs could come from possible infringements of the free
movement of labour and the resulting social expenses required for repatriated families.

So does Brexit mean a stricter and more prolonged period of austerity is necessary for Europe? The uncertainty of Brexit has already reduced private and public spending. But this won’t turn into a fully-fledged austerity in all EU member states if the situation is politically managed and economic uncertainty contained. The EU’s leadership may well need to find a way to implement, not only
talk about, policies that will push Europe’s economy towards much stronger growth.

IMAGE CREDIT: duallogic/Bigstock.com

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At the moment there is a lot of buzz about the ‘4th Industrial Revolution’. But what we need to address is something that is even bigger – the beginning of the end of the industrial age and our gradual entry into the digital age.

The 4th Industrial Revolution is only one part of that much bigger story.

Today’s Europe is to a very large extent a product of an industrial revolution that started in Europe and then gradually spread across the world. If the different parts of the global economy didn’t differ too dramatically in terms of wealth up until then, it was with the industrial revolution that the ascent of Europe and the wider West – with the United States coming somewhat later – really started.

What has evolved into today’s European Union started as an economic community centred on the two basic commodities of that phase of the industrial age: coal and steel. Integrating the coal and the steel industries of France and Germany would make war between them less and less likely. That was the foundation thought of what has since emerged as the EU.

Industrial production – still often dependent on steel – will remain an important part of our future economies. But gradually we see not only the rise of new sectors of the economy based on information and data and the profound transformation of classical sectors of our economy based on the processing of data.

The huge container ships crossing the oceans with their goods, often between the huge ports of East Asia, America and Europe, remain the symbols of the age of globalisation. And it remains critical to the development of our economies to safeguard the ‘choke points’ of these enormous flows, such as the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aden.

But gradually, things are changing. While growth in trade has been far less robust since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, data flows between continents and countries are exploding. A study by McKinsey estimates growth by a factor of 45 between 2005 and 2015 (and it will have, in all probability, accelerated further in the last year).

“The future is, plainly speaking, up for grabs. And Europe must wake up.”

A glance at how the list of the 20 or so most valuable companies in the world has changed during the last decade illustrates the magnitude of the digital transformation. Companies like Alphabet, Amazon and Alibaba are now driving important parts of the global economy.

The industrial age started around the coal fields of England. The emerging digital age has its epicentre in California’s Silicon Valley, but its impact is spreading far and fast, to every corner of the global economy. It’s impossible to predict who will be the winners and losers five years from now. The future is, plainly speaking, up for grabs.

And Europe must wake up.

A digital single market is obviously a must. It is on the agenda of the European Commission, but progress has so far been slow and cumbersome.

Also critical is the free flow of data between countries and continents – the lifeblood of the emerging new economy. Already we see how important global digital value chains are becoming, and it is important to create conditions for them that are as free and clear as possible.

The now moribund Trans-Pacific Partnership was the first major agreement that included provisions to this effect, and it is important that any forthcoming Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership deal between Europe and the United States continues along this road. But other arrangements, like the EU-US Privacy Shield are also of great importance in safeguarding an integrated and free transatlantic marketplace in the new digital age.

I co-chaired, with former US Ambassador to the EU William Kennard, an Atlantic Council task force on transatlantic digital issues. Our report called for a US-EU digital council – based in the White House and at a senior level in the European Commission – to provide the necessary heavyweight EU-US coordination on the rapidly increasing range of digital issues.

In our view, this digital council should seek to proactively shape interoperability policies in the digital space, including on data protection, cybersecurity efforts, the internet of things, broadband development, open data flows, blockchain possibilities, encryption policies, privacy concerns and regulations. And these are just some of the issues that will require close coordination across the Atlantic.

At the moment, we are in a somewhat uncertain situation, with responsibility for some of these issues in the European Commission not clear, and an American administration that will be in a state of transition for months to come.

But perhaps this would be the right time to launch this initiative. There will be a large number of issues that will require coordination, and a council of this sort would help to facilitate the process.

The report from the Global Commission on Internet Governance, which I chaired and which delivered its final report this summer, outlines a broad agenda of issues that must be tackled if we should be able to fully harness the potential of the digital revolution.

“The freewheeling and dynamic spirit of innovation and entrepreneurship that has made the internet the most important infrastructure in the world”

We must also be very aware of the fact that there is a silent war going on for control of our digital future. There are regimes – not too difficult to identify – that want to enshrine ‘digital sovereignty’ in international treaties and make as much as possible subject to strict state or multinational control.

The risks here are enormous.

It has been the freewheeling and dynamic spirit of innovation and entrepreneurship that has, within a couple of decades, made the internet the most important infrastructure in the world (and soon the infrastructure of all other infrastructures). The multi-stakeholder model has allowed the technical community, academia, governments, business and civil society all to have their voice in the expanding biosphere of internet governance. The experience has been extremely positive.

But advocates of ‘digital sovereignty’ want something very different.

Here, it is important that the EU, preferably in close cooperation with the US and in partnership with important nations like India and Brazil, formulates a clear global cyber strategy. At the end of the day it’s about setting the frameworks and the rules of the rapidly emerging digital age based on our values of open societies and open economies.

The transformations at the heart of the 4th Industrial Revolution will obviously be profound. We have seen the impact on the media and entertainment industries, and we see the rapid development of e-commerce in all its different forms. Soon autonomous vehicles and the robot revolution, in combination with the internet of everything, will take us into a far more revolutionary phase of the transition.

Europe must not be left behind. We must seek to be among the leaders. But we should recognise that we are not there yet – and so we better speed up.

IMAGE CREDIT: Prasit Rodphan/Bigstock.com

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The rule of law in cyberspace is at risk.

Criminal justice authorities need to be able to secure electronic evidence, including on servers in the cloud, to protect society and individuals against crime online. The powers to obtain such evidence must to be subject to data protection and other safeguards. Proposals to move ahead are now available.

Offences against computer systems and data are increasing. They include the theft of hundreds of millions of users’ data, to computer intrusions and denial of service attacks against critical infrastructure, media, civil society or public institutions – including, at the end of November, the European Commission.

But few of these offences are ever reported to criminal justice authorities. Of these, only a very small number of cases are successfully prosecuted. The same applies to offences by means of computers, from fraud and other types of financial crime, to online child abuse, xenophobia, racism and other forms of hate speech contributing to radicalisation and violent extremism.

Computer systems also host evidence in relation to crimes: ransom emails in cases of kidnapping or extortion, data on deals between drug traffickers, on corrupt arrangements, on the grooming of children, or data on terrorists conspiring to carry out an attack. However, many investigations are abandoned because of lack of access to such evidence.

Governments have an obligation to protect society and individuals against crime, but when it comes to cyberspace, their ability to meet this obligation remains limited. Progress has been made in Europe and other regions in terms of policies, legislation and criminal justice capacities. But this progress is often overtaken by the sheer scale of cybercrime, the number of devices, users and victims involved, and technical hurdles such as encryption or anonymisers.

Obtaining electronic evidence for use in criminal proceedings is essential for the rule of law. As I wrote for Europe’s World last year, “the ability of governments to ensure the rule of law in cyberspace will remain limited unless they can overcome impediments to accessing data and thus electronic evidence for criminal justice purposes. No data means no evidence, no justice and thus no rule of law.”

The challenges to securing electronic evidence are compounded by cloud computing. While data may be stored on, moving between or fragmented over servers in foreign, multiple or unknown jurisdictions – or hidden under multiple layers of service providers in various jurisdictions – the powers of criminal justice authorities are restricted to their specific territory.

So we need solutions allowing authorities to secure electronic evidence in the cloud.

The question of jurisdiction in cyberspace was a priority of the Dutch Presidency of the EU Council in the first half of 2016. It resulted in a set of Council conclusions in June 2016. The European Commission has been asked to submit concrete proposals by mid-2017.

At the Council of Europe in 2014 the parties to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime – currently comprising 41 European states as well as Australia, Canada, Dominican Republic, Israel, Japan, Mauritius, Panama, Sri Lanka and USA – established a working group to identify ‘solutions on criminal justice access to evidence stored in the cloud and in foreign jurisdictions’.

The results are now available. In November 2016, the Cybercrime Convention Committee – representing the parties to this treaty – discussed the recommendations of its ‘Cloud Evidence Group’. They include the following:

1. Parties should implement a set of practical measures to render mutual legal assistance more efficient – for example, through allocation of resources, streamlining of procedures or the establishment of emergency procedures. There are doubts that MLA is suitable to secure volatile electronic evidence. Nevertheless, it remains the most widely accepted means to obtain evidence from other jurisdictions while protecting the rights of individuals and the sovereignty of states.

2. Domestic production orders to request subscriber information directly from service providers should apply not only to those providers with a seat in the territory of a criminal justice authority but also those based elsewhere who offer a service in that territory. The main difficulty is to determine when a service provider is sufficiently connected to a territory to bring the provider under the jurisdiction of the authorities of that territory. The rationale is that subscriber details are the information that is the most often sought in a criminal investigation. European authorities are already sending more than 100,000 requests a year directly to companies such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter or Yahoo on an uncertain legal basis, raising data protection and other concerns.

3. There should be more consistent implementation of Article 18 of the Convention, domestic rules on the production of subscriber information. Currently, rules vary greatly between parties to this treaty, including between members of the European Union.

4. Greater practical measures are needed to facilitate cooperation between criminal justice authorities and service providers across borders. Examples include online tools with information on provider policies and procedural powers, standardised request forms and regular exchanges between the Cybercrime Convention Committee and major providers.

5. Parties should negotiate a protocol to the Convention with additional options for more efficient mutual legal assistance and for cooperation with providers and with rules and limitations on cross-border access to data, data protection and other safeguards.

While these recommendations received broad support from the Cybercrime Convention Committee in its session last month, talks continue. With the European Union also addressing these issues, the Committee coordinates closely with the European Commission. It is expected that the Committee will make a final decision, including on the preparation of a protocol, by June 2017. The solutions aim to adapt the agreed framework of the Budapest Convention to meet the challenges of cloud computing.

In a fast-changing world, common solutions with clear rule-of-law safeguards are preferable to unilateral solutions – otherwise a ‘jungle’ of diverse approaches presents risks for inter-state relations and the rights of individuals.

IMAGE CREDIT: agsandrew/Bigstock.com

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It’s been more than three months since a majority of the British people voted to divorce from the EU, and the economic consequences are getting clearer. Immediate market reactions after the referendum weren’t encouraging for the European economy, or for the rest of the world. Stocks plunged globally and the pound sterling hit its lowest value in three decades. This shouldn’t have come as a surprise – the economic uncertainty that Brexit was likely to cause had been widely predicted before the referendum.

Brexit is creating shockwaves, and confidence in the British economy has suffered substantially – although the longer-term implications for the economy will be known only when Britain’s future relationship with the EU is defined. The Bank of England has rightly extended quantitative easing measures, but it remains to be seen whether they will be enough to meet the challenge.

One thing is particularly noteworthy, however: the eurozone seems to be more resilient than expected. True, in its first post-Brexit Economic Outlook, the European Commission noted that the outcome of the referendum has the potential to damage the economic recovery of the EU. Growth prospects for 2016 and 2017 have been reduced. But growth forecasts have been revised only
slightly downwards, and in July the purchasing managers’ index indicated continued recovery.

The eurozone went through several economic governance reforms after the financial crisis in 2010-12. These reforms were necessary to correct the defects of economic and monetary union (EMU) and to restore confidence in the euro.

But Brexit changes the game. Past reforms won’t be sufficient, and additional changes need to be made to stabilise EMU. Steps towards further solidarity should be matched with enhanced responsibility for member states. The conclusion of the Banking Union is the most pressing task now. But we shouldn’t forget the Capital Markets Union, which will be important for businesses’ access to finance, especially for SMEs.

These institutional reforms are important. But we should also focus on the real economy to reinforce the still-fragile recovery, and I see three issues as particularly important. First, member states should commit themselves even more seriously to economic reforms. The experiences of Spain, Ireland and Latvia provide empirical evidence of how to pursue difficult reforms successfully. Second, the European Central Bank should continue its unconventional measures to support the eurozone economy. Third, eurozone surplus economies should boost domestic demand and investment to support economic activity in the EU.

Britain will remain a close ally of the EU, and its future trading relationship can be made mutually beneficial. The question of Britain’s access to the single market will be at the core of negotiations
over its future links with the EU, not least for its financial services industry. But we cannot water down any of the EU’s four freedoms.

Brexit also calls for bold action by every member state to boost economic competitiveness. One of the EU’s undeniable success stories, and the core of its integration process, is the single market. With Brexit, we lose one of its best advocates. And for an open, export-orientated economy like Finland, it’s of paramount importance to continue ambitious efforts to remove remaining barriers, particularly in the Digital Single Market. The same goes for energy and services. Moreover, it’s important that the EU continues to work for the competitiveness of its industries and for new free trade agreements.

In Finland, which was in a slow-motion economic decline for too many years, we practice what we preach. We’ve made a broad-based national effort to restore our competitiveness through a
social contract with trade unions and employers’ organisations. Our Competitiveness Contract will reduce unit labour costs by four percent in one go, implying no wage increases for two years. Structural reforms include a major move towards company-level local agreements for negotiating working hours and other conditions of work, the liberalisation of shopping hours, and a branch-and-root reform of healthcare and regional government. At the same time, we are investing more public funds in future industrial priorities, such as the bioeconomy, clean solutions, health-tech and digitalisation.

The motivations for establishing the EU – peace and stability among nations, and the freedom and wellbeing of citizens – haven’t disappeared. On the contrary, in a globalising world in which competition gets harder and challenges such as climate change and growing instability in our neighbourhood are crossborder by nature, we need a reformed and well-functioning EU more than ever.

We in the EU, and especially in the eurozone, must minimise the harm caused by Brexit and keep the EU on the road of reform to reinforce sustainable growth and strengthen its legitimacy. The
reformed EU must focus on the essentials: safeguarding peace and security and ensuring the right conditions for jobs and growth. Most importantly, Europe must not be allowed to slide into a painful decade of political and economic turmoil due to the British vote.

IMAGE CREDIT: Angelina Panayotova/Bigstock.com

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Estonia has long looked to the Nordic countries, mainly Sweden and Finland, for inspiration and belonging, rather than forging a common identity with its Baltic neighbours. Historically, Estonia has been shaped by the “good old Swedish times”, a national myth referring to the period from the 16th century to the early 18th century, when Estonia’s territory was under Swedish rule. Significant
reforms were introduced during this time, including the establishment of the University of Tartu. During the Second World War, many Estonians escaped as refugees across the Baltic Sea to neutral Sweden. Ties with Finland are even more profound. Estonians and Finns both speak a Finno-Ugric language and many Finns and Estonians were able to forge ties even during the Soviet days.

Estonia today shares generally secular-rational values with its Northern neighbours. Religion doesn’t play a large role in society; technological progress is viewed almost without scepticism. The success of Estonia’s e-government initiatives and start-up scene was preceded by the collective search for “Estonia’s Nokia”, when the Finnish company ruled the mobile phone market.

So why shouldn’t Estonia consider itself the sixth Nordic country? Parts of the progressive political elite already do. The Reform Party, which leads the government, titled its 2015 parliamentary election platform “Estonia: the New Nordic”. But in terms of attitudes towards other fundamental European values, such as social justice or human rights, Estonia couldn’t be further from the Nordic states.

The high taxation and well-functioning public services seen in Nordic countries are in stark contrast with the neo-liberal flat tax implemented in Estonia. The country is a fertile ground for e-government precisely because privacy has never been an important concern. Equal opportunities and gender equality measures are viewed by many Estonians as unnecessary meddling. And there are tough citizenship policies that negatively affect the Russian-speaking minority, which makes up a quarter of the population.

Estonians see immigration as their greatest concern, not re-starting stalling economic growth. They see Nordic attitudes to migration as misguided. Anti-immigration rhetoric and hate crime are rising, and the government has been reluctant to tackle it. There are also many differences on LGBT rights: although a civil union law that provides recognition and rights for same-sex couples came into force in 2016 in Estonia, its implementation has been halted by a political gridlock. In all five Nordic countries, marriage is – or soon will be – open to all couples equally (Finland’s
equal marriage law takes effect in 2017).

Having achieved its primary goal of escaping Russian influence in favour integration with the West – notably through membership of NATO and the EU – Estonia is now trying to focus on the construction of its national identity. But it is unclear yet whether the Nordic model will be the dream, or whether Estonia retreats to the nativism seen in Poland and Hungary.

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The worldwide frenzy caused by Brexit didn’t escape the Western Balkans. For some in the region, Brexit was conclusive evidence of the EU’s failure to keep itself together. It also signalled that EU enlargement as we once knew it will not return. For others, Brexit is an unforeseen opportunity: the EU may just shift its focus to the Western Balkans in a desperate attempt to restore its essence and cohesiveness. Brexit, to them, has revealed that the EU’s greater problem lies within its core member states rather than among its newcomers. This is a revelation the Western Balkans can play with. As ever, the truth rests somewhere in the middle.

Although membership of the EU is still attractive, according to various surveys, the Union’s appeal has waned over time. Enlargement conditions and bureaucratic hurdles, coupled with complexities on the ground, have led to many conflicting and confusing EU stances towards the Balkans. Often the EU’s priorities were unrelated to the region, yet had a direct impact on its future. Unresolved domestic and bilateral disputes within and between the countries of the region laid bare the structural limitations of the process, leaving the EU’s transformative power with a very limited effect. No country but Croatia, which joined in 2013, has come close to membership. But in many awkward ways, the region is already part of the EU. It shares borders with EU member states. It trades with the bloc. NATO countries are close by. Several important transport and trade routes pass through the Balkans. In 2015, at the peak of the refugee crisis, the region proved a virtually matchless partner for the EU. From border controls to security matters, it was clear that the Balkans shouldn’t be left out.

Western Balkan leaders with poor EU integration records can use Brexit to cement their own populist agendas, deploying well-known destructive nationalism to take the region backwards. Dreary economies and soaring unemployment rates have created deep public apathy. Paying lip service to the EU by complying with minimum requirements has been enough to let elites who have ruled since the 1990s prolong their political lives. Numerous ready-to-launch reforms were crafted, but there was never the political will to implement them. If Brexit is seen as an additional spur for the decline of liberal solutions, the spillover effects may be
far-reaching. Extremely weak institutional set-ups, including in the judiciary and police, may not respond as adequately as in the rest of Europe if challenged by a new populist government. Strong political and party control, including over the media, along with the public’s disengagement from political life, offer a bleak outlook.

Another, perhaps less observed issue that Brexit may trigger in the Western Balkans is the reinvigorated positions of non-European players. Russia enjoys influence in countries with an Orthodox majority. In the energy sector, it holds significant political sway through membership of various international organisations. Moscow’s refusal in 2014 to support the extension of a Western peacekeeping force in Bosnia is another good example of its influence. The British-German push for Bosnia’s EU accession also raised Russia’s hackles, with the Kremlin protesting that Euro-Atlantic integration is not the only option or
direction for Bosnia. Turkey nurtures relations with predominately Muslim “kin communities”. It is omnipresent in the region with cultural and religious networks as well as instruments of political influence, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. Both Russia and Turkey could exploit the dissatisfaction of Western Balkan populations, who desperately need progress, by offering governance models that are very different from Europe’s.

Western Balkan states’ chronic lack of progress leaves no country ready to enter the EU. Citizens need a breakthrough from stagnation, and the real hazard is that political elites will simply manipulate Brexit to continue business as usual. The EU
must maintain its focus on development in the Balkans. The fact that Theresa May visited Germany and France first following her appointment as the UK’s new Prime Minister speaks volumes about the relationship she wants to have with the EU, which is facing a greater challenge than before to fulfil its role as a global power.
While it could find a way to its full potential by including other new members, Western Balkan countries must define their strategic goals and set – and meet – their own firm deadlines.

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It has been a bumper year for elections – whatever one may think of their outcomes – and now an unscheduled one looms on the EU horizon.

The surprise decision by Martin Schulz to step down as President of the European Parliament and seek his political fortune back home in Germany introduces yet another factor of volatility in Brussels.

Media headlines tend to highlight the personalities in contention, but the most important issue may well turn out to be the democratic process itself.  Right now, the main focus in the Schulz succession race is the unexpected decision by French MEP Sylvie Goulard to challenge Guy Verhofstadt for the Liberal candidacy for the Parliament’s top job.

Former Belgian premier Verhofstadt is a political veteran who now must face down competition from one of the Liberals’ up-and-coming names.

Aged 51, Goulard has won widespread respect as a comparatively youthful writer and commentator on the European political economy, as well as being a redoubtable parliamentarian. (In the interests of full disclosure, she, like Verhofstadt, is also one of the 50 or so members of Friends of Europe’s Board of Trustees.)

“The process is really about the comfortable accommodations between party managers that exist inside the Parliament”

Liberal MEPs’ choice of candidate is about much more than these two hopefuls. The process of choosing a successor to Martin Schulz for the increasingly powerful post of Parliament president is really about the comfortable accommodations between party managers that exist inside the Parliament.

The Parliament presidency has long been a stitch-up between the centre-right European People’s Party group (EPP) and the centre-left Socialists and Democrats. They’ve been taking it in turns to occupy the job for most of the last six decades: only five of the 25 presidents have come from outside these groups, the last being more than a decade ago.

The European Union’s democratic credentials are notoriously shaky, of course. To boost its credibility, a new form of election was devised in 2014 to determine who should become president of the European Commission. Of the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ put forward by the transnational parties, the EPP’s Jean-Claude Juncker was unsurprisingly chosen over Schulz and Verhofstadt.

Tentative and minor attempts like this to democratise the process of filling the EU’s top jobs impress few people. If anything, they must share some of the blame for the dramatic advances enjoyed by populist parties across Europe.

Whether a Liberal MEP can succeed in breaking the mould of recent Socialist-EPP dominance by becoming president of the European Parliament remains to be seen. What matters far more is that the EU’s institutions should brace themselves for radical reform. It may well be that popular elections for the Commission presidency are impractical, but convincing moves towards making the selection process more transparent cannot be avoided indefinitely.

“Tentative and minor attempts like the Spitzenkandidaten process impress few people”

A first step towards this will be to ensure that it is not only the EU’s old war horses who contest its most important posts. The sense of behind-closed-doors deals has to be confronted by a much more open process. Sylvie Goulard’s apparently unwelcome defiance of Verhofstadt’s ‘incumbency’ of their party’s choice of candidate should be mirrored by younger newcomers becoming the Socialist and EPP contenders.

It’s time for Europe’s mainstream political parties to stop bemoaning the successes of populists on both the far right and far left, and instead respond in ways that will win back electoral support. That means abandoning practices within the EU that, rightly or wrongly, look to outsiders like political fixes.

Related content

• Friends of Europe: Report: State of Europe 2016 seeks way ahead for Europe in crisis
• Europe’s World: What’s really needed is structural reform of the European Parliament, by Adriaan Schout and Judith Hoevenaars
• Debating Europe: Should the President of the European Parliament be decided by a ‘stitch-up’?

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The European Union is the result of an economic integration process geared to reach a neoliberal utopia. It was designed to eliminate, neutralise or severely limit all national policy instruments capable of standing in the way of trade and capital flows, and to narrow down member states’ policy choices to deflation strategies, mainly focusing on wages and taxes. Some have referred to this as “negative integration”, with the EU more about repressing national sovereignty than creating European instruments, capacities and accountability.

Member states lost their monetary and exchange policies, and saw their budgetary policies limited, first through the Growth and Stability Pact and then, even more so, through the Fiscal Compact. The result is a new process of economic divergence and social disaster. Peripheral economies have accumulated systematic external deficits, financed through growing external debt. After the financial crisis, private debt was made public and several countries became insolvent. To make matters even worse, the European institutions pushed an insane austerity strategy that continues to prolong the economic crisis. The self-evident failure of this strategy is deeply rooted in the countless flaws in the EU’s institutional design. For those who share this point of view, the question is what changes are needed for the Union to work, as well as whether a transformation of today’s failed design can really be enacted.Without any presumption of being comprehensive, I would highlight five necessary reforms:

• Place the European Parliament at the centre of European democracy, with the power to dismiss the Commission and the right to propose legislation.
• Ensure that the European Central Bank puts full employment at the centre of its mandate, and make its price-stability objective, which the Bank has consistently failed to deliver, more flexible. The ECB itself must be fully accountable to the European Parliament, including provisions for the dismissal of its governing council.
• Make EU fiscal policy focus its rules for national fiscal policies on debt sustainability rather than annual deficits, which are necessary for counter-cyclical fiscal policy. We must have the creation of a real European budget financed by surplus countries, focused on public investment and highly redistributive to reduce the Union’s internal asymmetries.
• Abolish all off-shore and other privileged tax jurisdictions within the EU, and establish a minimum corporate tax rate for all member states to abide by, avoiding a race to the bottom on corporate taxation.
• Promote a debt restructuring procedure that can return peripheral countries’ public debt to sustainable trajectories and significantly reduce their debt repayments.

These changes amount to the EU abandoning a model by which countries are forced to compete through internal devaluation, and instead building a solidarity economy. This will only be possible
once all members accept that the integrity of the Union depends on significant and systematic financial transfers from the core to peripheral economies to compensate for today’s devastating imbalances. All EU policies should be reducing those imbalances through the development of peripheral economies, not through imposing a race to the bottom on wages, which will only contribute to economic stagnation, as we can already see.

So are these reforms possible? I have grown more and more sceptical for several reasons. First, the economic and social crisis has fuelled discontent with the EU’s institutions and the European
project itself. The Union was built on a promise of development and prosperity that has failed to deliver, which is obviously true for the peripheral economies, but also for the working classes of
surplus economies. Second,the EU leadership’s total disregard for the democratic will of peoples in several member states destroyed one of the most important elements needed for a successful process of integration: democratic legitimacy. The EU was already found wanting before the economic crisis, but this degree of disrespect for national democracies will make people increasingly wary of further integration under Europe’s leaders.

Third, there was an enormous amount of irresponsibility exhibited by the EU’s leadership, and some national leaders, when it came to pushing an explanation for the crisis. Their analysis was based on moralistic tales, or borderline racist theories, about “competent” and “hard-working” people on the one hand, and “sloppy” and “lazy” people on the other. These narratives have helped waken political monsters that Europe had hoped to bury. Finally, and crucially, there is an institutional obstacle. The European treaties are among the most armoured pieces of legislation in the world. Many of the required changes will need unanimous support, but that only comes after overcoming the European institutions’ lack of democratic accountability and the dearth of political power for the Parliament. In the EU, institutions with power are undemocratic and institutions that are democratic are given no power.

I had hoped that after crushing the Greek government and seeing the United Kingdom vote to leave, the EU’s leadership would pause and reflect on the road the European project is taking. But their
bitter response to Brexit couldn’t have been more disappointing. The sad truth is that today, in Brussels and Berlin, I can’t see any sign of change – only stubbornness and vindictiveness.

I believe that it’s our responsibility not to give up on the European project. But far greater is the responsibility not to give up on the social rights for which Europeans have fought so hard. If conflict
between the current EU and the rights that have given shape to our democracies becomes unavoidable, it will be wise to choose the way of a peaceful separation. Even if the Union fails, we’ll always have Europe.

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While liberal politicians and media lamented the results of Britain’s referendum on membership of the European Union and the outcome of the American presidential election, Moscow reacted to these events with hope.

The momentous developments of the past six months will not have any direct bearing on Russia’s interests, but they will re-shape international politics, bring new people into power and give the Kremlin a chance to ‘re-programme’ its relationship with the West.

Europe is the immediate concern. Moscow wants the EU sanctions imposed over the war in south-eastern Ukraine – and its own subsequent counter-sanctions – to be lifted. At a minimum, it wants to continue to fight the introduction of new sanctions over Russia’s actions in Syria – a goal that the Kremlin managed to achieve last October.

And now, Russia’s hand is stronger. Some of the most vocal and hawkish European critics of Moscow are facing significant domestic pressure. Angela Merkel has lost much of her popularity in Germany and her fate is uncertain as she runs for re-election in 2017.

Britain – as the most prominent opponent of Russia in the EU – has had its voice muffled even before it triggers Article 50. London’s European influence is on the wane, and a Donald Trump-led United States may not need Britain to amplify the American voice in Europe.

“This new moment in the history of Russia and Europe presents an opportunity for change. New presidents and officials may form fresh relationships”

Bulgaria has elected a new president who does not demonstrate hostility to Russia. France is set to do the same in May: the likely final-round candidates – Marine Le Pen of the National Front and François Fillon of the Republicans – are far more Russia-friendly than the current president, François Hollande.

Italy, Spain and Greece, which were most negatively affected by the sanctions, feel that little has been achieved by a confrontational approach. There was almost no impact on Russian policy, but very real damage to their own countries’ tourism- and export-oriented economies.

This is not to say that Russia-EU relations will become rosier after the next wave of elections.

The Dutch are not going to forget the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine unless Russia can produce evidence that it was not responsible for the crash. Trade deals have been made to exclude Russia.

And most importantly, trust has gone out of the relationship. The state of mind among many Russians has moved from ‘Europe does not understand us’ to ‘they mean us harm’.

The Russian intelligentsia – intellectuals, opinion-formers, academics and cultural figures – are excluded from the common European space where they can meet their peers and exchange views and ideas. Given the country’s position outside the EU’s Eastern Partnership, Russian participants are not invited to regional events and platforms where they could meet their counterparts from Eastern Europe. They no longer feel welcome.

Europe has a strong record of supporting well-intentioned but marginal causes in Russia’s domestic development. But interaction and dialogue with mainstream society and opinion-shapers has been largely ignored.

This new moment in the history of Russia and Europe presents an opportunity for change. New presidents and officials may form fresh relationships (although as British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson has recently demonstrated, they can also deepen enmity).

Military build-ups and dangerous encounters in Europe are becoming too frequent. We urgently need old-fashioned confidence-building measures that were practiced during the Cold War era – because it is evident that the notion of ‘liberal peace’ is not working.

“Russia is a part of Europe; a notion that politicians and the media in the European Union too easily forget”

Previously-agreed deals suspended after the events in Ukraine – energy projects such as the South Stream pipeline via Bulgaria – can be revived. Mediators in the Minsk process aimed at ending the conflict in Ukraine will hopefully make a more concerted and decisive push towards a peace settlement, leaving less room to manipulate differences in the Russian and EU positions.

And countries in Europe’s and Russia’s neighbourhood – such as Moldova, Belarus and Armenia – should be able to develop and preserve relations not on the basis of choice between mutually-exclusive options, but on a sensible combination of links to both of their large neighbours.

Finally, Russia is a part of Europe; a notion that politicians and the media in the European Union too easily forget. The tone of the discourse in Europe is that Russia is always a problem – either  an existential evil or a lame duck punching well above its weight – but this attitude does not bring us closer to solutions at the time of an escalation of tensions on a scale unseen since the end of the Cold War.

Political leaders should talk to each other and establish new rules of engagement in Europe. They should acknowledge that the relationship will not progress in conditions of distrust, and that the discourse of ‘values’ has limited resonance.

Instead, the relationship will have to be rebuilt on the basis of mutual interests and in full sight of the fact that Moscow will seek to avoid deep interdependency. Crucially, societies have to assume their share of responsibility for how low the relationship has fallen and make their own contribution to creating a common European space.

Russia is not Putin, and Putin is not the omnipotent president many think he is. Perhaps we need a Putin-light paradigm, in which we understand more and condemn less.

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Since the end of the Second World War, Europe has experienced unprecedented prosperity and a longer period of peace than at any other time in its history. But there are many questions to which Europe has yet to offer answers. The consequences of the financial crisis are still being felt in many countries, and we haven’t developed a common response to the refugee crisis.

I believe we need more integrated Europe. So I was pleased, the day after the British chose to leave the European Union, to see the European flag flown at the Minister-President of Baden-Württemberg’s residence and over the State Government building. It was a gesture that underlined the state’s positive view of European integration and encouraged ordinary citizens to consider the
future of Europe for themselves. Our objective must be to stop the right-wing populists and their anti-European and anti-immigration forces, and strengthen democratic diversity.

Baden-Württemberg is one of the largest and most economically successful German federal states, home to global corporations such as Porsche, Daimler and Bosch. The success of our export
industry is highly dependent on the European single market and global open markets to which we can export our products. The state also benefits to a very large extent from the free movement of
workers in the EU.

The rise of the automotive and components industry in south-west Germany would never have been possible had it not been for the so-called “guest workers” who were recruited in the 1960s. Labour shortages at the time led to the signing of bilateral recruitment agreements with Italy, Greece and Turkey. It was originally thought that the guest workers would return home after a few years with a little know-how and some savings in their pocket. But many chose to stay and bring their families to Germany. My father was one who came to the region alone. After a few years, my parents decided the whole family should move too. As well as job prospects, my parents were keen to provide their children with a good education and better opportunities.

The “guest worker” model wasn’t successful because there was too little incentive to return: in Germany, working conditions and educational standards were drastically better than in the workers’ countries of origin. Today, there are still many foreigners from outside Europe who wish to send their children to school in Germany and reap the benefits of living in a free and democratic country. So there is an urgent need to find new ways of managing this phenomenon. We need a common and modern European immigration law, and more options for working or setting up subsidiaries in other countries.

As someone who was born in Turkey but lives in and identifies with Baden-Württemberg, I have experienced just how successful integration can be. Almost a third of the state’s 10.8 million people
have a migration background. Of these, 1.4 million are foreign citizens and just over 1.7 million are naturalised German citizens. More than 40% of foreign passport-holders in the state are from
elsewhere in the EU.

“For the remaining member states, creating a functioning common immigration and asylum policy will be a key challenge in the post-Brexit EU”

In the capital, Stuttgart, where I live and work, 39% of the city’s 600,000 inhabitants have a migration background. These members of our community enrich our cultural life and provide valuable
support to companies, helping them to be globally competitive. They fill gaps in a labour market that is dependent on international professionals. Recognising and promoting cultural, linguistic and
religious diversity can only reinforce our tolerant and cosmopolitan atmosphere. Despite, or perhaps precisely because of, the large number of people with a migration background in our population,
there is relatively little social and intercultural tension.

But there’s a danger that Brexit could weaken diversity in our multicultural community. Fear of being overrun by foreigners through uncontrollable immigration was an important reason for many British citizens to vote for Brexit. This was despite the overwhelmingly positive impact on the UK of the accessions of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU. Many high-skilled workers from these countries took advantage of freedom of movement to the benefit of both sides. In terms of freedom of movement, Brexit is bad news for the EU and for Baden-Württemberg.

It’s not only the option of working in the UK that’s at stake for EU citizens; restrictions may soon also apply to students and apprentices – with similar hurdles placed before British citizens who wish to study or work on the continent. The UK will now only gain access to the single market if it accepts the principle of freedom of movement between the EU and Britain. The precise timing for triggering Article 50 will not make any difference in that respect.

“The immediate priority must be to stop people drowning in the Mediterranean, to step up humanitarian aid and to combat the smuggling of human beings”

For the remaining member states, creating a functioning common immigration and asylum policy will be a key challenge in the post-Brexit EU. The European Commission has already tabled a number of proposals. The immediate priority must be to stop people drowning in the Mediterranean, to step up humanitarian aid and to combat the smuggling of human beings. We must provide more legal routes for migration to Europe.

I believe EU member states will find a solution only if they work together. National self-interest and go-it-alone initiatives will not solve anything. We must create a common strategy that provides
protection to all those fleeing war and political persecution, and inspires hope for development in their countries of origin. Whatever it does, the EU must never forget it is not just an economic bloc. It is also a community of values committed to democracy, the rule of law and, above all, human dignity.

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