Le 23 mai dernier, Jacques Munier, journaliste sur France Culture, a consacré sa chronique « Le Journal des idées », à la Syrie.
Il cite à cette occasion l’article de Fawaz A. Gerges, publié en mars dans le numéro de Politique étrangère spécial 40 ans de l’Ifri (n° 1/2019) : « Le Moyen-Orient en 2029 ».
[…] « Les guerres qui ravagent aujourd’hui le Moyen-Orient n’ont pas vocation à se poursuivre éternellement et la région n’est pas vouée à être dirigée par des autocrates », estime Fawaz A. Gerges dans la dernière livraison de la revue Politique étrangère, qui se projette dans les dix années à venir. Le professeur de relations internationales à la London School of Economics évoque « une guerre froide régionale opposant trois acteurs clés – Iran, Arabie Saoudite et Turquie » au cœur des conflits actuels. Sur le terrain « la division criante du monde arabe entre une identité nationale et des identités tribales, religieuses et sectaires se manifeste par de violents affrontements ». […]
Lire la chronique de Jacques Munier en entier sur France Culture.
> > S’abonner à Politique étrangère < <
Earlier this year, the U.S. Army published two volumes that amount to the most comprehensive official history of the Iraq war. They cover the conflict’s most important episodes: the U.S. invasion in 2003, the death spiral into civil war that took shape in the aftermath, the more hopeful period that began with the surge of U.S. forces in 2007, and the withdrawal that saw the last U.S. forces leave Iraq at the end of 2011.
Blandly titled The U.S. Army in the Iraq War and based on 30,000 pages of newly declassified documents, the study recounts a litany of familiar but still infuriating blunders on Washington’s part: failing to prepare for the invasion’s aftermath, misunderstanding Iraqi culture and politics and sidelining or ignoring genuine experts, disbanding the Iraqi army and evicting Baath Party members from the government, ignoring and even denying the rise of sectarian violence, and sapping momentum by rotating troops too frequently.
The eight-year-long cultural phenomenon of HBO’s Game of Thrones culminated on May 18 with the fiery destruction of the Iron Throne and the death of the formerly beloved Queen Daenerys. The show’s final season has produced an explosion of commentary on what it all means. What is the appropriate basis for political authority? Can Daenerys be both a feminist hero and a war criminal? Does might make right? Should it, in a time of war?
Among the foreign-policy intelligentsia, and society broadly, interpreting Game of Thrones (and the book series by George R. R. Martin that the show is based on) has become a cottage industry. Every political analyst, historian, or theorist has his or her take on what lessons can be drawn from the story for real-world foreign policy. This enthusiasm tells us something about the show’s political implications: fans and writers argue over Game of Thrones precisely because there is power in interpreting a story to support one’s own arguments about what is right and who gets to choose.