Diplomacy & Crisis News

Efforts to end modern slavery have bipartisan support — but the State Department is still missing an ambassador-at-large to monitor and combat trafficking in persons.

Le 8 mai dernier, le président des États-Unis a choisi de renier la signature de son pays et d'engager une épreuve de force avec l'Iran. L'ancien promoteur new-yorkais est un habitué des paris hasardeux, du dédain de la loi et des clés de bras à ses partenaires en affaires. Mais, cette fois, c'est la (...) / États-Unis, Iran, Diplomatie, Relations internationales, Géopolitique, Accord international, Droit international, Mondialisation, Monnaie - 2018/06

Dans l’émission « Le débat du jour » du 18 mai dernier sur RFI, l’article écrit par Thomas Posado, « Le Venezuela peut-il sortir de l’impasse ? », et publié dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n° 1/2018) a été mentionné.

« Au Venezuela, c’est fin de campagne officielle en vue de l’élection présidentielle de dimanche. Le pays est enfoncé dans une crise économique sévère et l’opposition a décidé de boycotter le scrutin. On s’attend donc à une abstention massive et à la réélection du président Nicolas Maduro. Face à lui, pourtant, il y a deux candidats et l’un d’eux pourrait créer la surprise. La population subit la pénurie et une partie de la communauté internationale verrait d’un bon œil un changement de régime au Venezuela. Élection présidentielle au Venezuela : Nicolas Maduro peut-il perdre ? C’est notre débat du jour. »

Pour réécouter l’émission, cliquez ici.

 

Présentée comme une réponse aux aspirations des manifestants de 2014, la réforme de la police ukrainienne s'est focalisée sur la corruption des agents de terrain, laissant intacte l'instrumentalisation de l'État par des clans politiques. Pour y remédier, les bailleurs internationaux exigent la (...) / Europe, Europe de l'Est, Police, Sécurité, Corruption, Géorgie - 2018/06

Amid doubts over whether Theresa May can deliver a Brexit deal that avoids a hard Irish border, Winthrop Rodgers assesses whether the result will be a renewed push for a united Ireland.

The imposition of a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic by a seemingly callous Tory government would risk angering the youth and business classes of the North – but would it be enough to provide momentum towards a border poll? Democratic Union Party (DUP) leader Arlene Foster recently said that Irish unity was “not going to happen.” Meanwhile, Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn delivered a speech in Northern Ireland which stressed the popularity of a potential unification of Ireland within the context of Brexit.

Fundamentally, unification is very unlikely, for two simple reasons: first, London recognizes the immense political dangers surrounding the discussion and will likely work to minimize them and, second, there is not the popular support for doing so among the people of Northern Ireland or the Republic.

Treading a fine line

Perhaps no issue within the complex constellation of the Brexit negotiations is more fraught than how to deal with the UK’s land border with the Republic of Ireland. If this year’s celebrations of the 20th anniversary of the Belfast Agreement have taught us anything, it is that the first steps toward peace and prosperity in Northern Ireland were a close-run thing.

Indeed, the very nature of the transition away from violence and towards institution building makes a united Ireland unlikely as a consequence of Brexit. The 1998 Belfast Agreement, or the Good Friday Agreement as it is popularly known, binds the various parties together along a set of overlapping and mutually reinforcing axes that govern sovereign interplay. Leaders in both London and Dublin are loath to wade into the morass of Northern Irish politics or each other’s affairs without a very serious reason.

The danger for Prime Minister Theresa May is that she treads too far in one direction or the other. For instance, if she imposes measures that pander too much to the Eurosceptic wing of her Conservative party and imposes a hard border that impedes the free movement of goods, capital, and people to such a degree that it makes a majority of people in Northern Ireland rethink their relationship with the Union, then she risks a border poll or, at the very least, a drubbing at the next election.

If, instead, she opts for the softest of Brexits and creates special rules for Northern Ireland, on one side, she risks angering the hardline Eurosceptic Democratic Unionist Party, which props up her government after her disastrous decision to call a snap election in June 2017, On the other hand, she would enrage the Europhile Scottish National Party for not giving them the same deal and ignite a renewed push for independence.

Sticking to the middle ground

Therefore, it is likely that May will attempt to find a middle path that does not unduly privilege or punish one constituency or another, which would be true to her own personal instincts as a politician. (Anecdotally, during the last election, when asked for the “naughtiest” thing she had ever done, she said that as a child she and a friend used to “run through fields of wheat.”Who knows how Foreign Minister Boris Johnson would have replied?) She will likely chart a course that pleases no one and is vaguely technocratic enough to sound plausible, but does not risk bringing down her government or force a border poll.

Moreover, any kind of action that would harm the Irish Republic would bring European negotiators to its defense. The EU has made it quite clear that it fully stands behind Ireland and that it would take its side over Britain’s if push came to shove. If she imposes an overly harsh border policy, European Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier may retaliate against Britain in some other area, such as finance or the rights of British citizens in Europe and in a targeted manner designed to upset May’s domestic constituents.

No appetite for a poll

Nevertheless, there are some among the Irish nationalist camp who see Brexit as their best opportunity in the short term to force the issue of a United Ireland.

This misreads the situation in two ways. First, there is simply no appetite for a border poll in Northern Ireland and, in the unlikely event that one was held, it would fail. Poll after poll shows only a small minority who favor of a united Ireland; in fact, a recent Ipsos MORI pollfound only 21.1% total and only 42.6% of Catholics favor that option.

Second, there would have to be consent from the Republic as well, which would not be readily forthcoming. Ireland, at the moment, is still recovering from the disastrous financial crisis of 2008, which saw a catastrophic collapse of its economy. Northern Ireland is almost entirely dependent on an outsized block grant from London for its budget, and is struggling with increasing poverty, and is also burdened with a bloated civil service; Dublin would refuse to take on those responsibilities.

Moreover, the Irish in the south are fighting their own battles over social issues, most recently over abortion, and are casting off the old, clerically-mandated ways of thinking and acting and becoming a progressive, outward-looking society. To bring in a rump of angry, resentful, deeply conservative, religious fundamentalists from the DUP would work against this trend. There is likely to be significant resistance to adding a religious, nationalist angle to politics in the Republic.

A groundswell of support for a united Ireland is of course possible given the right trigger – but Brexit is not it. An all-island Republic is more likely to come about through the democratic acclaim of the Irish on both sides of the current border, rather than through violence or opportunistically because of poor relations between London and Brussels.

 

This article was first published on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Winthrop Rodgers.

The post Will Brexit be the backdoor to a united Ireland? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2018). Juan Flores Zendejas propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Johan Christensen, The Power of Economists within the State (Stanford University Press, 2017, 232 pages).

Les économistes occupent un rôle de plus en plus central dans la gestion des politiques économiques. Derrière ce constat, Johan Christensen montre que leur influence dans les structures gouvernementales n’a pas progressé au même rythme partout. Dans certains pays, la prise de pouvoir par les économistes s’est faite en quelques années, dans d’autres elle s’est étalée sur plusieurs décennies. Le livre montre également de manière détaillée le bouleversement vécu dans la conduite des politiques fiscales, menée auparavant par différents groupes professionnels, tels que les juristes ou généralistes. Après la prise de pouvoir des économistes, les politiques économiques se sont concentrées sur l’efficience du système fiscal aux dépens d’autres objectifs. Selon l’auteur, ces bouleversements sont liés à l’ascension de l’école néoclassique, depuis les années 1960 principal courant de pensée mondiale.

L’analyse suit le système fiscal de quatre pays (Nouvelle-Zélande, Irlande, Norvège et Danemark) et cherche à montrer comment le contexte institutionnel et politique a facilité (en Nouvelle-Zélande et en Norvège), ou retardé et limité (en Irlande et au Danemark) l’influence des économistes sur la politique fiscale. À leur arrivée au pouvoir, les économistes ont introduit des politiques fiscales « neutres » qui ont favorisé la taxation sur une base longue, avec un taux d’imposition marginal bas, tout en éliminant les exceptions ou déductions qui auraient pu déformer le ­fonctionnement des marchés.

Pour chaque cas, l’auteur décortique le rôle des économistes dans des réalités nationales uniques et complexes. L’influence de plusieurs acteurs est prise en compte : la structuration de l’administration publique, la compétition entre partis politiques et le rôle des groupes de pression. L’ouvrage englobe deux aspects de nos sociétés qui ne sont pas, en principe, liés directement. Tout d’abord, le recours à l’expertise dans la gestion des politiques économiques. Si la spécialisation du travail est devenue une caractéristique commune à presque tous les secteurs de l’économie, le recours à une expertise spécialisée peut aussi obéir à des raisons très contingentes et locales, par exemple la légitimation politique d’une réforme socialement impopulaire. Le second aspect concerne l’adoption d’un paradigme unique, autour de l’école néoclassique qui domine cette expertise. Sur ce point, l’ouvrage est convaincant.

Néanmoins, certaines questions restent ouvertes. L’adoption d’un paradigme unique devrait comporter l’adoption plus ou moins généralisée des politiques économiques préconisées. Mais l’auteur admet que le cadre institutionnel peut, dans un premier temps, freiner cette tendance à la généralisation. Si on suit la thèse du livre, les politiques économiques finiront par converger à moyen – ou long terme. Mais est-ce véritablement le cas ? La diversité d’expériences analysées dans l’ouvrage ne permet pas de dégager un pattern commun.

Le paradigme dominant sera probablement modifié avant que la convergence ait lieu. L’auteur suggère ainsi le rôle des crises financières (comme celle de 2008-2010) ou des pressions externes (l’OCDE ou l’Union européenne) comme sources exogènes de changement de politique économique. Depuis la crise de 2008 et à la suite des nombreuses critiques formulées à l’encontre des économistes, le futur de la profession reste incertain. Non seulement la réputation des économistes a été fortement endommagée, mais les piliers même de la discipline ne sont pas encore à l’abri d’une implosion.

Juan Flores Zendejas

Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.

Focusing on Trump and Kim’s game of hot and cold is that it is diverting focus from the more fundamental issue at hand: what a minimally successful agreement between Washington and Pyongyang should look like.

Modi now risks damaging India's reputation through his government’s divisive policies, both at home and abroad.

A new French law aims to separate truth from fiction, but it will mostly just give the government more control over the media.

Il y a un an, les élections législatives françaises offraient à M. Emmanuel Macron une très large majorité parlementaire. Pourtant, dans la Somme, un candidat de gauche, M. François Ruffin, parvenait contre toute attente à battre le candidat du parti du président et celui du Front national. La (...) / France, Extrême gauche, Extrême droite, Parti politique, Élections, Politique, Démocratie, Inégalités, Stratégie - 2018/06

The most important motive for the “Great March of Return” has been anger at Gaza's terrible conditions for daily life.

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres arrived in Mali on Tuesday, to honour the service and sacrifice of peacekeepers around the world, and mark the official International Day of UN Peacekeepers.

Following a visit to a cyclone-hit community in ‘Somaliland’, the United Nations has released close to $3 million to help people affected by an unprecedented storm which delivered a full year's worth of rain in just a few days, compounding damage caused by recent severe flooding.

Less than 20 per cent of the “desperate” civilians living in Syria’s hard-to-reach areas have got the humanitarian aid they need so far this year, a senior United Nations official warned on Tuesday, calling for the Security Council to help ease their plight.

Le solde des transferts français d'armements est largement positif. On en conclut que les ventes de matériels de guerre améliorent notablement la balance commerciale, ce qui, par temps de crise économique, ne peut être négligé. Pourtant cette déduction, logique en apparence, est quelque peu hâtive. (...) / France, Armement, Commerce des armes, Industrie de l'armement - 1988/03

For the U.S. president, like the last German monarch, foreign policy is all about personal ego, not national interests.

The head of the United Nations labour agency has called for a new spirit of cooperation and consensus between workers, employers and Governments, to end what he called the “new brutalism” of sexual harassment and violence in the workplace.

Aussitôt connue, la décision du gouvernement français de contribuer à la construction par Dassault-Breguet de l'avion de combat Rafale a soulevé de vives polémiques. Le projet coûtera-t-il 170 milliards de francs, comme l'ont écrit certains journalistes aussitôt qualifiés de « criminels » et d' « (...) / France, Armement, Commerce des armes, Industrie, Recherche - 1988/03

The US and North Korea are likely to attempt diplomacy for a few months, but impossible expectations and intentionally vague promises could frustrate both sides. If this causes the deal to fall through, bilateral tensions could boil over once again.

On 29 April 2018, the world watched as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in shook hands and crossed the border in an historic diplomatic moment. The next country on North Korea’s peace tour appears to be the United States, where President Donald Trump initially agreed to a summit to further his goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula – then withdrew the offer – then seemingly put it back on the table. However, Trump should prepare for the worst: there is ample evidence that both leaders are master showmen specializing in grand rhetoric with few tangible steps.

Conflicting expectations

Trump and Kim are working towards very different goals. Trump presumably wants to become the president who denuclearized the Korean Peninsula, and all other concessions are trivial to him in comparison. In contrast, Kim seeks the lifting of economic sanctions and a removal of a threatening US presence in South Korea at the very least, indicated by his sudden focus on economic progress and pledge to denuclearize in exchange for guaranteed security. Furthermore, if he truly has achieved his intended progress with North Korea’s nuclear program, he would likely demand recognition as a nuclear state.

It therefore becomes clear why the negotiations are at risk of falling apart before they have even begun. The leaders’ respective expectations are all non-starters: Kim will not easily give up his biggest bargaining chip, the US and UN have no plans to lift sanctions or recognize Pyongyang’s nuclear legitimacy, and the US cannot pull troops fully out of South Korea because it would solidify China’s position as the dominant force in the Asia-Pacific region. If Trump and Kim are unable to reconcile their conflicting objectives, the lack of progress could frustrate them and drive them back to aggressive rhetoric and brinkmanship.

Loopholes

Kim’s alleged promise to shut down the nuclear weapons program in exchange for confirmation that the US will not invade instills hope, but remains vague enough to avoid actually having to follow through. It is still unclear what Kim will consider sufficient evidence that he is safe from a US attack: he could demand an end to the Foal Eagle and Key Reserve joint military drills, or use continued American military presence in South Korea as a reason to resume his own arms buildup. Even if Pyongyang were to give up its nuclear program, its cyberwarfare program — responsible for the “Wannacry” ransomware attack and multiple cryptocurrency thefts — could likely continue to wreak havoc.

The Trump administration is also able to revise standards at any time to press for North Korean compliance. Even as Pyongyang returned three US detainees and Trump praised Kim for his “honorable intentions,” the US State Department released scathing criticism of Pyongyang’s “egregious human rights violations” and condemned the Kim regime as “one of the most repressive and abusive governments in the world” in a possible readjustment of terms of cooperation. Just as one side makes any small concession, the other can adjust the dial and demand more.

New variables

If Trump and Kim meet, it will likely  involve a lot of Trump’s empty showboating — except this time he’s meeting his match. If the US fails to lift sanctions or remove its military presence and Kim strays away from his promises of denuclearization, the two frustrated leaders would likely have to return to their reliable practices in grandstanding and threats.

Not only could the proposed conference between US and North Korean figureheads end in disappointment for those hopeful of nuclear de-escalation, but the relationship between Moon and Trump may also be in danger. Kim has successfully centered the diplomatic narrative around “inter-Korean peace” and framed the US as an outsider. For now, Moon is scrambling to include the US in all Korean dialogue, going so far as to suggest that Trump deserves the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to stabilize the region. However, as the Korea Research Center reports that 78% of South Koreans find Kim trustworthy after the Korean summit, Moon may now have two relationships to cautiously balance: one with Trump and one with Kim, both of which are notoriously volatile and urging him to support their interests. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula may spike once again, this time with new complexities as the three countries strive for their versions of stability.

Moving forward

Even if a US-North Korea summit fails to denuclearize the peninsula, Kim and Moon have gained new political advantages. After enduring criticism for appearing weak against Pyongyang, Moon’s dedication to peaceful negotiations has boosted his political clout.  The diplomatic triumph could secure his proposed extension to Seoul’s presidential term limits, instill much-needed confidence in his economic policies, and distract from his party’s sexual harassment accusations. If Seoul and Pyongyang successfully sign an end to the Korean War, Moon’s Democratic Party is almost guaranteed to secure the presidency for another term. Across the 38th parallel, Kim could gain a new ally to increase his legitimacy on the international stage, decrease his dependence on China, and more effectively further his own economic policies – potentially with Seoul’s help. Although the US-North Korean relationship is still uncertain, Moon and Kim have both emerged as winners from this diplomatic breakthrough.

 

This article was first published on Global Risk Insights, and was written by Kiana Mendoza.

The post Trump vs Kim: The art of the nuclear deal appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The Trump administration appears to be trying to salvage a summit set for June 12.