European Union

European Council President Charles Michel "took risks" during his recent visit to Georgia, and some in Brussels thought his actions were "mad", according to an EU official familiar with the latest diplomatic action meant to reassert the EU's 'soft power'.

In order to condemn the violence of the regime and to support the people opposing Lukashenko, the EU has put in place a two-level strategy which employs standard hard power instruments in regards to the leadership and a strategy inspired by the EUGS in regards to Belarussians. The approach toward Lukashenko is threefold, with different levels of political intensity: de-legitimation (non-recognition of electoral results), mediation (which has so far been entirely unsuccessful), and sanctions. Along with the US and other states and international organizations, the EU has also refused to recognise Lukashenko as the legitimate President, therefore de facto legitimizing the opposition, which is asking for renewed elections. The exiled Tsikhanouskaya is treated by the Western community as the legitimate representative of her country. Such recognition emerges through meetings she has had with institutional representatives (e.g. the President of the European Parliament), but also through invitations to ceremonies or the attribution of awards.

Both the US and the EU have also implemented sanctions on Lukashenko and other officials held responsible for voter fraud and post-election violent repression. For the EU, reaching a consensus on sanctions was somewhat problematic: Cyprus asked, in exchange for its approval, that EU members adopt a tougher approach to Turkey over its gas exploration in the waters off Cyprus. The sanctions dispute has therefore included apparently unrelated matters, proving once again the complexity of foreign policy decisions within the EU itself.

In regards to the people, meanwhile, Belarus opposition leader Tsikhanouskaya asserted that the Belarusian uprising is not a “geopolitical revolution (…) it is neither pro-Russian nor anti-Russian, not pro-EU nor anti-EU, (…) it is simply pro-Belarus and a democratic revolution” (European Parliament, 21 September 2020). Therefore, any EU action will have to carefully avoid suspicion of trying to bring Belarus into an enhanced partnership with the EU against Russia. Thus, in order to assist the people of Belarus, the EU can mainly rely on the concept of resilience, usually thought to be politically neutral, to replace the ambitious and increasingly contested goal of the promotion of democracy. The EU would likely act through selective and tailormade actions targeted at boosting the resilience of recipients (people, communities, groups, individuals). Resilience supports the need to rebrand the intervention of external actors, while at the same time legitimising their presence in their capacity of ‘tutoring’ communities. Endowing resilience therefore implies facilitating or developing the self-securing agency of those held to be most vulnerable, who need support in the development of a resilience capacity.

However, the circumstances in Belarus, where the autocratic regime can survive thanks to Russian economic support, partly hinder the enactment of resilience. The EUGS itself does not explicitly confront the question of how resilience can be supported in an autocratic regime that punishes any dissidents. Furthermore, it mentions that some of the factors that should endure resilience feature an inclusive definition of democracy (trust in institutions, sustainable development and growth, respect for human rights, and vibrant and inclusive societies), that can hardly be achieved in a long-lasting autocratic regime supported by a powerful external actor. Thus, the Belarusian situation points to two outcomes: an external intervention in favour of resilience could reinforce the autocratic regime in power, or, on the contrary, could undermine it, though likely causing tensions and possibly conflicts. Whereas the third progress report on the EUGS clarified that resilience “does not mean supporting stability by condoning authoritarianism”, it did not explain how to endorse resilience when those in power oppose any external action in its favour.

The EU has so far reacted rather pragmatically and has interpreted strengthening resilience as supporting resistance. Firstly, it has condemned the disproportionate violence against peaceful protesters and called for the release of those who have been prosecuted and detained. Journalists’ work in such a hostile environment has been praised, and attacks on and the detention of journalists, some of which are EU citizens, have been denounced. Also, in December 2020, the European Commission launched a programme called EU4Belarus: solidarity with the people of Belarus that focuses on four key areas of intervention: 1) civil society and independent media, in particular in regards to local communities and citizen groups’ initiatives; 2) support to youth, including scholarships for students and young professionals; 3) advisory support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in order to enhance resilience in the current economic slump; 4) reinforcement of health resilience by supporting Belarus’s response to the still ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Further support to SMEs, worth €6 million, is under preparation.

However, the most difficult task for the EU is to concretely deliver financial support for selected groups. The operation is politically very sensitive, because it could endanger local beneficiaries and the EU could be accused of meddling in a third country’ domestic affairs. Hence, the EU is obliged outsourcing resilience by relying on organizations based outside Belarus that are able to operate within the country. One of the key organizations involved is the European Endowment for Democracy (EED), which is financing activities on behalf of the EU, including small initiatives. The risk with supporting resilience in an autocratic regime is therefore the obfuscation of the question of accountability and responsibility, losing control of the whole process of enacting resilience.

On the side of the recipient groups, it is unclear to what an extent financing can enable them to impinge on the structure of power and reach their goals. In fact, it seems that while resilience recognises the agency of the people, it underestimates the obstacles posed by an hostile leadership. Then, even if resilience is not directly linked to regime change and democratization, the fact that it comes as part of a wider package of measures including sanctions directed to Lukashenko and his entourage scuppers the intention of de-politicising it. Furthermore, focusing on the resilience (resistance) of certain groups, especially within a single state, can bring to an underestimation of the complexity of politics. And moreover, as the issue of sanctions has shown, there are many ongoing crises in the EU’s neighbourhood and the solution to one has consequences in dealing with the others. Finally, the hazy nature of resilience and consequently its modest analytical value makes it difficult in this case to assess whether actions undertaken in its name achieve their objectives, which in truth remain unexpressed. It seems that resilience is a sort of floating concept that can at any time be interpreted according to current targets.

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article “The European Union Global Strategy and the EU’s Maieutic Role”

 

Author:

Serena Giusti is senior researcher and head of the Programme on Eastern Europe, Russia and Eurasia at Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa. She is also Senior Associate Research Fellow at the Institute for International Studies (ISPI) in Milan. She holds a Ph.D. in Political and Social Sciences from the European University Institute in Florence and a Master’s degree from the College of Europe (Natolin).

https://www.ispionline.it/it/bio/serena-giusti

Serena.giusti@sssup.it

ISPI:

Twitter: @ispionline

 Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies:

Twitter: @santannapisa

The post The European Union Global Strategy and the limits of resilience in the case of Belarus appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The opposition to modern breeding technologies is strong in Europe; however, it is not based on scientific facts. As soon as a serious flaw in the arguments is exposed, activists are moving the goalposts. From non-existent health dangers, the focus...

The new EU Climate Law increases the EU’s 2030 emissions reductions target from 40% to at least 55% while boosting the contribution from removals that can bring the target to 57%.
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

After a failed attempt last year, the European Commission is finally presenting today (21 April) its first batch of implementing rules under the EU’s sustainable finance taxonomy, laying down detailed technical criteria for what can be labelled a “green” investment in the EU.

The EU agreed to fund the LIFE programme with a budget of €5.4 billion. Watch our video to find out how the funds will support climate action.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

The European Parliament and the European Council reached an agreement on the first-ever EU climate law - raising the current 2030 emission-reduction target from 40 percent to around 55 percent (including carbon sinks).

Chanel v EUIPO - Huawei Technologies (Représentation d'un cercle contenant deux courbes entrelacées)
Intellectual and industrial property
The General Court dismisses the action brought by Chanel against the registration of a Huawei mark on the ground that the figurative marks at issue are not similar

The agricultural sector is faced with exponential population growth and is under pressure from different challenges, including climate change and changing socio-economic dynamics.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) on Tuesday (20 April) called for "coordinated action" across the European Union to tackle energy poverty, warning that poverty is "likely" to increase once bank moratoriums are lifted.

Es ist immer noch relativ still rund um das neue Bundesamt für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (BfAA), seit den letzten Updates hat sich nach außen hin nicht viel getan. Aber so langsam scheinen sich die neuen Strukturen zu etablieren, und selbst die deutsche Konsulin auf Mallorca tauscht jetzt ihre mediterrane Arbeitsumgebung gegen das Havel Valley.

[Update (27. April): Es gibt jetzt ein offizielles Organigramm des BfAA.]

Was sich so langsam herausstellt ist, wo und wie das Bundesamt räumlich zu finden sein wird. Auf der Karriere-Seite des Amtes heißt es aktuell:

“Zunächst arbeiten wir in Büros im Brennabor Gebäude, Geschwister-Scholl-Str. 10, voraussichtlich ab Sommer 2021 beziehen wir zusätzlich die Kirchhofstr. 1-2, 14776 Brandenburg.”

Das Foto vom Amtsschild in der Kirchhofstraße habe ich ja schon im Januar gepostet. Da soll jetzt also Richtung Sommer eingezogen werden. Aktuell sitzt man in einem Gebäudeteil, der früher zu den Brennabor-Werken gehörte. Das sieht man auch am Hintergrund des Videos von Amtsleiter Birgelen auf der Karriereseite.

Ich hab mal ein Foto geschossen, wo man links die Fenster der Arbeitsagentur sieht, die auch bei Birgelen im Hintergrund zu sehen sind.

Was gibt es sonst noch für Neuigkeiten? In einer aktuellen Stellenausschreibung sucht das Amt für das “schnell wachsende[] Team am Standort Bonn” Mitarbeitende für “Verwaltung”, im Bereich der Personalbezahlung sowie für die Leitung des Bereichs Logistik und Transport.

Heißt, diese Aufgaben verbleiben nicht nur in Bonn sondern werden dort auch vergrößert. Im aktuellen FAQ des BfAA heißt es dazu (meine Hervorhebung):

“Rund 110 Beschäftigte der Zentralstelle für Auslandsschulwesen und 68 im Bereich Personalbezahlung und Logistik werden […] weiterhin am Standort Bonn arbeiten.

Etwa 30 Beschäftigte verbleiben in den Arbeitsbereichen Veranstaltungsmanagement sowie Fortbildung in Berlin, weil diese Aufgaben an die Räumlichkeiten des AA gebunden sind.”

Dass ein Bereich Veranstaltungsmanagement auch ins BfAA ausgelagert wird, ist interessant. Man hätte denken können, dass das doch eher im politischen Kernbereich der Arbeit des Auswärtigen Amtes ist, aber vielleicht betrifft das nur bestimmte Veranstaltungsformate oder solche einer bestimmten Größe.

Und dann gibt es aktuell auch die Ausschreibung für die Leiterin der Zentralabteilung, mit Details zur Organisation und dem Aufgabenbereich dieser Abteilung. Zum Einen wird klar, dass es dort die Referate Personalmanagement, Haushalt, Organisation, Innerer Dienst und IT geben wird. Die Zentralabteilung wird rund 40 Mitarbeiter*innen haben.

Zu den Aufgaben der Zentralabteilung gehören demnach:

• Verwaltungsmodernisierung und Digitalisierung im BfAA
• Zusammenarbeit mit der Auslands-IT des AA
• Aufbau- und Ablauforganisation im BfAA
• Aufstellung und Ausführung des BfAA-Haushalts
• Gleichstellung, Diskriminierungsschutz, Korruptionsprävention, Geheimschutz, Brandschutz, Arbeits- und Gesundheitsschutz und betriebliches Gesundheitsmanagement
• kundenorientierter Innerer Dienst
• BfAA-Liegenschaftsfragen.

Dazu gab es Ausschreibungen für den Zentralen Einkauf. Aufgaben für den Zentralen Einkauf sind unter anderem:

• Wirtschaftlichkeitsuntersuchungen
• Vergabeverfahren
• Inhouse-Vergaben
• Leistungen aus bestehenden Rahmenvereinbarungen abrufen
• Verwaltungsvereinbarungen mit anderen Einkaufsbehörden des Bundes abschließen
• Auslandsvertretungen bei der Durchführung von Auftragsänderungen und Vergabeverfahren begleiten

Ich habe meinen Organigramm-Entwurf vom Februar mit den Informationen aus diesem Blogpost und den jeweiligen Quellen aktualisiert bzw. ergänzt.

Bei einzelnen Aufgaben ist noch nicht ganz klar, in welcher Abteilung sie im Organigramm angesiedelt ist. Ich hab die jetzt mal im überarbeiteteten inoffiziellen Organigramm-Entwurf  in die misteriöse Abteilung D eingebaut, die ich “Dienstleistungen” nenne. Dort habe ich auch spekulativ das Veranstaltungsmanagement und die Logistik einsortiert.

Das ist weiterhin Spekulation, es gibt nach meiner Kenntnis kein offizielles öffentliches Organigramm.

Vielleicht gibt es ja demnächst mal ein offizielles Update zur geplanten Struktur des Amtes. Soweit ich das sehe, gibt es keine Presse- oder Kommunikationsabteilung, die man fragen könnte. Bis dahin sammele ich hier die Informationen zusammen, die öffentlich zu finden sind.

PS: Vor einigen Wochen hat mich eine Person, die sich für das BfAA bewirbt, kontaktiert (immer gerne über meine Email, die ihr hier findet), um zu fragen, wie es sich denn so in Brandenburg leben lässt. Ich empfehle da neben den Seiten der Stadt die Webseite Finde das Leben (Design: Bureau Steffi Holz), wo man auch viele der städtischen Partner finden kann. Über diese Seite bin ich auch nach Brandenburg gekommen.

Es gibt auch viele tolle Instagramm-Kanäle, z.B. Luftbilder Brandenburg oder Entdecke Stadt Brandenburg, in denen man den Alltag hier in der Stadt im Havel Valley ganz gut nachvollziehen kann. Schaut mal, wer den beiden Accounts folgt oder wem diese folgen, um die vielen duzend anderen Kanäle zu finden.

The post Das BfAA in Brandenburg: Von Mallorca ins Havel Valley appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The Portuguese presidency of the EU Council aims to meet the European Parliament halfway by increasing up to 25% the eco-scheme ring-fencing, in a bid to break the deadlock on the green architecture of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) reform.

Fair taxation is a priority for the European Parliament. Find out how it wants to tackle issues such as tax avoidance, tax fraud and more.

Source : © European Union, 2021 - EP

In today's edition of the Capitals, find out more about the German defence minister saying German-French cooperation is needed as security threats are increasing in Europe, US fighter planes being deployed in Poland, and so much more.

European Union negotiators reached a deal on the European Climate Law after fourteen hours of talks on Wednesday (21 April), allowing the EU to arrive at the US-hosted climate summit tomorrow with an agreement on the bloc’s 2030 target.

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Four representatives of ethnic minorities will pay tribute to the victims of the World War II concentration camp Jasenovac on Thursday at a separate ceremony to that to be attended by state leaders. “That means that ethnic minorities will this...