Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Briefing Paper

Reducing gender gaps in education, employment and political decision making, among other dimensions, has long been an important development objective. This is confirmed by the international consensus reached over Millennium Development Goal 3 (MDG 3): “Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women”. Ensuring equal access to education, in particular, is a central component of this effort, as reflected in the goal’s target, which is to eliminate gender disparities in education by 2015.
Are countries that have adopted democratic political institutions more successful at reducing the gender gap in education? And can higher levels of political representation of women contribute to achieving this objective?
Democracy advances the cause of women’s education in the absolute, although there is no conclusive evidence on whether it improves women’s situation relative to men’s. When it comes to political representation, the evidence is clear: larger numbers of women in politics and elected office improve overall educational outcomes and reduce the gender gap in education.
What lessons can be learnt regarding the linkages between democratic institutions, women’s political representation and the gender gap in education?

- The fact that democracies have a better track record than autocratic regimes when it comes to education and development provides additional justification for development cooperation policies that support gradual political opening in autocracies as well as the stabilisation and consolidation of democracy in countries that have chosen to go down this path. Moreover, it suggests that the adoption of specific democratic institutions, such as allowing women to run for office, can make a difference, even in countries that are not formally democratic.

- Multiple policy objectives could be reached with one policy tool: women’s political representation. Progress in this dimension improves not only girls’ education but also health and political participation, among other outcomes.

- Policy-makers and international donors should exercise caution in adopting and supporting the implementation of quick fixes to increase women’s political representation, such as gender quotas. In countries with high levels of gender inequality, such as India, quotas alone are likely to have limited effects. Instead, these should be integrated into a larger set of interventions aimed at diminishing gender gaps in employment, assets and decision making.

Overall, these arguments speak directly to the current debate on the post-2015 agenda. The ratio of girls to boys in education and the proportion of seats held by women in national parliament are two indicators for MDG 3. As these topics are also likely to be central in the post-2015 agenda, it is important to consider the studies showing that making progress in the second indicator advances the first one. This, in fact, can help when analysing the feasibility of these objectives and in the planning of the resources required to achieve them. Moreover, these findings point to the importance of including governance in the global develop¬ment agenda.

This briefing paper proposes a Global Framework for Climate Action (GFCA), a comprehensive and collaborative programme to build advantageous linkages between the multilateral climate regime and non-state and subnational climate initiatives.
Global climate governance features a great diversity of institutions, state and non-state stakeholders, and their plethora of actions aimed at mitigation and adaptation. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol remain the most important elements of the multilateral climate regime. However, these state-centred regimes and their ongoing negotiations have been criticised for being cumbersome and insufficiently effective. The multilateral regime leaves governance deficits regarding implementation (of adaptation and emission-reduction policies), regulation (new international agreements, norms and standards) and legitimacy (effective output, as well as engagement by underrepresented stakeholders). These deficits could partially be addressed through a growing number of non-state and sub-national initiatives. For instance, cities have adopted emission-reduction targets and cooperate on adaptation, and industries are setting their own targets to reduce emissions. These kinds of initiatives have the potential to make concrete and solution-oriented contributions towards realising a climate-resilient and low-carbon future and also improve the effectiveness of the UNFCCC process. The groundswell of initiatives has, however, not reached its full potential as – until now – it has been uncoordinated and not well documented.
The proposed GFCA aims to catalyse non-state and subnational initiatives, grant recognition to initiatives that make substantial contributions, and inspire governments to raise mitigation and adaptation ambitions by scaling-up innovative solutions and successful methods. To achieve this, a layered design is proposed that allows for the recording of a wide array of initiatives while ensuring measurability of progress in terms of output (visible activities and products), outcome (behavioural change) and impact (changes in environmental indicators). Periodic overall assessments of participating initiatives will strategically inform where initiatives could complement the multilateral process and where links could be built.
We envisage a GFCA as a collaborative programme, oper¬ated and administered by a network of experts, think tanks as well as public and private organisations. Such a network yields the strengths of existing efforts and pools resources from multiple organisations while retaining legitimacy through a partnership with an international body, such as the UNFCCC secretariat or the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
The proposed GFCA could become an important element in the future global climate governance architecture. It would strengthen coordination capacity within the UNFCCC to steer non-state and subnational actions towards greater ambition and the implementation of international targets and agreements on the ground. It would also give recognition to initiatives that substantially contribute to low-carbon and climate-resilient develop¬ment, and it would motivate reputation-conscious non-state stakeholders to develop such initiatives.

The Ebola pandemic is a crisis of global proportion and of global concern. It is locally concentrated and requires responses on a local scale with a global scope. Its projected trajectory is the subject of volatile predictions, confused communication, imperilled responses and, increasingly, panic. It is at once a health crisis, with severe economic repercussions, and a threat to peace and security, espe­cially in the region and even beyond.
The response to the Ebola pandemic should be twofold.

• The immediate crisis must be brought under control. We propose a set of short-term actions that are based on a much stronger commitment and co­ordination by the international community. Above all, these are geared towards establishing an acknow­ledged and legitimate global health leadership structure: based in the United Nations system and supported by key global players such as the United States and the European Union.

• In order to overcome the current Ebola outbreak with a view towards drawing conclusions to prevent another such crisis, international actors need to reflect on the structural aspects undergirding this crisis. Three elements of such a response need to be recognised. First, the Ebola pandemic is a global crisis; in addition to the individual impacts of infection, a global pandemic can easily lead to a panic in which health, social, economic and political costs are impossible to quantify. Second, it is a health crisis not only for those infected with and affected by the Ebola virus, but also for the most affected region - in health, economic and security terms (as people seek health care apart from Ebola treatment). Third, Ebola poses a health, economic and security crisis for the West Africa region and beyond: its spread threatens the fragile gains made in the post-conflict societies of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The broader West Africa region and the Sahel are characterised by fragile social cohesion, as people struggle to sustain livelihoods curtailed by quarantines, fear and falling trade while authorities work to maintain and manage socio-political tensions.

The current Ebola crisis illustrates the shortcomings of the way international cooperation is organised. In rising to the challenge of a committed, coordinated response, the following points must be acknowledged.

• Ebola's eruption into densely populated urban areas reinforces the vital necessity of functioning local, national and global health systems. Zoonoses are likely to multiply; learning to predict and prepare for them is vital.

• It makes it clear that weak and fragile local systems, especially in a post-conflict setting, pose not only a local hazard but a global threat.

• Current crisis response mechanisms of the international community are neither effective nor adequate. To a large extent, the situation is caused by chronic underfunding of the core functions of leading international institutions.

• There are urgent opportunities that the international community should take advantage of to improve the workings of the (global) health sector, e.g. compre­hensively supporting health systems' development

United Nations (UN) deliberations are underway towards a post-2015 agenda that unites poverty eradication and sustainable development. While negotiators are tasked to determine goals and indicators, another fundamental question is: How will progress towards the sustainable development goals (SDGs) be monitored and reviewed?
A post-2015 accountability framework is needed to document and guide how stakeholders take responsibility, learn from their efforts and adjust their behaviour towards achieving the SDGs in a transparent manner. Discussions on such a framework are still at an early stage.
Only some general elements of an accountability framework have been agreed among UN Member States. Most importantly, the framework will be voluntary, non-binding and state-led, which raises the question of how governments and other actors can be incentivised to participate. The main incentives are likely to be reputational: states can strengthen their SDG profiles and showcase “best-practices”. They could also benefit through exchanging lessons learnt. Financial support, capacity development support and technology transfer can be additional incentives, particularly for least developed countries.
Incentives, however, have to be complemented by a strong commitment and ownership at the national level. The framework should be rooted in an inclusive, bottom-up approach, in which each government determines its own level of ambition. Further, governments should be able to link their national efforts to SDG discussions at the regional and international levels in a multi-layered framework.    

Currently, a fragmented landscape of international bodies is dealing with individual elements of the proposed SDGs. For each of the 17 goals, myriad entities and platforms exist, both within and outside the UN system. All claim global coordination functions, but many continue to work in parallel. Without addressing this incoherence, the accountability framework risks becoming a loose collection of disconnected efforts. Such a patchwork approach will not suffice in supporting the realisation of an aspiring agenda.
Therefore, the post-2015 discussions offer the unique opportunity of setting up a coherent accountability framework that engages stakeholders across all platforms. Such a framework would help to avoid duplication and promote synergies. Its major benefit is to bring key stakeholders together in a few focused discussions that are more effective and legitimate than the current fragmented setup of international cooperation.
A coherent framework would feature improved monitoring and reporting as compared to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and would enable a strengthened review process. It should consist of three key components: key actors (governments, the UN system, other stakeholders), interlinkages (within UN structures and outside of them) and ambition (in design and commitments).
The international community should engage in discussions on the accountability framework without delay. Only then can the post-2015 agenda be placed on solid footing from the start.

With the wrapping up of the United Nations' Open Working Group (OWG) on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at the end of July 2014, the international process towards the adoption of universal sustainable development goals has entered its decisive phase. Established in the wake of the 2012 "Rio+20" summit on sustainable development, the OWG has arguably fulfilled its task by tabling a substantive proposal that represents "an integrated indivisible set of global priorities for sustainable development" with "aspi¬rational global targets." Crucially, the OWG's proposal re¬flects the global level of ambition as well as attention to national circumstances.
It is now up to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and, ultimately, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to follow up on the OWG proposal and to foster consensus at the global level. Concomitantly, the SDGs also need to be anchored within an institutional system that facilitates progressive implementation and ensures accountability. The OWG has come a long way in paving the ground, but deliberations will continue before the UN General Assembly eventually adopts a consolidated set of SDGs in 2015. This defines the political space to promote improvements as the international community strives for a set of goals that is pragmatic enough to ensure broad ownership across the North-South divide and ambitious enough to actually make a difference vis-à-vis business as usual. Four issues deserve particular attention from policymakers and negotiators:

1. Negotiators should not let themselves be diverted by the quest for a smaller number of goals. The total number of SDGs is of little concern for each SDG to deliver on its promises. The substance and the feasibility of individual targets matters, not the memorability of the set of goals as such.
2. A consolidated set of SDGs should further emphasise the potential of integrated approaches wherever this is reasonable, for example with regard to targets relating to water, food security and energy provision. The goals tabled by the OWG could do better to overcome the silo approach that has characterised the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
3. The goals need to be ambitious both in terms of substantive targets and in terms of sharing the burdens of implementation in the envisaged 'global partnership'. Now is the time to specify who is expected to be doing what, by when, and with which means.
4. The goals are supposed to be universal and hence need to be relevant and fair for developed countries and developing countries, as well as within all countries. The notion of 'leaving no one behind' should be reflected more consistently across the eventual set of goals.

This briefing paper elaborates on these priorities as it critically appraises the outcome of the OWG with a view to forthcoming sessions of the UN General Assembly. It also identifies challenges for implementation, notably regard¬ing the responsibilities of Germany and the European Union. It concludes that all countries will be well advised to devise national road maps that facilitate the incorporation of the SDGs into domestic policy. These should be fashioned in a manner that is in itself aspiring and flexible enough to allow for progressive adjustment as the global partnership for sustainable development evolves beyond 2015.

Western donors attempting to promote democracy across the globe face a dilemma. Democracy is a highly valued policy goal, but they are fearful that the path to democ¬racy will undermine another highly valued goal – political stability – and potentially cause widespread violence in the recipient countries or beyond. We ask whether these fears have empirical support and how donors can balance the potentially conflicting objectives of democratisation and stability when intervening in governance matters.
Recent research at the German Development Institute shows that fears about the destabilising effects of democratisation do indeed have some empirical support (Leininger et al 2012; Ziaja 2013). But these fears deflect attention from the bigger problem of “getting stuck in the middle”. Hybrid regimes that exhibit authoritarian traits under a façade of formal democratic institutions constitute, in the long run, a larger security risk than attempts to make these countries more democratic. Hybrid regimes also hamper economic development, thus constituting an additional, indirect, risk of violent conflict.
The promotion of democracy is hence a laudable effort, but it may itself carry risks. A recent DIE study of 47 African countries suggests that support for democracy increases popular mobilisation in the short run, leading to increased demonstrations and riots. However, the same study produced no evidence that democracy support is likely to spark civil wars. Increased mobilisation is thus rather a sign of aid effectiveness than a reason to worry.
Yet, to be effective in the long run and to help steer popular demands into peaceful channels, democracy support must assist domestic actors in building institutions that fit the needs of their society. In the past, the potentially de¬stabilising consequences of popular participation have seduced would-be engineers of social change into re¬stricting competition in young democracies. This is a bad idea, as our recent research shows: narrow, elite pacts have, on average, led to worse political outcomes than open competition.
The best contribution that donors can make from the out¬side is to enable marginalised groups to participate in crea¬ting the institutional setup. This is best achieved when many donors promote democracy simultaneously. Only then can they avoid the “blueprint trap”, which snaps shut when donors try to impose – advertently or inadvertently – an institutional setup on the partner country that does not fit its society’s needs. Diversity on the donor side increases the chances of finding a context-adequate institutional design.
These findings suggest that an overly cautious sequencing approach to democracy promotion – stability first, only then democracy – has little empirical support. Most countries in the world embarked on a (formally) democratic path more than two decades ago. A gradualist approach that builds institutions while at the same time encouraging mobilisation is thus the more viable approach.
Recommendations in brief:

•     Promote democracy now
•     Keep democracy aid diverse
•     Encourage endogenous, inclusive polity design
•     Enforce conditionality on conflict resolution mechanisms in institutional design
•     Balance trade-offs of democratic transitions.