Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

This paper discusses the importance of acknowledging power asymmetries in transnational (knowledge) cooperation and exchange. The authors explore different forms of power and the challenges of tackling power imbalances while working in  cooperation between diverse actors. They argue that new and more reflective approaches to transnational (knowledge) cooperation are necessary. The authors then discuss how power inequalities are addressed in the Managing Global Governance  (MGG) Academy and in the Shaping Futures Academy,24 organised by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). Both formats are mutual learning and dialogue programmes for early to mid-career professionals from different partner countries around the globe.

This paper discusses the importance of acknowledging power asymmetries in transnational (knowledge) cooperation and exchange. The authors explore different forms of power and the challenges of tackling power imbalances while working in  cooperation between diverse actors. They argue that new and more reflective approaches to transnational (knowledge) cooperation are necessary. The authors then discuss how power inequalities are addressed in the Managing Global Governance  (MGG) Academy and in the Shaping Futures Academy,24 organised by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). Both formats are mutual learning and dialogue programmes for early to mid-career professionals from different partner countries around the globe.

Amidst resurgent autocratisation around the world, digitalisation makes it easier than ever before for civil society activists and opposition politicians to connect with potential allies in other countries. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, domestic  grassroots social movements seem to be increasingly connecting and forming transnational networks and platforms. Against this observation it becomes relevant to study whether transnational alliances can and will play a greater role in fostering democratisation and countering autocratisation. This paper first provides background on the phenomenon of increased transnational networking in sub-Saharan Africa. It then proceeds to present a brief case vignette of the role transnational activist  connections played during Togo’s constitutional reform episode 2017-2019. Findings show that activists purposefully sought transnational allies, but that for the specific case at hand, the links to transnational networks and platforms were still too  nascent. The Togolese regime hence was able to easily obstruct transnational democracy activists from having greater influence.

Amidst resurgent autocratisation around the world, digitalisation makes it easier than ever before for civil society activists and opposition politicians to connect with potential allies in other countries. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, domestic  grassroots social movements seem to be increasingly connecting and forming transnational networks and platforms. Against this observation it becomes relevant to study whether transnational alliances can and will play a greater role in fostering democratisation and countering autocratisation. This paper first provides background on the phenomenon of increased transnational networking in sub-Saharan Africa. It then proceeds to present a brief case vignette of the role transnational activist  connections played during Togo’s constitutional reform episode 2017-2019. Findings show that activists purposefully sought transnational allies, but that for the specific case at hand, the links to transnational networks and platforms were still too  nascent. The Togolese regime hence was able to easily obstruct transnational democracy activists from having greater influence.

Amidst resurgent autocratisation around the world, digitalisation makes it easier than ever before for civil society activists and opposition politicians to connect with potential allies in other countries. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, domestic  grassroots social movements seem to be increasingly connecting and forming transnational networks and platforms. Against this observation it becomes relevant to study whether transnational alliances can and will play a greater role in fostering democratisation and countering autocratisation. This paper first provides background on the phenomenon of increased transnational networking in sub-Saharan Africa. It then proceeds to present a brief case vignette of the role transnational activist  connections played during Togo’s constitutional reform episode 2017-2019. Findings show that activists purposefully sought transnational allies, but that for the specific case at hand, the links to transnational networks and platforms were still too  nascent. The Togolese regime hence was able to easily obstruct transnational democracy activists from having greater influence.

Advocacy is a strategy to fight the root causes of poverty and exclusion, including activities to influence policies, awareness-raising, legal action and networking (van Wessel, Hilhorst, Schulpen, & Biekart, 2020, p. 730). While some of the advocacy  activities might only take place at the domestic level targeting national actors, many domestic issues are framed by civil society organisations (CSOs) as part of transnational campaigns. As development challenges are not confined to national  borders, CSO networks can contribute to policy processes at different policy levels through transnational advocacy. The contribution engages with an advocacy programme that sought cooperation between government and civil society actors,  challenging not only the state–civil society divide, but also the power-laden relationship between donors and implementing partners. Although this approach could not tackle structural imbalances in the aid system, the programme still showed that complementary action between government and civil society actors can contribute to stronger transnational advocacy.

Advocacy is a strategy to fight the root causes of poverty and exclusion, including activities to influence policies, awareness-raising, legal action and networking (van Wessel, Hilhorst, Schulpen, & Biekart, 2020, p. 730). While some of the advocacy  activities might only take place at the domestic level targeting national actors, many domestic issues are framed by civil society organisations (CSOs) as part of transnational campaigns. As development challenges are not confined to national  borders, CSO networks can contribute to policy processes at different policy levels through transnational advocacy. The contribution engages with an advocacy programme that sought cooperation between government and civil society actors,  challenging not only the state–civil society divide, but also the power-laden relationship between donors and implementing partners. Although this approach could not tackle structural imbalances in the aid system, the programme still showed that complementary action between government and civil society actors can contribute to stronger transnational advocacy.

Advocacy is a strategy to fight the root causes of poverty and exclusion, including activities to influence policies, awareness-raising, legal action and networking (van Wessel, Hilhorst, Schulpen, & Biekart, 2020, p. 730). While some of the advocacy  activities might only take place at the domestic level targeting national actors, many domestic issues are framed by civil society organisations (CSOs) as part of transnational campaigns. As development challenges are not confined to national  borders, CSO networks can contribute to policy processes at different policy levels through transnational advocacy. The contribution engages with an advocacy programme that sought cooperation between government and civil society actors,  challenging not only the state–civil society divide, but also the power-laden relationship between donors and implementing partners. Although this approach could not tackle structural imbalances in the aid system, the programme still showed that complementary action between government and civil society actors can contribute to stronger transnational advocacy.

Neoliberal institutionalism frames international institutions as being able to “obviate the need for national power” (Barkin, 2003, p. 334). As the concept of transnational cooperation is informed by the school of neoliberal institutionalism, the question  arises as to how relevant power relations are in settings of transnational cooperation, and in what way power can actually be obviated in these settings? Transnational cooperation formats are often seen as an ideal space for diverse actors to cooperate with each other, but like other political spaces, they are not free of questions of power – instead they are very much shaped by power relations. For the case of Sámi-EU relations as a para-diplomatic and post-colonial relationship, it is decisive to  understand the dimension of power in order to comprehend this relationship and in what way power relations are challenged and changed in these transnational cooperative settings.

Neoliberal institutionalism frames international institutions as being able to “obviate the need for national power” (Barkin, 2003, p. 334). As the concept of transnational cooperation is informed by the school of neoliberal institutionalism, the question  arises as to how relevant power relations are in settings of transnational cooperation, and in what way power can actually be obviated in these settings? Transnational cooperation formats are often seen as an ideal space for diverse actors to cooperate with each other, but like other political spaces, they are not free of questions of power – instead they are very much shaped by power relations. For the case of Sámi-EU relations as a para-diplomatic and post-colonial relationship, it is decisive to  understand the dimension of power in order to comprehend this relationship and in what way power relations are challenged and changed in these transnational cooperative settings.

Neoliberal institutionalism frames international institutions as being able to “obviate the need for national power” (Barkin, 2003, p. 334). As the concept of transnational cooperation is informed by the school of neoliberal institutionalism, the question  arises as to how relevant power relations are in settings of transnational cooperation, and in what way power can actually be obviated in these settings? Transnational cooperation formats are often seen as an ideal space for diverse actors to cooperate with each other, but like other political spaces, they are not free of questions of power – instead they are very much shaped by power relations. For the case of Sámi-EU relations as a para-diplomatic and post-colonial relationship, it is decisive to  understand the dimension of power in order to comprehend this relationship and in what way power relations are challenged and changed in these transnational cooperative settings.

Global development governance has traditionally been dominated by states. Recent trends towards transnationalisation and multi-stakeholderism, however, emphasise non-state actor inclusion in more horizontal structures. This paper investigates the  extent of genuine transnationalisation in global development governance, focussing on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) as an ambitious attempt at transnationalisation. Although we find that the GPEDC  demonstrates a strong commitment to formally incorporating non-state actors, (wealthy) states continue to wield decisive influence. Despite apparent inclusivity, we observe a condition we term “transnationalisation light”: the limited realisation of  substantive non-state stakeholder inclusion. Notably, power imbalances persist between and among state and non-state actors, often favouring Northern stakeholders and exacerbating evolving North/South divisions.

Global development governance has traditionally been dominated by states. Recent trends towards transnationalisation and multi-stakeholderism, however, emphasise non-state actor inclusion in more horizontal structures. This paper investigates the  extent of genuine transnationalisation in global development governance, focussing on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) as an ambitious attempt at transnationalisation. Although we find that the GPEDC  demonstrates a strong commitment to formally incorporating non-state actors, (wealthy) states continue to wield decisive influence. Despite apparent inclusivity, we observe a condition we term “transnationalisation light”: the limited realisation of  substantive non-state stakeholder inclusion. Notably, power imbalances persist between and among state and non-state actors, often favouring Northern stakeholders and exacerbating evolving North/South divisions.

Global development governance has traditionally been dominated by states. Recent trends towards transnationalisation and multi-stakeholderism, however, emphasise non-state actor inclusion in more horizontal structures. This paper investigates the  extent of genuine transnationalisation in global development governance, focussing on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) as an ambitious attempt at transnationalisation. Although we find that the GPEDC  demonstrates a strong commitment to formally incorporating non-state actors, (wealthy) states continue to wield decisive influence. Despite apparent inclusivity, we observe a condition we term “transnationalisation light”: the limited realisation of  substantive non-state stakeholder inclusion. Notably, power imbalances persist between and among state and non-state actors, often favouring Northern stakeholders and exacerbating evolving North/South divisions.

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In collaboration with the Malala Fund and the Atlantic Council, IPI hosted a high-level panel discussion to mark International Women’s Day on March 8th. The event addressed the harrowing reality of millions of women and girls living under systematic oppression at the hands of the Taliban and highlighted the ongoing efforts of Afghan women and the international, legal, and research communities to ensure justice for these abuses—in particular, the momentum around efforts to codify the crime of gender apartheid.

The discussion placed thought-leaders of international law, human rights experts, Afghan women, diplomats, and activists in dialogue to offer insights on the lack of basic rights and fundamental freedoms for women and girls in Afghanistan since the Taliban’s repressive regime took over in August 2021. Panelists shed light on the crimes being perpetrated by the Taliban, called on the international community to recognize these crimes, and discussed developing tools for accountability. The event also offered a platform for the testimony of women and girls impacted by the Taliban alongside that of legal and policy experts on gender apartheid.

Participants heard directly from Afghan women and girls in the audio recordings of the initiative “Inside Afghanistan’s Gender Apartheid,” an interactive audio timeline and collaborative effort between the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and the Civic Engagement Project. The initiative, which was publicly launched at the event, documents the first-hand accounts of life under gender apartheid and analyzes the impact of the Taliban’s increasingly entrenched and institutionalized legal system that curtails freedom, stifles potential, and erodes dignity.

Deputy Permanent Representative of Mexico Alicia Buenrostro Massieu delivered opening remarks, situating the deteriorating state of Afghan women and girls within the larger international imperative to achieve and protect gender equality for all. Articulating the global backlash on women’s rights she instructed, “the pushback is intensifying and so must our response…it is high time to end the systematic exclusion of women and girls.”

Nayera Kohistani, women’s rights defender and teacher, spoke from her personal experience of “dehumanization” and being reduced to a “second-class citizen…with no human agency or dignity.” While she painted a vivid and grim picture of the situation that Afghan women face on the ground where “the Taliban has criminalized [their] whole existence and identity,” she also shared details of Afghan resistance and protest.

Nobel Peace Laureate Malala Yousafzai labeled the event a true moment of solidarity. She drew attention to the technologies of “highly calculated policies of oppression” that the Taliban relies on, noting that Afghanistan is the only country in the world that forbids girls from completing an education. She emphasized the need for solidarity from the global community with the girls who are “having their childhood and their future stolen” to not only change the conditions for Afghan girls but to also communicate to all girls around the world that their education, humanity, and human rights matter.

Panelists Penelope Andrews, anti-apartheid expert and Professor of Law and Director of the Racial Justice Project at New York Law School, and Dorothy Estrada-Tanck, Chair of the UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls, provided the legal and policy expertise on the codification of gender apartheid in international law. Drawing from a depth of knowledge on racial apartheid in South Africa, Professor Andrews identified the situation of women in Afghanistan as unequivocal gender apartheid based on the evidence of systemic, vicious, and comprehensive oppression and denial of basic civil and political rights on every level. She made an actionable request: include gender apartheid in the draft convention on crimes against humanity. To galvanize and focus efforts, she said, naming a harm is one of the most influential tools available so there is an imperative to recognize what is happening to Afghan women clearly: “This is gender apartheid – calling this what it is, we can create the conditions for people to be able to live dignified lives.”

Dorothy Estrada-Tanck identified the explicit codification of gender apartheid in Afghanistan as a priority for the UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls. While there are legal instruments currently available to address the rights violations women in Afghanistan are facing based on human rights tools built over the last 80 years, Estrada-Tanck pinpointed their insufficiency to identify and frame the mass nature and scale of this “state-sponsored, institutionalized and systematic oppression and subjugation.” Recognizing and codifying this as a crime against humanity is necessary to accurately name and understand the full scope of the elements of this regime and most importantly, to trigger action from the international community. Calling on the international community’s not just moral, but legal obligation to prevent and combat this crisis, she concluded, “This is a test for the multilateral system, where are we going to draw the red line?”

The event was co-sponsored by the Global Justice Center, Rawadari, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, and the Permanent Missions of Mexico and Malta.

Opening/Closing Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and Chief Executive Officer, International Peace Institute
H.E. Vanessa Frazier, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Malta to the UN
H.E. Alicia Buenrostro Massieu, Deputy Permanent Representative of Mexico to the UN

Speakers:
Malala Yousafzai, Nobel Peace Laureate
Nayera Kohistani, Afghan Activist and Expert
Penelope Andrews, John Marshall Harlan II Professor of Law & Director, Racial Justice Project, New York Law School
Dorothy Estrada-Tanck, Chair, UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls

Moderator:
Jomana Karadsheh, International Correspondent, CNN

Zu den Ergebnissen der jüngsten Sitzung des Rates der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) äußert sich Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Die EZB hätte ein klares Signal für eine Kehrtwende ihrer Geldpolitik und eine baldige Zinssenkung geben sollen. Die Entscheidung der EZB und ihre Kommunikation sind eine verpasste Chance, mehr Klarheit zu schaffen und die Finanzierungsbedingungen zu verbessern. Damit bleibt die Geldpolitik eine der wichtigsten Bremsen für die Konjunktur und für die schwachen Investitionen in der Eurozone und in Deutschland.

Die EZB läuft Gefahr, ihren Fehler von vor zwei Jahren zu wiederholen und zu spät zu handeln, denn Geldpolitik entfaltet ihre volle Wirkung erst nach anderthalb bis zwei Jahren. Die Inflation in der Eurozone ist deutlich gesunken und die Inflationserwartungen sind schon jetzt konsistent mit der Preisstabilität. Die von der EZB immer wieder betonte Sorge vor sogenannten Zweitrundeneffekten – vor allem, dass die Inflation zu höheren Löhnen und einer stärkeren Nachfrage führt – hat sich bisher nicht bewahrheitet. Es ist richtig, dass Löhne steigen und auch die Lohnstückkosten zulegen. Aber dies sind notwendige temporäre Aufholeffekte. Es gibt keinerlei Anzeichen für permanente Effekte, beispielsweise durch eine Lohn-Preis-Spirale, durch die sich eine höhere Inflation verfestigen könnte.

Die Wahrscheinlichkeit ist heute höher, dass die EZB ihr Ziel der Preisstabilität über die nächsten drei Jahre unterschießen wird, als dass die Inflation zu hoch bleiben wird. Dies würde nicht nur die Glaubwürdigkeit der EZB erodieren, sondern könnte auch der Wirtschaft einen empfindlichen Schaden zufügen.

Nach einem mehrjährigen und intensiven Gesetzgebungsprozess auf EU-Ebene tritt heute der Digital Market Act in Kraft, der den großen Tech-Unternehmen Verpflichtungen auferlegt, um den Missbrauch ihrer Marktmacht zu verhindern. Wettbewerbsexperte Tomaso Duso, Leiter der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte im DIW Berlin, kommentiert das Gesetz wie folgt:

Mit dem Digital Market Act (DMA) tritt endlich eine Regelung in Kraft, die die Marktstellung der großen Digitalkonzerne aufgreift und faire Wettbewerbsbedingungen im digitalen Binnenmarkt zu gewährleisten verspricht. Sechs Tech-Giganten wurden zunächst als Gatekeeper definiert: Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, ByteDance, Meta und Microsoft, aber auch andere Unternehmen wie Booking.com stehen auf der Beobachtungsliste. Diese Unternehmen bieten Dienste an, die für jeden Anbieter, der in der digitalen Welt Geschäfte machen will, unverzichtbar sind. Aufgrund ihrer zentralen Stellung und ihrer großen Marktmacht müssen sie künftig besondere Pflichten erfüllen und sich an Verhaltens- und Datenzugangsregeln halten. Anders als im Wettbewerbsrecht, wo die Beweislast bei den Behörden liegt, die nachweisen müssen, ob Unternehmen gegen die Wettbewerbsregeln verstoßen haben, wurden im DMA spezifische Pflichten im Voraus definiert. Deren Einhaltung müssen die großen Tech-Unternehmen nun durch Compliance Reports nachweisen.  

In den vergangenen Jahren waren die Instrumente der Wettbewerbspolitik überfordert und zu langsam, um der enormen Dynamik und der Komplexität dieser Märkte gerecht zu werden. Mit der neuen Regulierung hat Europa Maßstäbe gesetzt, um den Wettbewerb auf den immer zentraler werdenden digitalen Plattformmärkten durch klarere und effektivere Regeln zu schützen. Jetzt ist die Zeit der Durchsetzung gekommen: Insbesondere die Europäische Kommission, aber auch die nationalen Wettbewerbsbehörden wie das Bundeskartellamt in Deutschland sind gefordert, eine neue und sehr komplexe Aufgabe zu übernehmen, für die es viel Mut und Entschlossenheit braucht. Es geht um die Sicherung von Wettbewerb, Innovation und Wohlstand, aber auch um ein Stück Demokratie.

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In a timely discussion ahead of the 68th session of the Commission on the Status of Women on March 6th, IPI, in partnership with the Nordic Africa Institute, cohosted a hybrid policy forum. Panelists assessed the role of the Elected 10 (E10) member states in influencing UN Security Council policy outcomes and outlined strategies and challenges for these non-permanent states to advance the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda within the council. Researchers, policymakers, and former and current members of the E10 highlighted successful efforts and opportunities for growth alike to promote the WPS agenda in the face of an increasingly challenging global context. The discussion was anchored in the principles of Resolution 1325 as speakers offered their insights around the themes of centering women’s participation in peace processes, the importance of national and regional context, and the need for innovative tactics to advance the WPS agenda.

Ireland and Norway shared their best practices and lessons learned as former E10 members, emphasizing the importance of implementation beyond rhetoric. Reflecting on Norway’s recent tenure on the Security Council, Permanent Representative of Norway Merete Fjeld Brattested identified three key ways that Norway worked on Women, Peace, and Security including mainstreaming WPS language into all Security Council products, supporting and strengthening cross-regional collaboration, and prioritizing the safe and meaningful participation of women civil society briefers in formal and informal meetings.

Permanent Representative of Ireland Fergal Mythen spoke from his experience as an initiating member of the Presidency Trio of Ireland, Kenya, and Mexico: “Shoehorning women, peace, and security into one week in October is tokenizing—there needs to be more implementation, more meaningful and sustained participation of women.” He highlighted the elements of a cross-regional approach and a commitment to action as essential to the successes of the Trio, but noted the inclusion of women in peace processes as an area with much more room for improvement.

Representing the perspective of current elected member of the E10 and newly elected co-chair of the Informal Expert Group on Women, Peace, and Security, Sierra Leone, First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone Roselynn Finda Senesi offered a lucid set of objectives and actionable items. Working from the foundational idea that, “women on the frontlines don’t want good rhetoric, they need action, accountability, and change,” her objectives include: an improved collaborative link between the African Union and WPS actors in the region; processes of accountability to increase the representation of women in peace processes; clear, specific, and decisive language on WPS; and strong support and protection of women civil society briefers.

The event provided an opportunity to share the findings of the Nordic Africa Institute’s multi-year research project, “Shattering Glass: How Elected Members of the UN Security Council Fight for Women, Peace and Security,” undertaken with the Peace Research Institute Oslo. The project assessed the dynamics, politics, and processes that affect the WPS agenda in the UN Security Council, posing the question: How do the members of the E10 advance the WPS agenda within the council?

Based on this research, Louise Olsson, Research Director, Global Norms, Politics and Society, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), commented on the examples provided by other panelists and presented insights on the broader structure of the Security Council and the opportunities therein to influence WPS outcomes. One of her conclusions was that as the WPS agenda becomes further integrated into the council, the individual profile, including the position, credibility, history, and interests, of an elected member state as they come into the Security Council is an important factor in their ability to advance WPS objectives. Another factor to consider in the further incorporation of WPS is the resulting parallel rise in resource demands.

Independent Consultant and former Director of Programmes, Futurelect, Sithembile Mbete, reflected on the role of South Africa as a three-time elected member of the Security Council. Illustrating the geographic and regional significance of an E10 member articulated by many panelists, she spoke of how the nexus between domestic and foreign policy concerns, the implication of South Africa’s national interests with the interests of the African continent, and its unique history has shaped its approach to foreign policy and the advancement of WPS in its terms within the Council. One of the innovations of the E10 that Dr. Mbete highlighted was the “reform by stealth” of the Security Council.

The event concluded with a question-and-answer session open to audience members and closing remarks from Angela Muvumba Sellström, Senior Researcher of the Nordic Africa Institute and Project Lead of “E10, WPS, and the UN Security Council.”

Opening remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute
Therese Sjömander Magnusson, Director, Nordic Africa Institute (NAI)

Speakers:
H.E. Merete Fjeld Brattested, Permanent Representative of Norway to the UN
H.E. Fergal Mythen, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN
Roselynn Finda Senesi, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the UN
Louise Olsson, Research Director, Global Norms, Politics and Society, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)
Sithembile Mbete, Independent Consultant, former Director of Programmes, Futurelect
Pablo Castillo Díaz, Policy Specialist on Peace and Security, UN Women (virtual)

Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of WPS, International Peace Institute

Closing remarks:
Angela Muvumba Sellström, Senior Researcher and Project Lead, “E10, WPS and the UN Security Council,” Nordic Africa Institute (NAI)