Russia & CIS

The Embassy of Azerbaijan in Switzerland and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Switzerland jointly organized a business forum in Switzerland which was attended 85 Swiss businessmen representing such diverse industries as energy agriculture construction tourism ICT healthcare and the food industry

Here’s the second in a series of policy briefs on Russian strategic culture and leadership decision-making, written for a collaborative project organized by the Marshall Center with support from the Russia Strategy Initiative. This one is on Russian strategic goals in a Nordic crisis. With permission from the Marshall Center, I am posting the full text here, though please go to the Marshall Center website if you would prefer to read a PDF version. The first of these briefs, focusing on the Baltics, was posted last April.

Executive Summary

• This policy brief examines how Russian strategic culture operates in the distinct geographic and geopolitical environment of the Nordic region. This analysis is based on a model of Russian decision-making in crisis situations that describes Russian leaders as prospect theory players who take greater risks to prevent anticipated defeats than they do to pursue potential opportunities. They seek to prevent foreign policy defeats that could translate into a loss of power in the region, a loss of great power status, or, in some cases, political defeats at home.
• Russia’s strategic objectives in the Nordic region are thus focused primarily on maintaining the status quo rather than changing the strategic environment or expanding Russian influence in a significant way. The primary objective is simply to maintain Russian influence in the region. Russia is also working to prevent the formal admission of Sweden and Finland to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to deter Sweden and Finland from joining NATO in fighting against Russia in the event of a conflict.
• We can expect Russia to act cautiously in the Nordic region because it is not facing a loss situation. Russian leaders will tend to pursue their goals through nonmilitary means and will be careful to avoid unintended escalation. The one exception to their preference for nonescalation would occur in the event of an attack on Russian territory, which would create a loss situation for Russia and therefore allow for a robust defense and/or counterattack.

Introduction

 This policy brief, the second in a series that addresses how Russian strategic culture can explain Russian foreign policy behavior, examines how Russian strategic culture operates in the distinct geographic and geopolitical environment of the Nordic region. The Nordic region is presented as a case study to generate conclusions with regard to the drivers of Russian strategic behavior, especially the factors that incentivize or constrain risk-taking.

Overview of Russian Strategic Decision-Making

This analysis is based on a model of crisis decision-making developed by the Russian analysis team at CNA. As an abbreviated version of this model has already been presented in a previous article in this series, what follows is a brief summary. The model presents Russia as a prospect theory player on the international scene that takes greater risks to prevent anticipated defeats than it does to pursue potential opportunities.

Russian strategic objectives are rooted in and derived from the following three principal Russian foreign policy motivations:

• Maximizing security, which results in the pursuit of extended defense and has been the main driver for Russian aggression in its near abroad and Russia’s military modernization at home.
• Russia’s desire for a privileged sphere of influence as an effort to achieve regional hegemony based on the goal of maximizing its overall power.
• Maintaining great power status in the international system by ending U.S. primacy and thereby upending the unipolar nature of power distribution in the international system in favor of a multipolar one. However, this motivation does not necessarily mean that Russia wants to challenge the United States directly, given the power disparity.

Russian leaders prefer to achieve their political goals through coercion and threats of violence, rather than actual violence. Russian strategy in a conflict seeks to establish escalation dominance over potential adversaries by convincing them that Russia is able and willing to use force in pursuit of its objectives. When pressed to use force, Russia tends to use the minimum amount of force required to achieve its objectives in order to minimize losses and costs. This approach also allows Russia to maintain the threat of bringing in additional force if the adversary does not accept Russian objectives. Russia is happy to use force multipliers, such as local militias and mercenaries, to absorb the bulk of combat losses. Ambiguity is used to maintain plausible deniability and thereby slow adversary decision-making. Finally, Russia seeks to deter external actors from interfering in a conflict in order to prevent escalation.

Russia’s Strategic Assessment of the Nordic Region

Russia’s strategic calculus suggests that in the event of a crisis in the Nordic region, Russia will focus on the geographic and political environment in the region in determining its strategic objectives and minimum and maximum goals for the situation.

The geography of the Baltic Sea would play a particularly important role in Russia’s assessment of a potential maritime conflict scenario. The geography of the Baltic Sea in many ways mirrors that of the Black Sea, except that the geography favors NATO and its partners, rather than Russia. Like the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea is enclosed, with passage restricted by the Danish Straits. Although the Oresund and Fehmarn Belt are considered international straits, as governed by the Copenhagen Convention of 1857, they could easily be closed by NATO forces in the event of a conflict, effectively preventing Russia from bringing naval reinforcements to the Baltic Sea from the Northern Fleet or the Mediterranean. In addition, a series of islands can provide effective control over the sea itself. Bornholm (controlled by Denmark), Gotland (Sweden) and the Aland Islands (Finland), can be used to control the sea lanes in the Baltic Sea as well as the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia. These islands thus can play the same role in the Baltic as Crimea does in the Black Sea. Furthermore, Estonia and Finland effectively control entrance to the Gulf of Finland and therefore to St. Petersburg.

Although Western analysts often paint Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave as a militarized territory that threatens the security of the NATO member states in the region, Russian planners view the region as a vulnerable outpost surrounded by potentially well-armed NATO states. As a result of these factors, Russia feels that the region’s geography is relatively negatively set up for Russian forces to act in the event of a conflict with NATO and its partners.

Russia’s political assessment also emphasizes the potential challenges of a military conflict in the region. Although Sweden and Finland are ostensibly neutral, Russian leaders fully expect them to be involved on the side of NATO in any conflict between NATO and Russia. They point to statements that the two countries have made, such as the European Union (EU) solidarity clause and the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) effort joined by Sweden and Finland in 2017, that strongly imply such a scenario. They also note that the two countries have been strengthening their military forces in recent years and have increasingly integrated these forces with NATO. Both Sweden and Finland have increased their frequency of participation in NATO exercises. These developments are seen in Russia as clear signals that neither country will stay out of the fight in the event of a conflict.

On the other side, Swedish planners fear that Russia might preemptively attack Gotland in a conflict in order to take control of the middle section of the Baltic Sea. They have responded by placing troops on the island for the first time in over a decade. Although the force is only the size of a regiment, it is meant as a symbol of Swedish intent in combination with the reintroduction of military conscription. Russia has decried this move as a step toward the further militarization of the region.

Finland’s history of relations with Russia makes its leaders cautious about exacerbating tensions with Moscow. They point to their losses in previous wars with the Soviet Union in the 1930s and 1940s, which resulted in the policy of “Finlandization” that effectively meant that Finland did not have full control over its foreign policy orientation until the end of the Cold War, a period of over 40 years. As a result, Finnish leaders have generally avoided hostile rhetoric against Russia while retaining more contacts with Moscow than other countries in the region. Furthermore, most of the Finnish population remains opposed to their country joining NATO. Although Finland has supported EU sanctions against Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, it has retained significant trade relations and has a sizable expatriate Russian population in Helsinki. Russia has proved adept at using trade links and expatriate Russian populations in other European countries to undermine anti-Russian policies. Similar tactics could be used in the Nordic region.

Russia’s Strategic Objectives

Russia’s strategic objectives in the Nordic region are thus focused primarily on maintaining the status quo rather than changing the strategic environment or expanding Russian influence in a significant way. The primary objective is simply to maintain Russian influence in the region. To this end, Russia has undertaken a propaganda effort to show the citizens of these countries that Russia does not threaten them. Russia has pursued political influence operations to prevent the growth of negative political attitudes toward Russia. To this end, there are concerns that it has used the Russian expatriate population and other pro-Russian activists in the region, especially in Finland, as a supportive element. It has also provided support to political parties and societal organizations critical of the EU and especially of NATO as a way of limiting the trend toward closer cooperation between NATO and the two nonmember Nordic states. Russia has also sought to maintain and enhance economic linkages with Nordic states, most notably through the strategic use of its role as an energy supplier to Finland. It is estimated that forty percent of Finland’s energy comes from Russia, and Russia has taken steps in recent years to make the import of electricity cheaper for Finland in order to maintain that connection.

In regard to military issues, Russia has worked to prevent the formal admission of Sweden and Finland to NATO. To this end, it has used a classic carrot-and-stick approach. Russian media has highlighted popular opposition to NATO membership within these countries, noting the likelihood of negative political consequences for any government that chooses to pursue NATO membership. Russian officials have threatened political, economic, and military consequences for Sweden and Finland should they choose to formally join NATO. The implicit threat is that not only would cheap energy supplies end and trade be negatively affected, but Russia could use tactics it has pursued elsewhere, such as cyberattacks and funding of antigovernment groups, to undermine political stability in these countries. Russian media have also suggested the possibility that Russia might offer inducements to Sweden and Finland for remaining neutral or at least not joining NATO formally.

In the event of a regional crisis, Russian leaders would seek to deter Sweden and Finland from joining NATO in fighting against Russia. They would seek to preempt the threat by neutralizing Nordic militaries through a Russian military buildup in the region combined with the threat that Russia would target these countries’ territories should fighting break out. Russia’s minimum goal in a Nordic crisis is thus to maintain and exacerbate existing divisions in the Nordic states that prevent them from seeking to join NATO and to inhibit further integration of their military forces with NATO forces short of membership. Russia’s maximum goal is to reverse the existing close integration of the military forces of the Nordic states with those of the United States and NATO and ideally to have these states recommit to neutrality in deed as well as in word.

Russia’s Vulnerabilities

Russia’s vulnerabilities in a Nordic crisis are to a large extent the same as its vulnerabilities in other regions, though there are some aspects particular to this region. The Russian military has relatively few forces in northwestern Russia because its main focus in recent years has been on securing the Caucasus, reinforcing its border with Ukraine, and building up forces in the Arctic and the Far North. Russian forces in northwestern Russia are not equipped for a short-notice conventional conflict, with relatively few mechanized units and a command structure not set up to fight a war in this region. As noted above, the geography of the region makes a maritime conflict relatively complicated for Russia, though that disadvantage may be mitigated in a broader engagement due to the Nordic region’s proximity to Russia and the relatively long border with Finland.

Russia is hampered by its lack of allies in the European theater. Although Belarus is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and a Russian military partner, it would be unlikely to actively participate in a Russian military campaign. It might, however, reluctantly allow Russia to use its territory as a staging area in a conflict with NATO. Recent political tensions about the extent to which Belarus can be expected to integrate with Russia have highlighted the limits of the relationship between Moscow and Minsk. Other allies are even less likely to get involved. Neither Russia’s other CSTO allies nor China will want to get involved in a fight with NATO and (with the exception of China) would not be able to contribute significantly to the effort.

As with any conflict with a powerful but distant adversary, Russian leaders would be concerned that the overall force balance between Russia and NATO would become highly unfavorable in a longer-term conflict. For this reason, they would want to keep the conflict short and ensure that any conflict in the region would not result in horizontal escalation, which could expose Russian territory to defeat by the much larger and stronger U.S. military in a regional or even global conflict. They would be particularly concerned about the possibility that the conflict could spread to other theaters, especially the Mediterranean, which would cause Russia’s forces to be stretched thin in a fight on multiple fronts.

Finally, Russian leaders may be concerned about the impact of any kind of extended or costly intervention on Russian domestic politics. They will want to make sure that they avoid costly and long-lasting entanglements that might result in the Russian public turning against the intervention. Such a situation would be especially likely if Western states pursued strong economic countermeasures that had a direct negative effect on the Russian economy or on Russians’ ability to travel to Europe. In particular, this scenario would be a problem in a conflict that the Russian public might see as a war of choice rather than of necessity, especially one that becomes costly in either financial or human terms. For this reason, Russian leaders will seek to avoid both defeat and long-term entanglement in a Nordic conflict, as these circumstances would increase the likelihood of a strong negative effect at the domestic level.

Red Lines and (De-)Escalation Drivers

As in the Baltics, Russian leaders would view a crisis in the Nordic region primarily as a potential opportunity to realize strategic gains rather than as a threat to Russia’s vital interests. As a result, they would consider the stakes to be relatively low in most situations. This assessment would lead to a strategy of managing the crisis carefully in order to keep costs low and avoid triggering a vigorous response by NATO. Although it is important for Russia to keep Sweden and Finland out of NATO, Russia would not be likely to mount a military response if the two Nordic states take steps toward that goal. Concerns about the vulnerabilities described above, especially the danger of horizontal escalation to other theaters and the risk of loss of popularity at home due to high casualties or serious financial impact from a conflict, would encourage Russian leaders to de-escalate hostilities in the event of a crisis in the Nordic region.

The one exception to this calculus would occur in the event of a NATO attack on Russian territory. Such an attack would lead to escalation as it would pose a direct threat to the homeland and regime survival while uniting the Russian population in defense of their homeland. The Russian people have shown repeatedly that they are far more likely to accept sacrifices to defend the country than to engage in a war of choice, so Russia should be expected to escalate any conflict where control of its own territory is at stake.

Conclusion

Russia’s main peacetime goals in the Nordic region involve preventing further military integration of the Nordic states with NATO. The primary means to carry out these goals are political and cyber in nature, rather than military. In a conflict, Russia’s main goals would be similar: to keep the Nordic states out of any conflict with NATO or to keep NATO out of any conflict with a Nordic state. Escalation poses serious risks to Russia, so Russian leaders would be unlikely to initiate a conflict in the region. Russia would be much more willing to defend itself if threatened or attacked but otherwise would limit itself to using indirect means to weaken the Nordic states and to undermine their unity with their NATO partners.

Trade between Azerbaijan and Russia saw a 23 percent growth in 7 months of this year said Azerbaijans Minister of Economy Shahin Mustafayev He pointed out big potential for expanding the bilateral trade describing it as one of the key priorities of AzerbaijanRussia cooperation

Cristiano Ronaldo added another record to his collection after becoming the alltime leading goalscorer in European Championship qualifiers SportStar reported

Azerbaijan and Russias Sverdlovsk region are negotiating to create a joint venture for the production of cranes Azerbaijani Minister of Economy Shahin Mustafayev told reporters in Baku Trend reports on Sept 11

The Azerbaijani documentary The First Success of the Nobel Brothers has been awarded with the title of Honor in the Best Foreign Language Documentary Short Film category at the Internacional De Cortometrajes Libelula Dorada Festival in the Dominican Republic

An official opening ceremony was held at the Azerbaijan British College on September 11 to mark the beginning of the new school year Trend reports referring to Azerbaijani state oil company SOCAR

Russia has weaned off the threat of default by fully securing possible lump payments on its public debt. In doing so, Russia has also waved off the threat of political blackmail through sanctions. For the first time since 2014, Russia's net government debt has fallen below zero into the negative zone. This became possible owing to record reserves that have covered the debt of the state, RBC said. Net debt shows company's ability to pay the entire debt at the time of analysis. To do this, specialists compare the size of long-term and short-term borrowings with available highly liquid assets.In a nutshell, if Russia found itself in need to pay off its debts immediately, it would be possible to do it at the expense of government deposits at the Central Bank and commercial banks.Oleg Alexandrov, director of CEFK GROUP, told Pravda.Ru, that such an  achievement may show positive influence on Russia's international ratings. "The state can now direct more investments into economy, including for infrastructure development," Oleg Alexandrov noted. According to the expert, the changing structure of prices on hydrocarbons, Russia may switch to developing non-oil exports and the non-oil sector of economy. Russia can now enter the borrowing market for much more favorable conditions. Gazprom, for example, has placed its bonds at 1.1% per annum. Naftogaz of Ukraine - at 12% per annum. The Ukrainian company must thus pay a higher interest to compensate investors' risk. Russia's Ministry of Finance announced that it would enter the borrowing market if it could borrow at lower interest rates than existing ones - 3.4% per annum.The accumulation of public debt in developed countries and issuing countries, especially in the United States, is not seen as a dangerous phenomenon, because those countries profit from selling their currency as a commodity. In order to repay and service previous debts, new ones are issued at lower rates. In other words, new loans keep their economies afloat. For those countries that maintain complicated relationships with the United States, the accumulation of public debt is deemed dangerous. They may lose a possibility to refinance it being unable to access short-term borrowings, for example, as a result of appropriate sanctions. Russia experienced this situation in 1998 due to the crisis of the global financial system. Russia experienced default, the collapse of the national currency rate and the impoverishment of the population.As usual, there is another side to the issue of debt stability. Against the backdrop of growing state reserves, the Russian economy is showing low growth rates. In the first half of 2019, Russia's GDP grew by only 0.7% in annual terms. The Russian government is running a tight budget policy, both in terms of control over government spending and the tax burden. The budget builds up savings by withdrawing assets from the private sector.In developed countries the debt burden grows disproportionately to economic success. There is stagnation both in the USA and in Europe. The only solution to debt problems of developed countries is devaluation of reserve currencies. Such a move will lead to inflation and a decline in the welfare of the population of issuing countries. The dollar may lose its reserve currency status in the world, which will be very difficult to restore.

Russia's state-of-the-art narrow-body passenger aircraft MC-21 took part in the flight program of the MAKS-2019 air show in the town of Zhukovsky near Moscow. The flight lasted for about five minutes, with presidents of Russia and Turkey, Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan watching. Putin and Erdogan took part in the opening ceremony of the air show. It was the first time, when the new airliner demonstrated its beauty in the sky to the eyes of the general public. MAKS-2019 will demonstrate three MC-21 aircraft, one of them with interior design. The first test flight of the aircraft was held in 2017; the serial production of the MC-21 is to begin in 2021.Aeroflot will become the main operator of the new aircraft. The airline has already signed a contract for the supply of 50 of these aircraft with another contract for 35 more aircraft under development.Russia has been working on the MC-21 for more than ten years. Only one version of this mid-range narrow-body airliner is being developed - the MC-21-300 with a capacity of 211 seats in the two-class layout. The Irkut Corporation created the aircraft in cooperation with many foreign companies. In 2018, the company faced difficulties with the deliveries of composite materials because of sanctions. Large elongated composite wings reduce fuel consumption, thereby increasing the economic efficiency of the aircraft.The USA imposed sanctions on JSC Aerocomposite (part of the United Aircraft Corporation, UAC) and some other companies related to the same industry profile in the fall of 2018. Foreign suppliers (Hexcel (USA) and Toray Industries (Japan)) thus stopped selling composite raw materials to two Russian companies. As a result, Irkut Corporation had to localize the production of components and systems of the aircraft. The level of localization is expected to reach 97% by 2020, and the aircraft will not depend on foreign supplies. The total cost of the project until 2025 is estimated at 437 billion rubles. On July 22, 2019, the head of Rostec, Sergei Chemezov, asked President Vladimir Putin for another 300 billion rubles for the financial recovery of all UAC companies to implement the MC-21 project and other programs of the Russian aviation industry. The Sukhoi SuperJet 100, Airbus A350 900 and Embraer E195 are also to be demonstrated as part of the flight program of the MAKS-2019 air show. As for military aviation, one will be able to see  the fifth-generation fighter Su-57, the latest MiG-35 of 4 ++ generation, modern combat aircraft Su-35S, Su-34, the Be-200 amphibious aircraft. For the first time, naval aviation pilots of the Russian Aerospace Forces will present the program "Air combat with elements of super-maneuverability." The pilots will fly two Su-30SM fighters for the program.MAKS-2019 will also showcase the model of the Russian-Chinese wide-body long-range CR929 aircraft. Visitors will be able to see the cockpit, as well as elements of the first, business and economy class cabins.Foreign aircraft manufacturers will demonstrate in Russia the short-haul airliner Embraer E-195E2 in the Tech Lion livery, the Pilatus PC-24 business jet, and the light-engine Piper M500 aircraft. The Airbus A350-900, which was previously demonstrated at MAKS air shows, will be presented this year with new Airbus Connected Experience solutions. The solutions are designed to raise the level of passenger comfort and improve their interaction with the crew.The fifth-generation Russian fighter aircraft Sukhoi Su-57 will be presented for the first time both in the static and in the flight program. The Ilyushin Il-112VE light military transport aircraft will be another new model of military aircraft. The convertible Il-78M-90A air tanker, more than 160 modern models of military equipment and latest high-precision aviation weapons will be shown at MAKS-2019 as well.The range of products manufactured by Russian Helicopters will be widely represented too. Visitors will be able to take a look at the world's heaviest Mi-26T2V helicopter, the Mi-38T transport assault helicopter, Mi-171A2 and Mi-17V-5 medium-sized helicopters, Mi-24P and Mi-35M transport-combat helicopters, combat reconnaissance and Ka-52 Alligator assault chopper, light helicopters Ansat and Ka-226T. Ka-52K and the export version of the "Night Hunter" - Mi-28NE will be on display on the ground.Russia's Almaz-Antey aerospace defense company will showcase full-scale models of vehicles of the Tor anti-aircraft missile system and a new system for countering unmanned aerial vehicles. The company will also show the S-400 Triumph and Antei-2500 long-range systems, the Viking and Vityaz medium-range systems, and other products.

Russian President Vladimir Putin made an important statement after the meeting with members of Russia's Security Council. The meeting was dedicated to USA's recent missile tests. Full transcript of Putin's statement below:"On August 18, the United States conducted the test launch of a ground-based cruise missile, which, according to the US Defense Department, struck a target at a distance of over 500 kilometers."Such weapons are classified as prohibited under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles from 1987. In addition, the use of the MK-41 universal launcher during the test fully confirms the validity of the claims that the Russian side had expressed to the United States during the period when the treaty was valid. "We have repeatedly pointed out that the deployment of such launchers on land by the Americans, on the air defense base in Romania, and their imminent deployment in Poland comes as a direct and substantial, flagrant violation of the INF Treaty."The Americans have stubbornly rejected this, claiming that ground-based MK-41 launchers were allegedly unable to launch Tomahawk sea-based cruise missiles. Now the fact of their violation is evident, it is impossible to dispute it - they spoke about it themselves."And of course, a question arises: how do we now understand what is going to be deployed in Romania and in Poland? Is it going to be missile defense systems or missile attack systems of sufficiently long range?"It is noteworthy that the tests of the missile with characteristics prohibited under the Treaty took place only 16 days after Washington completed the denunciation of the said Treaty. It is obvious that it was not improvisation - it became another link in a chain of events that had been planned and long time in advance. "This can only confirm the validity of our concerns that we have previously expressed. We had the information that the United States had long been engaged in the creation of weapons prohibited by the INF Treaty, and we had repeatedly pointed this out to our partners."But in order to rectify this unacceptable situation and return to the observation of the Treaty, the Americans orchestrated a propaganda campaign about Russia's alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the said Treaty. As it is now obvious to everyone, its only purpose was to cover up both the work that Washington was carrying out in violation of the Treaty and the initial intention to pull out from it."All this leaves no doubt about the true plans of the United States. Having disposed of the established restrictions, they wanted to have a free hand to deploy previously prohibited missiles in various regions of the world. American politicians of a very high rank say that the deployment of new systems can be started from the Asia-Pacific region, but this also affects our fundamental interests, because all this is close to Russian borders."As you know, we never wanted, do not want and will not get involved in the costly arms race that will be destructive for our economy. Let me remind you that Russia takes a rather modest, seventh place in the world in terms of defense spending after the United States of America, the People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, France and Japan."Our development of state-of-the-art and second-to-none arms systems was caused and, one may say,  provoked by USA's unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty on the Limitation of Missile Defense Systems in 2003. We were simply forced and were obliged, of course, to ensure the security of our people and our country. We do it now and will certainly do it in the future."At the same time, bearing in mind the newly emerging circumstances, I instruct the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and other relevant departments to analyze the level of threat posed by the aforementioned actions of the United States to our country and take comprehensive measures to prepare a symmetrical response."Russia will remain open to an equal and constructive dialogue with the United States of America to restore confidence and strengthen international security."

New analytical article up at War on the Rocks, co-authored with Kasey Stricklin. Here’s a preview of the introduction.

It is widely acknowledged that general and flag officers are important actors. Senior uniformed leaders are, of course, crucial in determining the trajectory of a country’s military development and in some cases even of its foreign policy. Yet, with vanishingly few exceptions, even those Americans who closely track national and international security focus little on the generals and admirals of other nations’ militaries. In the case of Russia, the U.S. national security community has an almost comical obsession with Gen. Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of the Russian armed forces, and his eponymous (but largely fictional) doctrine. But that’s where it ends.

American national security analysts and practitioners would be well advised to follow who is rising to the senior ranks of the Russian military. Over the decades, these leaders have been important in shaping the trajectory of a foe that was once America’s most formidable and remains, arguably, its most troublesome. From the decision to avoid developing aircraft carriers in favor of cruisers and submarines during the Cold War to the debate over the primacy of ground forces or strategic rocket forces in the post-Soviet period, Soviet and Russian generals and admirals have played critical roles. Understanding the background and preferences of those who are likely to be the next set of leaders of the Russian armed forces thus can give analysts a better idea of how it will develop over the next two decades.

….

In May 2019, Vladimir Putin announced a transition in the senior leadership of the Russian Navy. Adm. Vladimir Korolev, having served as commander in chief of the Russian Navy for three years, retired and was replaced by Adm. Nikolay Yevmenov, who had served as commander of the Northern Fleet since 2016. Vice Adm. Aleksandr Moiseyev moved from his command of the Black Sea Fleet to replace Yevmenov at the Northern Fleet and Vice Adm. Igor Osipov was appointed as the new head of the Black Sea Fleet. Some commentators were surprised by the appointment, including one analyst who suggested that Moiseyev seemed a stronger candidate on paper. Now is therefore an opportune time to examine the career factors that lead to the selection of Russian naval leaders and to make some predictions about who is likely to rise to the highest positions in the Russian Navy in the coming years.

Our analysis of career trajectories of senior Russian naval officers highlights the career mileposts that increase the likelihood of promotion to the senior-most positions in the Russian Navy. These mileposts also help to explain why Yevmenov was appointed to head the service ahead of Moiseyev. In fact, our initial research, completed in early 2018, highlighted Yevmenov as the most likely candidate to succeed Korolev as commander in chief.

How to Reach the Highest Ranks in the Russian Navy

To develop our findings, we put together a database of Russian Navy flag officers who were active between 2005 and 2016. For this part of the analysis, we examined the career trajectories of 199 officers who had already retired at the rank of rear admiral or higher. Fifteen officers reached the rank of admiral (including two who made admiral of the fleet), 48 officers retired at the rank of vice admiral, and 136 officers retired as rear admirals.

Read the rest here.

As many as 17 foreign countries owe Russia a total of $27 billion with Belarus, Ukraine and Venezuela being the largest debtors. According to the Ministry of Finance of Russia, the total debt on Russian state loans nears as much as $39.4 billion as of May 1, 2019. Nearly 15.8 billion of this debt accounts for the countries of the former USSR, and more than five billion is held as restructured debts of foreign countries to the former USSR (Vietnam, India, Iraq, Yemen, Cuba).The information on loans becomes public if Russia signs intergovernmental agreements that are subsequently ratified by the State Duma. Most of such loans are political, rather than commercial. They are provided as part of military cooperation that largely remains classified. Moscow gave such loans to Armenia, Venezuela, India and Indonesia.As of June 1, 2019, Belarus owes Russia $7.55 billion. Since 2012, the country's debt has doubled. In the summer of 2019, Moscow refused to refinance the current part of the Belarusian debt. It was the first incidence in the relations between the two countries. Russia's decision forced Belarus to ask for a loan from China and place Russian ruble bonds on the Russian market. The relations between Russia and Belarus have cooled since then. Ukraine follows Belarus with about $3.7 billion of debt to Russia. Kiev still owes 3.075 billion in Eurobonds, which the National Wealth Fund (NWF) acquired in December 2013. In December 2015, the new authorities of Ukraine defaulted those securities. Russia sued Ukraine in connection with that decision, but the case is still pending. Ukraine does not recognize this debt to Russia. Ukrainian officials claim that it was not an interstate loan, but commercial securities. They also say that Russia forced Ukraine to issue those bonds. Russia's Finance Ministry believes, however, that the deal was concluded as a bilateral intergovernmental loan. Ukraine takes into account only the debt of $0.61 billion, which was formed in the early 1990s for the supplies of Russian gas.In 1997, Russia and Ukraine agreed, within the framework of the division of the Black Sea Fleet, that the debt would be repaid in cashless form by offsetting $97.8 million every year for renting the base of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. The last offset was made in March 2014, and the debt was frozen at $606 million.Venezuela holds the largest debt to Russia outside post-Soviet space. Venezuela's debt to Russia amounts to $3.15 billion and is to be repaid in 2027. This debt has been growing since the 2011 loan, the purpose of which was to finance the supplies of Russian arms to Venezuela. In late September, Venezuela is to wire a regular interest payment on the loan in the amount of $200 million. Most likely, Russia will have to deal with problems to receive dollar assets from Caracas after the US imposed sanctions on Venezuela. Cuba owes about three billion dollars to Russia, but there is no precise information about the number. In 2014, Moscow wrote off 90 percent of the Cuban debt, having left $3.52 billion. Cuba repays the debt in equal payments every six months ($1.76 billion is left to pay). In 2015, Moscow gave two more credits to Cuba totalling $1.44 billion to finance local industry projects.Russia also gives export government loans to other countries for the construction of nuclear power plants. For example, a nuclear power plant in Bangladesh has been under construction since 2017. In 2016, Russia agreed to support the construction of this facility with a loan of $11.38 billion. According to the Ministry of Finance of Bangladesh, the amount of financial assistance from the Russian Federation made up almost $2 billion since 2014. Russian loans for the construction of nuclear power plants will be repaid during the period of 20 years starting from 2027.Another state loan in the amount of up to 10 billion euros (11.1 billion dollars) to finance the third stage of the construction of Paks NPP in Hungary was approved in 2014. However, according to the Hungarian Government Debt Office, only $28 million, or 0.25 percent of the total credit line, has been allocated so far.Rosatom (Russian Federal Agency for Atomic Power) is building or is planning to build nuclear power plants in Belarus, India, Turkey and Egypt. Last year, President Putin announced plans to give a loan of $25 billion to Egypt for the construction of a nuclear power plant. The fate of the project remains unknown yet. India owes Russia about $1.1 billion. This debt is denominated in Indian rupees and refers to loans from the former Soviet Union. India repays the debt by exporting goods to Russia.

Michael Kofman and I co-wrote a short piece on the August 8 explosion in Russia for the Monkey Cage. Here’s a preview.

An Aug. 8 accident at Russia’s Nonoksa missile testing facility left seven dead and caused a brief radiation spike in a nearby town. What went wrong?

Vague and potentially misleading statements by Russian authorities have only added to speculation that scientists were working on a nuclear propulsion system for one of the country’s more secretive weapons projects, possibly the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile. Here’s what you need to know:

1. Accidents happen frequently in the Russian military

Ever since the sinking of the Kursk submarine in 2000, the Russian military has had an image of being accident-prone. There have been at least six fires on Russian submarines since 2006 — and at least three explosions at ammunition storage depots since May. In July, a fire on the Losharik deep-sea submersible in July caused 14 deaths.

Repairs are a dangerous time for the Russian navy, not just with the fires on submarines in dry dock, but also with the accidental sinking of the PD-50 floating dock in 2018, which almost sank and indefinitely disabled the sole Russian aircraft carrier.

But the recent deadly accidents involving nuclear-powered platforms like the Losharik and the Burevestnik missile are particularly dangerous for both the health of Russians in the vicinity and the reputation of the Russian military.

2. And the military looks to cover up the story

The Russian military’s initial reaction to bad accidents is to try to cover them up. Despite evidence from atmospheric monitoring devices in Severodvinsk, the Russian military initially denied that any radiation had been released during the explosion, telling nearby residents that everything was safe and to avoid panic.

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Recent protests in Moscow exposed the problem of deep contradictions between the authorities and citizens. The rally on Sakharov Avenue on August 10 became the largest in Moscow in the past seven years. According to unconfirmed reports, as many as 50-60 thousand people took part in the rally. Moscow has seen four actions of protest during the last few weeks. The rallies were held in support of the candidates withdrawn from elections to the Moscow City Duma. Three of those rallies (on July 14 and 27 and on August 3) were unauthorized, while the third one, which was coordinated with the authorities, (on July 20) gathered about 22,500 people.Most recently, candidates served administrative arrests for organising uncoordinated events. Famous journalists, bloggers and musicians also took part in the acts. According to journalist Leonid Parfenov, "the latest campaign has revealed so many lies and so much ensued violence that the Moscow City Duma elections were no longer the reason."The organizers of the action also said that the mayor's office tried to correct the list of speakers by banning music performances before the event. There were calls made to "take a walk" to the presidential administration after the rally. Boris Zolotarevsky, an employee of the Anti-Corruption Fund, as well as several other people who reached the Kitai-Gorod metro station, were arrested. It was later said that there were 256 people detained on August 10. With regard to third-party damage, Moscow's transport and road services evaluated the damage at 100 million rubles. It is worthy of note that participants of the riots on Bolotnaya Square in 2012 were also accused of causing damage to city infrastructure objects. For the time being, Moscow protests do not show influence on the domestic political situation in general. Fitch experts, reasoning the upgrade of Russia's rating from BBB- to BBB, noted that increased public activity and willingness to protests remained localized. The protests did not lead to the formation of the national political opposition movement, nor did they strengthen the existing opposition movement in Russia. Political scientist Mikhail Vinogradov named three components of protests: the resuscitation of Bolotnaya as a broad movement, the explicit radicalization of the actions of the authorities, and the escalation of the feeling of disappointment among the younger generation. Political strategist Sergei Polyakov believes that the protest sentiments in Russia are not going to fade, because Russian people can no longer recklessly trust the president. They want to participate in the decision-making process. For most people, the decision to deny registrations for candidates came as denial of people's right to be heard. 

Due to a series of uncoordinated protests in Moscow, analysts and experts started making forecasts about the imminent collapse of the present-day system in Russia.Valery Solovey, a former professor at MGIMO (the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Relations) is one of such futurologists. In general, this scholar is known for quite bizarre forecasts that sound very convincing, even though they never come true to life. This time, Mr. Solovyey predicted an "open, protracted crisis" that would end with a regime fall in 2020-2021. At the same time, as Russia is going to extricate from this political crisis, the nation will see a "new political order."In 2016, Valery Solovey spoke about early presidential election that would take place in Russia in 2017. He even named possible successors - Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, Tula region governor Dyumin, and even Sergei Ivanov, the former head of the presidential administration.As we can see, the early election did not take place. Putin's most recent campaign was one of the most predictable ones. As for Mr. Solovey's forecast of the imminent collapse of the system in Russia and the protracted crisis of 2020-2021, we would like to refer to an opinion voiced on "Stukach" Telegram channel. Its authors write: "An open political crisis" is, for example, a decision of the Constitutional Court that would contradict the position of the president. If Prime Minister Medvedev refused to comply with the Putin's decrees, this would be an open political crisis as well. Today, there are no open political crisis in Russia."If the Russian Army had refused to take part in operations to extinguish Siberian wildfires, it could have technically triggered a crisis. However, Russia's sitting Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu previously served as the head of EMERCOM, so the Russian army followed the orders instantly. The current political regime is not going to end in 2020-2021, because there are no prerequisites for it. The current system of power is solid. Nevertheless, some analysts speak about the brewing crisis between power and society amid growing social tensions. For example, experts at the Institute for Economic Growth named after Stolypin speak about the weak effect of national projects and the curtailment of small and medium-sized businesses in Russia. According to them, the Russian economy is sliding into a recession.Thus, negative processes in the economy are already directly associated with the implementation of national projects, which casts doubt on the competence of the government. At the same time, the expert community believes that it is impossible to improve the situation against the background of the present monetary and tax policies. The question is what the government is likely to revise first - national projects, the strategy of the Central Bank or taxation. In other words, tensions in Russia do not grow within the scope of big politics. They grow within the scope of "household" politics, so to speak. The main challenge that the Russian authorities face today is not about the desynchronization of actions. Russian people find most of those actions incomprehensible and unacceptable - this is the main challenge for the Russian authorities today.

The territory of a chemical factory in the Irkutsk region of Russia needs to be ameliorated. The factory may otherwise turn into an "ecological Chernobyl." Usoliekhimprom chemical factory is an abandoned plant, on the territory of which  a huge amount of mercury-containing residues and containers (many of them pressurized) with chemically hazardous substances are still being stored.In addition, oil wastes has been pumped into the wells from which saline used to be extracted. The wells thus pose a serious threat to the Angara River nearby. A rupture in a well will lead to the contamination of vast territories along the riverbed.According to Svetlana Radionova, the chairwoman of the Federal Service for Environmental Supervision, the territory of Usoliekhimprom chemical factory is a territory of an ecological catastrophe. According to her, the agency has already appealed to the Russian government with a request to create a program for the restoration of the hazardous facility.    Usoliekhimprom plant is located in the city of Usolye-Sibirsky, the Irkutsk region (Siberia). When in operation, the plant produced chlorine and other chemicals. In 2017, the company was declared bankrupt. The factory now stands abandoned and dilapidated. In November 2018, the administration of Usolye-Sibirsky introduced an emergency situation in the town over the risk of a man-made disaster. The problem arose after it became known that metal containers with residues of pesticides posed a threat to the population. Moreover, some of those containers can often be illegally removed from the industrial site of the former chemical plant and taken to the town.Mikhail Toropkin, the mayor of Usolye-Sibirsky, said that the abandoned chemical factory was being looted. "Dozens of trucks loaded with metals and other materials leave the territory of the factory on a daily basis. There are eleven pressurized railway tanks with contents of unknown origin there," the official said. Deputies of the Legislative Assembly of the Irkutsk region announced their intention to introduce  changes to the regional budget, but only in the event the state program for the restoration of Usolyechimprom chemical enterprise is approved. Photo: Baikal24.ru

Russia Adding a New Super-Weapon to its Arsenal Exceeding the Best in the West by Stephen Lendman Russian super-weapons technologically outmatch the Pentagon's best, developed at a small fraction of the cost, using its resources efficiently.

The Russians have experienced the 17th Q&A session with President Vladimir Putin. As it was predicted, Russia stopped for the time of the conference with Putin to see what he has to say to his people. However, the agenda of the last few months in Russia  is not something that may shine with positive news. Perhaps, the most negative topic is the pension reform (the raise of the retirement age). Putin spoke about the issue separately, but it seemed that it was not enough to make people understand and accept the need for such changes.According to opinion polls, the level of people's apparent concern over the topic of the pension reform in Russia was declining. A year ago, more than 40 percent of citizens admitted a possibility for mass riots in the country against the backdrop of the demise of the living standard. In  February of this year - the percentage of concerned people changed to 30 percent, and in May of 2019 - to about 25 percent.At the same time, the ratings of the Russian authorities have been declining too, including the ratings of Putin himself. Today, Putin's approval rating remains on the minimum level of the spring of 2014 (66 percent of confidence rating and 48 percent of electoral rating). A decline in the rating of confidence to the president indicates the presence of serious questions that the people of Russia want to ask to their president. Interestingly, the number of questions that have been registered prior to Putin's live conference (1.180,000) was considerably lower than during the previous years. Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov ascribed this nuance to hot summer weather, when most people do not want to stay in their homes and prefer to go somewhere. However, it appears that the lack of interest in the Q&A live conference is based on certain political and economic reasons.In addition to the acute issue of the pension reform, many point out the continuing impoverishment of the Russian population. The level of real income has been falling in the country, thus forcing many to raise more and more loans against the backdrop of growing prices on essential goods and fuel. According to spring surveys, an increasing number of Russians redistribute their income in favor of essential items and food products. About 65 percent of the population have no savings for a rainy day.Conflicts on ethnic and criminal grounds appear to be the icing on the cake. One may understand the topic of national strife as it rarely subsides, but it has exposed the level of people's distrust in law-enforcement authorities, which automatically extends to distrust in the authorities in general. This applies to the recent conflict with a gypsy community in the village of Chemodanovka and to the story of GRU special forces soldier Nikita Belyankin, who was killed in a fight with migrants in the Moscow region. When answering a question about salaries and how can one live on 10,000 rubles ($154) a month, Putin did not even believe what he heard and asked to look into the question as a salary of 10,000 rubles does not correspond to the minimum wage.A teacher from the city of Orel told Putin during the conference that her salary was 10,000 rubles. Later, an EMERCOM employee said in his address to the president that his salary was 16,000 rubles ($245). The man added that he has to take two or three jobs to survive.Putin proceeded to say that each of those reports should be looked into. He then said, however, that the average salary in Russia in 2019 increased to 44,000-45,000 thousand rubles ($700) from 33,000 ($500) in 2017. He noted that salaries differ in Russia depending on industry and region. Putin explained why people think that their income is declining: they count their money wrong. Putin noted that it is important to understand the fact that the financial burden on the Russian people increases, and their income therefore decreases.Putin then referred to the report form Russia's Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, who recently explained to the Russians why their incomes were growing, but not falling. As Putin said, a growth in real income declined because of the increase in costs on loan repayment. In other words, he said, people receive the same money, but they can keep less of it, because they have to repay their loans. Putin admitted that life in Russia has become harder, because several years ago Russia had to deal with major shocks that undermined the state of affairs in the domestic market and affected the social sphere."Several years ago we had to face several shocks at the same time - they were not even external shocks associated with so-called sanctions or external restrictions. Those shocks were about the market of our traditional export goods - oil, petroleum products, gas, hydrocarbons, metals, chemical fertilizers, chemicals in general, some other products. This caused not very pleasant consequences in the economy," Putin said. As for sanctions, someone asked Putin when Russia was going to "reconciles with all" and whether the West could lift the sanctions. "We haven't quarreled with anyone ... There's no question of reconciliation," Putin stressed noting that although there were external signals about the need to lift the sanctions, but one still did not have to wait for them to be lifted. Russia lost $50 billion, the EU - $240 billion, the USA - $17 billion, and Japan - $27 billion because of the anti-Russian sanctions, Putin said adding that those numbers did not count job losses. Russia has even acquired something as a result of the sanctions. "We learned to use our brains in high-tech areas and began developing the areas where we did not work before. For example, even in the USSR there was no naval engine-building. This is a separate industry, and we have learned to build our own engines in a few years," Putin said.Answering a question of whether Russia's recent buildup of military power implies preparations for a war, Putin referred to two proverbs and avoided a direct answer."If you want peace, prepare for war. If you don't want to feed your army, you will feed someone else's," Putin said.According to him, Russia is far from the first place in the military business. China, the USA, Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, France and Japan go ahead Russia at this point. Russia is ranked 7th on the list of world's biggest army spenders. He added that Russia, unlike any other country in the world, gradually reduces military spending. And at the same time, the Russian army has second-to-none weapons. It just so happens that Russia comes two steps ahead of other countries in the development of state-of-the-art military technology.Putin also drew attention to the fact that it is powerful economy, rather than nuclear weapons, that matters in the first place. Russia needs weapons for protection for the time when the country works to ensure economic growth.Russia is ready for dialogue with the United States as much as the USA is ready for this dialogue, Vladimir Putin said answering a question of whether US President Donald Trump could show influence on the relations between Russia and the USA. According to Putin, the powers of the American president are limited. Trump is running for a second term, so things are not going to be easy, Putin said adding that he would like to discuss with him such issues as the START-3 treaty and economic questions. American companies operate in Russia despite the sanctions. Russia has repeatedly offered the United States to start cooperating on the development of rules in the field of cyber security. Putin added that he considers the introduction of sanctions against Russia a huge mistake that the USA had made. He also set out a hope that this mistake will be corrected some day. Speaking about the election of comedian Vladimir Zelensky for the position of the President of Ukraine, Putin said that he considers his Ukrainian counterpart a "talented person.""He is a talented person, I remember his KVN performances (a humor show) in Moscow, it was funny. But what we have seen so far is not funny. This is not a comedy, this is a tragedy," Putin said. As long as Zelensky has found himself in this position, he needs to address problems. According to Putin, the conflict in the Donbas cannot be solved without dialogue with breakaway republics. However, "nothing is being done, the blockade is only being strengthened," said Putin. Also read: Putin: For Russians, patriotism and national identity are most important

Irans Islamic Azad University will open a branch in several countries including Azerbaijan said Ali Akbar Vilayeti Advisor to the Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Khamenei and rector of the Azad Islam University APAs Tehran bureau reports

According to the plan of military cooperation between the ministries of defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland The Salamanca Band Bugles of The Rifles of the Royal Army of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has arrived in Azerbaijan AzerTag reports