Defence`s Feeds

India has successfully conducted the first live firing of a Boeing-built anti-ship Harpoon missile from a fighter plane.

French EC725 Caracal Medium Transport Helicopter

Preparations are on-going for what are labelled “non-official” talks between Afghans of “different parties.” Organised by the non-governmental academic network, the Pugwash Conference, this will be a follow up to a first round of such talks held in Qatar on 2 and 3 May 2015 which brought members of the two biggest insurgent organisations – the Taleban and Hezb-e Islami – as well as political and civil society figures from inside Afghanistan and some internationals, mainly from the United Nations, to one table. All had been invited in their individual capacities. It was not the first time an Afghanistan-related gathering was organised by the Pugwash Conference. However, it was the first time that a final statement was released. This document contains some surprising elements of consensus, writes AAN’s senior analyst Thomas Ruttig. He also asks whether this consensus can kick start, and then sustain, negotiations for a political settlement in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, a recent meeting between Afghan government and Taleban representatives in China signals a possible edging (in deeds, not in words) of the Taleban towards direct talks with the government and has given new momentum to these developments.

A new attempt to get different parties to the Afghan conflict talking is under way. Since Saturday, 30 May, Professor Paulo Cotta-Ramusino, the Secretary-General of the Pugwash Conference has been in Kabul to prepare for a follow-up meeting to one it had organised in Qatar in early May. One of the participants of that meeting, MP Seyyed Ishaq Gailani, told AAN that Cotta-Ramusino will talk to bozorgha-ye mamlakat (“elders of the country”), including President Ashraf Ghani and the government’s Chief Executive Officer, Dr Abdullah as well as delegates from the last meeting. On 6 June, there will also be a preparatory meeting in Dubai between Taleban ‘representatives’ and six participants from Kabul – including Gailani, Shahzada Shahid from the High Peace Council (HPC) and Qutbuuddin Helal, a member of Hezb-e Islami who ran for president last year after returning from exile. The next Qatar meeting, possibly with broader participation than the previous one, will be held after the month of Ramadan which ends around 17 July.

The Qatar meeting in early May came a bit out of the blue, although it was not the first Afghanistan-related gathering organised by the Pugwash Conference, a renowned international non-governmental network of scientists that sometimes helps to mediate in armed conflicts and that was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995. The Pugwash-organised meetings come after a number of earlier attempts to get Afghans, including representatives of the insurgents, together which, however, had no follow-up (see AAN analysis of those here). These attempts included an “academic conference” (a term also used for the Pugwash gathering by the Taleban) in the Japanese city of Kyoto in June 2012 during which, for the first time, a high-ranking Taleban member (former planning minister Qari Din Muhammad Hanafi) participated; a meeting in Chantilly in France in December 2012 and a number of even earlier meetings in the Maldives in 2010. A UN initiative to start an ‘intra-Afghan dialogue,’ (1) planned for February 2013 in the Turkmen capital of Ashgabad, was blocked by an angry then-president Karzai. The May Qatar meeting was also preceded by a training course in Norway on the role of ceasefires in peace processes where Taleban sat in the same room with officials of the Afghan government – along with people from other countries.

The Qatar set-up

The Pugwash-organised meeting took place in al-Khor, a Qatari spa town north of the capital Doha (where the Taleban’s famous ‘Doha office’ is situated) after a year-long lull in contacts. The last direct contact between any party and the Taleban, apart from possible individual, explorative contacts, (2) were those of the US government, also in Qatar a year ago that led to the release of Bowe Bergdahl, the only US soldier held by the Taleban; he was exchanged for five Taleban internees from Guantanamo. After the exchange, this line of contact went cold, mainly over the Taleban’s refusal to hold direct talks with the government in Kabul (led by then-president Hamed Karzai), which the insurgents consider a ‘puppet’ administration. (According to one participant in the recent talks in al-Khor, the Taleban avoided using the word hukumat (government) but spoke of edara-ye Kabul (Kabul administration) instead; at the same time, the non-Taleban delegates referred to them as “Taleban” not “the Emirate.”)

Both the main insurgent groups – the Taleban and Hezb-e Islami – sent high-ranking people. For the latter, Mullah Sher Muhammad Abbas Stanakzai from the leadership council, deputy head of the Taleban political commission, attended; most others were from the team of the officially defunct Qatar office (biographies here). Hezb-e Islami sent its deputy party leader, Ghairat Bahir, who, under Karzai, had often travelled to Kabul (see AAN analysis here and here).

From Afghanistan, major political forces or their leaders – from different mujahedin factions to the ‘Karzai camp’ to ‘civil society’ – were asked to nominate participants. Most decided to send lesser-known people. The most prominent were two former ministers, Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi and Wahidullah Shahrani (who started his career in high-ranking positions under Karzai); MP Ishaq Gailani (who as a member of a prominent family of spiritual leaders also commands respect among insurgents), former MP Malalai Shinwari (one of only three women); Fahim Hakim, a civil society activist and former member of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission; and two high-ranking HPC members, deputy chairman Ataullah Ludin and spokesman Shahzada Shahed. Apart from them, Qayyum Kuchai, the chairman of the Ahmadzai tribal council and uncle of the president, attended, as well as some lesser known politicians linked to former mujahedin factions, some known to be close to former president Hamed Karzai and a few other civil society activists. Another politician reportedly invited, former deputy foreign minister Ershad Ahmadi, decided not to attend. (He recently accompanied former president Karzai on his China visit, though; see a media report here).

Many of the participants, on all sides, were Pashtuns, but it was noticeable that almost no ‘Kandaharis,’ ie Pashtuns from southern Afghanistan, were there; almost all came from the east or southeast. (An official list of participants has not been released, so find a tentative list – combined from media and other reports – at the end of this dispatch.)

As it is usual in track II meetings like this one, participants were invited in their personal capacity. This allows them to speak freely, rather than be forced to fully represent their organisations’ views – although, at the same time (as was the case in Qatar), such views are aired, opening the chance to channel back to organisations ideas raised. Not all participants found it easy to stick to this principle. The Taleban made their anger known after Ludin identified himself as the HPC vice chair. Despite this, reporters on the ground and some participants described the atmosphere of the talks as generally amicable.

One participant told AAN that some participants did not leave al-Khor immediately after the 2–3 May talks, indicating more private contacts may have occurred after the official two rounds of exchange.

Insofar as the Pugwash Conference filled a vacuum, it created a new chance to kick-start talks again, with the aim of moving to a regular peace process – a term explicitly used in the final communiqué. (It even says that the peace process “should be speeded up.”) It would be a large step forward if the participating (non-)sides would see the al-Khor meeting as part of, or precursor to, such a process.

Going public

Another first at al-Khor was the release of a communiqué (full text here) outlining the type of meeting and the “important common points” that “emerged.” This fact alone highlights the fact that the inviting organisation, at least, saw the time was ripe to make the discussion public; the document contains issues that need to be tackled if and when future talks – the planned follow-up and, possibly later, more formal negotiations – commence. It was also a nod to those in Afghanistan who have often demanded that ‘peace talks’ should not be held in secrecy, because they fear secret talks might result in backroom deals that determine the destiny of a whole nation without sufficient inclusion and information. It must be noted, though, that the organisers seemed to have authored the communiqué. That does not seem to have been a problem: no participant made a public protest, either about the publication as such or about the content. (There still might be issues about nuances: according to some reports there was no agreement that foreign troops leave “soon” but rather “eventually.”) The communiqué, at least, made it possible to ‘map’ common ground and to identify where gaps are that need to be bridged.

The Taleban later published a statement on their official website that their participants had read out and distributed in al-Khor (full texts here, in English and in Pashto). There, they had insisted – in accordance with the spirit of the “non-official” meeting (as Pugwash labelled it) – that this paper was not their organisation’s official stance. But such ambiguity, on all sides, is part of this kind of pre-negotiation meeting.

The al-Khor communiqué and the Taleban statement also reiterate what participants said were the Taleban’s ‘preconditions’ but what the Taleban, maybe more accurately, called the “main hurdles in the way for peace,” ie their key demands: the “occupation, black list and reward list, non-availability of an official address for the Islamic Emirate, continuing to keep political prisoners behind bars [sic].” Participants say that the Taleban also demanded that the government be represented by people who “really believe in peace” (another sign that they might indeed consider direct talks, but also that they do not consider the current personnel genuine on the issue) and that “negative propaganda should be abandoned,” ie the other side should stop calling them “terrorists.” One participant said it was notable how little other participants pushed back on the Taleban claim that the war was against ‘invaders and puppets.’

Agreements . . .

The communiqué contains some – at first glance – surprising points of consensus:

The idea of bringing about peace in Afghanistan and ending the conflict was wholeheartedly supported by all the participants.

The civilian casualties of the Afghan conflict have been lamented by everybody. . . . Protection of civilians is, as it should be, a priority for everybody.

Any political discrimination against any Afghan political party or group would be an obstacle to the peace process. . .

Corruption and the production/selling of drugs are among the most serious problems of Afghanistan. . .

The value of education for both men and women was underlined by everybody. Economic development in Afghanistan will heavily depend on peace . . .

In any case, the government of Afghanistan will be an Islamic one. This does not mean that minorities of any sort should be discriminated against. . .

The model of the so-called Islamic State (Daesh) is alien to the tradition and the desires of the Afghan people. . .

The relation with neighbouring countries should be kept amicable, and cooperation with such countries should be strengthened. This does not mean that neighbouring countries are welcome to interfere with Afghan internal affairs.

The Taleban’s al-Khor statement, not reflected in the final communiqué, also contains what appears to be revolutionary wording about women’s rights:

The Islamic Emirate is committed to all rights of women in all walks of life which are bestowed upon them in the sacred religion of Islam. Women have the right to choose her life-partner [sic]. She has the right of ownership and inheritance. She has the right of acquiring knowledge and work. . . . in a balanced way in which they are neither deprived of their just and legitimate rights nor are their human dignity and Islamic values are jeopardized…

The participants also agreed that the Qatar government, “non-governmental international organizations such as Pugwash” and the UN “continue to support the Afghan peace process.” This is positive, as the Taleban often have been critical of the UN and perceived it as a body mainly reflecting Western interests, or as under US dominance. Also, the Afghan government under Karzai did not want to see any UN role in the peace process.

Almost all Afghans would subscribe to most points in the communiqué – from the need for peace to getting the economy going, to concerns of Daesh spreading to the region, including to Central and South Asia. But this might also be a problem. The general consensus covers deep differences on detail.

. . .  covered gaps . . . 

For example, the general agreement that “in any case, the government of Afghanistan will be an Islamic one” does not reconcile the whole range of opinions about what an “Islamic government” means in practice. The government and many Afghans argue that their country is already called an Islamic Republic, with Islam as the “religion of the state” and a constitution that stipulates that “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam.” At the same time, the constitution contains a whole range of democratic, pluralistic institutions and mechanisms that were not part of political practice during the Taleban’s Islamic Emirate – it existed without any elected bodies. (It needs to be noted that other political forces in Afghanistan reject ‘Western-style’ democracy; see here.) On the other hand, the Taleban at al-Khor did not openly object to the communiqué’s provision that “no party should have a monopoly on power.”

Other consensus points, like education for boys and girls, are clearly under ‘sharia caveat.’ In a statement released a few days after the al-Khor meeting, the Taleban reiterated that they were seeking “a way out for intra-afghan disputes in the light of Quran and Sunnah.” On civilian casualties, the consensus is accompanied, on the part of the Taleban, by accusations that Western and Afghan government forces continue killing civilians. (This is reflected in the communiqué by the phrase that “differences may exist on who bears the main responsibility of these casualties.”) UN reports clearly pinpoint that most – around three quarters – of all civilian casualties are caused by the insurgents. The Taleban contest this and say they find the reports biased, even though UNAMA takes pains to investigate any reports of civilian casualties they receive from the Taleban and adds any substantiated casualties to their figures; in al-Khor the Taleban claimed that currently two of their commanders are under investigation for infringements on killing civilians, but these also need to be transparent. A question reportedly asked from the Taleban present about recent mass abductions of civilians (see AAN analysis here) remained unanswered.

The issue of civilian casualties has been taken up elsewhere recently. It became known that Afghanistan’s then still-acting main peace envoy, Masum Stanakzai (now nominated for the post of defence minister, see AAN reporting here), met former high-ranking Taleban officials in the north-western Chinese city of Urumqi. After that meeting, the official Chinese news agency Xinhua came up with an article blaming the Taleban for “launching indiscriminate attacks.” This can hardly by incidental, given the government’s control over all media in the country.

At least as importantly, the Urumqi meeting shows that the official Taleban refusal to directly talk to Kabul officials is not cast in stone – a glimmer of hope for progress on peace talks. That the meeting took place was confirmed by the former head of the Taleban ‘religious police’ (amr bil-maruf), Mawlawi Qalamuddin, and unnamed diplomats while a Taleban spokesman delivered a denial and a spokeswoman for China’s foreign ministry, less clear-cut, professed she “wasn’t familiar” with the talks. On the Taleban side, former Taleban deputy foreign minister Mullah Abdul Jalil, former Kandahar governor Mullah Muhammad Hassan Rahmani (who had been on the Taleban leadership council) and former interior minister Mullah Abdul Razzaq reportedly attended. All three are based in Pakistan and are said to have good links with the Pakistani intelligence service (who reportedly helped organise the talks) while their exact status in the Taleban movement is unclear. (This also provides the Taleban deniability about contacts with the Afghan government which they officially continue to reject.)

One interesting point in the al-Khor communiqué is found in a statement about neighbouring countries’ ‘interference’ in Afghan domestic affairs. Participants say they understood this as a criticism of the Ghani/Abdullah government’s attempts to push Pakistan, by mobilising its – as called in Pakistan – “all-weather ally” China to push the Taleban to the negotiations table. This was confirmed by Kuchai who was reported as saying: “The Taliban were upset that the Afghan government approached the Pakistanis rather than reaching out to them directly.”

On the same day as the Xinhua statement mentioned above, the Taleban published an article (3) on their website supporting a Chinese mediating role, praising the “expanding power” for its understanding “that the Taliban are a force on the ground, a reality which cannot be ignored” and even waving a carrot at Beijing: that China could “capitalize on the current situation in order to rebuild the Silk Road.” But this praise is not unconditional: The article adds that “China must therefore establish direct contacts with the Taliban and not task other powers” with talking to them – another hint that it does not want to be addressed through Pakistan. It even challenges the leadership in Beijing: “If China truly wants to achieve reconciliation between Kabul and Taliban by playing the role of a mediator, can it for example assure that America and the foreign powers will abide by the decisions [of negotiations] especially if the main demands of the Taliban are enforcement of Shariah and expulsion of foreign troops?”

. . . and disagreements

Apart from the civilian casualties issue, one more fundamental disagreement is clearly spelled out in the communiqué: that there are “different opinions” about the “structure of the political system (and the constitution of Afghanistan)” that “should be discussed in detail.” The Afghan government insists that the Taleban recognise the current constitution while the Taleban insist (as reiterated in al-Khor and in their later published statement but not spelled out in the communiqué) that an all-Afghan “expert” body writes a new one, as the current one was – in the Taleban’s reading – drafted “in the shadow of the B-52 bombers.”

Naturally, as the al-Khor communiqué points out, “the role of foreign forces that are or have been present in Afghanistan were evaluated in different ways (also in relation to the civilian casualties mentioned above).” On the matter of their withdrawal, some participants were calling – and this also went into the communiqué – for “an agreement among Afghan political forces before the departure of the foreign forces.” This indirectly reflects doubts about the defence capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces in case of an on-going insurgency after the last western troops have left, with military aid beyond 2017 unclear.

In their subsequently published al-Khor statement, the Taleban participants made it clear that “reconciliation and withdrawal of foreign forces are linked to each other,” ie the latter has to precede the former (see also here). The same goes for a ceasefire that had been proposed by Qayyum Kuchai but rejected by the Taleban (confirmed to AAN by participants). The Taleban further hold against the Ghani/Abdullah government the fact that it signed the US-Afghan bilateral strategic defence agreement (BSA) and similar one with NATO which extended the deployment of Western troops on Afghan soil: “It must be regretfully said that whenever the Islamic Emirate has moved forward towards peace, it has been practically halted by signings of the so called strategic agreement and security agreement.”

So far, it remains unclear whether, and how much, the positions presented in Qatar and/or agreed in the communiqué reflect a real change of policy on the part of the Taleban or whether they are simply paying lip service to the idea of talking. (The Taleban also must be careful, as they have to keep their own ‘hawks’ on board.) The drastic gap between their stated policy and practical attitude toward the civilian population and its protection is a point in case. While the Taleban, time and again, in their ‘leader’s’ Eid statements and in al-Khor again, claim that they do everything to protect civilians in war, the recent three bomb attacks in Kabul claimed by them alone show this is not the case: in each of these attacks, more uninvolved civilian passers-by were killed than people the Taleban perceive to be (often against international law) ‘legitimate targets’ (more AAN analysis here).

The same goes for their recent attacks on foreign civilians. While they have signalled in earlier statements that they are interested in mutually respectful relations with all countries and being part of the ‘international community,’ and surely must be aware of the socio-economic situation in Afghanistan that necessitates continued international humanitarian and development aid for the Afghan population, they jeopardise these positions by lumping international civilians, even aid workers, in with what they call “the invaders.” If there are no security guarantees, government-funded development programmes might be forced to close down.

Open questions: What about the government . . .

Reports are contradictory on a number of issues discussed in al-Khor and which were not reflected in the final communiqué (or not in detail). One issue is whether the Afghan government was ‘represented’ at the meeting at all (on an individual basis, of course), and if not, why. The names of participants published so far do not indicate participation beyond the two HPC members. And although HPC members are appointed by the president, HPC is not fully a governmental body. It was not clear (or intentionally left ambiguous) whether Kuchai, the president’s uncle who is also rumoured to be a candidate for the chairmanship of the HPC (4) went to the meeting on behalf of, or at least with the tacit approval of, the president or – as some told AAN – against his will. It is clear, however, that the Afghan government remains in contact with the hosts of the al-Khor meeting, the government of Qatar – although a next meeting, a trip of president Ghani scheduled for Saturday 30 May had to be postponed because of domestic issues.

According to some sources privy to the preparation of and proceedings at the al-Khor meeting, Masum Stanakzai, the head of the joint secretariat of the HPC and of the government’s ‘peace and reconciliation programme’ (and now nominated as defence minister) had initially been on the list of invitees. Whether he decided not to go because government participation might lend too much perceived ‘weight’ to the talks, or was vetoed by the Taleban, or both is not clear. Pugwash had submitted the list to all participants and apparently allowed room for objections. Participants in the talks said the Taleban repeated their rejection of any direct talks with Kabul. According to one version of events, they feel betrayed; they referred to their support of Ghani during the presidential campaign (AAN, here, and others, here, reported) and claimed there had been an understanding – later broken – that the new president would not sign the BSA.

Furthermore, according to participants, the Taleban and the Hezb participants from the insurgent wing demanded that an interim government be formed, because (as put in the Taleban statement) “in the presence of foreign forces, an independent government cannot be formed in Afghanistan.” (The intended timing was unclear, whether immediately before or after the withdrawal of all foreign forces.) This, of course, would signal that both of the main insurgent groups do not consider the current political set-up legitimate or do not want to be seen to be recognising it as legitimate; therefore, they want to discuss the future political system and constitution, as stated in the communiqué.

All in all, the different Taleban statements at al-Khor and published on their website alone are highly inconsistent on one key issue: their willingness to talk directly with the Afghan government. The Afghan government, on its part, signalled goodwill before the meeting by not blocking the meeting. This is a positive difference from the Karzai government’s stance of trying to monopolise all Taleban contacts and actively shut down any channel of contact that it was not part of or did not control.

. . . and what about elections?

Media reports (here and here) said the Taleban, for the first time, had shown “openness for the idea of elections” (or even had “explicitly agreed” to them). Participants AAN spoke to remember this discussion differently; some say the term ‘elections’ was not explicitly used but – in the context of the insurgents’ demand for a new constitution – a “popular consultation” and decision “by the people’s vote” were mentioned. Also if an interim government was set up at some point, a process would still be needed to convert from such a temporary body to a permanent, fully legitimate one. In the tradition of Afghan Islamic political groups, the ‘people’s opinion’ also can be obtained through indirect means, for example by a shura of representatives of different factions – similar to the Shura-ye Hal o Aqd organised during the mujahedin rule in the 1990s.

Direct, multi-party elections do not figure in the Taleban’s worldview. They rarely use this term in their documents, do not consider themselves a political party and have never set up a structure like Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland that acted as the political arm of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). (The Taleban’s political commission is a sub-structure of the Shura-ye Rahbari, the movement’s leadership council, also referred to as the Quetta shura, which is military and political at the same time.) In their (already quoted) statement, they speak about an “Afghan-inclusive Islamic system of life … where all the people and tribes [but note, not parties] are represented.” In contrast, Hezb-e Islami, in its 2010 peace plan (AAN analysis here), in general, suggested elections, although open only to “Islamic parties.” (Whether the party – which is known for its ever-shifting positions – considers that plan still valid is unclear.)

The role of Hezb at the al-Khor talks itself was as ambiguous as ever. Among the participants were found both individuals from the wing that is officially registered and politically active in Afghanistan, filling high-ranking positions in the previous and current governments, and individuals from the one that continues to fight this very government. The Kabul-based wing (represented in al-Khor by HPC vice chairman Ataullah Ludin, governor of Nangrahar province until recently) has officially distanced itself from the insurgent wing (led by the party’s founder and still active leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and represented in al-Khor by deputy party leader Ghairat Bahir and a party spokesman, Qarib-ur-Rahman Said). (5) Yet Ludin, and Qutbuddin Helal – a former Hekmyatyar deputy who ran in the 2014 presidential elections – sat together with Bahir and Said on one side of the table, next to the Taleban, choosing not to represent government ideas. To several other participants, they looked like a single delegation, and made the party ‘split’ look more like Clausewitz tactics: “March separately, strike jointly.”

Imbalances

The configuration of the al-Khor meeting had some other shortcomings. That the organisers coordinated the list of invitees with them beforehand is usual practice. But in effect, it gave the Taleban a veto over who would be with them at the table. This, however, was only possible because the ‘other side’ – politicians of different parties and backgrounds and a small number of civil society activists – were insufficiently prepared for the meeting and had not coordinated among themselves. As one participant told AAN, the Taleban were much better prepared, presenting their positions on apparently assigned topics one by one, which took the other participants by surprise.

The civil society people (and the three women involved) apparently had not coordinated within their existing structures – at previous international Afghanistan conferences, for example, civil society delegates were elected, and involved non-Kabulis. If that had been done, the civil society people would have had more legitimacy and political weight and could have equipped themselves with ideas, concepts and positions towards peace talks that have already been discussed. These include how to combine top-down peace negotiations with local, bottom-up initiatives and a sufficient inclusion of women. Only one women with some political clout was at al-Khor, a former journalist and MP, Malalai Shinwari, who later worked as a government official. The other two were reported to be very young, said nothing at the gathering and have not been publicly named.

There are also no institutionalised mechanisms to guarantee that ideas of inclusion promoted by women and other civil society organisations, if and when the Afghan government should join such talks, will be integrated into its negotiating strategy. Another problem was that many of the political factions who were asked to send representatives are not functioning in a democratic way, so that their leaders are the ones who are approached with invitations and who decide who is to attend on their behalf. This lack of legitimacy of the civil society activists may have contributed to he fact that the participants from Kabul apparently did not challenge the Taleban much on issues where there was a gap between Taleban words and deeds.

And another point: significant sectors in civil society and some factions would prefer not to talk – or ultimately share power – with the Taleban at all. They hope that the Afghan armed forces will still be able to achieve what up to 140,000 Western forces, plus Afghans were unable to do: defeat the insurgents with military means. This is understandable, given their personal experiences with the Taleban regime and the movement’s current approach to the civilian population – and expectations that negotiations might result not only in compromises but also in reversals of hard-won gains achieved over the past 14 years, particularly in the rights sector.

Follow-up moves

But there are some signs of hope, too. The al-Khor participants from Kabul now seem to have started to come together to prepare for the next round. One participant who has initiated meetings for better coordination among the non-insurgent participants says he is hopeful that the group might be able to soften the Taleban’s rejection of talking to the government directly. At the moment, however, Afghanistan’s non-governmental groups are not sufficiently prepared to face the Taleban even at talks, during a competition of ideas.

This is where the international community can – and should – come in. Not with plans and suggestions of its own, but with encouragement and – if necessary – specific funding to make sure particularly the civil society side consolidates and enters the coming meeting better prepared. In the end, if and when negotiations find a positive outcome, the international community will have to act as a guarantor anyway. The presence of UNAMA representatives keeps the door open for indirect Kabul-Taleban talks that could move a peace process forward.

Immediately after the talks, media reports said that the HPC has taken steps to delete more Taleban from the UN sanctions list. Any official request to the UN Security Council needs to come from the Afghan government – and would be another indication how much buy-in to the Qatar talks there is in the administration, despite the Taleban’s (so far) inflexible position towards it.

 

(1) This ‘intra-Afghan track II dialogue’ was defined by the UN as “trying to engage and provide platform for Afghan people, representatives of different groups, civil society, political parties and also those that are fighting the Government, a platform on which they can discuss their future.”

(2) For example, one report said – after the al-Khor meeting – that the president’s uncle, who participated in al-Khor, held meetings with Taleban representatives before the al-Khor meeting.

(3) The Taleban websites has the follwing categories of content (among others): {official) “statements,” and apparently less official “weekly analysis” and “articles.”

(4) The HPC is supposed to be ‘reformed’ and made leaner, ie downsized from its current membership of 70. This has been confirmed to AAN by HPC members.

(5) Some reports had a third Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar) participant, Qazi Hakim (see for example here).

 

Annex:

(Likely incomplete) List of participants

(sources: ToloNews, here and here; The News; Express Tribune; Taleban website)

 

Participants from Kabul:

▪ Abdullah Walwalji (Uzbek; writer and civil society activist; links to Jombesh but independent-minded)

▪ Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi (eastern Pashtun; former finance minister and former head Chef of Afghan Mellat party)

▪ Assadullah Saadati (Hazara, MP from Daykundi, close to former Vice President Abdul Karim Khalili’s Hezb-e Wahdat faction)

▪ Ataullah Ludin, (Pashtun from Nangrahar; deputy chairman High Peace Council; Hezb-e Islami);

▪ Atta ul-Rahman Salim (Tajik; former deputy minister for hajj and awqaf; nominee of former interior minister Yunos Qanuni);

▪ Fahim Hakim (civil society activist; former member of the Independent Human Rights Commission)

▪ Ghulam Faruq Azam (Kandahari Pashtun; former deputy leader of the mujahedin party led by Pir Gailani, minister in the former 1990s mujahedin government and leader of his own peace initiative)

▪ Haji Ruhollah (Pashtun from Kunar or Nuristan, former leader of a small Wahhabi group and Guantanamo detainee, released in 2008)

▪ Malalai Shinwari (Pashtun from Nangrahar; reportedly close to ex-president Karzai)

▪ Qayyum Kuchai (Pashtun from Logar; uncle of the President)

▪ Seyyed Ishaq Gailani (Pashtun/Seyyed from the southeast; former MP, leader of a small political party)

▪ Shahzada Shahed (eastern Pashtun; HPC spokesman);

▪ Wahidullah Shahrani (Uzbek; former mining minister under Karzai)

▪ Two more women who did not speak

▪ A few Afghan businessmen, brought by different participants

 

Taleban:

▪ Sher Muhammad Abbas Stanakzai (Pashtun from Logar; deputy head of the Political Commission; former health minister)

▪ Shahabuddin Delawar (Pashtun; former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, later in Pakistan)

▪ Suhail Shahin (Pashtun; spokesman of the Qatar office, former editor-in-chief of the Kabul Times)

▪ Qari Din Muhammad Hanif (Tajik from Badakhshan; former planning minister)

▪ Abdul Salam Hanafi (Uzbek; former deputy education minister)

▪ Jan Muhammad Madani (Pashtun; former ambassador to the UAE)

▪ Seyyed Rassul Halim Nangrahari (Pashtun; religious scholar who had no government position during the Taleban regime)

▪ Hafez Aziz-ul-Rahman (former diplomat to the UAE)

More biographic details about the Taleban participants in this AAN dispatch.

 

Hezb-e Islami:

▪ Ghairat Bahir (from Hekmatyar’s wing; Hekmatyar’s son-in-law and deputy party chairman)

▪ Qarib-ur-Rahman Said (from Hekmatyar’s wing; party spokesman, now Oslo-based spokesman for Northern Europe)

▪ Qutbuddin Helal (another former deputy party leader under Hekmatyar; returned to Afghanistan in 2014)

(see also Ludin, above)

 

Internationals:

Senior and second political officer, UNAMA

Acting head of human rights department, UNAMA

A former senior political officer of UNAMA

Ambassador of Sweden

Professor Paolo Cotta Ramusino (the Secretary-General of the Pugwash Conference)

Project 23000E or Shtorm (Storm) is a multi-purpose, heavy aircraft carrier project being designed by the Krylov State Research Center for the Russian Navy. The cost of the supercarrier is estimated as being between $1.8 billion and $5.63 billion (at August 2015 exchange rates), with development expected to take ten years. The carrier is being considered for service with the Russian Navy's Northern Fleet. Nevskoye Design Bureau is also reported to be taking part in the development project.

A scale model of the ship is going to be demonstrated for the first time at the International Maritime Defence Show 2015 in St Petersburg from 1-5 July. The Project 23000E multipurpose aircraft carrier is designed to conduct operations in remote and oceanic areas, engage land-based and sea-borne enemy targets, ensure the operational stability of naval forces, protect landing troops, and provide the anti-aircraft defence. The design has a displacement of 90-100,000 tons, is 330 m in length, 40 m wide, and has a draft of 11 m. It has a top speed of 30 kt, cruising speed of 20 kt, a 120-day endurance, a crew of 4-5,000, and designed to withstand sea state 6-7. Currently it has been designed with a conventional power plant, although this could be replaced by a nuclear one, according to potential customers' requirements.

The ship carries a powerful air group of 80-90 deck-based aircraft for various combat missions. The model features a split air wing comprising navalised T-50 PAKFAs and MiG-29Ks, as well as jet-powered naval early warning aircraft, and Ka-27 naval helicopters. The carrier's flight deck is of a dual design, features an angled flight deck, and four launching positions: two via ski-jump ramps and two via electromagnetic catapults. One set of arrestor gear is included in the design. The design also features two islands; a feature only previously seen on the latest UK design.

Protection against air threats will be provided by four anti-aircraft missile system combat modules. An anti-torpedo armament suite is available. The electronic support complex includes integrated sensors, including a multifunction phased array radar, electronic warfare system, and communications suite.

Source
http://www.janes.com/article/51452/russia-developing-shtorm-supercarrier

Tag: Russian ArmyProject 23000E

It looks like Russian Su-24s flew over US warship in Black Sea. Again.

According to several Russian media outlets, Russian Navy Su-24 Fencer jets “forced” a U.S. Navy destroyer to head towards neutral waters after it was noticed by Russian Black Sea monitoring stations heading into Russia’s territorial waters.

Reportedly, the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Ross was heading directly towards Russian waters after leaving the Romanian port of Costanta. Russian Su-24s were scrambled towards the warship.

After the close encounter with the Su-24 jets, the destroyer “then turned around and left for neutral waters,” says RT, suggesting an unlikely violation of the Russian territorial waters by the U.S. warship.

“It seems that the Americans did not forget the April 2014 incident when one Su-24 actually shut down all equipment on the new USS Donald Cook American destroyer with anti-missile system elements,” an unnamed source said to Sputnik News.

The mysterious source refers to the April 2014 incident when a Su-24 Fencer flew multiple passes at 500 feet above sea level, within 1,000 yards of the USS Donald Cook, the U.S. Navy destroyer operating in the Black Sea at that time: a behaviour that the ship commander considered “provocative and inconsistent with international agreements.”

Following the incident, speculations (fueled by propaganda) reported that the Su-24 jammed all the systems aboard USS Cook to such an extent all the onboard screens went black and 27 officers resigned as a consequence of the attack: a quite unbelievable and unlikely story.

Anyway, Russian Su-30s and Su-24s aircraft from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet launched from Novofedorvka, an airbase captured on Mar. 22, 2014, in western Crimea peninsula 70 kilometres north of Sevastopol, have conducted attack runs on NATO warships operating in the Black Sea recently.

Image credit: Andrey Zinchuv/Airforce.ru and U.S. Navy

 

Related articles

• Russia’s newest Su-30 multirole jets and Su-24 bombers practiced attack runs on NATO warships in the Black Sea
• Russian Su-24 Fencer attack plane performs multiple passes near U.S. warship in Black Sea
• Video shows Su-24 Fencer attack plane perform an insane low-level flyby at unknown airbase
• Here’s the latest ultra-low level Russian Su-24 Fencer flyby
• Amazing video brings you aboard Russian Su-24 Fencer attack plane during bombing mission
• Russian Su-24 Fencer ultra low flyby on highway as seen from the cockpit
• Here’s the position of the two U.S. Navy warships off Sochi for Olympics Security

GoPro cameras bring you aboard a Mig-29 Fulcrum during a flight to the Edge of Space.

Ever wondered what flying one of the most famous Russian warplanes at supersonic speed and so high (between 17 and 22 km) that you can clearly see the curvature of Earth?

The video below will give you a hint.

It was produced by MigFlug, a company that offers fighter jet flying experiences in wide variety of aircraft in Russia, Europe and North America, during a Edge of Space mission with their MiG-29 Fulcrum.

Interestingly, the video was shot by a famous aviation video producer, Artur Sarkysian, who attached a GoPro cameras to the two-seater Mig-29UB’s outer surfaces in such a way they could withstand speed up to 2450 km/h and a load factor of 9g!

From several different points of view you can watch one of the most famous Soviet-era jet (still serving in Russia, Ukraine, North Korea, Poland, Syria and Iran, among the others) fly at supersonic speed and high altitude, maneuver, perform aerobatics and land.

The video was produced over a time of 6 months. But the results are stunning.

Here below you can watch the whole video. Enjoy!

 

Related articles

• [Photo] Pro-Russia separatists have shot down another Ukrainian Mig-29 Fulcrum
• Video shows what is it like being on the receiving end of a Mig-29 Fulcrum’s gun
• Ukrainian Mig-29 Fulcrum jets getting new digital color scheme
• Serbia’s Mig-29 Fulcrum jets return to service thanks to donation by Russia
• Video shows what aerial combat looks like from aboard a Bulgarian Mig-29 Fulcrum
• Ukrainian Mig-29 Fulcrum (in display team livery) performs low pass over pro-Russia separatists
• Mig-29 Fulcrum jets releasing flares over Armenia from the GoPro camera point of view

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The 'FORAN new modules, new functions and FEM-Link (Hypermesh) Seminar' was held on 23 April in Wuhan.

Americas

• California-based ViaSat Inc. was awarded a contract with a potential value of $478.6 million on Thursday for Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) Joint Tactical Radio Systems (JTRS) terminals. These will give commanders the ability to communicate by voice, video and data links to forces via a line-of-sight, jam-resistant channel across ground, air and naval assets.

• Also on Thursday the Air Force signed a contract with Raytheon to procure Griffin missiles, with the deal worth $12 million. The Griffin is a precision miniature munition that utilizes parts from other Raytheon-manufactured missiles – such as the Javelin ATGM and the AIM-9X AAM – to keep costs down. The missile is currently used as part of roll-on armed kits for US C-130 transport aircraft.

• The Navy’s plans for disposing of the USS Enterprise (CVN 65), following the carrier’s inactivation in 2012, are coming under increasing scrutiny. A Congressman – Rep. Derek Kilmer – is pushing the Navy to articulate a definitive plan for the disposal, particularly as the potential work plan for his Puget Sound workforce, where US nuclear vessels have previously been recycled, has become increasingly unclear as the Navy mulls the idea of opening the disposal up for industry competition.

Europe

• Russia is reportedly planning on acquiring at least 50 new Tupolev Tu-160 strategic bombers in a move which would triple the country’s supersonic nuclear-capable aircraft fleet. A major upgrade program on its 16 in service Blackjacks is also reportedly set for completion ahead of schedule, with the aircraft set for delivery in 2019 – a year earlier than planned.

• France’s tender for miniature unmanned aerial vehicles is expected to garner attention from two Israeli manufacturers – BlueBird and Aeronautics Defense Systems – among several others. The requirement for thirty-five new systems is currently in the initial pre-qualification process, with a RFI expected in coming weeks. BlueBird produces the SpyLite UAS whilst Aeronautics Defense Systems produces the Orbiter Mini UAS, both of which could be offered to fulfill the French requirement.

• Airbus is preparing to deliver the first of its H145M helicopters to the German Army, with two set for delivery by the end of 2015. The Germans have ordered fifteen of the helicopters, with the Royal Thai Navy also set to see deliveries from next year onwards, following the H145M successfully receiving its European Aviation Safety Agency certification.

• General Dynamics European Land Systems has awarded a $88 million subcontract to Rolls Royce to supply diesel engines for the British Army’s Scout Specialist Vehicle. GD was awarded a $5.3 billion contract in September last year to produce 589 vehicles, with the program passing a critical design review in February.

Asia

• North Korea has reportedly deployed a new generation of fast Very Slender Vessels, following reports last year which cited 2013 satellite images of the boats then under development. The new low-profile, radar-evading vessels are thought to be capable of achieving speeds of up to 60mph. Seven of the ships are thought to be in service, with these stationed on the western side of the Korean Peninsula.

• The US has handed over a second batch of 4 UH-60M Black Hawks to Taiwan, part of a $3.1 billion 2010 Foreign Military Sale for 60 of the helicopters. The first batch of 4 was delivered last December, with Mexico having also recently requested the UH-60M. The Taiwanese delivery is set to take place in ten batches, scheduled to finish in 2019.

• Britain’s BAE Systems has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd for Hawk Mk132 maintenance upgrade and development, as well as the maintenance of the Indian Air Force’s legacy Jaguar fleet, which faced problems earlier this year with upgrades to its engine.

Today’s Video

• The USS Enterprise arriving at Newport News Shipyard for inactivation in 2013:

The US Air Force's (USAF's) Special Operations Command (AFSOC) has retired from service the last of its Lockheed Martin AC-130H Spectre gunships after more than 45 years of service, it was announced on 28 May. A ceremony marking the departure of aircraft 69-6569 'Excalibur' from the 16th Special

Airbus has 'a serious quality control problem' in the final assembly of the A400M Atlas transport aircraft, a senior company executive admitted on 28 May. Speaking to the German publication Handelsblatt , the chief strategy and marketing officer of Airbus Group, Marwan Lahoud, said that the initial

The German Ministry of Defence (MoD) is to initiate concept studies for a successor to the Leopard 2 main battle tank (MBT) before the end of the year. The news was announced by German Defence State Secretary Markus Grübel to Parliament, with Grübel adding that the MoD plans to conduct

Russia is to increase the size of its Tupolev Tu-160 'Blackjack' fleet by a factor of three over the coming years as it looks to build up its strategic bomber capabilities in the face of ever deteriorating relations with the West. The expansion of the fleet from 16 to a proposed 50 bombers was

Ansar Allah, the Yemeni Zaidi group that a coalition of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia is currently trying to defeat, has unveiled 'homemade' rockets for the first time as well as a BM-27 Uragan multiple rocket launcher (MRL) under its control. The Piercing Star (Al-Najim al-Thaqib) rockets were

PRC-154 with 75th RR
(click to view full)

The Pentagon’s JTRS (Joint Tactical Radio System) aimed to replace existing radios in the American military with a single set of software-define radios that could have new frequencies and modes (“waveforms”) added via upload, instead of requiring multiple radio types in ground vehicles, and using circuit board swaps in order to upgrade. Trying to solve that set of problems across the entire American military meant taking on a very a big problem. Maybe too big. JTRS has seen cost overruns and full program restructurings, along with cancellation of some parts of the program.

JTRS HMS (Handheld, Manpack & Small Form-Fit) radios, for use by the individual solder, have survived the tumult, and are now headed into production. They offer soldiers more than just improved communications, and have performed in exercises and on the front lines. Now, production is ramping up.

JTRS HMS: The Radios AN/PRC-154 Rifleman
(click to view full)

JTRS HMS’ AN/PRC-154 Rifleman radios are jointly developed and manufactured by Thales and General Dynamics. These software-defined radios are designed as successors to the JTRS-compatible CSCHR (PRC-148 and PRC-152) handhelds, securely transmitting voice and data simultaneously using Type 2 cryptography and the new Soldier Radio Waveform. General Dynamics touts it as being more than 20% smaller than current tactical handhelds, with battery life of over 10 hours. It weighs 2 pounds, with battery and antenna.

The Rifleman radio can create self-forming, ad hoc, voice and data networks. What’s even more significant is that they also enable any leader at the tactical level to track the position of individual soldiers who are also using the radio. That’s a big deal in urban environments, which can force a squad or platoon to split up.

For vehicles that may not have a JTRS HMS radio or a base station, the Rifleman Radio also mounts to a ‘Sidewinder’ accessory that provides power for recharging and/or longer-range transmission. To use it, just slide your PRC-154 radio in. The Sidewinder’s hardware assembly includes the 20w power amplifier from the AN/PRC-155, and connectors that work with the vehicles’ existing intercom systems. Sidewinder is compatible with many US standard military mounting trays and vehicle intercom systems: MT-6352/VRC; SINCGARS VRC-89, 90, 91, 92; and SINCGARS AM-7239 VAA.

JTRS HMS set
(click to view full)

The program’s Small Form Fit (SFF) configurations also include embedded variants that serve in Army host platforms. The 0.5 pound SFF-A/D offers communications for UAVs and the tracked SUGV robot. The 3.4 pound SFF-B can serve as a communications relay; it allows bridging from unclassified to classified networks, and is expandable with the broadband WNW. SFF-B can be carried in vehicles, helicopters, or as an airborne relay by UAVs.

JTRS HMS’ AN/PRC-155 Manpack is a larger 2-channel networking radio that allows battlefield commanders to talk to their team on one channel, and exchange information with other forces or headquarters on the second channel. There are many times on the battlefield when having to choose one or the other is a lousy choice to make, and the fact that it has been that way for a long time doesn’t make fixing it any less beneficial.

The 14-pound PRC-155 is the only JTRS radio to successfully demonstrate all 3 new waveforms: the Soldier Radio Waveform, the Wideband Networking Waveform, and the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellite-communications waveform. That last option comes in very handy in urban environments, mountains, and other terrain that can block straight-line radio communications. The PRC-155 is also interoperable with older systems, of course, including the current frequency-hopping SINCGARS standard. Planned enhancements would extend that backward compatibility, and include: HF, IW, VHF/UHF LOS, AM/FM, and APCO-25.

Unfortunately, the radio’s 17 pounds makes it twice as heavy as previous SINCGARS radios, its effective range is less than half as far (3 km vs. 7 km), its 2 batteries last less than 20% as long (6 hours vs. 33 hours), and its user interface is an impediment. The US Army has deferred its planned Lot 3 purchase.

Phase 2 of JTRS HMS will produce Manpack radios with stronger NSA-certified Type 1 cryptography.

Both the JTRS HMS AN/PRC-154 Rifleman and the 2-channel AN/PRC-155 Manpack networking radios are planned for inclusion in the Army’s Capability Set 13, which is to be delivered to Infantry Brigade Combat Teams beginning in October 2012.

Contracts & Key Events

May 29/15: California-based ViaSat Inc. was awarded a contract with a potential value of $478.6 million on Thursday for Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) Joint Tactical Radio Systems (JTRS) terminals. These will give commanders the ability to communicate by voice, video and data links to forces via a line-of-sight, jam-resistant channel across ground, air and naval assets.

April 30/15: The Army awarded an up-to $3.89 billion firm-fixed-price and cost reimbursable, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract to Thales Defense & Security and Harris Corp for rifleman radios, beating out two other bids. Thales was previously awarded a US Army contract in 2012 for its AN/PRC-154 radios, jointly developed with General Dynamics.

April 3/15: SANR RFP to come. The Army is expected to release a RFP in 2016 for the Small Airborne Networking Radio (SANR), with the program included in the President’s proposed 2016 budget. The SANR will enable better helicopter-soldier communication through a software-defined dual-channel system capable of relaying both voice and data information.

January 12/15: HMS RFP. The U.S. Army issued an RFP for full rate production, with plans to test units over 2015-1016, “off-ramping” multiple vendors who do not meet requirements and going into full production in 2017.

FY 2013 – 2014

June 16/14: PRC-155 backtrack. The US Army cancels a May 30/14 sole-source decision to buy more PRC-155 radios. This proposed LRIP-3 order is undone:

“U.S. Army Contracting Command – Aberdeen Proving Ground (ACC-APG) intends to solicit on a sole source basis under the statutory authority permitting Other than Full and Open Competition 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(2), as implemented by FAR 6.302-2, Unusual and Compelling Urgency to General Dynamics C4 Systems… for the procurement of Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Manpack Radios (AN/PRC-155).”

Sources: FBO.gov, “58–Manpack Radio, Solicitation Number: W15P7T14R0027″

June 13/14: Manpack problems. The PRC-155 radios didn’t win a lot of fans in recent trials. Where to start? The radio’s 17 pounds makes it twice as heavy as previous SINCGARS radios, its effective range is less than half as far (3 km vs. 7 km), its 2 batteries last less than 20% as long (6 hours vs. 33 hours), and its user interface is an impediment. Adding to the fun, overheating is hazardous to the carrying soldier if it’s taken out of the case against recommendations. Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster, commander of the Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, in Fort Benning, Georgia:

“The Maneuver Center of Excellence considers the dismounted HMS manpack radio unsuitable for fielding to brigade combat teams…. A radio that is heavier and provides less range while creating a higher logistics demand does not make our units more operationally capable. Additionally, any radio that places our soldiers at risk of being burned is unacceptable.”

Most manpack radios are actually placed in vehicles, where all concerns save their short range vanish. Even so, the Army has a problem. Congress has been able to make things worse, by demanding that it spend about $300 million in appropriated radio funds, even if the best technical course of action is to wait. Now throw in the usual corporate welfare/ industrial base arguments, which are further complicated by Harris Corp.’s contemplation of a lawsuit to have JTRS HMS compatible manpack radios competed – something BAE might also want. Regardless of how the political and contractor games play out, the bottom line is that the front-line soldiers are losing. Sources: NDIA National Defense, “Army Tactical Radios in the Crosshairs After Scathing Review”.

April 17/14: SAR. The Pentagon releases its Dec 31/13 Selected Acquisitions Report. For Joint Tactical Radio System Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit Radios (JTRS HMS):

“The PAUC [which includes amortized R&D] increased 20.0 percent and the APUC increased 19.2 percent above the current APB, due to a revision in the acquisition strategy for full rate production (including a change from a single vendor per radio to multiple vendors per radio), vehicle integration requirements not previously identified as a funding responsibility of the program, and a change in the Army fielding strategy that fields fewer radios per year.”

Aug 19/13: Manpack. The US Army is also preparing a competition for the larger JTRS HMS Manpack radio in FY 2014. General Dynamics and Thales lost one potential incumbent advantage when schedule slippages sent 10th Mountain Division soldiers to Afghanistan with Harris’ earlier-model Falcon III 117G radios, instead of JTRS HMS AN/PRC-155s. The division’s 3rd and 4th Brigade Combat Teams did take the AN/PRC-154 Rifleman radio with them. Sources: Defense News, “Army Preparing For a Slew of Critical Radio Contracts”.

Aug 16/13: Rifleman. The US Army’s JTRS HMS Rifleman solicitation takes longer than they thought, as the draft RFP is issued for comments. The Army still intends to conduct an open competition for a 5-year firm-fixed-price follow-on, and is hosting a Rifleman Radio Industry Day on Sept 5/13. The goal is an award in FY 2014.

It’s possible for the Army’s base radio type to change as a result of that competition, and General Dynamics’ PRC-154 will face competition from Harris’ RF-330E-TR Wideband Team Radio, among others. FBO.gov #W15P7T13R0029 | US Army ASFI | Harris RF-330E-TR.

Oct 22/12: Rifleman. The US Army prepares to open JTRS HMS to competition for full rate production, via a sources sought solicitation:

“Project Manager Tactical Radios is seeking industry comments and feedback to the draft Statement of Objectives, draft Statement of Work, draft Performance Requirements Document, draft Contract Data Requirements List, and questionnaire for Handheld, Manpack and Small Form Fit (HMS) Rifleman Radios (RR)… NO SOLICITATION EXISTS AT THIS TIME. It is currently anticipated that Solicitation W15P7T-12-R-0069 regarding this requirement will be released later in 1QFY13.”

Sources: FBO.gov.

Oct 22/12: BAE’s Phoenix. The Lexington Institute’s Loren Thompson offers a quick rundown of the JTRS concept, and spends a fair bit of time talking about the Phoenix radio that BAE has developed with its own funds, as a future JTRS HMS Manpack competitor. Its anti-jam feature may help remove an issue encountered when counter-IED devices are broadcasting, and during Israel’s 2006 war in Lebanon when its SINCGARS radios were jammed with Iranian assistance. He says that likely JTRS HMS competitors include BAE Systems, Harris, ITT Exelis, and Northrop Grumman, alongside the existing GD/Thales team. Sources: Forbes, “Army Resets Radio Plans As Demand Signal Shifts” | BAE Systems Phoenix Family.

Oct 11/12: PRC-155 LRIP OK. The PRC-155 Manpack radio is also cleared for low-rate initial production now, after the Pentagon issued a memo accepting that flaws with SINCGARS performance and difficulty of use had been fixed.

The May 2011 entry covered Milestone C for the entire program, but the PRC-155’s progress was conditional. The memo authorizes 3,726 HMS Manpack radios, under a 2nd LRIP order to follow. That order will also support future test events, development up to a Full Rate Production decision, and potential fielding as part of the US Army’s Capability Set 13. Beyond that, however, the memo also directs the service to conduct a “full and open” competition for full-rate production JTRS HMS radios, starting no later than July 2013. US Army | Bloomberg.

Manpack to LRIP

FY 2010 – 2012

Sept 17/12: LRIP-2. The U.S. Army awards a $53.9 million Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contract for 13,000 AN/PRC-154 Rifleman Radios and associated gear, with production to be split between prime contractor General Dynamics C4 Systems, and their partner and 2nd-source supplier Thales Communications.

Each contractor produces 50% of the ordered equipment, and the LRIP-2 contract brings AN/PRC-154 Rifleman Radio orders to 19,250 so far. Thales Rifleman Radios are manufactured at the company’s Clarksburg, MD, facilities. US Army | GDC4S | Thales Communications.

LRIP Lot 2

May 16/12: WNW Test. General Dynamics C4 Systems announces that they have demonstrated wireless high definition video and data transfer on the JTRS HMS AN/PRC-155 two-channel networking manpack radio, using the new high-bandwidth Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW). With so many UAVs, robot UGVs, and other sensors roaming around the battlefield these days, that kind of local high-bandwidth networking is really helpful.

May 16/12: AOL Defense reports that General Dynamics tried to get an amendment to the 2013 defense budget that would affect the JTRS HMS competition, but the amendment’s wording was somewhat confusing, and it failed. The House Armed Services Committee seems pretty intent on full and open competition.

March – May 2012: The US Army 1st Armored Division’s 2nd Brigade uses the Rifleman Radio in the Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) 12.21 exercise, alongside other equipment that comprises WIN-T Phase 2. GDC4S.

March 30/12: SAR. The Pentagon releases its Selected Acquisition Reports summary, and JTRS HMS is on it. It’s reported as a significant program change, since:

“Program costs increased $3,493.3 million (+60.1%) from $5,811.4 million to $9,304.7 million, due primarily to a quantity increase of 49,224 radios from 221,978 to 271,202 radios [DID: +22.2%].”

That’s only a 22.2% quantity increase, which leaves 37.9% of the cost increase unaccounted for. At least HMS did better than the JTRS GMR for ground vehicles, whose costs declined 62.2% because the program was cancelled. The army says the vehicle-mounted GMR radars were just too expensive, and they’ll look for JTRS-compatible off-the-shelf alternatives.

SAR – more JTRS HMS, no JTRS GMR

Feb 17/12: MUOS test. General Dynamics C4 Systems announces that they’ve successfully run their 1st test of the AN/PRC-155, suing the MUOS satellite-communications waveform to transmit encrypted voice and data. Development of the MUOS waveform remains on track for completion in the third quarter of 2012, with expected production availability or software upgrade by year-end.

The PRC-155 manpack radio will be the first MUOS communications terminal used by soldiers. Its twin channels mean that a soldier can use 1 channel for line-of-sight SINCGARS and SRW waveforms, and bridge to the 2nd channel using the MUOS satellite system for global communications reach.

Jan 23/12: It’s announced that the US Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment special forces in Afghanistan have deployed with the PRC-154 the Rifleman Radio, and General Dynamics Itronix GD300 wearable computer. The Rifleman Radio is for intra-squad communications, while the GD300, running the Tactical Ground Reporting (TIGR) tactical “app,” will be used to send text messages, situation reports and other information to individual soldiers.

The equipment reportedly gets good reviews in theater. CDC4S | Inside the Army [PDF].

Jan 17/12: DOT&E testing. The Pentagon releases the FY 2011 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). JTRS HMS is included, and a number of the DOT&E’s conclusions appear elsewhere in the timeline. Their core concern is that:

“The JTRS HMS program is schedule-driven and has reduced developmental testing to support an aggressive operational test schedule. Therefore, operational testing has and will likely continue to reveal problems that should have been discovered and fixed during developmental testing.”

Dec 14/11: IOT&E done. The AN/PRC-154 Rifleman Radio has finished its Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) with members of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division (2/1 AD), during the U.S. Army’s Network Integration Evaluation at Fort Bliss, TX. The IOT&E is the last formal test required by the military before the radios enter full-rate production. US Army | GDC4S.

Oct 10/11: WNW. General Dynamics C4 Systems announces a 5-year, maximum $64.5 million contract to support, maintain, and further develop the high-bandwidth JTRS Wideband Networking Waveform.

This Software In-Service Support contract was awarded by the U.S. Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWAR), which oversees JTRS. The award is separate from, but related to, GDC4S’ role as the prime contractor for the JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit radio program.

WNW support & development

July 7/11: LRIP-1. The U.S. Army awards the 1st Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contract. It’s a $54.4 million order for 6,250 AN/PRC-154 Rifleman Radios, plus 100 AN/PRC-155 Manpack radios for continued testing, and expenses for one-time production startup costs, accessories, training, related equipment and supplies.

Technically, General Dynamics receives the LRIP contract, and the Rifleman radios will be manufactured in a 50/ 50 split by both Thales Communications and General Dynamics. JTRS HMS’ contract structure, from System Design and Development through LRIP, has been designed to provide competition from multiple qualified sources.

The JTRS HMS networking radios are the first ground-domain radios that will be fielded by the U.S. military that meet the full suite of JTRS requirements. At this point, the Army plans to purchase more than 190,000 Rifleman and approximately 50,000 Manpack radios. GDC4S | Thales Communications.

1st Production Lot

July 2011: Manpack testing fail. During the Army’s Network Integration Eexercise (NIE), they test the JTRS HMS Manpack. The Pentagon’s DOT&E testing report says that it demonstrated poor reliability, short range of the Soldier Radio Waveform and Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) waveforms that significantly constricted the operational area of the cavalry troop, and Inconsistent voice quality. Overall, the Army decided that the Manpack’s Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) waveform was not ready for test and did not test it during the truncated formal Government Developmental Test. Source: DOT&E.

May 2011: Milestone C. The JTRS HMS program received a Milestone C decision from the U.S. Department of Defense, clearing the radios for low-rate production. The Defense Acquisition Executive approved up to 6,250 Rifleman Radios, and up to 100 Manpack radios.

Milestone C

January 2011: The US Army conducts a Verification of Correction of Deficiencies (VCD) test with a redesigned version of the Rifleman Radio.

That full redesign stemmed from the 2009 Limited User Test, where the radio was deemed ok during movement and preparation, but didn’t perform well in combat. The redesigned Rifleman Radio featured improvements in size, weight, battery life, radio frequency power out, and ease of use. Source: DOT&E.

Sept 8/10: Crypto cert. General Dynamics announces that its AIM II programmable cryptographic module has been certified by the US National Security Agency (NSA) to secure classified information up to and including Top Secret, Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).

The AIM II module uses a secure hardware foundation with embedded software-based cryptographic algorithms. It’s certified for the JTRS HMS and Airborne Maritime Fixed (AMF) radios alike.

Crypto cert

Additional Readings

• General Dynamics C4 Systems – AN/PRC-154 Rifleman Radio

• General Dynamics C4 Systems – Sidewinder Vehicle Mount

• General Dynamics C4 Systems – Small Form Fit Radios

• General Dynamics C4 Systems – AN/PRC-155 2-channel Manpack Radio

Naval launch
(click to view full)

As UAVs proliferate, and the demands of counter-insurgency fights force militaries to look at arming new kinds of aircraft, a number of manufacturers and governments are looking to develop precision-guided “mini-missiles” and glide weapons. Raytheon’s 33+ pound, 42 inch long Griffin is a member of that class, and comes in 3 versions.

Griffin was privately developed, and Raytheon took pains to re-use components from existing weapons like the AIM-9X Sidewinder air-air missile and the Javelin anti-tank missile. The resulting weapon carved out a niche in the growing market for small and relatively inexpensive guided weapons, but Raytheon thinks it has more potential, and has been investing in new capabilities…

The AGM-176 Griffin Family KC-130J, Afghanistan

AGM-176A. Griffin-A is currently in use as part of American roll-on armed kits for its C-130 Hercules transports. It’s dropped out of “gunslinger” tubes and “derringer doors,” providing precision weapon drops from the rear ramp and side door. It packs a 13 pound blast-fragmentation warhead, and uses a combination of GPS/INS and a semi-active laser seeker for guidance.

AGM-176B/ MK-60. Griffin-B is a powered missile can be a forward-firing weapon, and can be launched from land, naval, or aerial platforms. The missile’s estimated range is similar to the larger AGM-114 Hellfire: about 3.5 miles if surface-launched without a booster motor, rising to 12.5 miles or more if fired from an aerial platform at altitude. That’s fine for aerial platforms, as Griffin A/B offers them the ability to carry more Griffins than Hellfires, while achieving similar reach and precision. The tradeoff is a smaller warhead.

There are still targets like tanks that will demand a larger AGM-114 Hellfire warhead, and targets like buildings may demand a full-size AGM-65 Maverick missile or LJDAM bomb. In many cases, however, the Griffin offers a “just enough, for less” solution that has the added benefit of minimizing collateral damage.

The AGM-176B Block III adds an improved semi-active laser seeker, enhanced electronics and signal processing, and a new Multi-Effects Warhead System that works against a number of different target types.

Confirmed Platforms: AT-6C turboprop, KC-130J Harvest Hawk, AC-130J Ghost Rider, MC-130W Combat Spear, MQ-1 Predator UAV, MQ-8B Fire Scout VTUAV, MQ-9 Reaper UAV, Cyclone Class patrol boat. Has also been tested using ground launch system, and on the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior scout helicopter.

AGM-176C. The Griffin C attempts to compete against Lockheed’s Hellfire and MBDA’s Brimstone 2 by adding dual-mode laser/IIR guidance for a fire-and-forget missile that uses thrust-vectoring control for vertical launch compatibility, a datalink for retargeting in flight, and waypoint flight to maneuver around obstacles.

The AGM-176C-ER keeps these improvements, and its rocket motor extends surface-launched range to 10 miles or more – about 3x the range of previous Griffins, or their larger Hellfire/ Brimstone competitors.

Looking Beyond Griffin on HMMWV
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The Army has tested the 45-pound, powered Griffin-B missile as an option for forward outposts. Its de facto competition here is Raytheon’s own Javelin missile, which is already widely deployed, and offers similar range and firepower. Javelin is a rather expensive missile, and takes some time to activate and reload, but comes with advanced sensors that troops use independently.

In order to find a viable niche and achieve acceptance, Griffin will have to compete on cost and response time/volume. Griffin C’s added range will help, but this missile family’s ability to receive geo-coordinate cues from UAVs and other sensors, without the need for an operator to find the same target himself, may be their biggest edge.

On the naval front, the picture isn’t as rosy. Griffin-B reportedly costs about half as much as the Raytheon NLOS-LS PAM, but its surface-launched range is less than 1/6th of NLOS-LS PAM’s 21 nautical miles. This severe cut in reach, coupled with the warhead’s small size, sharply limits its versatility. Griffins could engage enemy speedboats, but guidance modes for the A & B models force one-at-a-time engagements. Nor can Griffin do much damage to full-size enemy vessels – most of which will pack large anti-ship missiles with a 50 – 200 mile reach.

This didn’t stop the Navy from designating the Griffin as an interim solution, and it has been a very useful addition to their Cyclone Class patrol boats. On the other hand, Griffin’s limitations, and the availability of fire-and-forget Hellfire missile stocks, led the US Navy to equip their Littoral Combat Ship with AGM-114L Hellfire Longbow radar-guided missiles instead.

Griffin C’s combination of range and guidance modes may give it a chance on other vessels that are thinking of mounting Brimstone-class weapons, but it’s never going to compete with anti-ship missiles. Nor does it have the range to deliver naval fire support for ground forces, outside of a CONOPS involving small speedboat/ USV swarms. That leaves close-in fire as Griffin’s sweet spot, with a potential boost from its ability to also equip tactical-size shipboard UAVs.

Contracts & Key Events KC-130J’s “gunslinger”
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Unless otherwise noted, the USAF’s Air Armament Center Contracting, Advanced Programs Division at Eglin Air Force Base, FL manages these contracts, though U.S. Army Contracting Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL also seems to have its share. The contractor is Raytheon Missiles Systems Co. in Tucson, AZ.

FY 2012 – 2015

AGM-176C Griffin triples range, adds retargeting and dual-mode guidance; Griffin elbowed aside for LCS by Army AGM-114L Hellfires; Army, Naval tests; Griffin fired from RAM missile launcher. AT-6C & Griffins
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May 29/15: Orders.The Air Force signed a contract with Raytheon to procure Griffin missiles, with the deal worth $12 million. The Griffin is a precision miniature munition that utilizes parts from other Raytheon-manufactured missiles – such as the Javelin ATGM and the AIM-9X AAM – to keep costs down. The missile is currently used as part of roll-on armed kits for US C-130 transport aircraft.

Nov 3/14: Orders. A maximum $85.5 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for Griffin AGM-176A Block II and AGM-176B Block III (q.v. Feb 20/14) missiles and test/ support equipment, along with engineering support under a cost-plus-fixed-fee CLIN. $32.6 million is committed immediately as an initial order, using FY 2013 – 2015 USAF budgets.

DID asked Raytheon’s Griffin Programs Director Steve Dickman about this order. He told us that this isn’t a major shift for Griffin, just a way for the government to continue buying missiles as it needs them. Based on past figures, the initial order is very solid.

Work will be performed at Tucson, AZ, and the government will be able to continue buying missiles and services under its terms until Oct 30/17. This award is the result of a sole-source acquisition. The USAF Life Cycle Management Center at Eglin AFB, FL manages the contract (FA8656-15-D-0241).

Multi-year contract

Oct 28/14: Testing. Raytheon announces that its SeaGriffin has had a name change to Griffin C, and successfully completed flight tests at Yuma Proving Ground, AZ. The missile extends range to around 10 km, adds in-flight retargeting, and features IIR and laser seekers for fire and forget mode. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon Griffin C flight tests demonstrate in-flight retargeting capability”.

July 17/14: LCS closed. Navy Recognition interviews a US Navy representative re: the Surface to Surface Mission Module aboard LCS, which will sit above the helicopter hangar on the Freedom Class, and behind the 57mm gun on the Independence Class. Key excerpts:

“Longbow Hellfire is the selected missile to help meet the LCS Surface Warfare Mission Package’s (SUW MP) engagement requirement per the LCS Capabilities Description Document (Flight 0+). Currently, no new requirement exists to warrant acquisition of a new engagement capability…. An LCS variant can only receive one SUW mission package. This will have one Surface-to-surface Missile Module (SSMM), which will utilize one launcher structure that holds 24 Longbow Hellfire missiles…. There currently is no requirement for at-sea reloads.Therefore, the current SSMM design does not support at-sea reloads… It utilizes an existing Army M299 launcher mounted within a gas containment system.”

Looks like Raytheon’s SeaGriffin has lost its shot, despite tripling its previously-comparable range and adding comparable fire-and-forget capability in its latest iteration. Sources: Navy Recognition, “Q & A with the US Navy on Lockheed Martin Hellfire missiles for Littoral Combat Ships”.

July 14/14: SeaGriffin. Raytheon hasn’t given up on its “SeaGriffin missile” for the Littoral Combat ship just yet. A recent test was used to demonstrate a dual-mode laser and imaging infrared guidance system, whose fire-and-forget capability would allow the same kind of salvo launches against swarming targets that the AGM-114L Hellfire’s MMW radar seeker offers. They also tout “an extended range motor that will nearly triple [SeaGriffin’s] range,” giving it a notable advantage over Lockheed Martin’s AGM-114L Hellfire or MBDA’s Dual-Mode Brimstone 2.

Other SeaGriffin enhancements beyond the Griffin-B Block II include a datalink for in-flight target updates, waypoint navigation, and vertical launch capability with vectoring thrust control. The firm says that they’re conducting a series of SeaGriffin guided flight tests to demonstrate the missile’s readiness as an option for the LCS Surface Warfare module. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon SeaGriffin completes guided flight test with new dual-mode seeker”.

SeaGriffin (Griffon C/ C-ER) introduced

LCS: Hellfire
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April 9/14: LCS. The US Navy confirms that they have picked the AGM-114L Hellfire Longbow radar-guided missile as the LCS Surface Warfare Package’s initial missile. Its fire and forget guidance, salvo capability, and ability to use the ship’s radar tipped the balance against Griffin. Lockheed Martin says that the missile has had 3 successful test firings in vertical launch mode, and there are plans to test-fire the missile from LCS itself in 2014, using a new vertical launcher.

Hellfire wouldn’t have any more range than Griffin’s 3.5 nmi, but the millimeter-wave radar seeker allows the ship’s radar to perform targeting, while allowing salvos of multiple fire-and-forget missiles against incoming swarms. In contrast, the Griffin’s laser designation must target one boat at a time, from a position that’s almost certain to have a more restricted field of view than the main radar. Navy AGM-114L missiles would be drawn from existing US Army stocks, which will have shelf life expiry issues anyway. That’s one reason the Army intends to begin buying JAGM laser/radar guided Hellfire derivatives around FY 2017.

Griffin’s existing aerial platforms won’t be affected by this decision, except to the extent that costs will be slightly higher with fewer missiles ordered. LCS deployment probably won’t affect Griffin use on the PC-1 Cyclone Class patrol boats, either, as they don’t have radar targeting capabilities. Sources: DoD Buzz, “Navy Adds Hellfire Missiles to LCS” | USNI News, “Navy Axes Griffin Missile In Favor of Longbow Hellfire for LCS”.

Griffin out of LCS

March 25/14: MK-60 IOC. The MK-60 Patrol Coastal Griffin Missile System has formally achieved initial operational capability with the US Navy on its Cyclone Class vessels. they’ve actually been carrying Griffin for a while; testing began in March 2012.

The MK-60 system includes the AGM-176B Griffin missile, a laser targeting system, a US Navy-designed launcher, and a battle management system on a laptop for use by the missile’s operator. Sources: Navy Recognition, “DIMDEX 2014 Show Daily: US Navy achieves IOC on Patrol Coastal Griffin Missile System” | Shephard, “US Navy declares IOC for MK-60 Griffin missile system”.

Naval IOC

Feb 20/14: Griffin Block III. After a range of testing including a number of live test shots against fixed and moving targets, Raytheon says that the new Griffin Block III is on the production line as the missile’s new iteration.

Block III introduces an improved semi-active laser seeker, enhanced electronics and signal processing, and a new Multi-Effects Warhead System that works against a number of different target types. We’re starting to see a lot of general convergence between blast, fragmentation, and armor-piercing effects, and the trend seems to be headed toward sharp reductions in the number of weapon variants determined by warhead type. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon demonstrates Griffin Block III missile”.

Feb 5/14: #2,000. Raytheon announces delivery of its 2,000th Griffin Missile since production began in 2008, an AGM-176B Block III variant. The production milestone also highlights 70 consecutive months of on-time or early Griffin deliveries to the warfighter. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon marks delivery of 2000th Griffin missile”.

Delivery #2,000

July 22/13: GAO Report. The US GAO releases GAO-13-530, “Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost”. The entire report is a long chronicle of the Littoral Combat Ship program’s history of falling short and unresolved issues, including a number of issues with the mission modules. While Griffin missiles have been deployed on Cyclone Class patrol boats, GAO says they may never be deployed aboard LCS:

“The Navy assessed over 50 potential missile replacements for LCS, and in January 2011 selected the Griffin IIB missile as an interim solution based, in part, on it costing half of [NLOS-LS per missile]. The program now intends to purchase one unit with a total of eight Griffin IIB missiles, to be fielded in 2015, which leave other SUW module equipped ships with a limited ability to counter surface threats. However, Navy officials told us that they may reconsider this plan because of funding cuts related to sequestration. According to OPNAV, funding for Griffin development and testing has been suspended for the remainder of fiscal year 2013. OPNAV and the LCS program office, with LCS Council oversight, plan to investigate using a more cost-effective, government-owned, surface-to-surface missile system that would provide increased capability, including increased range. According to Navy program officials, the deployment of the Increment IV [Griffin successor] missile could also be delayed by over a year [i.e. to 2020] because funding reductions have delayed early engineering work and proposal development for the missile contract.”

June 12/12: Testing. Raytheon reveals a winter 2012 test in which 3 Griffin missiles were fired from a sea-based launcher at 3 separate speeding-boat targets more than 2 km / 1.2 miles away. The weapons were guided by laser, and scored direct hits on the targets.

The test demonstrates that the Griffin can defend a warship against speedboats that venture inside mutual torpedo range. On the one hand, that’s a good thing. Those with a grasp of naval history might recall British Royal Navy Captain Augustus Willington Shelton Agar, VC, DSO. As a Lieutenant, he sank the Russian heavy cruiser Oleg and a submarine depot ship, and badly damaged 2 battleships in 1919, using torpedo-armed speedboats launched from the Terijoki Yacht Club in Finland. The bad news is that Agar’s successors use larger Fast Attack Craft, armed with anti-ship missiles that vastly outrange the Griffin. The AGM-176B can still be very useful on patrol boats and smaller craft, but it’s a secondary defense at best for warships.

May 29/12: Orders. An $8.2 million firm-fixed-price contract modification buys “Griffin stand-off precision guided munitions” and engineering services support. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/12. One bid was solicited, with one bid received. The U.S. Army Contracting Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL manages this contract. (W31P4Q-10-C-0239).

This order pushes announced contracts to date over $166 million.

Order

May 18/12: Orders. An $85.5 million firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to buy Griffin missiles. Based on past records (q.v. Nov 2/11), the total contract would correspond to a maximum of over 800 missiles.

It isn’t all committed at once, and the initial order buys just 22 Griffin all-up-rounds, and 43 telemetry rounds for testing. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and will run until July 31/13 (FA8677-12-D-0037).

Major order

April 18/12: RAM shot. Raytheon announces that sometime in winter 2011, the USN fired a Griffin B missile from a land-based Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) launcher. The shot was taken at a static target about 2 miles away, and the GPS/laser guidance produced a direct hit.

OK, successful demonstration. On the other hand, the RAM system already has the ability to hit surface craft from longer range than Griffin, albeit with less surety than Griffin’s laser guidance. Since RIM-116 missiles can also kill incoming anti-ship missiles, it isn’t clear why a ship would mount Griffins by sacrificing several RIM-116 slots on a 21-slot MK-49 or 11-shot SeaRAM launcher. Sources: Raytheon, “US Navy Fires Raytheon Griffin Missile From RAM Launcher”.

Feb 14/12: Army testing Griffin. Raytheon announces that the US Army is testing its powered Griffin B as a potential system to provide 360 degree quick-reaction firepower to smaller outposts. Raytheon’s Javelin missile can already do this within the Griffin’s firing range, so the Griffin will have to compete on cost, responsiveness, and fire volume:

“During the test, warfigthers fired a Griffin missile from a launcher at a static target more than 4 kilometers (2.5 miles) away. Using GPS coordinates generated by a tethered aerostat, the missile directly impacted the target, achieving all test objectives.”

FY 2008 – 2011

Griffin ordered for C-130 aircraft, UAVs, and Cyclone Class patrol boats; Picked for LCS. Griffin testing

Nov 7/11: LCS. Inside the Navy reports [subscription] that the Griffin missile will be part of LCS’ initial surface warfare module, but a competition will begin in 2012, and:

“The program executive office for the Littoral Combat Ship has already identified capabilities that could replace the Griffin missile…”

The new missile would be due for fielding after FY 2016. One possibility that’s already on the market is IAI’s Jumper.

LCS SuW pick

Nov 7/11: KC-130J-HH. Inside the Navy reports [subscription] on Griffin usage in Afghanistan:

“Less than a year after first introducing it to the fleet, the Marine Corps has already used the Harvest Hawk… to fire 74 Hellfire and 13 Griffin missiles… while also providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, a Marine aviation official said here recently.”

Nov 2/11: Orders. A $9.3 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to buy 70 Griffin Block IIA all up rounds, and 21 Griffin Block II A telemetry rounds that replace the warhead with testing electronics. The primary location of performance is Tucson, AZ, and the purchase supports U.S. Special Operations Command (FA8677-11-C-0115, PO 0008).

Order

Aug 19/11: UAVs. Aviation Week reports on 2 key milestones for the MQ-8 Fire Scout helicopter UAV program. One is the addition of the larger MQ-8C/ Fire-X. The other is weapons approval for the MQ-8B, beginning with the APKWS-II laser-guided 70mm rocket that’s already cleared for use from Navy ships.

Raytheon’s laser-guided short-range Griffin mini-missile is slated for a demonstration before the end of August 2011, and will be the platform’s next weapon, as opposed to Northrop Grumman’s own GBU-44 Viper Strike.

Aug 15/11: Orders. An $11.5 million firm-fixed-price cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for an unspecified number of Griffin missiles, and associated engineering services support. Work location will be determined by task order, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/12. One bid was solicited, with one bid received by the U.S. Army Contracting Command at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-10-C-0239).

Order

July 14/11: Orders. A $9.1 million contract modification to buy 4 Griffin Block II A telemetry rounds for testing (part number 2292000-25), and 74 Griffin Block IIA all up rounds (Part Number 2292000-26) to include shipping, engineering services, and proposal development costs.

Griffin is currently used on UAVs and armed C-130s, as well as a potential future aboard the LCS (FA9200-11-C-0180, PZ0003).

Order

May 12/11: LCS. Inside the Navy reports:

“The Navy may not have settled on the Griffin missile to replace the canceled Non-Line-Of-Sight missile on the Littoral Combat Ship, despite the service’s announcement in January that it planned to use the missile for both a short-term and long-term solution to the capability gap, officials told Inside the Navy last week…”

Jan 11/11: LCS. Media report that the U.S. Navy is moving towards selecting Raytheon’s Griffin missile as the replacement for the cancelled NLOS-LS, instead of taking over that program’s development now that the Army has pulled out. USN surface warfare division director Rear Adm. Frank Pandolfe told a Surface Navy Association convention audience in Arlington, VA that a 6-month review had settled on this Raytheon product, as something that can hit targets at “acceptable” ranges and cost.

That recommendation must be endorsed by the Navy before anything comes of this; if they do, the service would field the existing very short range Griffin by 2015, and try to develop a longer range version later. DoD Buzz | Arizona Daily Star.

Sept 8/10: UAVs. Flight International reports that the Griffin is being integrated onto MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper UAVs. They are not specific, but these are probably US Special Operations Command’s modified MALET drones.

Griffin-B launch
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June 9/09: Orders. A $14.5 million firm-fixed-price with cost-plus-fixed-fee line items contract for Griffin A & B munitions and engineering services. Even the air-launched versions have ranges of just 9+ miles, however, and at this point, Griffin is not on the radar screen for use on LCS.

Work is to be performed in Tucson, AZ, with an estimated completion date of May 31/10. One bid was solicited, with one bid received by the US Army Aviation and Missile Contracting Center at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-09-C-0517).

Order

Dec 24/08: Orders. A firm-fixed-price with cost-plus-fixed-fee line items contract for Griffin munitions and engineering services – but the amount is not mentioned. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, with an estimated completion date of Aug 31/09. One bid was solicited and one bid received by the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Contracting Center at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-08-C-0252).

Order

Aug 13/08: Orders. A $6.1 million firm-fixed price with cost-plus fixed fee line items contract for Griffin munitions and engineering services. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and is expected to be complete by Aug 31/09. One bid was solicited on Feb 5/08 by the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-08-C-0252).

At this point, NLOS-LS is still a program in good standing, and Griffin is seen as a UAV and helicopter weapon. The prospect of equipping an MQ-1A/B Predator with 6 Griffins instead of 2 Hellfires is seen as especially attractive. See also Aviation Week, “Small Raytheon Missile Deployed On Predator” [dead link].

Order

May 23/08: Order. A $10.25 million firm-fixed price contract for Griffin munitions. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and is expected to be complete by March 31/09. One bid was solicited on Feb 5/08 by the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-08-C-0252).

Order

May 7/08: Order. A $9.4 million firm-fixed price contract with cost-plus-fixed fee items for Griffin munitions, and associated engineering services. Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and is expected to be completed by Dec 31/08. One bid was solicited on Feb 5/08 by the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W31P4Q-08-C-0252).

Order

Additional Readings

• Raytheon – Griffin.

• Defense Update – Griffin [and] Small Tactical Munition (STM); Griffin B

• DID- The Right to Bear Arms: Gunship Kits for America’s C-130s.

• DID – The USA’s New Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). Griffin-B was slated to replace the canceled NLOS-LS PAM missile, but was displaced by the radar-guided AGM-114L Hellfire Longbow.

• DID – Arming RQ-7 UAVs: The Shadow Knows…. Even Griffin may be too heavy for the RQ-7, though…

• DID – GBU-44 Viper Strike: Death From Above. A Griffin competitor from Northrop Grumman.

• Flight International (Sept 8/10) – Raytheon’s Griffin missile makes quiet gains with US military .