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A recent decree by President Ghani on how to deal with terrorist crimes has introduced the prospect of detaining, without trial, Afghans (and foreigners in Afghanistan) suspected of planning acts of terrorism. The relevant article allows the Afghan authorities to detain suspects indefinitely on very little evidence and with little or no opportunity to defend themselves. The president has, also, through this decree, mandated a tripling of the period that the state can hold terrorist suspects whom it wants to put on trial before they have to be sent to court. Introduced quietly together alongside other presidential decrees, these sweeping new powers have hardly been subject to public discussion so far. The measures seem to be an attempt by the Afghan government to circumvent the legal system and its protections of basic rights. AAN’s Lenny Linke reports (with input from Kate Clark).

The new decree

Presidential Decree 76 “Annex Number One (1) to the Criminal Procedure Code on Terrorist Crimes and Crimes against Internal and External Security,” creates an annex to the existing Criminal Procedure Code (which can be found here in English and Dari) and delivers additional provisions for “terrorist crimes and crimes against internal and external security.” This decree was endorsed on 25 September 2015 and published in the Official Gazette (number 1190) on 19 October 2015 and, thereby, already has the force of law. The aim of decree, according to its first article, is the “effective prosecution” of perpetrators of terrorist crimes and sixteen other offences that are mentioned in the Law on Crimes against Internal and External Security. This earlier law was passed in 1987, under the leftist, Soviet-backed Najibullah regime and was aimed at offences ranging from treason and sabotage, to assisting an enemy force, to anti-state propaganda (including “intentionally spreading false news or self-serving allegations”) and, also, not informing authorities or trying to cover up ‘anti-state crimes.’ The wordings of many of these crimes are rather broad and potentially open to abuse or the casting of a very wide net. (1)

The decree can essentially be divided into two part: 1) articles 2-9 and 11-13 of the annex contain provisions for individuals suspected of terrorist crimes and crimes against internal and external security which, among other items, extends the period of pre-trial detention and allows covert intelligence gathering without prior authorisation, and 2) article 10, which authorises “Exercising of Precautionary Measures.”

As the new decree has been introduced quietly and together with more than a dozen other decrees, there has been little public discussion to date. Human rights organisations and some people in the parliament, have caught on to the fact that, in its current form, it threatens to undermine important rights and protections. Article 10, titled “Exercising of Precautionary Measures,” has attracted the most attention.

Article 10 – measures that allow for indefinite detention without trial

With article 10 of the Annex to the Criminal Procedure Code, the state has established an internment regime – also known as administrative or preventative detention – in just four short paragraphs. Based on this single article, the Afghan state can now detain, without trial, people who are strongly suspected of having committed a crime – and keep suspects it thinks may commit (again) acts of terrorism, or ‘crimes against internal and external security’ in the future after their release from detention, even when there is not enough evidence to launch an investigation.

Article 10 reads as follows:

(1) Precautionary measures shall be taken in the following circumstances:

The person is suspected of committing terrorist crimes or crimes committed against internal 
and external security but gathering of incriminating evidences is not possible and as a result of detective activities, based on strong indications or reliable information, there is a strong probability that he/she will commit a crime if released. 


The person has been sentenced to imprisonment for commission of terrorist crimes or crimes against internal and external security and has served his/her sentence term and based on strong indications and reliable information, there is a strong probability that he/she will again commit crimes if released. 


(2) National Directorate of Security shall propose to the Supreme Court detention of the suspect or the convict stated in paragraph (1) of this article after obtaining the agreement of the relevant prosecution office and confirmation of the Attorney General’s Office. 


(3) The period for exercising of security measures shall be one year and in case the situation set forth in paragraph (1) of this article continues, it may be extended consecutively. 


(4) Persons mentioned in paragraph (1) of this article shall be kept in a special place under the supervision of the prosecutor, separate from the detention center and prison.” 


Based on the above article, the Afghan state can now hold someone without trial under one of the following two scenarios:

Scenario 1: If a person is suspected of having committed or may commit terrorist crimes or crimes against internal 
and external security in the future, but it is not possible to gather “court-worthy” evidence. This means, if no evidence has been found, or an investigation has been inconclusive, but “detective activities” (2) based on strong indications or reliable information indicate a strong probability that he/she will commit a crime, if released (art 10, para 1, pt 1).

Scenario 2: If a person has been convicted and is in prison for a terrorist crime, or a crime against internal and external security, and has completed his/her sentence term, the state may choose not to release him or her if, “based on strong indications and reliable information,” the authorities think “there is a strong probability that he/she will again commit crimes, if released.” (art 10, para 1, pt 2)

The decree does not detail what could amount to ‘strong indications’ or ‘reliable information.’

These above-mention scenarios are not unique to Afghanistan – other countries have adopted similar measures post-9/11. Unlike in anti-terrorism legislation formulated by other countries permitting detention without trial, for example, by Australia, article 10 of the annex to the Criminal Procedure Code does not even specify an immediate future – only any time in the future ­­– for a possible suspect believed to possibly commit a crime. Many other countries severely limit the maximum period during which a person can be held without trial. In Australia, it is just 14 days. The Australian legislation also extensively details the procedures governing preventative detention – in 75 pages, as opposed to the Afghan decree’s one article with four paragraphs. See here for analysis of the Australian legislation and here for the law itself.

Who investigates and detains?

In terms of procedure, according to the new decree, it is the Afghan intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) that can ask for normal due process to be suspended so that an individual can be detained without trial. The NDS proposes to the Supreme Court “the detention of the suspect or convict stated in paragraph 1 of this article after obtaining the agreement of the relevant prosecution office and confirmation of the Attorney General’s office” (art 10, para 2). There is no provision in the law to allow suspects to defend themselves. There is also no mention of counsel and representation from a defence lawyer. The law, moreover, does not actually specify what the NDS has to show to the Supreme Court so that it can be given the necessary authorisation. In fact, article 10 paragraph 2 only states that the NDS has to propose the detention to the Supreme Court – from the text itself it is not clear in what form the proposal is required, or within what time frame and how the Supreme Court needs to respond to the request.

The new decree says that “the period for exercising the security measures shall be one year and if the situation set forth in paragraph 1 of this article continues, it may be extended [by the Supreme Court] consecutively” (art 10, para 3). This implies that any detention under article 10 would be fixed to one year (not more or less) and that, after that first year, all that seems to be required for the detention to be extended is that the original circumstances are deemed to be unchanged. Again, no opportunity is set out in the legislation for a suspect to argue against the continuing detention. Only another request from the NDS to the Supreme Court proposing an extension is required. The article does not specify any maximum number of renewals, nor does it mention any way that an individual could challenge or appeal against this preventative detention. However, circumstances might change or evidence might emerge that clears the detainee of suspicion. But there does not seem to be a process that would allow this new information to be brought in. In effect, this article provides the opportunity to detain a person indefinitely and without recourse.

According to Article 10 paragraph 2, the NDS needs to propose the detention without trial to the Supreme Court. It is not clear from the decree (art 10 para 3) whether individual members of the Supreme Court (official name: High Council of the Supreme Court (in Dari: شورای عالی ستره محکمه) can decide about such a NDS request or whether a full session of all of its nine members needs to take a decision.(3)

The Annex to the Criminal Procedure Code does not require any defence files to be presented or indeed to allow for anyone to argue for the detainee. In effect, this makes the procedure just an exchange of letters. Nor are there any other safeguards in the law against rubber-stamping requests. There are concerns that the session of the High Council (which do not take place every day and where other issues also need to be discussed) might not provide enough time to carefully study each case file. In particular, when the entire High Council of the Supreme Court needs to evaluate the credibility of the evidence, assess the potential threat a person might present and then come to a collective and reasoned decision.

How the Government justifies detention without trial

It is now almost three years since Afghans were last officially detained without trial on Afghan soil. The US had put a great deal of pressure on then President Karzai and his government to continue the US practice, but this was ultimately banned by Karzai who said it breached Afghan law. In the subsequent power struggle with the Americans, Karzai managed eventually to wrest control of Bagram’s Afghan detainees and, since 25 March 2013, they have had to be either put on trial or freed. (4)

Now, however, President Ghani appears to have decided to revert to the old practices. Hence, the decree came as a surprise to those who work on rule of law and detention issues, especially as Ghani has been among those criticising the US’s use of indefinite detention without trial at Guantánamo and, formerly, at Bagram. Human Rights Watch said it was “incomprehensible” that he would now introduce this draconian procedure to Afghanistan. (5) Detention without trial is an extreme measure for any state to take, but it is particularly risky where weak rule of law makes the power open to abuse. For President Ghani, however, it is the very weakness of the judicial system which, he said, led him to introduce the new powers: “We are dealing with a weak judicial system… sentences are reduced because of corruption in the courts… our security forces thought this was a mockery and people were getting out [of prison] with impunity….” (6) He added there had been “a need for a signal in the time of national emergency.” Despite the obvious need to have effective means of dealing with terrorism, this looks like a very risky way to try to do that, and here is why…

Problems with Article 10 of the decree

The issues with article 10 seem to be two-fold. First, in general, detention without trial is inherently problematic and a serious step for a state to take. Secondly, and more specifically, there is concern about the lack of defence lawyers, the ease of the process, the insufficient oversight and the absence of safeguards to ensure detainees cannot be ‘forgotten’ in Ghani’s decree.

Added to this, the Afghan context makes detention without trial particularly problematic. Currently, the war looks open-ended. This prompts the question of when and how an individual may no longer be deemed a threat. The Taleban and other militants are not identified by uniform or membership card, but mingle amongst the civilian population. This makes false arrests and false accusations easy. The decree’s language outlining what is needed to make an individual a terrorist suspect is scanty and vague: the NDS must just provide “reliable information” to the Supreme Court. Article 10 could thus very easily be used to frame another person – a business rival, a bothersome neighbour or a petitioner in a land dispute, for example, with false claims that could amount to ‘strong indications’ that this person is connected to the Taleban or Daesh (Islamic State).

There are already multiple problems with the Afghan law enforcement and judicial system when it comes to both ordinary and security crimes. Despite improvement over the past few years, Afghanistan continues to struggle to implement procedures to a satisfactory standard. This has been mentioned by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), for example, for ordinary crimes and for security-related crimes by UNAMA. (See the February 2015 UNAMA report on the Update on the Treatment of Conflict- Related Detainees in Afghan Custody: Accountability and Implementation of Presidential Decree 129 – which focused on a population detained for security crimes.)

Is Article 10 even legal – or necessary?

The Laws of Armed Conflict (also known as International Humanitarian Law) acknowledge that a state may use preventative detention during wartime. For example, Additional Protocol II (APII) to the Geneva Conventions which Afghanistan ratified in 2009 says that, when a state is at war, it may deprive its citizens of “their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict.” The first Memorandum of Understanding on handing over the Bagram detention facility from US to Afghan hands, in March 2012, (read the text here) nods to APII. However, APII does not necessarily make preventative detention legal in Afghanistan. It just makes it not a war crime per se. International Human Rights Law, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, also recognises that some rights, including the right to a prompt trial if arrested, can be derogated from “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed” (art 4, para 1). But…

The Afghan constitution already provides for such a suspension of rights during a state of emergency. Thus, President Ghani could have legalised internment by invoking article 143 (7) of the constitution and declaring a state of emergency. This is possible if there is “war, threat of war, serious rebellion, natural disasters, or situations similar.” The state of emergency can be declared in the whole country or in part of it and is permitted for two months (extendable) and with Parliament’s agreement. The president can then, with the agreement of the speakers of the Wolesi and Meshrano Jirga, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court make use of article 145 (8) which provides measures to suspend or restrict a number of constitutional provisions, including clause 2 of article 27 that says the due process of law must be followed in detention.

Both those drafting the constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights clearly recognised that partially suspending the rule of law is such a serious step for the state to take that it should be in the context of a declared state of emergency. However, Ghani chose not to take this route. He may have rejected this option for political or practical reasons – too much publicity, too many possible naysayers and too much potential political fallout (a state of emergency is a measure of last resort – and not utilized to ‘only’ suspend some legal provisions). But, by doing so, he has opened himself up to the accusation that he has violated the constitutional right to a trial.

More rights lost or curtailed with this decree

The other articles of Decree 76 deal with those whom the state does want to put on trial for terrorist crimes, for crimes against internal and external security and where sufficient evidence is available to do so. What the other articles of the annex do, however, is to expand many of the current time frames and provisions that are within the international norms to an extent that now they could be considered illegal. The most important ones are those that extend the powers of the state with regards to:

Covert Intelligence (article 3)

Article 3 deals with covert intelligence. Up until now, written permission (or oral permission for counter-narcotics-related activities) had to be obtained from the prosecutor’s office for any “covert detective operations,” such as wire-tapping. There is now no need for prior permission. Instead, the police or NDS can conduct wire-tapping of anyone they suspect of terrorist crimes or crimes against internal and external security for up to five days before they have to request permission from anyone to do so. Only on the sixth day do they need to have obtained a “verification of the lawfulness of their activities from the relevant division of the Supreme Court through the Prosecutors Office.”

This verification can be based on evidence collected during the first five days of surveillance. Article 3 remains silent on what happens to any intelligence if the continued collection of it is not deemed lawful – will it have to be destroyed, or is it still permissible to use in court as ‘reliable information’ for indefinite detention, even though the collection of further covert intelligence has been denied? Article 3 also fails to outline what will happen if covert intelligence operations are continued without permission after the five days. This lack of precision leaves gaps that could be easily utilized to circumvent any effective controls on the covert intelligence gathering process.

Pre-trial detention lengthened (articles 4 – 6)

Security personnel now have ten days “after learning about the occurrence” of a terrorist crime, or after the arrest of a suspect, before they need to hand over “the suspect and their activity report, documents, evidence and other collected substantiating materials” to the relevant prosecution (art 4, para 1). This more than triples the maximum period of pre-trial detention, from the current 72 hours (as per article 87 of the Criminal Procedure Code). International criminal procedure norms, according to the International Convent on the Civil and Political Rights, advocate a maximum of 72 hours before a suspect should be charged, released or further permission sought for detention. Although security personnel now have ten days to hold a suspect, according to article 5, they must still inform the prosecutor of the arrest within 24 hours.

After 72 hours of police or NDS detention, the prosecutor previously was allowed to request additional time for their investigation under existing law. The 2014 Criminal Procedure Code (article 100) allowed a judge to accede to a request for an additional seven days in the case of misdemeanours and 15 days for felonies. For terrorist crimes, these seven additional days for investigating misdemeanours have now, based on article 6 of the Annex, turned into 30 days, and the 15 days for felonies has turned into 60 (ie from two weeks to two months). A person suspected of involvement in a terrorist crime can now spend up to 70 days in custody before seeing a judge. While, under the existing Criminal Procedure Code, a total of 78 days of pre-trial detention was possible, the last 60 days at least had to have been approved by a judge and required the suspect and his or her defence lawyer to be present in court.

Other articles

Article 8 of the annex titled “Detention of the Accused during Trial” outlines the maximum number of days for each phase of the trial for the Primary, Appeal and Supreme Court – stating in paragraph 2 that the total period of detention during trial for all three stages cannot exceed 210 days. While the commitment to process a trial, so that detainees are not held for longer than necessary, is laudable, the timeline in the annex appears to be unrealistic. The setting of such a timeline is also not necessary, as due process often requires time and should not be dictated by a schedule. Such a timeline is not even set for trials in countries without the challenges of the Afghan judicial system, which tends to be plagued by delays and backlogs. A strict following of this provision threatens to harm, rather than help, due process.

Article 9 of the annex designates the Justice Centre in Parwan (at Bagram Airbase) as the venue for any primary and secondary stages of the counter-terrorism court – this means that all trials to do with terrorism or crimes against external and internal security must be held there, without exception. (9) Generally, prosecution takes place in the same geographic location as where the crime was allegedly committed. Given the good reputation of the Justice Centre in Parwan by Afghan standards and the extensive experience among judges, prosecutors and notably defence lawyers, of dealing with these types of cases, the move to Parwan might be positive. The Justice Centre in Parwan was already dealing with the majority of terrorist crimes before Decree 76 came into force. There is the concern, however, that it might become overwhelmed with the number of cases, particularly as ‘crimes against internal and external security’ is a rather broad term. Already, there are delays with the release of prisoners who have served their time, but have not been released yet. (10)

Article 11 – 13 contain additional provisions, such as bans on non-prison terms or pardons for those convicted or terrorism or crimes against external and internal security and an authorisation to seize convicts’ assets according to the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crimes. Again, for these provisions, there is no clear indication of how a suspect under the new decree can contest or reverse these measures. (11)

Why is this a ‘dangerous’ decree?

The new powers given to the state in this decree would be disquieting even in a stable system with a good record on the rule of law. In the Afghan context, the annex is likely to present a true challenge to upholding human rights. The AIHRC has already raised concerns pointing out that the article 10 of the annex to the criminal procedure code contradicts the human rights standards and norms. As evidenced by various reports on the Afghan system, such as UNAMA’s “Update on the Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody: Accountability and Implementation of Presidential Decree 129“ in February 2015, or even recently released information by the AIHRC (see here), it is clear that, currently, the Afghan state cannot even efficiently and accurately implement the rules and regulations already in place.

Adding the more complicated and often ambivalent and vaguely formulated provisions of Decree 76 to the current legislation will not improve the overall situation.  For example, it is not unheard of for files, and even detainees, to go missing ahead of, or even during, a trial, or for detainees to not be released after the sentence is over, or when they have been acquitted. It is a system where the powerful can easily use the law to oppress the powerless, where bribes or pressure on police, NDS, prosecutors and judges are used by strongmen to get the ‘right’ judicial outcomes. To then introduce new procedures that provide far less oversight and virtually no opportunities for defence appears to be a reckless loosening of what laws and protections Afghans (and foreigners living here) do enjoy. For example, according to the 9 December 2015 statement by the AIHRC, “at the moment more than 300 detainees in Bagram prison [aka Justice Centre in Parwan] have completed their sentences but are still incarcerated.” Afghanistan may be in a dire position vis-à-vis a brutal insurgency, but interning citizens runs the risk of being completely counter-productive.

President Ghani, in the meantime, has suggested that it was impossible for violations of the state’s new powers to take place, since human rights groups would be closely monitoring the implementation of the new law. “[Their] voice is not absent in Afghanistan,” he said in a television interview, “[their] voice is present and paid attention to. Countries get away with this when there is no voice. When there is voice, accountability follows.” However, normally, checks, balances and safeguards would be included as statutory obligations in the legislation, rather than relying on non-governmental organisations – with no statutory authority – to prevent miscarriages of justice.

Moreover, the presence and “voice” of human rights organisation has not been able to prevent other abuses from recurring. There has been, for instance, consistent evidence of the police and NDS using torture against terrorism suspects, as documented by UNAMA and AIHRC and of elements in the state manipulating the justice system to protect themselves or to deal with rivals. Human Rights Watch’s Patricia Grossman, thus cautions, “This presidential decree attempts to end-run the legal system and could put detainees at of risk of grievous, unlawful abuses.”

The fact that there were already contradictions between the process as outlined in the new law and how President Ghani described it, is also potentially worrying. For example, the decree says those to be detained without trial “shall be kept in a special place under the supervision of the prosecutor, separate from the detention centre and prison” (art 10, para 4). Ghani, however, in the same interview said the Supreme Court would have oversight and, rather than detainees being held in a place separate from detention centres or prisons, they will be held at “the Bagram, Parwan detention facility that is specifically geared to provide maximum access to rule-based approaches.” (12) There would be “no black sites,” he stressed. However, the point of article 10 paragraph 4 appeared to be that suspects would be housed separately from convicts or those going to trial, but still under the prosecutor. (13)

Considering the (deteriorating) security situation in Afghanistan in 2015, it is understandable that the state feels the need for more robust legislation and associated procedures to deal more effectively with those who have, or are planning to commit terrorist crimes against the state. But the questions arise as to whether these are really necessary, given the current robust laws in place and the legal options provided by the constitution to suspend some freedoms in the case of an emergency. Therefore, the introduction of a regime of detention without trial and the extension of pre-trial detention beyond international standards risks making a system with already serious challenges much worse.

Next steps for this decree

Every decree signed by the Afghan president automatically has the force of law. This is also the case with the annex to the Criminal Procedure Code that has already been published in the Official Gazette. However, parliament still has the option of rejecting it with a veto (under article 79 of the Afghan Constitution). If, however, it does not take such action, the decree will remain in effect.

Since October 2015, when the decree was published in the Official Gazette, it could have been considered by the judiciary commission, which is tasked with reviewing decrees and recommending members of parliament to either veto or uphold them. If the decree is upheld, it has the force of legislation, since both president and parliament have agreed to it.

At the time of writing, the parliament has already rejected several of the decrees put forward by President Ghani during the last parliamentary recess session, mostly using article 79 of the Constitution, which precludes presidential decrees “in matters related to budget and financial affairs.” The rejected decrees dealt with a variety of issues, including ministerial caretakers, taxation on mobile phone cards, amendments to the customs laws, the establishment of an economic advisory unit and amendments to the electoral laws.

For the annex to the Criminal Procedure Code, there are legal grounds to justify a rejection of the decree, apart from article 79 (which might not work for this decree as there are no explicit but possibly implicit, budgetary matters). For example, based on article 7 of the constitution, (14) Afghanistan is obliged to observe its international commitments (eg International Convent on Social and Political Rights). Some of the articles in the new annex violate Afghanistan’s obligations. When Afghanistan ratifies a particular treaty or convention, it implicitly agrees to adjust its national legislation to conform to these commitments and this needs to be done through an official amendment. Article 7 of the constitution, by extension, also requires that new laws do not contradict Afghanistan’s obligations – as the Annex to the Criminal Procedure Code does.

So, while the parliament has several grounds on which to justify a rejection of the Presidential Decree 76, there are concerns whether the judiciary commission is able to effectively present these reasons and, thereby, underline the dangers of this decree. In light of statements by the palace, such as by Sayed Zafar Hashemi, the deputy spokesperson, who presented this decree as necessary to protect the Afghan population from terrorism, there is the concern that political pressure might be exerted on members of parliament to avoid a rejection of the decree.

On 16 January 2016, the head of the judiciary committee, Haji Abduh, told AAN that the judiciary commission had only recently started to discuss Decree 76, but that this discussion had not been finalised yet as “it is a very sensitive matter that requires thorough consideration.” As the parliament goes into its winter recess, which lasts for 40 days, on 21 January 2016, the decree will remain in force – meaning detention without trial can take place and all other new powers apply – until at least the beginning of March 2016. Haji Abduh also indicated that, even after the recess, the judiciary commission would still need to get extensive input on the decree from experts before it will be ready to have the decree voted on in parliament. So, while there is hope that the efforts by civil society and other stakeholders can still bring about a rejection, or at least an amendment of the decree to prevent detention without trial to Afghanistan, the already on-going implementation of the decree in the meantime cannot be underestimated in terms of its potential for human rights violations.

 

(1) Article 1 of the Annex of the Criminal Procedure Code says suspects of the following offences from The Law for Crimes Committed against Internal and External Security can be detained without trial: national treason (article 1); espionage (article 2); terror – ie assassination of state personality or political, social, or religious leader, in order to sabotage and weaken the people’s sovereignty (article 3); sabotage – ie intentionally or unintentionally committing acts to weaken state authority, or key economic activities or disrupting the activities of state or social organisations (article 6); anti-state propaganda – ie for personal purposes and for the purpose of weakening the people’s authority, intentionally spreading false news or self-serving allegations, embarking on provocative propaganda, or oral and written propaganda or the possession of such publications (article 7); propagating war in any form (article 8); organised activities against internal and external security – ie forming, organising or administering an underground/secret organisation in order to commit crimes, or becoming a member of such organisation or establishing contact with such an organisation in order to achieve illegitimate goals, or encouraging and persuading others by physical or mental pressure (article 9); crimes against the diplomatic relations of Afghanistan with foreign countries – ie any act that harms or damages the bi-lateral relations of Afghanistan with foreign states or leads to the breakage of the diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and foreign nations (article 10); wilfully moving and administering Armed Forces divisions without an authoritative order or legitimate reason, in order to commit a crime, or despite an order to stop or disarm continuing to act (article 12); exposing state secrets without any intention of committing treason to homeland (article 13); looting, banditry or gangsterism (article 15); illegal occupation of public facilities (article 18); assisting the force of the enemy to gain material or spiritual benefits (article 23); not passing on valid information about crimes of upcoming crimes of national treason, terror, espionage, sabotage, disruption, war propaganda, anti-state activities, banditry and forgery (article 28).

Offences not listed in the Annex to the Criminal Procedure Code include destruction (art 5), hostage taking (art 16), collecting money and material assistance for anti-state organisations (art 20). The full text of “Crimes against Internal or External Security” in English is here.

(2) Article 10, paragraph 1, point 1 refers to “detective” activities, meaning detection (in Dari “کشف“) of crimes, rather than investigation (in Dari “تحقیق”). In the Afghan context, police and NDS detect the crime and prosecutors then investigate it after a suspect has been arrested and his/her file has been handed over to the prosecution.

(3) Unless the Supreme Court later interprets the provisions in article 10, paragraph 3 as meaning that only one or more judges of the High Council can make these decisions. Ghani has also referred to the entire Supreme Court making the decision.

(4) In 2012, when the Afghan state started to gain control of Bagram prison, it initially signed up to detention without trial and for several months, as AAN reported, the Afghan state did indeed hold Afghans without trial. However, when President Karzai found out that he had unwittingly agreed to this practice, he banned it, saying it breached Afghan law.

The exception to this are the seven Afghans still held by United States forces in Guantánamo and at least four foreign detainees still held by the Afghan state at Bagram (officially known as the Detention Centre in Parwan) also without trial.

(5) “Given President Ashraf Ghani’s sharp criticisms of United States practices at Guantanamo, it is incomprehensible why he would want to bring indefinite detention without trial to Afghanistan,” said Patricia Grossman from Human Rights Watch. “Afghanistan needs to take steps to address terrorism and protect public safety, but not by denying Afghans the right to a fair trial.”

(6) Taken from the interview with Ashraf Ghani in Deutsche Welle’s “Conflict Zone” programme, recorded on 16 December 2015. The relevant part is from 15:58 to 18:21. The transcript (by AAN) is as follows:

Tim Sebastian: But you did find the time to propose a pretty draconian amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code, didn’t you? That would allow for indefinite detention without trial. Why when you were so critical of American methods in Guantanamo, do you adopt the same kind of method –

Ashraf Ghani: – we have not –

TS: – indefinite detention without trial

AG: ­– we are dealing with suicide bombers on a daily basis, we are dealing with a weak judicial system, where people are given one year sentences in the primary court, their sentences are reduced because of corruption in the courts to six months or a year and they did not serve, our security forces thought this was a mockery and people were getting out with impunity – and repeatedly committing crimes. Because of this there was need for a signal in the time of national emergency and to be able to do this ­– But the procedure, again you need to understand and I respectfully bring it to your attention, it is the Supreme Court that makes the decisions and not the administrative part.

 TS: But human rights groups think it is a mockery because there is no specifying if the detainee will have access to family members or a lawyer or the right to examine the evidence against him, or the right to challenge this evidence

AG: The court system can ensure [this] once the Supreme Court is charged with this and we have an excellent chief justice whose integrity and commitment to law is second to none, {he] can ensure this.

TS: And they are kept supposedly in a special place under the supervision of the prosecutor, separate from detention centres and prisons. What kind of place are these, are these black sites? Á la CIA?

AG: No black sites, it’s the Bagram, Parwan detention facility that is specifically geared to provide maximum access to rule-based approaches

TS: Without oversight?

AG: Oversight is that by the Supreme Court, I just brought this to your attention.

TS: But how do we know that they are going to do that properly?

AG: Ask the Supreme Court!

TS: And avoid the unlawful abuse that we have seen at other detention centres.

AG: You think that the human rights community is silent? With the megaphones that they have? There is going to be silence…any abused? Voice is not absent in Afghanistan, voice is present and paid attention to. Countries can get away with this when there is no voice. When there is voice, accountability follows.

(8) Article 145 of the Afghan Constitution states: During the state of emergency, the President can, after approval by the presidents of the National Assembly as well as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, suspend the enforcement of the following provisions or place restrictions on them:

1. Clause Two of Article Twenty-Seven (No one shall be pursued, arrested, or detained without due process of law.)
2. Article Thirty-Six (The people of Afghanistan shall have the right to gather and hold unarmed demonstrations, in accordance with the law, for attaining legitimate and peaceful purposes.);
3. Clause Two of Article Thirty-Eight (In case of an evident crime, the responsible official shall enter or search a personal residence without prior court order. The aforementioned official, shall, after entrance or completion of search, obtain a court order within the time limit set by law.)

(9) The Justice Centre in Parwan on the Bagram airbase has pre-trial detention and prison facilities, along with prosecutors offices and a courthouse: it is where the United States held its detainees without charge for more than a decade and where the Afghan state now tries and houses most terrorist suspects and convicts.

(10) While article 9 paragraph 2 acknowledges that the juvenile code applies to the confinement of juveniles falling under this decree, it does not detail explicitly which procedures will be applied during the investigation and interrogation of juveniles.

(11) Article 11, which states “Convicts of terrorist crimes and crimes against internal and external security may not benefit from the decrees on pardoning and commutation of penalties,” ensures that, unlike in the past, those rightfully convicted cannot find a loophole to secure their release. However, given the increase of the other powers in this annex there is the concern that, in cases of miscarriages of justice, it will be more difficult for those individuals to be released.

Article 12, which covers “Proceeds of Crimes,” make reference to “suspects and accused of crimes stated in this annex” and tasks “Security Personnel, prosecution offices and courts” “to identify the properties [of those individuals] which are under their possession or have, somehow been transferred to other persons and determine the proceeds of the crime and take action to seize, freeze and confiscate such proceeds, in accordance with the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crimes.” There is no mention of how those affected by this provision are able to regain possession of their property.

Articles 13 on “Restrictions” outlines that “provisions on Alternatives to imprisonment, suspension of enforcement of sentence, temporary release, release on parole, and granting of time-offs shall not be applicable to convicts of terrorist crimes against internal and external security.”

(Article 14 only specifies the immediate enforcement of all the provisions in the annex and its publication in the official gazette).

(12) Although the official designation for the location is Justice Centre Parwan or Justice Affairs Centre Parwan, it is still commonly referred to as Bagram Jail, Bagram Prison or Bagram Detention Centre. This might also explain Ghani’s “Bagram, Parwan” reference.

(13) Housing those in detention without trial in a separate facility from the suspects under investigation by the prosecutor for terrorism crimes (pre-trial detention) or convicted terrorists (prison) seems prudent, in order to prevent these populations from mixing and to thereby risk potential radicalization. At the same time, as HRW points out, “segregation of these suspects from the regular criminal justice system, without any provision for their access to counsel, raises the risk of torture or other ill-treatment.“

(14) Article 7 of the Afghan Constitution states: “The state shall observe the United Nations Charter, inter-state agreements, as well as international treaties to which Afghanistan has joined, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

Text of the Presidential Decree 76 – in Dari (Annex1 of CPC-Official Gazette 1190) and English (2015 09 Pres. Legis. Decree 76, Annex 1 to CPC English- 2016 Jan. 11 v.4 from UNAMA)

Russian DShK Heavy Machine Gun

A couple of recent announcements indicate that Russian shipbuilders are continuing to struggle with construction of new types of ships. First came the announcement, right at the end of 2015, that the commissioning of the Admiral Gorshkov frigate was being delayed for another year, until the end of 2016. At the same time, the navy announced that the Admiral Grigorovich frigate will be commissioned in the first quarter of 2016. It had previously been expected to be commissioned in May 2015, before being repeatedly pushed back. In addition, commissioning of the lead ship of the Alexandrit class (Project 12700) of minewsweepers has been pushed back yet again, to May 2016. It was originally planned to be in the fleet back in 2013. And sea trials of the Ivan Gren amphibious ship were also delayed until the first quarter of 2016. As a result, in 2015 the Russian Navy received no new blue water surface ships.

On the other hand, it lost the services of several ships, including the Steregushchiy corvette that suffered a fire in April and both Neustrashimyi class frigates. The latter ships are waiting to be overhauled at Yantar shipyard, but the overhaul will take a long time since Ukraine will not supply replacement engines for the ships. The lack of engines will delay construction on most of the larger classes of surface ships, including Project 22350 (Admiral Gorshkov class hulls 3-4), Project 11356 (Admiral Gorshkov class hulls 4-6), and Project 20385 (Stereguschiy class variant, replaced by Project 20380 with less reliable Russian-built engines).

Submarine construction may seem better on the surface, with the commissioning of two Improved Kilo class ((Project 636) diesel submarines and the return to active service in 2015 of the Akula class submarine Gepard and the Sierra class submarine Pskov after length overhauls. While there is no doubt that Russian submarine construction is in much better shape than the construction of ocean-going surface ships, there are problems here as well. First of all, despite being commissioned back in 2013, the Severodvinsk SSN remains in sea trials for the third year.

But more importantly, development of a new class of diesel-electric submarines appears to be in trouble. Problems with propulsion systems have long delayed commissioning of the lead vessel of the Lada class, resulting in the decision taken several years ago to build six Improved Kilo class submarines for the Black Sea Fleet. The Russian Navy appeared to be moving on in announcing the successor Kalina class, which was to have air-independent propulsion systems (AIP). Russian experts argued that AIP would be ready by 2017-18, and the new submarines could be built relatively quickly after that. However, the Russian Navy recently announced, with quite a bit of fanfare, that it had ordered another six Improved Kilo class submarines for the Pacific Fleet. These are very good submarines, which undoubtedly be equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles that will give them a potent anti-ship and land-attack capability. But the implication of this announcement is that the Russian Navy does not expect to receive any of the new Kalina class submarines any time soon, and is therefore ordering the tried and true submarines to fill the gap.

All in all, it seems that Russian shipbuilding is continuing to “tread water,” successfully building ships that it has already built in the past but having serious problems with delays in the new projects that were expected to form the core of the Russian Navy in the 2020s.

French Mistral Man-Portable Air Defense Missile System

In the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the European Defence Agency (EDA) supports EU-led military operations and missions offering a wide scope of services, ranging from managing contracts for satellite communication, through training in cyber defence, ending up with providing HR management software to operational commands. Especially developing a model of ready-to-use framework contracts will give the EDA the possibility to broaden its service to more comprehensively support the establishment and running of CSDP operations and missions. 

Introduction

Support to CSDP Operations is one of the key task for the European Defence Agency, which was highlighted in the recent revision of the statute, seat and operational rules of the Agency. “We are proud to support EU-led military operations: to see our projects being used and to know that our expertise is being appreciated. Continuous service is what makes the Agency valid,” says Jorge Domecq, the EDA Chief Executive. 

The EDA offers its existing projects as well as ready-to-use contracted solutions that will replicate the successful framework contract model for satellite communications. Consequently, the EDA support to operations is cost-effective and efficient, as it does not generate any additional costs for the Member States or the Agency. 

The range of EDA services to support CSDP operations

In more detail, the EDA delivered a Human Resources management software for Headquarters (J1FAS) to the EU military operation in the Central African Republic in 2014. Commander Paschalis Gkounidis, the HQ Assistant Chief of Staff for Human Resources said that “the installation of this new system represents a big step forward in managing our personnel and will provide useful lessons for the improvement of the system in the future.” A similar support is also provided for the operational command of the military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (Operation Sophia).

Additionally, the EDA conducted cyber awareness training events in Larissa and Rome Operational Headquarters for the operations in the Central African Republic and in Southern Central Mediterranean respectively. In the case of Operation Sophia, the EDA also offered the MARSUR networking system, which may contribute to increasing the maritime situational awareness. 

Following several successful test cases, e.g. contracting Air-to-Ground Surveillance Services for the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) in 2014, the EDA signed an arrangement with the Athena Mechanism (February 2015) to facilitate ad-hoc support for contracting for CSDP operations. Under this arrangement, the Agency has already supported the EU training mission in Mali for procurement of medical equipment as well as the EUFOR Althea for benchmarking current camp management services.

The signature of the arrangement also provided a new impetus for the usage of the already existing EDA Contractor Support to Operations (CSO) platform as a powerful tool for interaction between economic operators and EU-led operations. The platform has successfully been used to assist in fulfilling tailored needs for the EU training missions in Mali and Somalia. 

With the Athena Mechanism having joined the EU SatCom Market project in June 2015, the cooperation has gone one step further. CSDP operations and missions can now rely on a ready pre-mission contracted solution for satellite communication. The EDA framework contracts offer high quality service with less administrative burden. The EU training mission in Somalia has successfully been using such solution since October 2015 for Fixed Satellite Services. “Thanks to the excellent cooperation between the EUTM J6 team, the EDA and the contractor, EUTM Somalia benefits from a reliable and secure connection with Europe for its Command and Control chain,” said Brigadier General Antonio Maggi, the Operation Commander. The EU Training Mission in Mali is also relying now on the EU SatCom Market for Mobile Satellite Services.

Potential projects in the future 

“I have no doubts that our support to CSDP operations will increase in the future, and will provide more opportunities to deliver civil-military synergies in the contractor support context,” says Jorge Domecq. The EDA, together with the Athena Mechanism and EU Military Staff, is currently exploring possibilities to implement additional ready-to-use solutions for other services, to include medical services with helicopter medevac as the first priority, infrastructure and camp management as well as strategic transportation services. The overall aim is to provide comprehensive contracted support covering all major areas pertaining to operations: from deployment and redeployment of troops, through the establishment and maintenance of camps, satellite communications services to end up with medical service.

There is also a number of EDA-led projects which be might relevant for CSDP operations as they mature in the future. The list includes: smart energy camps to manage renewable energies, Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) awareness and training, cyber situational awareness packages for headquarters to enhance cyber defence planning, a platform to share and analyse geospatial information (GISMO 2), a C-IED joint deployable exploitation analysis laboratory, and an electronic on-line gov-to-gov market platform eQuip to sell or transfer surplus defence equipment. 

More information

• Project page on Operations Support 
• Brochure on Contractor Support to Operations (CSO) platform
• News "JDEAL deployable capability: final trainings before delivery" (24 November 2015)
• News "EDA provides satellite communications services for EUTM Somalia" (13 October 2015)
• News "EDA installs energy management equipment at EUTM Mali camp" (13 October 2015) 
• News "EDA supports EUTM Mali to enhance medical facilities" (8 September 2015)

Interoperable open architecture is a System-of-Systems Architecture (SoSA) based upon open standards that delivers interoperability amon

Americas

• The upgrade program of the Chinook CH-47F looks to be shortly approved after a successful meeting at the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council. All that is required for the project to be green lit, is a signed decision memorandum that will allow the service to release a request for proposals for its “Block II” upgrade program. While little is known of the exact upgrades that will be part of the program, it is believed that changes will be made to the electrical system, transmission and rotor system, as well as increasing the helicopter payload by 4,000 pounds to 54,000.

• Engine makers Pratt & Whitney will make engines for the F-35 program. Details of the agreement have yet to be finalized, but two contracts will be issued to produce 167 engines to power Lockheed Martin’s latest jet within the next month. Further details of the deals have yet to be realized, but sources close to the deal revealed that the production of the engines alongside engineering support, spare parts and program management, would be worth more than $3 billion to Pratt, a unit of United Technologies Corporation. The USAF said that the latest contracts will help drive down costs of the program which makes it affordable for customers.

• Tomahawk cruise missiles could get a lot more destructive if a new development program is successful. Researchers from Energetic Materials Research and Engineering have been successfully utilizing residual fuel left inside a missile during impact and turning it into a fuel-air explosive that can contribute to the blast created by the missile’s warhead. At present the team are looking to find the best way to implode the fuel tank to generate a cloud of fuel that will mix with surrounding air to ignite into an intense, high-temperature explosion. If successful, the add on to the missile could increase the Tomahawks payload without any need to change the dynamics of the warhead.

Middle East North Africa

• Britain’s largest warships may have problems docking at some Royal Navy bases according to a question answered in parliament. It’s been revealed that the HMS Jufair in Bahrain would be unable to support Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers when they come into operational capability in 2020. Armed Forces Minister Penny Mordaunt stated that while the aircraft carriers would be able to access facilities while at anchor in the vicinity of the Mina Salman port, it would not be able to berth directly alongside the support facility itself due to draught constraints.

Europe

• Increased Swedish-Finn defense ties may see the latter purchase Gripen fighters replacing the Air Force’s F/A-18 C/D Hornet aircraft, which are scheduled to be retired between 2025 and 2030. While both governments have remained tight lipped about any particular deal, the increase in bilateral ties may see Sweden’s Gripen gain an advantage as a potential choice for the Finish HX-program. Both nations follow neutrality clauses which prevent them from joining NATO, but they are looking build the basis for a stronger regional military-security alliance with NATO-neighbors Denmark, Norway, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.

Asia Pacific

• After some delays, Afghanistan has finally received delivery of four A-19 Super Tucanos. The light attack aircraft are equipped with the capacity to fire guided and unguided rockets. The Brazilian manufactured jet will be used to carry out advanced training, border surveillance and internal security missions. Pilots and maintenance crew for the aircraft underwent training at Moody Air Force Base in Georgia in late 2015. On December 7, two of the students went missing from the base prompting a search. One of the airmen was recently located while the other remains unaccounted for.

• The visit of Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Sri Lanka did not result in a purchase of JF-17 fighters. A Sri Lankan Air Force spokesperson said that while the fighter is still being considered, among others, a deal was never going to be signed alongside Sharif’s visit to Colombo. The JF-17 still seems to be the top choice for Sri Lanka which is looking to replace the Israeli Kfri jet currently in use.

• An earlier Defense News report that Taiwan may procure refurbished AV-8 Harrier Jump Jets from the USMC has been refuted by Taipei. A potential sale would have been facilitated through the Excess Defense Articles program as the USMC replaced the jets with the F-35B stealth fighters. Despite this, the Taiwan defense ministry denied that they would be looking to buy the aircraft, stating that the fighter is outdated and that performance is inconsistent with future needs.

Today’s Video

• A SpaceX Falcon 9 crashing after a mishap landing on a sea platform.:

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Block IV Cutaway
(click to view full)

Block IV Tomahawk is the current generation of the Tomahawk family of cruise missiles. The BGM-109 Tomahawk family began life in the 1980s as sub-sonic, low-flying nuclear strike weapons, before being developed into long-range RGM/UGM-109 conventional attack missiles. They’re most frequently launched from submarines and surface ships, and have been the US Navy’s preferred option for initial air strikes in Iraq, Libya, et. al. Britain has also bought Tomahawk missiles, and launches them exclusively from submarines.

Block IV is the latest variant. It adds innovative technologies that improve combat flexibility, while dramatically reducing the costs to buy, operate, and support these missiles. That’s why the Block IV program, under US Navy PMA-280, has been one of the USA’s defense acquisition success stories over the last decade.

xGM-109: Missile & Launcher Types TLAM operation
(click for video)

Tomahawk missiles have become the US Navy’s major land strike missile. The USA has bought more than 4,000 over the years, and March 2011 saw the 2,000th GM-109 Tomahawk fired in combat, from USS Barry [DDG 52]. The missile typically flies at 50 – 100 feet above ground using terrain-following radar, and navigates to its targets using a combination of GPS/INS, computer matching of the land’s radar-mapped contours to the missile’s internal maps (TERCOM), and final matching of the target scene (DSMAC). Once on target the missile can fly a direct horizontal attack mode, trigger preprogrammed detonation above the target, or use a pop-up and dive maneuver. CEP is often described as being about 10 meters.

There are 3 fielded variants.

The xGM-109C/D Block III missiles will serve in the US Navy until FY 2020, and can be fitted with either a 1,000 pound unitary conventional warhead (xGM-109C), or a conventional submunitions warhead with hundreds of smaller bomblets (xGM-109D). The Tomahawk Block III has a 750 nautical mile range. Unfortunately, mission planning requires 80 hours of work.

The xGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV achieved Initial Operating Capability in 2004, and current Pentagon plans will end purchases in 2015. Block IV reportedly increases missile range to 900 nautical miles, but it only uses the unitary warhead. Mission planning has been cut from 80 hours to just 1 hour, which makes a big difference to combat usage. The missile also has a 2-way UHF SATCOM datalink that allows the missile to be redirected in flight, or commanded to loiter over an area and wait for instructions from a Fleet HQ’s Maritime Operations Center.

Submarine Launch 109 UGM-109 launch
(click to view full)

Submarine-launched UGM-109 missiles are more expensive than their ship launched RGM-109 VLS counterparts, because the submarines’ launch mechanism is more involved and more strenuous. UGM-109 “all-up-round” storage and interface canisters come in 2 types: CLS and TTL. CLS canisters launch UGM-109s from vertical launch tubes installed on many of America’s Los Angeles Class (SSN 719 on), all Virginia Class, and all SSGN Ohio Class submarines. TTL canisters are used to launch Tomahawk missiles from a submarine’s torpedo tubes, which is Britain’s preferred method.

In both cases, a Tomahawk launches “wet”, unlike most anti-ship missiles. The canister remains in the vertical-launch or torpedo tube, while the missile is ejected. Once the UGM-109 has reached a safe distance from the submarine, its rocket booster ignites underwater to power it airborne. That booster falls away just before the missile ignites its jet engine. If the submarine needs to “clear the tube” for torpedoes, anti-ships missiles, mines, UUVs, etc., TTL canisters can be ejected into the sea after launch, as a separate evolution. In contrast, CLS vertical-launch canisters are only removed portside, when the submarine comes into base for servicing and reloading.

Tomahawk: The 2019 Evolution LRASM-A Concept
(click to view full)

There was a plan to develop a successor to the retired xGM-109B ship-killer by 2015, as an interim capability for the US Navy’s Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) program. That was shelved in the FY 2014 budget, as the Navy opted to drop the interim capability. Instead, they’re moving ahead with OASuW’s main xGM-84 Harpoon missile replacement program for air and sea launch. The LRASM derivative of Lockheed Martin’s subsonic but stealthy AGM-158B JASSM-ER is the initial air-launched missile, but there will be competition for air and naval missiles beyond FY 2019.

Raytheon has partnered with Norway’s Kongsberg to offer the stealthy, and accurate JSM for the air-launched OASuW, and their entry has the unique ability to fit inside the F-35C’s weapon bays. They could also offer Kongsberg’s NSM counterpart in the naval realm, but that would leave Tomahawk in the cold. Or would it?

The key to the next set of Tomahawk improvements is actually a warranty. The missile has a 15-year warranty and a 30-year service life, so 2019 will begin a recertification cycle for the fleet that could last until 2030. Threats continue to evolve, so why not add some missile upgrades while they’re back in the shop anyway? The US Navy already has a specifications sheet of possible improvements, and they’ve done a number of capability studies.

Raytheon is investing almost $40 million of its own funds in parallel, and they’re still talking to the Navy about that final package, which will break down into 3 broad categories.

MI concept

Anti-Access/ Area Denial Communications Suite. Saddam Hussein had a sophisticated anti-aircraft system, but he didn’t have the kind of high-end jamming and emissions triangulation capabilities expected of future opponents. The challenge is twofold: keep the enemy from cutting off your communications, and keep your communications from alerting the enemy.

One option that has been mentioned in public involves adding a Line Of Sight datalink capability. The flip side of that move would involve training and tactics changes that push missile control farther down the command chain. That may be necessary, but is the US Navy comfortable doing that? There’s more to these A2/AD-CS discussions than just picking technologies.

Autonomy. The Tomahawk is already an autonomous weapon, in the sense that it can be fired at pre-planned fixed targets and left alone. To remain relevant, it needs to add dynamic terminal autonomy: the ability to acquire targets on its own and hit them, even if the target is moving or has moved. It would also be useful to expand the missile’s navigation autonomy, by offering backups for hardened SASSM M-code GPS.

Both kinds of upgrades are being contemplated. Early tests that aren’t autonomous involve Rapid In-flight Target Update, which allows units that have a lock on a target to transmit rapid final scene updates for the missile’s DSMAC guidance. This is still done via Fleet HQ as Standard Operational Procedure, but that’s enough to hit moving targets in some circumstances. Ships would become vulnerable to Tomahawk strikes if the targeting platform can survive their defenses, and the same is true for land-based air defense systems that can repeatedly move to new fixed locations.

Raytheon and the Navy are looking for more, with a focus on mature technologies to cut down program risk. An ESM system for noticing and geolocating emissions has already begun testing. Raytheon personnel stress its quality, to the point that Navigation via Signals of Opportunity (NAVSOP) might be possible as a backup to GPS. During the attack run, ESM can allow the Tomahawk to home in on an active enemy ship or air defense radars, or even on other intercepted signals. That begins to add autonomous moving target capability, and the firm plans to take the next step by flight testing a dual-mode ESM/ active radar seeker system before the end of 2014. Finally, passive visual spectrum (camera or imaging infrared) guidance has also become popular for long-range strike missiles, because it doesn’t give the missile’s location away by creating electro-magnetic emissions. Raytheon has confirmed that CCD/IIR upgrades are also under consideration for Tomahawk, but stressed that no final decisions have been made about a future guidance package.

Core Strengthening. All of these capabilities are great, but they demand more computer processing power, more memory, more onboard power, etc. The missile’s core will need redesigns, in order to keep up.

Raytheon had to develop a Multi-Function Modular Processor to handle those computing needs. Other efforts will look to add new technology, like the Joint Multiple Effects Warhead System (JMEWS) warhead to allow mid-flight reprogramming, and improve performance against reinforced targets like bunkers. Still other attempts will take advantage of existing upgrades. As an example of the latter, Block III introduced the ability to throttle the missile’s Williams F107-WR-402 turbofan, and Raytheon has been expanding its usefulness over time. It’s a capability that’s obviously handy for adjusting the missile’s time of arrival, or extending range, but the firm has recently been testing a “high speed dash” mode. It’s still subsonic, but it represents some impressive flying that close to the ground.

The Missing Link Saab S340-AEW
(click to view full)

Even after all of these upgrades, the Tomahawk is still a 1970s design that relies on low altitude to hide from radar. That isn’t really subject to change, even though downward-looking radars are proliferating on small AWACS planes and aerostat blimps, and radars in modern ships and air defense systems are taking big steps forward.

All of the Tomahawk’s proposed technologies are well and good, and they will expand the missile’s usefulness substantially. Adding them to thousands of existing missiles is very cost effective, and makes a great deal of sense. As budget crunches force the Navy to re-examine every aspect of their programs, however, the Navy will have to make decisions about the cost, capability profile, and limitations of every weapon in their arsenal. Raytheon is trying to position Tomahawk as best they can, but the final decisions will lie elsewhere.

Contracts & Key Events 45 min. documentary
(click for video)

Unless stated otherwise, US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD manages the contracts to Raytheon in Tucson, AZ. In general, these contracts aren’t competitively procured, pursuant to the “only 1 responsible supplier” exemption in 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1).

Key subcontractors include Lockheed Martin in Valley Forge, PA (Weapon Control System element), QinetiQ North America in San Jose, CA (Command and Control element), and Boeing Inc. in St. Louis, MO (Command and Control element).

FY 2016

January 19/16: Tomahawk cruise missiles could get a lot more destructive if a new development program is successful. Researchers from Energetic Materials Research and Engineering have been successfully utilizing residual fuel left inside a missile during impact and turning it into a fuel-air explosive that can contribute to the blast created by the missile’s warhead. At present the team are looking to find the best way to implode the fuel tank to generate a cloud of fuel that will mix with surrounding air to ignite into an intense, high-temperature explosion. If successful, the add on to the missile could increase the Tomahawks payload without any need to change the dynamics of the warhead.

January 15/16: Testing of a new sensor on the Tomahawk missile has been successful. Raytheon owned T-39 test aircraft carried out a number trials over a three week period engaging moving targets on land and at sea. The development of the sensor was part of company funded, independent R&D looking to enhance the current Tomahawk long-range precision strike/land attack role. Since 2005, Raytheon has been investing in increasing the missile’s seeker capabilities and effectiveness in varying environments.

October 7/15: Raytheon has demonstrated how a Tomahawk Block IV cruise missile can be used to assess battlefield damage, loiter and then attack a target following analysis of the data it provided to operators. The test demonstrated how the missile could be launched from one location, travel to a second area of operations and communicate via a UHF SATCOM link with a third location half-way around the world, before striking a target. The Block IV Tomahawk demonstrated flexible mission planning capabilities in flight during previous testing in August, with this latest round of testing also demonstrating that multiple missiles could be coordinated from a single control point.

FY 2015

August 6/15: Raytheon’s Block IV Tomahawk cruise missile demonstrated mission planning capability during flight tests announced on Wednesday. The upgraded software allowed planners to adapt the missile’s mission profile on the fly, with this new capability now set to be rolled-out across the fleet of Tomahawks in service. The Block IV missile demonstrated similar capabilities in March 2014, when the missile received information in-flight and re-targeted itself to strike a moving vehicle.

Oct 11/14: American A2/AD. Rep. Randy Forces [R-VA-4] sends a letter to Army Chief of Staff Gen. Odierno on the eve of the AUSA conference, pushing for the Army to set up a modern version of its Coastal Artillery: long-range, land-based anti-ship missiles that would be forward-based in friendly countries to endanger Chinese vessels and shipping. Missiles like LRASM and the longer-ranged but less stealthy AGM-109 Tomahawk are obvious candidates for this sort of thing, significantly outranging competitors like Kongsberg’s Naval Strike Missile or Boeing’s SLAM-ER. The RAND study that Forbes refers to actually posited using shorter-range missiles like NSM, but its maps also showed the number of deployment sites required for effective coverage.

The idea would be a nice turnabout on China’s Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy, and a Philippine deployment would produce a very tangible benefit all by itself, at low cost. On the other hand, Rep. Forbes probably underestimates the difficulty of getting many countries beyond the Philippines to accept an inherently provocative deployment whose use is technically beyond their control. Recent American waffling around the world suggests an even less palatable conclusion: the penalty for saying yes would be immediate, without any assurance that the weapons would actually be used to help the accepting country if push came to shove.

Contrast with the Russian approach. They just sell SS-N-26 shore batteries to interested countries, helping customers to create the same barrier under their own control, without the offsetting political challenges. India’s derivative PJ-10 BrahMos missile may also wind up being used this way, if India can get its act together on the export front. Sources: RAND, “Employing Land-Based Anti-Ship Missiles in the Western Pacific” | Breaking Defense, “Army Should Build Ship-Killer Missiles: Rep. Randy Forbes”.

FY 2014

Final dive
(click to view full)

Sept 24/14: Orders. Raytheon in Tucson, AZ receives a $251.1 million firm-fixed-price contract for 231 Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round missiles for the U.S. Navy (211: 147 vertical launch systems and 64 capsule launch systems / $224.5 million/ 89.4%) and the United Kingdom (20 torpedo tube launch systems / $26.7 million/ 10.6% – q.v. July 1/14 DSCA request). All funds are committed immediately, using foreign funds and FY 2013 & 2014 US Navy weapon budgets.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (32%); Camden, AR (11%); Ogden, UT (8%); Anniston, AL (4%); Minneapolis, MN (4%); Glenrothes, Scotland (4%); Ft. Wayne, IN (4%); Spanish Fork, UT (3%); Ontario, CA (3%); Vergennes, VT (3%); El Segundo, CA (2%); Berryville, AR (2%); Westminster, CO (2%); Middletown, CT (2%); Walled Lake, MI (2%); Huntsville, AL (1%); Dallas, TX (1%); Farmington, NM (0.2%); and various locations inside and outside the continental United States (11.8%); work is expected to be complete in August 2016.

This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 by US Navy NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-14-C-0075).

US/UK order

July 31/14: Raytheon in Tucson, AZ, receives an $8.7 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract modification for Tomahawk Depot Missile maintenance, including inventory management for the US Navy and the United Kingdom, and direct fleet support for resolving technical issues with forward deployed, in-theater weapons.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (60%); Camden, AR (36%); and various other continental United States locations (4%); and is expected to be complete in March 2015. Funds will be obligated on individual delivery orders as they are issued by US Navy NAVAIR in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-13-D-0002).

Sept 9/14: Testing. Raytheon touts a recent pair of live warhead test firings from the USS Hampton [SSN 767: UGM-109] and USS Lake Champlain [CG 57: AGM-109], demonstrating “enhanced flex retargeting” and improved flight performance. Sources: Raytheon, “Tomahawk enhancements showcased in back-to-back flight tests”.

July 17/14: Political. The Senate Appropriations Committee approves a $489.6 billion base FY 2015 budget, plus $59.7 billion in supplemental funding. If they get their way, xGM-109 Tomahawk Block IV production would continue at full rate, with $82 million in extra funding. It has been set to end with a 100 missiles, but the added funds would drive it toward the standard annual buy of 180-200.

The budget still has to be voted on in the whole Senate, then reconciled in committee with the House of Representatives’ defense budget, then signed into law by the President. Sources: DID, “FY15 US Defense Budget Finally Complete with War Funding”.

July 1/14: UK request. The US DSCA announces Britain’s formal request for up to 65 UGM-109 Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round missiles plus containers, engineering support, test equipment, operational flight test support, communications equipment, technical assistance, personnel training/equipment, spare and repair parts, and other support. The estimated cost is up to $140 million. DSCA adds that:

“The UK needs these missiles to replenish those expended in support of coalition operations.”

Which is to say, over Libya. The principal contractor will be Raytheon Missile Systems Company in Tucson, AZ, and Britain doesn’t need any more contractors on site from Raytheon or from the US government. Sources: US DSCA #14-30, “United Kingdom – Tomahawk Block IV Torpedo Launched Land-Attack Missiles”.

DSCA request: UK (140)

April 28/14: Testing. Raytheon announces a successful captive-carry test flight, using a small T-39 Saberliner business jet fitted with their passive ESM seeker. The jet flew at subsonic speed and at varying altitudes, while the “passive seeker and multi-function processor successfully received numerous electronic signals from tactical targets in a complex, high density electromagnetic environment.”

This test brings the Raytheon-funded multi-mission processor to Technology Readiness Level 6. The next step for the company-funded effort is an active seeker test, which will combine the processor with ESM and active radar. That combination would likely form the core of future Tomahawk upgrades. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon tests new guidance system for Tomahawk cruise missile”.

April 17/14: SAR. The Pentagon finally releases its Dec 31/13 Selected Acquisitions Report [PDF]. It makes early termination official, and explains the savings:

“Program costs decreased $1,832.1 million (25.8%) from $7,109.0 million to $5,276.9 million, due primarily to a decrease of 1,161 TACTOM missiles from 4,951 to 3,790 (-$1,249.2 million) and associated schedule, engineering, and estimating allocations

• (-$586.2 million).”

Note that SecNav Mabus’ comments regarding 4,000 GM-109s in stock (q.v. April 13/14) appear to have been in error. Many have been used over the years.

Termination

April 13/14: Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus sees an inventory of 4,000 Tomahawks that “will carry us through any eventuality that we can foresee,” but Raytheon wants to avoid shutting down their line and cutting the chain to more than 100 suppliers in 24 states. Their lobbying is helped by the fact that the USA’s byzantine procurement and budgeting processes add some strategic risk. News that the Navy was even thinking of a next-generation replacement reportedly came as a surprise to Raytheon in January 2014. Which means that it’s entirely imaginable to have a 20 year wait between the last Tomahawk delivery, and a comparable new operational missile.

On the other hand, every defense production line shuts down eventually, and a dollar spent on Tomahawks can’t buy new ships, fighters, air defense missiles, etc. Rather than waging a frontal assault that tries to keep missile orders coming, Raytheon is reportedly looking to accelerate the combined xGM-109 recertification/ upgrade process by a few years, so it picks up where Tomahawk production leaves off. Raytheon senior program manager Chris Sprinkle says that Raytheon has invested $30 million of their own funds in R&D for upgrades, and plans to invest another $8 million or so. Sources: Arizona Daily Star, “Proposed halt of Tomahawk missile buys raises concerns at Raytheon”.

March 4/14: FY15 Budget. The Navy unveils a preliminary budget request briefing. It doesn’t break down individual programs into dollars, but it does offer planned purchase numbers for the Navy’s biggest programs from FY 2014 – 2019.

The plan confirms 196 Tactical Tomahawk missiles in FY 2014, and proposes to end production with 100 missiles ordered in FY 2015. Source: US Dept. of the Navy, PB15 Press Briefing [PDF].

Feb 19/14: Datalink test. A Tomahawk Block IV missile is launched from the USS Sterett [DDG 104] on a loitering fire test:

“… [the missile] flew a preprogrammed route while receiving updates from a simulated maritime operations center and from advanced off-board sensors updating the missile’s target location. Throughout the flight, the missile maintained communications with all the command and control assets and provided updates on its location before hitting the target.”

Raytheon told DID that this is the first of many tests involving “off-board sensors”, though 2014 will also see a number of flight tests using new on-board ESM and radar sensors. Many will be captive-carry tests, using one of the US Navy’s T-39 Sabreliner modified business jets. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon, U.S. Navy test Tomahawk Block IV’s latest communications upgrades”.

Feb 14/14: Upgrades. Tomahawk program manager Capt. Joe Mauser tells Defense Tech that they’re working on a new Joint Multiple Effects Warhead System (JMEWS) warhead for the Block IV, in order to improve performance against reinforced targets like bunkers.

At the same time, Raytheon is working on a new active & passive dual seeker (q.v. Oct 7/13). Raytheon has been elbowed aside from the OASuW program, which is currently owned by Lockheed Martin’s stealthy LRASM-B. A low-cost upgrade that accomplishes some of OASuW’s goals offers Raytheon the opportunity to get some funds, keep their missile relevant for years to come, and position themselves as a weaker Plan B if further budget cuts remove their competitor. Sources: DefenseTech, “Navy Wants Its Tomahawks to Bust More Bunkers”.

Jan 14/14: #3,000. Raytheon announces that they’ve delivered the 3,000th Tomahawk Block IV missile, as part of FY 2012’s FRP-9 production contract. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon delivers 3000th Tomahawk Block IV to US Navy”.

#3,000

Oct 7/13: ESM multi-mode. Raytheon announces a successful field test of a new multi-mode seeker technology that would add an advanced Electronic Support Measure (ESM) antenna and processor to the Block IV Tomahawk missile. Raytheon told DID that the system is based on the firm’s own technology, rather than being a direct offshoot of the attempt to add AARGM technology to the Tomahawk (q.v. April 27/12).

Raytheon is correct that the current Tomahawk is an open architecture ‘truck’ capable of integrating new payloads and sensors, and an ESM seeker is a helpful addition to recent improvements like the 2-way datalink. ESM would turn the missile into a radar and communications killer that could deal directly with enemy air defenses, and could begin to engage some kinds of moving targets. The challenge is that the missile still needs to survive long enough to hit its target, and the Tomahawk’s low-level flight isn’t enough to protect it from the kind of advanced air defenses that would make you want to use unmanned ESM missiles. Its best use case might be against enemy ships. Sources: Raytheon, “Raytheon demonstrates new seeker technology for Tomahawk Block IV missile”.

FY 2012 – 2013

Launch.
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April 17/13: UK. The US DSCA announces [PDF] Britain’s request to import follow-on support and keep their UGM-109 Tomahawk Weapon Systems (TWS) ready for use. Work can include missile modifications, maintenance, spare and repair parts, system and test equipment, engineering support, communications equipment, technical assistance, personnel training/equipment, and other related elements of logistics support.

The estimated cost is up to $170 million, but actual costs will be negotiated in a series of contracts. The principal contractors will be Raytheon Missile Systems Company in Tucson, AZ; Lockheed Martin in Manassas, VA, Valley Forge, PA, and Marlton, NJ; Boeing in St. Louis, MO; BAE North America in San Diego, CA; COMGLOBAL in San Jose, CA; and SAIC in Springfield, VA and Patuxent River, MD. Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of 1 U.S. Government and 2 contractor representatives to the United Kingdom for the duration of this case.

DSCA: UK support request

April 10/13: FY 2014 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage.

News for the Tomahawk program is mixed. The OASuW Harpoon replacement program canceled plans for an interim solution based on the xGM-109 family, even as it plans to award Technology Development contracts in FY 2013. Raytheon will need to consider its competitive options carefully, as OASuW could grow to be a huge opportunity.

Within the existing Tomahawk program, yearly budgets are rising even though the number of missiles per year remains constant at 196. This is pushing flyaway cost for new missiles from $956,000 in FY 2013 to about $1.2 million. The extra funds are going to 2 areas: obsolescence replacement/ diminishing manufacturing sources, and restoration of planned missile improvements. The former category includes such key components as the Williams turbojet engine and the satellite datalink, and is important enough that FY 2011 – 2011 contract savings are being applied to address it. Improvements will begin with missile communications that will work even in jamming-rich or otherwise hostile environments.

March 11/13: UK. A $6.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for 4 torpedo tube launched (TTL) Tomahawk Block IV all-up-round missiles for the government of the United Kingdom under the Foreign Military Sales Program. All funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (32.6%); Camden, AR (13%); Ogden, UT (10.5%); Dallas, TX (3.5%); Minneapolis, Minn. (3.3%); Glenrothes, Scotland (3.3%); Spanish Fork, UT (3.1%); El Segundo, CA (3%); Walled Lake, MI (2.6%); Anniston, AL (2.5%); Ft. Wayne, IN (2.3%); Ontario, Canada (2.2%); Vergennes, VT (2.1%); Berryville, AR (1.8%); Westminster, CO (1.6%); Largo, FL (1.5%); Middletown, CT (1.3%); Huntsville, AL (1.2%); Clearwater, FL (0.8%); Moorpark, CA (0.8%); El Monte, CA (0.6%); Salt Lake City, UT (0.6%); Farmington, NM (0.2%); and various continental U.S. (CONUS) and outside CONUS locations (5.6%); and is expected to be completed in February 2015 (N00019-12-C-2000).

4 for Britain

March 7/13: Support. A $12.8 million firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for services in support of Tomahawk missile depot maintenance, including direct fleet support for resolving technical issues with forward deployed, in-theater weapons and inventory management for the US Navy and the United Kingdom.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (70%); Camden, AR (24%); Commerce Township, MI (4%); Indianapolis, IN (1%); and various other continental U.S. (CONUS) and outside CONUS locations (1%) until February 2014. $2.4 million is committed immediately, of which $2.3 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-13-D-0002).

Jan 17/13: DOT&E testing. The Pentagon releases the FY 2012 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The Tomahawk gets high marks. It continues to meet its standards, and remains operationally effective and suitable (maintainable).

The one thing Pentagon OT&E would like to see is restored flight testing of the Block III model, until it goes out of service in FY 2020.

Dec 18/12: CCLS. A $45 million firm-fixed-price contract modification from the USN for 120 Tomahawk Block IV Composite Capsule Launching Systems (CCLS), which are used to launch UGM-109s from vertical submarine tubes. All contract funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (24.61%); Lincoln, NB (23.17%); Camden, AR (12.48%); Rocket Center, WVA (10.3%); Carpentersville, IL (8.74%); Joplin, MO (6.63%); Hopkinton, MA (4.76%); Huntsville, AR (4.37%); Alamitos, CA (2.05%); Torrance, CA (1.47%); Downers Grove, IL (0.75%); and Brooksville, FL (0.67%), and is expected to be complete in July 2015 (N00019-12-C-2000).

Dec 17/12: 252 missiles. A $254.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising a US Navy option for 252 Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round (AUR) missiles: 132 RGM-109s designed to launch from strike-length Mk.41 cells on surface ships, and 120 UGM-109 CLS missiles that are fired from different vertical launch tubes installed on American submarines.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (32%); Camden, AR (11%); Ogden, UT (8%); Anniston, AL (4%); Minneapolis, MN (4%); Ft. Wayne, IN (4%); Glenrothes, Scotland (4%); Dallas, TX (4%); Spanish Fork, UT (3%); Vergennes, VT (3%); Walled Lake, MI (2%); Berryville, AR (2%); El Segundo, CA (2%); Westminster, CO (2%); Middletown, CT (2%); Huntsville, AL (1%); Farmington, NM (0.2%); and various locations in the continental United States and outside the continental United States (11.8%); and is expected to be completed in August 2015. See also Raytheon.

FY 2013: 252

Sept 3/12: OASuW. Aviation Week offers a look into the Tomahawk’s potential future. In June 2012, the US Navy announced a sole-source contract to Raytheon to develop the interim Offensive Anti-Surface Weapon (OASuW) by modifying a Tomahawk Block IV missiles with new sensors and data links. The missile is expected to enter service by 2015… but it’s likely to face competition from Lockheed Martin’s LRASM-A, among others.

Full OASuW Technology Development awards are expected to begin in FY 2013, after a Q2 Milestone A decision. The technical Development phase runs from FY 2013 – FY 2017, to an expected total of $557.2 million. Initial Operational Capability is currently set for 2024.

July 12/12: CCLS. A $45.9 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, buying 123 Tomahawk Block IV Composite Capsule Launching Systems (CCLS) for the US Navy.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (24.61%); Lincoln, NB (23.17%); Camden, AR (12.48%); Rocket Center, WVA (10.3%); Carpentersville, IL (8.74%); Joplin, MO (6.63%); Hopkinton, MA (4.76%); Huntsville, AR (4.37%); Alamitos, CA (2.05%); Torrance, CA (1.47%); Downers Grove, IL (0.75%); and Brooksville, FL (0.67%), and is expected to be complete in July 2014 (N00019-12-C-2000).

June 7/12: 361 missiles. A $337.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for 361 Tomahawk Block IV All-Up-Round missiles for the Navy. This includes 238 RGM-109E missiles that are launched from strike-length Mk.41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells on surface ships, and 123 UGM-109E missiles that are launched from submarines equipped with the Capsule Launch System (CLS).

Raytheon’s release says that the buy includes replenishment of weapons used during Operation ODYSSEY DAWN in Libya, as well as the FY 2012 buy.

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ (32%); Camden, AR (11%); Ogden, UT (8%); Anniston, AL (4%); Minneapolis, MN (4%); Fort Wayne, IN (4%); Glenrothes, Scotland, UK (4%); Dallas, TX (4%); Spanish Fork, UT (3%); Vergennes, VT (3%); Walled Lake, MI (2%); Berryville, AR (2%); El Segundo, CA (2%); Westminster, CO (2%); Middletown, CT (2%); Huntsville, AL (1%); Farmington, NM (0.2%); and various locations inside and outside the continental United States (11.8%), and is expected to be complete in August 2014 (N00019-12-C-2000).

FY 2012 + Libya replacement: 361

April 27/12: New sensors? FBO.gov:

“The Naval Air Systems Command intends to negotiate and award a sole source order under Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) N00019-11-G-0014, pricing arrangement cost-plus-fixed-fee, for engineering services necessary to support a study to assess the possibility of integrating, onto the Block IV Tomahawk weapon, Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) technologies.”

The AGM-88E AARGM uses GPS to navigate to the target’s vicinity, then finds targets that are moving or have moved using a combination of emission-locating ESM and an active millimeter wave radar seeker. AARGM is meant to destroy enemy air defense systems, but a system for a missile of this size would also be able to target enemies like ships. ATK received a $452,000 contract on Aug 22/12.

xGM-109E Block IV TLAMs: A Program Success Story Fly.
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Block IV missiles offer a number of improvements over previous versions: the missile’s purchase cost drops by almost half, to about $750,000, while lowering its future maintenance costs, and upgrading its capabilities.

Capt. Bob Novak, who was the Tomahawk All-Up-Round (PMA-280) program manager until August 2005, began leading the Tomahawk AUR program team in 2002 during a critical time in the development of the Tactical Tomahawk cruise missile. Under his leadership the program awarded the Navy’s first-ever weapons multi-year contract, and was estimated to have reduced the cost per missile from Block III to Block IV by almost 50%, saving $1 billion over planned lifetime costs while upgrading the missile’s capabilities. While reducing the Block IV Tactical Tomahawk’s purchase costs, improved design and manufacturing also reduced maintenance/ recertification requirements from once every 8 years for Block III missiles to once every 15 years.

PMA-280 was honored with several prominent awards, including the Secretary of Defense Value Engineering Award, the Daedalian Award, and the Ed Heinemann Award.

Boom.
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One important new capability that Block IV Tomahawk brings to the US Navy’s Sea Strike doctrine is derived from the missile’s 2-way satellite data link, which enables the missile to respond to changing battlefield conditions. The strike controller can “flex” the missile in flight to preprogrammed alternate targets, redirect it to a new target, or even have it loiter over the battlefield awaiting a more critical target. Block IV Tomahawks can also transmit battle damage indication imagery and missile health and status messages via the satellite data link, allowing firing platforms to execute missions in real time.

Global Positioning System-only missions are also possible in addition to the missile’s previous terrain-mapping guidance mode, thanks to an improved anti-jam GPS receiver for enhanced mission performance.

The majority of Tomahawk cruise missiles are currently launched by Navy surface vessels, such as the Ticonderoga Class (CG-47) cruisers and Arleigh Burke Class (DDG-51) destroyers. The later series of Improved Los Angeles Class (SSN-688I) and the newest Virginia Class (SSN-744) attack submarines are also armed with 12 dedicated Tomahawk launch tubes, while earlier Los Angeles boats and the newest Seawolf Class (SSN-21) have to sacrifice some of their stored torpedoes to carry and launch Tomahawks through their torpedo tubes. But the USA’s premier Tomahawk carrier vehicle in future will be the Ohio Class SSGN stealth strike subs, with launch capacity for an astounding 154 Tactical Tomahawks each.

Additional Readings & Sources

DID would like to thank Raytheon Tomahawk Program Director Roy Donelson, and Growth Program Manager Chris Sprinkle, for their assistance with this article. Any mistakes are our own damn fault. Readers with corrections or information to contribute are encouraged to contact editor Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.

Weapon & Program Background

• US NAVAIR – Tactical Tomahawk

• Raytheon – Tomahawk Cruise Missile. See also their 2012 paper on the missile’s evolution from Block III: “Tomahawk: Serving the U.S. and Allied Warfighter“.

• Globalsecurity.org – BGM-109 Tomahawk

• DoN Acquisition One Source – Reducing Cost/Schedule for TOMAHAWK All-Up-Round Program

• Air Power Australia – Tomahawk Cruise Missile Variants: BGM/RGM/AGM-109 Tomahawk/TASM/TLAM/GCLM/MRASM. Last updated 2012.

• DID – Naval Swiss Army Knife: MK 41 Vertical Missile Launch Systems (VLS). Strike-length cells are required to fire Tomahawks.

News & Views

• DID – LRASM Missiles: Reaching for a Long-Range Punch. Covers the USN’s OASuW program, whose sea-launched component has already affected the Tomahawk program. The current plan is based around air and sea-launched adaptations of Lockheed Martin’s AGM-158B JASSM-ER.

• FAS Strategic Security Blog (March 18/13) – US Navy Instruction Confirms Retirement of Nuclear Tomahawk Cruise Missile. The xGM-109B Tomahawk Block II.

• Defense Daily (Nov 29/07) – Navy Seeks New Uses For Tomahawks. Covers a number of program developments, including the potential for thermobaric warheads.

• Naval Air Station Patuxent River Tester Magazine (April 12/07) – Submarine-launched Tomahawk IV flight test a success

• Naval Air Station Patuxent River Tester Magazine (Dec 14/06) – Tomahawk IV in West Coast Test. “The test successfully demonstrated the Tomahawk Strike Network. The Tomahawk Strike Network (TSN) is a unique aspect of the Block IV system. Utilized in this test, TSN is a communications network that provides secure connectivity among all of the participants in a strike plan. Those participants include the Block IV missile(s), the strike controller, and the missile controller. Messages are generated, sent, and received inside the network, and are monitored by a channel controller. TSN allows the strike controller to retarget the missile in flight, monitor the health and status of the missile in flight, and collect images along the route.”

• Naval Air Station Patuxent River Tester Magazine (Aug 10/05) – Tomahawk program marks historic milestone. Capt. Rick McQueen became the 1st program manager for the newly formed Tomahawk Weapons System Program Office (PMA-280), as the Navy’s All-Up-Round (PMA-280) and Cruise Missile Weapons Systems (PMA-282) groups merged.

• Naval Air Station Patuxent River Tester Magazine (Oct 7/04) – New Tomahawk ready for warfighter. Block IV was accepted by the USN on Sept 29/04.

Belgian FN MINIMI Light Machine Gun

In a brief press conference on Monday 18 January 2016, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced the date for Afghanistan’s next vote: 15 October 2016. But the preparations for the elections – for the lower house of parliament and, for the first time, district councils – are complicated by ongoing controversies over the legitimacy of the current IEC, the nature of the electoral reforms that need to precede the elections, as well as who will be organising them and under which amended laws. AAN’s Martine van Bijlert takes a closer look.

The facts

The IEC had come out in full force for the 18 January press conference, with ten people sitting at a long table in front of a row of large Afghan flags. IEC chair Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani, appointed by former president Hamed Karzai in the run-up to the 2014 presidential vote, started the conference by noting how the government, so far, had failed to show any sign of preparation or cooperation for the upcoming elections, and asking the government to cooperate with the date he was about to announce. He then requested the government to provide the necessary budget, to ensure security – for polling centres, staff, candidates and voters – and to instruct all government bodies to cooperate. He asked civil society, the media, political parties and citizens to take on their roles and responsibilities in an honest manner. He thanked the international community for their support in previous elections and asked them to continue on the same path. He, finally, asked all actors to respect the authority of the IEC.

The date then was announced for 24 Mizan 1395, or 15 October 2016, which is eight months from now. The elections planned for this date are already overdue, as according to the Constitution they should have been held  by June 2015. The Wolesi Jirga elections will be held for the third time, but the district council elections are a different matter, with the large number of electoral constituencies, several of which are highly insecure, and the practical obstacles of varying district lists and unclear boundaries. Two days earlier, however, Nuristani had optimistically told the Wolesi Jirga that the IEC was already “fully ready” to hold elections.

Nuristani finally said the IEC had learned from past mistakes and was ready to implement its own reforms as planned, without specifying what these reforms would consist of.

The controversies

The announcement of the electorion date by the IEC is complicated by three controversies: the status of the current IEC, the nature the electoral reform needed before the elections, and the competing pressures surrounding the electoral timeline.

When the National Unity Government (NUG) came into being the two sides agreed on the need for “fundamental changes” to the electoral laws and institutions before the parliamentary elections. It was however obvious that they would have differing views on what kind of reforms would be necessary. The Abdullah camp, apart from generally pushing for changes to the electoral system, has particularly insisted on the replacement of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC).

Although initially very slow, the electoral reform process finally did catch (some) steam. The position of the IEC and IECC became increasingly precarious, as the government got ready to replace at least some of the commissioners. The IEC leadership strongly resisted these moves, arguing that they had been appointed for six years, that the executive did not have the authority to interfere and that, as the country’s main and independent electoral body, they should be in charge of everything election-related – including their own reform. The government, however, increasingly bypassed the IEC, instead relying on the recommendations of the Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC) that was established as part of the NUG agreement. So today’s announcement of the election date, whether chosen in consultation with the government or not, will  probably look to many Afghans as an act of defiance by the IEC.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the NUG agreement puts competing pressures on the electoral timeline, as it sets out a very ambitious sequence of events: electoral reforms before the 2015 [sic] parliamentary elections; parliamentary and district council elections before the convening of the Loya Jirga; and the Loya Jirga within two years of the establishment of the government. Proper electoral reform is, of course, likely to take much longer, particularly at its current pace (and particularly since the Loya Jirga, strictly speaking, would already have to take place in September of this year).

This tension is already being used by political pressure groups. Shortly after the president on 31 December 2015 indicated that the elections would probably take place between summer and autumn, the Council for the Protection and Stability of Afghanistan, with Ustad Sayyaf as its most prominent spokesperson, released a statement welcoming the government’s commitment, but calling the timeline “unrealistic.” Rather than arguing that the elections would probably take longer to prepare – given the complexity of the reforms and the fact that the district council elections have never been held before – the group argued that the timeline would make it impossible to still organise the Loya Jirga within two years of the NUG’s inauguration. It called for an election between spring and summer, which, the statement noted, would still be possible “if the government really meant to have elections.”

The council says it wants to constructively encourage reform and has no intention of bringing down the government. The fact, however, that the group is already implicitly questioning the legitimacy of a national unity government that does not follow its own agreement, is making the government uneasy.

What about the electoral reforms?

The government’s efforts to effect electoral reform, in the meantime, seem to have stalled. The long delays in the establishment of the Special Reform Commission (SERC) initially led to suspicions that the Ghani camp was dragging it’s feet. When the SERC finally got to work, in the summer of 2015, it prepared two batches of recommended for reforms. The first batch, presented to the CEO on 30 August 2015, resulted in several amendments by presidential decree to both the Electoral Law and the Law on the Structure, Authorities and Duties of the Electoral Bodies (the SAD Law). The most controversial amendments, at least according to the IEC, were those that changed the requirements and tenures of the electoral commissioners, opening the way for the replacement of at least some of them. (1)

On 21 December 2015 the SERC handed in its second, more complicated batch of recommendations, including changes in the electoral system and the electoral constituencies. This however came to a halt, when on the same day the Wolesi Jirga voted off the earlier decree that had amended the SAD Law and that was the basis for the establishment of a Selection Committee which was about to start looking for new electoral commissioners. On 26 December 2015, the Wolesi Jirga proceed to also vote off the decree amending the Electoral Law. On 5 January 2016 the Meshrano Jirga followed suit, voting off both decrees without discussing the merits of the amendments.

With the rejection of the decrees, the electoral reform efforts are not only back to square one, it also means that the legal basis for the replacement of the IEC and IECC commissioners has, for the moment, been removed.

In a press conference on 6 January 2015, possibly emboldened by the parliament’s actions, Nuristani said the IEC would announce the election date in the next week, and added that he hoped the president would now stop sending decrees to the parliament. He stressed once again that the 2014 vote had been the best elections ever and that the Selection Committee had been established against the law. The head of the IECC Saadat also welcomed the parliament’s decision and stressed that both the Reform Commission and the Selection Commission would now have to stop working.

Where to go from here?

The government has not yet formally reacted to the IEC’s announcement, which may be in part because they were busy with the quadrilateral ‘peace talks’ (or rather, the preparatory talks for hoped-for talks with the Taleban) that were taking place in Kabul on the same day.

But on the day before, after the IEC had announced it would hold a press conference, CEO Abdullah Abdullah told the council of ministers (and subsequently the press and social media) that the government considered electoral reform a pre-condition for elections and that “Afghans are still concerned over the flawed management of the previous elections” (the Twitter account in his name was much blunter, saying that “some Afghans are concerned that former commissioners convicted of fraud may be leading another election”). He left no doubt as to what reform would need to entail: “Upcoming elections will be held under the supervision of a new commission.”

President Ghani had earlier said something similar on 31 December 2015 during a televised press conference, when he stressed the government’s continued commitment to reform. He reiterated that the Selection Committee’s work would result in new commissioners (but did not specify how many) and said that the elections would be held between summer and autumn [2016] and that the IEC would fix the exact date. His words, slightly different from what Abdullah said, indicate that he is probably aiming for a compromise which would leave the current electoral bodies at least partially intact and for reforms that are not too far-reaching or time-consuming.

At the end of the day, the electoral reform discussion remains plagued by two fundamental problems: on one hand, the lack of consensus on what the problems of the 2014 election were and, on the other hand, the lack of real options to decrease the likelihood of fraud, manipulation and a contested outcome in the upcoming elections (the most important intervention would be the introduction of reliable voter lists, based on centralised population data, but this is unlikely to go ahead any time soon). It should then come as no surprise that, despite all the talk of commitments to both electoral reform and the convening of elections, there is probably very little real appetite to embark on another complicated and politically tense vote.

 

(1) The amendments to the two laws by presidential decree included 1) the cancelation of the existing voting cards, the establishment of voter lists based on voters’ tazkeras (ID documents) and the linking of voters to specific polling stations; 2) review of the polling centre distribution; 3) changes in composition of the Selection Committee for the electoral commissioners; 4) changes in the composition and tenure of the IEC by decreasing the number of commissioners and both decreasing and staggering the term of service; 5) changes in the requirements for the IECC commissioners; 6) changes in the composition of the Wolesi Jirga (an extra separate seat for Sikhs/Hindus) and provincial and district councils (25% women’s quota); and 7) the employment of school teachers and others civil servants as temporary electoral personnel.

Americas

• Raytheon has been given an $85 million contract to supply Griffin A & B Block II/III missiles to the USAF. Delivery of the missiles is expected to be January 31, 2017. The missiles are the two variants of the AGM-176 Griffin mini-missile. The Griffin A is an unpowered precision munition that can be dropped from a rear cargo door, or a door-mounted launcher of an aircraft, while the rocket-powered Griffin B can be employed as an air-to-surface or surface-to-surface missile. Both are currently being used on a variety of weapons platforms including LCS vessels, C-130 aircraft and UAVs.

• The foreign military sales approval process has been described as “tortuous” by the US Navy Secretary, Ray Mabus. Mabus made calls for continual streamlining of the approval process which he claimed frustrated all parties involved. The announcement comes amid frustrations felt by companies such as Boeing over large purchase orders by the governments of Kuwait and Qatar. Kuwait and Boeing are currently awaiting approval of a $3 billion deal for twenty-eight F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter jets which Mabus viewed as symptomatic of a larger problem in place.

• All variants of the F-35 fighter jet are to get design overhauls since the discovery that the fuel tanks could over-pressurize in certain flight profiles; 154 F-35s have been delivered to date. Lockheed Martin has already received contracts to implement fixes on F-35A and F-35B, and are currently putting together a proposal for engineering works on the F-35C. Fuel tank ruptures have potentially devastating consequences, especially for fast moving aircraft such as the F-35s, with the potential to cost millions of dollars worth of damage.

Europe

• Belgium’s government is looking to buy the Patriot air defense system as part of its new strategic defense plan. The plan, if approved by the parliamentary defense select committee, could potentially see over $600 million used to purchase a battery of the system. Defence minister Steven Vandeput said the system would be used not only as part of Belgium’s defense from ballistic missile threats, but could be utilized by other NATO allies in places where such a system is most needed such as on the Turkish-Syrian border. The announcement comes alongside the news that Poland may also install the system in their country in a procurement that could reach $5 billion.

• Running contrary to earlier reports, Serbia’s up and coming defense shopping list will not include the S-300 system. With limitations to its current budgets, the system was not part of discussions with Russian officials who visited Belgrade for a defense and trade summit last week. Instead, requests to buy MiG-29 fighters, the short-range Tor missile system and medium-range Pantsir-S1 systems have been made. Keeping their budget in mind, it’s been reported that these will be supplied from refurbished existing stocks rather than fresh off the production line. News that they were looking to buy the long-range S-300 system was seen as a counter-measure to recent plans for NATO to establish its own missile defense shield in Croatia.

Asia Pacific

• The suspense surrounding India’s Rafale jet acquisition continues. With plans seemingly already in place for the deal to be finalized, India is looking to negotiate a new option to the existing deal to buy thirty-six fighters from Dassault. A visit to New Delhi by French defense minister Jean-Yves Le Drian last week was initially seen as a final dotting of i’s and crossing of t’s on negotiations ahead of President Hollande’s visit next week. The Indian government seems to be more confident that the $9.1 million deal will be ready for the visit, claiming the contract to be “politically ready”.

• China will receive its first batch of Su-35 fighters by the fourth quarter of this year with completion due in the next three years. It’s unknown how many will be delivered in 2016, but twenty-four fighters have been ordered in total at a cost of $2 billion. Beijing is the first foreign customer of the latest multi-role jet, although there have been fears that the purchase is only being made in order to reverse engineer key technologies for China’s own indigenous fighters.

• Japanese Air Self-Defense Force aircraft has failed to detect nuclear material over North Korea. Since the apparent hydrogen bomb test by the DPRK earlier this month, the Japanese have been conducting environmental tests to monitor radiation levels near where the testing took place. Earlier monitoring posts had also failed to detect any such material which prompted Tokyo to send four T-4 training aircraft and one C-130 to collect further air samples.

Today’s Video

• Japanese sniffer aircraft sent to DPRK:

Russian Verba Man-Portable Air Defense Missile System

Italian Benelli M4 Combat Shotgun

Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency and Ine Eriksen Søreide, Norwegian Minister of Defence met today for discussions on Norway’s involvement in EDA projects as well as ways to further enhance defence cooperation.

“I am very pleased to welcome the Chief Executive of EDA to Norway”, said Defence Minister Eriksen Søreide. “EDA is an important partner for Norway in the development of our Armed Forces. Although a non-member of the EU, Norway has a strong interest in maintaining European security and prosperity. European cooperation is vital to bolster European defence capabilities and in strengthening European allies’ contribution to the wider trans-Atlantic defence and security community”, said the Minister. 

“Norway is actively engaged in European as well as regional defence cooperation. This is not only of benefit for Europe but also for the Norwegian armed forces and defence industry. Today’s discussions concentrated on future projects. At the Agency, we see Norway’s strong support to the Agency’s air-to-air refuelling programme as well as to our research and technology initiatives with a focus on maritime capabilities and to counter chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats”, said Jorge Domecq.

Not being a member of the European Union, Norway signed an Administrative Arrangement with the Agency in 2006. Norway regularly participates in EDA projects and programmes such as helicopter exercises and other flying events, the air-to-air refuelling programme and the Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory. Additionally, since 2006 Norway has contributed more than € 30 million to EDA’s research and technology initiatives.

More information:

• Administrative arrangements with non-EU members
• Norwegian Ministry of Defence

Taleban fighters broke into the Ghazni jail and freed hundreds of inmates, including key Taleban commanders, in the early morning of 14 September 2015. It was the ninth spectacular jailbreak since 2001, but the Ghazni jailbreak was different than most of them: better planned and with more fighters. The government forces, on the other hand, lacked coordination between the jail protection unit and other security forces, and there may have been someone on the inside helping the Taleban. AAN’s Fazal Muzhary talked to government officials, local witnesses and people close to the Taleban, to find out whether it was the weakness of the Afghan government or the better planning of the Taleban fighters that led to the successful jailbreak.

The Ghazni jailbreak; how it happened

On 14 September 2015, at 1:50, the attack started. Taleban fighters first shot a rocket at the main entrance of the jail to open the way for a suicide attacker who drove his Toyota Corolla to the gate and blew it up. The blast was so big that it shattered the windows of several houses nearby and caused the entrance post to catch fire. The first suicide attacker was said to have had nine comrades, who were ready to blow themselves up if the jail protection guards showed strong resistance. Three of them were killed during the initial, short resistance by the jail guards. After the blast and the short fight, a group of 40 attackers, who had been waiting in an adjacent canal, entered the jail to free the prisoners.

An eyewitness who lives about 120 meters from the Ghazni prison and who was asleep at home when the attack happened, described how the blast shattered the windows of his house and woke him. He first heard the shouting of “Allahu Akbar” and then gunfire. The shooting lasted for a few minutes. The explosion had set the police post at the entrance on fire, so what was happening at the prison’s gates was clearly illuminated. “I could see a large number of people coming out of the jail,” he told AAN. The jail guards, he said, had resisted only briefly and at nearby police check-posts there was only “shooting in the air.” An hour later, he said, “at 2:50am when the [other] government security forces arrived, they started shooting in all directions until sunrise.”

A source close to the Taleban said the group of Taleban fighters that freed the prisoners had been told beforehand that there would be ten persons, who also were inmates, inside the jail who would be wearing white clothes and would be waiting for them. These ten persons had broken the doors of several cells immediately after the blast. When the fighters got in, they did not face any problem freeing the prisoners. The group apparently went from cell to cell fearlessly freeing prisoners. The interior ministry later said a total of 355 prisoners had been released. As a result of the attack, four attackers and seven guards were killed, both by the blast and in the firefight.

At 2:50 when the government security forces from Ghazni city finally arrived at the jail, witnesses said they started shooting in every direction, but by this time, everything had already ended. The freed prisoners were on their way to Andar and other areas out of the government’s reach; some had probably already arrived to safety. The freed prisoners were from Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia and Zabul provinces. They were first moved to Kalakhel, Alizai, Khadokhil and several other villages in Andar district, about 17 kilometres to the south, and were then sent to neighbouring Giro, Qarabagh and other districts of the province.

In a statement later that day, on 14 September 2015, Taleban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahed said that hundreds of fighters from several districts had participated in multiple attacks in the city. Indeed, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) had been caught in a complex situation, as Taleban fighters launched attacks, not just on the prison, but on several other security check posts and key government institutions at the same time, including the main police headquarters. This made it difficult for the security forces to identify the main target of the attacks and probably led to confusion and great difficulty with coordination.

What is clear, however, is that the Afghan National Army (ANA), the prison guards and the police who were in the vicinity of the jail did not put up much of a fight. Although the guards at the gate fought for a short time, the guards in the central and other towers did not support them and the few guards who resisted were ultimately killed. Moreover the jail guards did not contact the police headquarters to ask for help, until much later. Ghazni police chief Muhammad Hakim Angar, who has since then been replaced, told AAN that when they were finally contacted, supporting forces arrived at the jail within ten minutes, but by that time everything was already over.

The Ministry of Interior, on the same day of the attack, sent a delegation to Ghazni to officially investigate the incident. On 19 September, five days later, interior ministry spokesman Sediq Sediqqi told Hasht-e Subh daily that the investigation was completed and the findings had been sent to the president’s office. He said they would share the findings with the media, but months later still nothing has been shared. AAN has tried several times to reach the spokesman, but his phone has either been off or he did not respond.

The media and other commentators, in the meantime, were swift to come up with their own verdict. A day after the attack, local media vehemently criticised what they saw as the security officials’ incompetence and lack of coordination. Hasht-e Subh daily in an editorial wrote: “After the first Kandahar jailbreak, officials said they had learned and were now prepared to prevent similar attacks in the future, however the Ghazni jailbreak proved that the officials did not learn anything.” According to Sarkhat daily, jail superintendent Muhammad Latif Hassanyar and security director Omarakhan had not been at their duty stations when the attack happened.

Taleban preparation

The multiple attacks in Ghazni on 14 September 2015 was a complex operation, targeting a large number of check posts and involving a large number of Taleban fighters. Most of them had apparently not been told what the main target was (except 50 of them, among them, the ten suicide attackers). Interestingly, several separate groups of Taleban fighters participated in these attacks and every group was given a different task without knowing the tasks of the other groups. A source close to the Taleban said that one group of fighters had simply been instructed to follow their commander and only around midnight, when they realised they were close to the main Ghazni-Paktika highway and near the jail, were the fighters told they were attacking the central jail of Ghazni. This group, which he said consisted of 180 men, did not attack the security check posts around the jail; instead, some of them entered the jail after the blast and freed the inmates. Others were told to target the government reinforcements if they showed up, and otherwise to just accompany the freed prisoners to the villages – which they did.

Moreover, the Taleban simultaneously attacked several security posts around the jail and in other parts of the city, as well as in the districts. Targets included the base of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and the check-post in the former base of the US Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Ghazni city, two posts in Qala-e Qazi and Zargar immediately outside the city, and posts in Suleimanzai (in Deh Yak district), and Mullah Noh Baba (in the south west of Andar district). This seems to have successfully confused the Afghan security forces, a trick that the militants did not try in other jailbreaks. Not letting their own fighters know the full plan also appears to be a tactic not used in other, similar attacks, particularly on jails.

Later on the day of the attack on 14 September 2015, the Ministry of Interior said that three – of the 355 – escaped prisoners had been re-arrested, although local sources a week later could confirm only one (a prisoner who had originally been sentenced for theft and who was re-arrested in the Zarghar area near Ghazni city). Former police chief Angar later told AAN that, since then, 28 prisoners had been recovered; he said most of them had returned voluntarily and a small number were re-arrested. This figure has not been confirmed by other sources aware of the incident.

Although NDS director Ali Ahmad Mubariz on 3 October 2015 said that an operation had been immediately launched to track down the freed prisoners, no one in the surrounding areas appears to have seen a single police or government force. If the government had indeed conducted such an operation, local people said they would probably have encountered the Taleban fighters who were waiting for them in Mangor area, not more than ten kilometres to the south of the city.

After the Ghazni jailbreak; flowers and executions

AAN has followed what happened to the prisoners who were freed and found that they were first moved by the Taleban to several villages in Andar district (which neighbours the district centre to the south-west) and then sent to Giro and other districts of the province. Locals in Alizai, Kamalkhel and Hayatwal villages told AAN that a large number of people came to Andar to greet their freed relatives with flowers. Habib Rahman, a Taleban commander from Hayatwal village who is also known as Mansur, and his brother, were welcomed in this way; both received flowers after they arrived in Andar.

Taleban jailbreaks do not only involve the release of their own comrades, but often also general criminal prisoners. After the prisoners’ arrival in Andar, the Taleban divided the prisoners in groups, selecting those whom they believed should be punished and those who should be released. The first group included former members of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and major criminals. Two prisoners were executed by the Taleban. All others, AAN was told, were freed a week after the jailbreak. Some of the freed prisoners who had previously worked in the ANSF were asked for a guarantee that they would not rejoin the government’s forces.

The two prisoners the Taleban executed were Enayatullah Taqat, also known as Natak, from Andar district, and Alawadin from Qarabagh district. Natak ran in the provincial council election in 2014, while Alawadin was with the police in Qarabagh district. The reason for the executions, according to a local source, was that they had committed serious crimes. Natak, who was also the stepbrother of former Andar district chief Lahur, had apparently been involved in kidnappings as well as murders. According to a local teacher who spoke to AAN, Natak had, in the autumn of 2014, killed a man called Sharaf from Laghar village and married his wife a month later. He said Natak had also kidnapped a person from Ghazni city in spring 2015 and had only freed him after receiving a ransom.

Alawadin was executed in the neighbouring district of Qarabagh. He had been involved in killings and robbery. A local resident told AAN that Alawadin had killed his brother, who was working as a doctor in Kandahar, on 1 March 2015. The brother had been driving from Kandahar to his hometown Moqur, when Alawadin, who had recently been deployed to Moqur district as a policeman, asked the victim to drop him off at Moqur bazaar, together with a friend who was a member of the ALP. On the way, between Janda and Moqur, Alawadin and his friend stabbed the doctor, threw his body into a nearby well and stole his car. When the family of the victim learned about this, they informed the district officials, who arrested Alawadin. The other man fled.

How the jail break could have happened

Talking to AAN, deputy governor Ahmadi gave several reasons why the Ghazni jailbreak may have been so successful. He said that, first of all, also according to the investigation team from Kabul, there had been a lack of coordination between the security forces. The jail guards did not inform the nearby security posts; and the police and the army stationed nearby did not show any reaction, even though they must have seen and heard the fighting. There is a security post of ANA soldiers about a kilometre to the southeast of the jail on Kohibad hill, from where soldiers only fired a couple of warning shots in the air, but according to former Ghazni Governor Faizanullah Faizan, they did not contact the jail guards to ask what was happening or if they needed help; nor did the jail guards inform them.

There are, all in all, ten police check-posts in the neighbourhood, but none came to help or rescue the jail guards or to stop the attack. There may be valid reasons for inaction by some of the posts: they could have been confused because they were also attacked, or they did not receive information from the jail security guards. Others may not have come out of their posts for fear of being ambushed by the Taleban fighters outside the posts. However, according to Ahmadi, if they had reacted and with coordination, the attack could have been fought off, or at least they could have prevented such a large number of prisoners from fleeing.

Secondly, according to Ahmadi there was weak management and coordination within the jail protection unit, who did not act as they were supposed to: they barely fought the attackers and did not prevent them from getting into the jail. He said the jail guards did not resist because they were not “serious and faithful people.” Some of the guards were sleeping, he said, while some others had intentionally failed to resist. Last but not least, he said there was the possibility that the Taleban had a secret agreement with some of the jail officials. Ahmadi particularly mentioned superintendent Muhammad Latif Hassanyar and his deputy Agha Jan, who were arrested on 14 September 2015, together with three security guards, on suspicion of negligence and collusion with the Taleban.

Faizanullah Faizan, a former Ghazni Governor who closely followed the jailbreak, also said the jail guards did not honestly resist the attack. He confirmed that the guards near the entrance did show a reaction but received no support from their colleagues, and that this was why only these seven guards were killed. He moreover said that, if the jail guards had immediately informed the nearby soldiers and the police, they could have at least stopped the prisoners from escaping the jail. Faizan, who was a mujahedin fighter in the 1990s, had at the time himself participated in an attempted jailbreak. Comparing this jailbreak with his own experience, he told AAN: “We failed to break into Ghazni jail in the 1990s because the police forces reacted honestly and were well-coordinated.”

One source close to the Taleban said that after the prisoners were freed, a Taleban commander looked around the entire jail, but could not find a single security guard. “It means all the guards of the jail either hid somewhere or escaped during the attack,” he said. This, despite the fact that, based on the attendance sheet, 110 of the total of 173 guards were supposed to have been present on the day of the attack (although according to deputy governor Ahmadi only 60 guards were actually there). Moreover, according to Ghazni police chief Angar: “We found that only four pika machine gun bullets, seven kalashnikov bullets and five pistol bullets were fired by the jail’s security guards and not a single bullet hole could be seen in the exterior walls of the towers.” This is another indicator that the jail guards in the central towers did not resist; if they had done so, they would have been shot at by the Taleban fighters.

Angar also pointed to what he considered interference in the hiring of jail staff. He said that parliamentarians in Kabul and provincial council members in Ghazni had interfered in the appointment of the staff (including the superintendent and security guards) which meant that they were more loyal to the MPs than the government, lacked professional skills and had not been trained in security tactics. He thought they had either lacked the ability to inform the other security forces and/or had not seriously tried to resist the attackers.

Earlier jailbreaks; differences and similarities

Since 2001, Afghanistan has experienced eight Taleban-planned jailbreaks in which a total of 1,954 prisoners were freed and 17 jail guards killed. In the first jailbreak in 2003 in Kandahar’s Sarpoza prison, the Taliban tunnelled their way out of Sarposa and forty-one prisoners escaped. After a weeklong search, only a handful was recaptured). In a second jailbreak in Kandahar in 2008, Taleban fighters carried out a massive attack, which killed 15 security guards, and freed at least 1,200 prisoners including important Taleban members. Before the attack, the Taleban had apparently warned locals living in the vicinity of the prison that they should evacuate their houses. (1) In the third break into Sarpoza prison in 2011, 500 prisoners were freed through a one kilometre long underground tunnel that had been dug by the Taleban. In the north, in Sar-e Pul province, Taleban fighters were able to free 170 inmates in 2012. The jailbreak followed a powerful bomb blast inside the building and a well-coordinated attack from three directions.

Smaller jailbreaks include from Farah prison when inmates broke out by digging a tunnel from their cell to the outside, on 28 November 2009. Officials captured a thirteenth prisoner as he tried to escape. Eight months later, on 18 July 2010 after a bomb went off at the main gate of the same prison, nineteen inmates escaped. Officials said that only one guard was killed. They also had said that eight escapees were re-arrested. In Zabul, eight prisoners overpowered a jail guard, who had taken them out for the Fajr dawn prayer, and fled on 15 July 2009. Lastly, four foreign prisoners escaped from the heavily fortified and well-guarded then US-controlled Bagram jail in 2005. Military officials familiar with the episode said the suspects are believed to have picked the lock on their cell, changed out of their bright orange uniforms and made their way through the heavily guarded military base under cover of night. They then crawled over a faulty wall where a getaway vehicle was waiting for them.

Interestingly, none of these jailbreaks caused many casualties on the side of the Taleban. Only during the Sar-e Pul jailbreak were three insurgents reportedly killed, and one suicide attacker in Kandahar in 2008. This suggests these operations were all well-planned, but also points to the likelihood of repeated inside assistance.

Since the Ghazni jailbreak, two more have ensued. When Kunduz city fell to the Taleban on 28 September 2015, about 700 prisoners were freed, (see a video here), while in another jailbreak, in Ghorian district in the western Herat province on 21 October 2015, six Taleban prisoners were released.

Conclusion

It seems that the Taleban fighters were smart enough and well-prepared enough to carry out their operation exactly as they wanted. They distracted the Afghan government forces by attacking several security check posts at the same time. They also kept their own fighters largely unaware of the plan. Though officials said there was inside cooperation with the Taleban at the government’s side, it also seems that, if this had indeed been the case, there would have been no need for such a big, complicated operation or such a high level of secrecy. Even bearing in mind the multiple attacks that night, the Afghan government displayed great confusion in response to the attack. They were uncoordinated and failed to even try to foil the attack and the escape of the prisoners. If the jail protection guards had immediately informed all the surrounding check posts, the Taleban fighters could have faced a much stronger resistance. It is less likely they could have freed all the prisoners and taken them to local areas while losing so few fighters.

Although, the jailbreak in Ghazni is over, it is clear that similar attacks can happen again, unless the Afghan government manages to improve the protection of its jails and other key institutions.

 

(1) For a detailed account of 2008 Sarpoza jailbreak see Graeme Smith’s book “The Dogs are Eating them Now: Our War in Afghanistan,” Alfred A. Knopf, Canada, 2013 (pp. 215-233).

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP