Defence`s Feeds

The Afghan parliament’s lower house has sacked seven ministers in a new wave of interpellations (estizah). It is not clear who instigated the estizah motions, MPs themselves or Palace intrigue, or who will come out as the winner (the president has told the ministers to stay in their posts and called on the Supreme Court to reverse the MPs decisions). But the affair shows that the long-standing conflict between the two camps within the government is far from over. The estizah affair is compounded by additional rifts within the Jamiat party and the long-standing conflict between the executive and parliament. Thomas Ruttig (with input from Ehsan Qaane and Salima Ahmadi) looked into the various levels of conflicts and concludes that another painful process of appointments – and wrangling over them – could be restarted, further bogging down the government.

Seven ministers voted off

The Wolesi Jirga, the Afghan parliament’s lower house, voted seven members of the cabinet out of office last week. MPs scrutinised 16 ministers in five sessions held every day, an unusual although not unique pace of work (a 17th minister who was on the original list had already resigned for – genuine – health reasons and was exempted). Usually, the Wolesi Jirga only convenes on Saturdays, Mondays and Wednesdays and struggles to reach a quorum (see AAN analysis here and here), but for these sessions over 200 out of the current 235 MPs participated in each one.

The procedure is called estizah (interpellation) and the power of the MPs to deliver such motions to call ministers to account is enshrined in the constitution. Use of that power, however, has often proved detrimental to government; it has regularly interrupted both the work of the cabinet and parliament itself (which could have devoted its time to more urgent legislative matters). For the National Unity Government (NUG), which took a painstaking two years to establish a full cabinet that finally completed in June 2016, this is the second estizah round this year. The previous motion, against the women’s affairs minister, Delbar Nazari, in July 2016, failed. The government had also managed to get its security minister candidates through parliament relatively smoothly, in April and June 2016, and it had looked as if MPs had become tired of toppling ministers – prematurely, it seems now.

Officially, this time the MPs called those ministers to account who had not been able to spend more than 70 per cent of their ministries’ development budget for the financial year of 1394 (2015). (Afghanistan’s budget consists of two parts, the budget for running costs and the development budget for all other projects and investments.) This was not a first: in 2013, during the last year of President Hamed Karzai’s era, 11 ministers came under estizah for the same reason. However, this time the ministers were voted out of office for this reason (in 2013 all survived). The threshold was different this time: while in 2013, all ministers that had spent 50 per cent or less of their development budgets were summoned, this was now increased to 70 per cent. (1)

On the evening of 12 November, after the first estizah session, in which all three ministers were voted off – Salahuddin Rabbani for Foreign Affairs, Mahmud Balegh for Public Works and Nasrin Oryakhel for Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled – the government intervened for the first time. The president and the Chief Executive invited the MPs to send a delegation to discuss the situation and suggested that they suspend the summoning of the ministers. The MPs accepted the invitation but declined to postpone the estizah sessions.

The president then called an emergency cabinet meeting on 14 November 2016 and turned to the Supreme Court with a query as to the legality of the estizah (see here, here and here). In 2007, then President Karzai had asked the court for a similar judgment, after parliament had fired his foreign minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta after he had unable to block the deportation of a huge number of Afghan refugees from Iran; the court declared the parliamentary decision invalid and Spanta continued in his job. It can be safely assumed that Ghani is hoping for a similar outcome.

The cabinet meeting was attended by both the president and chief executive, the latter after a long absence due to disagreements with Ghani. The president instructed the dismissed ministers to continue their work until the Supreme Court’s verdict. As a result, starting on 13 November 2016, the votes in Parliament were taken in the absence of the ministers concerned.

Ministers who lost the votes of confidence:

• Salahuddin Rabbani, Foreign Affairs (12 November); nominated by Abdullah
• Mahmud Balegh, Public Works, (12 November), nominated by Ghani
• Nasrin Oryakhel, Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (12 November), nominated by Ghani
• Assadullah Hanif Balkhi, Education (13 November), nominated by Abdullah
• Muhammadullah Batash, Transport and Civil Aviation (13 November), nominated by Ghani
• Farida Momand Higher Education (14 November), nominated by Ghani
• Abdul Razeq Wahidi, Telecommunication (15 November), nominated by Abdullah

Ministers who secured the votes of confidence:

• Eklil Hakimi, Finance (13 November), nominated by Ghani
• Sayed Sadat Mansur Naderi, Urban Development (14 November), nominated by Ghani
• Abdul Basir Anwar, Justice (14 November), nominated by Abdullah
• Assadullah Zamir, Agriculture (15 November), nominated by Ghani
• Salamat Azimi, Counter-Narcotics (15 November), nominated by Ghani
• Ali Ahmad Usmani, Water and Energy (15 November), nominated by Abdullah
• Sayed Hussain Alemi Balkhi, Refugees (16 November), nominated by Abdullah
• Abdul Sattar Murad, Economy (16 November), nominated by Abdullah
• Firuzuddin Firuz, Public Health (16 November), nominated by Abdullah

(For the exact numbers of votes, see the annex.)

The pressure of the presidency seems to have worked at least partially: the number of the ministers voted out by parliament declined over the week; in the last estizah session, on 16 November, all three ministers survived.

The most important estizah victim in the Dr Abdullah camp was foreign minister Salahuddin Rabbani, as he is also the current leader of Jamiat-e Islami. Jamiat is one of the most powerful parties in the country. It is also the main support base for the president’s partner in the National Unity Government, Chief Executive Dr Abdullah, (although there were always some Jamiat leaders who were less than enthusiastic in their support). Salahuddin Rabbani has held the Jamiat lead ever since the assassination of his father, former president Borhanuddin Rabbani, in 2011, although still officially in an interim role.

Apart from these seven ministers, there is an additional need to find three other ones: Border and tribes minister Gulab Mangal has just been appointed governor of Nangarhar province, Information and culture minister Abdul Bari Jehani stepped down for health reasons and the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum is currently being run by the former deputy minister, Ghazal Habibyar-Safi, after the previous minister, Daud Shah Saba resigned in March 2016.

Development budget expenditure as a criterion

Formally it makes sense to measure the performance of cabinet members by looking at the spending of their development budgets, as one yardstick. With the division of the budget of Afghanistan’s government institutions, the spending of the development budget, which is fed both by domestic and external sources, reflects how much money ministries and similar institutions invest in their ‘real’ work, for example, in expanding services for the population in the provinces. (The other part of the budget covers salaries and other running costs only.)

Spending figures, though, are a quantitative – and possibly over-simplified – criterion, as they do not reflect the quality, usefulness or effectiveness of what the money has been spent on. The discussions during the estizah sessions also did not constitute systematic performance evaluations of the ministers by the MPs, which could have been done even in the ministers’ absence. As in former years, ministers who did attend the session cast doubt on the figures used by the MPs. For example, foreign minister Rabbani claimed – albeit in vain – that his ministry had in reality spent 73 per cent of its development budget (which would have safeguarded him from estizah).

Whether or not expenditure of development budgets is a fair or accurate way to measure ministers’ performances, it can be assumed that other criteria influenced MPs’ decisions. The usually outspoken Kabul MP Ramazan Bashardost, a former planning minister, indicated that bribes had been handed out to vote or not vote for particular ministers. When he urged fellow-MPs to “stop exchanging money,” his words also indicated that there were both ‘givers’ and ‘takers’ among them. A pro-Ghani MP told AAN that the president himself had encouraged MPs to vote down ministers who did not spend their development budget and had even proposed a threshold of 80 per cent. As always, these accusations are difficult to pin down (although AAN has tried). If budget spending had been the MPs’ point, Bashardost argued, then all ministers below the 70 per cent threshold should have been fired, without exception.

The multidimensional power-struggle behind the estizah

It is not clear who instigated the estizah motions – MPs themselves or Palace intrigue. There are strong rumours in Kabul that the president was planning a cabinet reshuffle anyway and that a caucus of MPs had intervened on his behalf to engineer it through the Wolesi Jirga. But it was clear that various conflict lines converged over the past week and influenced the outcome of the estizah sessions.

First, the estizah motions represent a new round of the on-going power struggle within the NUG. Ostensibly, Ghani and Abdullah had ended their conflict before the Brussels donor conference. For a long time before that, the NUG had presented an unappealing image of disunity which was harming its chances of securing ongoing foreign funding. Harmonisation was achieved, but only on the surface. The underlying problem remained unsolved: Abdullah’s side complains about Ghani’s management style and tendency to micromanage, versus the Ghani camp’s view that Abdullah and his team block reform. Ghani, so one theory wented, wanted to break out of the impasse by reshuffling his cabinet and weakening Abdullah.

Ghani was, reportedly, particularly unhappy with both foreign minister Rabbani and refugee minister Alemi Balkhi. Both had refused to sign (see here and here) the government’s deal with the European Union on the return – both voluntary and involuntary – of rejected Afghan asylum seekers, on which a number of western governments had made the continuation of development aid before the Brussels conference tacitly conditional.

The unhappiness was not one-sided: Rabbani had opposed the president’s appointment of relatives and allies into key ambassadorial positions. These included Ghani’s uncle Qayum Kuchai as ambassador to Moscow, former finance minister Hazrat Omar Zakhilwal, to Pakistan and, particularly, Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani as ambassador to Spain, a post held for many years by the long-time aide to late commander Ahmad Shah Massud, Massud Khalili, who was retiring. Appointing Nuristani meant replacing not just an ally, but a close friend of Abdullah with someone from the opposing camp (who had moreover been in charge of the Independent Election Commission during the bitterly-disputed 2014 presidential elections). After these complaints, an MP told AAN, Ghani had asked Rabbani to resign, who had refused and said that he had come from the Abdullah camp and the president could not ask him to vacate his post.

Sources close to the presidential palace and foreign minister Rabbani have told AAN they had the impression that the president was trying to push Abdullah aside in favour of acting Balkh governor, Atta Muhammad Nur. (The New York Times picked up the same rumours, read here, although it also reported that a presidential advisor had rejected the rumours.) The reshuffle, if it happened,  would represent a realignment of the Ghani camp with a different faction within Jamiat, rather than a complete drop of the party. (Playing one Jamiat faction against the other would be similar to former president Karzai’s approach; AAN analysis here.) The same sources, spoke about Ghani’s desire to have nine ministers reshuffled; this was also reflected in some Afghan media,  including in Sarkhat daily, which is considered close to National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar, on 13 November. In this context, President Ghani might not have been unhappy about parliament voting some ministers out of office.

Secondly, the two camps in the government are also competing in parliament to muster majorities, particularly so they can secure votes of confidence for ministers and other appointees they support, for example during estizah sessions. Parliament also has the power to delay laws and, by that, important political projects, as the on-going debate on the electoral law demonstrates. This is further complicated in a house without formal party-based factions, where MPs can switch sides easily.

While Abdullah’s Jamiat party has a relatively stable foothold in the Wolesi Jirga – although nothing close to a majority, the president has even less guaranteed influence, as he lacks an organised power base (such as a party or a movement) of his own. Over the past two years, the president and his allies – particularly Atmar – have worked among MPs to convince a number of them to cooperate with the Palace and to establish what amounts to an informal, pro-presidential caucus in the Wolesi Jirga.

On 14 November 2016, a group of at least 16 MPs (3) collected signatures and asked the speaker of the house to postpone the estizah sessions and urged their fellow MPs to vote for in favour of their proposal. They are ethnically and politically mixed, including both Jamiatis and members of Hezb-e Islami. The most active MPs include Nazir Ahmad Ahmadzai, who is from the president’s tribe in the southeast, as well as a southern, western and another southeastern: Lalai Hamidzai, Muhammad Saleh and Kamal Nasir Osuli. Furthermore, there is Haji Almas, an influential former Hezb-turned Jamiat commander from Parwan province, who is a Tajik and, for now, in the president’s camp. But this group failed in parts of their task, illustrating that the president is still far away from commanding a reliable support base in the Wolesi Jirga.

The debate about whether and when to hold estizah sessions also reflects a continuation of the rocky relations between the executive and legislative branches of government, a legacy of the Karzai years (AAN analysis here), and attempts by parliament to assert itself as an independent body vis-à-vis the presidency.

Inner-Jamiati intrigues

Thirdly, jostling over the still vacant leadership in Jamiat has  influenced the balance between the Ghani and the Abdullah camp in the NUG. Atta – who leads Jamiat in the country’s populous north and large parts of the northeast and who became head of the party’s Executive Council, replacing Ahmad Zia Massud, in 2013 – is said to aspire to the overall leadership of the party, wishing to wrest it away from its traditional leaders. They have traditionally been, on the military side, Panjshiris (Ahmad Shah Massud and his commanders) and, on the political side, Badakhshis (Rabbani and son). Abdullah belongs to the Panjshiri faction.

A number of MPs thought to be close to Atta – including Assadullah Sharifi and Farhad Azimi, both from Balkh – had been campaigning against the younger Rabbani and for close Ghani ally Eklil Hakimi (currently finance minister), AAN was told by sources close to the governor. This would, if true, have been part of a quid-pro-quo between Ghani’s and Atta’s supporters. An MP who asked not to be named, told AAN that a person had come to him “before the voting process started and asked me to give a vote of no-confidence to Rabbani” and later “called me to [tell me to] give a vote of confidence to Hakimi.”

Atta rejected these reports in a statement released on his Facebook page on 12 November 2016, condemning the MPs for their “wrong” decision on Rabbani and assuring Jamiat he would do everything to keep their leader in his ministerial position. Earlier, on 2 November, he had confirmed though that he was engaged in negotiations with President Ghani (which he said Abdullah was aware of), but called claims in the Afghan media that he was about to leave his position in the north “incorrect.” There have been long standing rumours that he aspires to a cabinet post, as a staging post for a possible run in the 2019 presidential election (already in 2014, he tried to assume the role of king maker, see AAN analysis here). Atta’s strategy could be to try to weaken Abdullah and replace him as Ghani’s key Tajik ally.

Bringing in new allies?

The other rumour in Kabul is that Ghani wants to create space for ministers from Hezb-e Islami, after a peace treaty was concluded with its leader in late September. The deal may well have made such rewards necessary, although nothing official has been said. Hezb is the traditional competitor of Jamiat, although the mutual tensions eased in 2014 when the then leader of Hezb’s legalised, non-insurgent wing, Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, supported Abdullah (and lost his cabinet post when Ghani won) and Abdullah chose as his running mate, former Hezb-e Islami intelligence chief Khan Muhammad. The party is already represented in government – apart from Khan there are, for example, two cabinet ministers – but not, of course, from within its insurgent wing. Both Hezbi ministers remained in their positions: Justice Minister Anwar won his vote, while rural Development Minister Nasir Ahmad Durrani was not summoned.

Ghani might even seek to placate his predecessor Karzai by making some of his allies minister. Karzai, over many months, has become one of the major critics of the NUG, pushing for a Loya Jirga to decide the fate of the government and in particular the future of the position of chief executive, and regularly commenting on current events in ways seen as critical of the government. A partial rapprochement, bolstered by cabinet posts, could take some steam out of that uneasy relationship (more on this in a forthcoming AAN dispatch).

A mixed outcome

Politically, the outcome of the week-long estizah sessions was mixed. In terms of numbers, the president and his camp (including for example, Vice President’s Dostum’s Jombesh party) lost four ministers: Balegh, Batash, Oryakhel and Momand. Abdullah lost three: Rabbani, Assadullah Balkhi and Wahidi. (2) However, in terms of clout, Ghani’s key ally, finance minister Hakimi, was saved from sacking (Abdullah has reportedly long wanted his nephew, currently deputy minister of finance, Muhammad Mustafa Mastur, for this job), while the Abdullah camp lost Rabbani (foreign affairs). Murad (economy), another key Jamiati, did survive, however.

EU countries will also have noticed with interest that refugee minister Alemi Balkhi – nominated by the Abdullah camp, but more of an independent – survived. He has proven a difficult partner in talks on migration issues and one not always agreeing with the president.

Next round: the budget

The dismissal of more Ghani allies than Abdullah allies, and the loud protests by most MPs on the second day of the estizah sessions against the government’s attempt to postpone them, made it plain that the president’s work in parliament is not yet where he wants it to be. The circle of pro-presidential MPs still does not command a majority. The Abdullah camp continues to have a lot of influence, but cannot command a majority either. The middle ground – vulnerable to political pressure and plain bribery – is too wide, and it is too lucrative for MPs not to be there.

The estizah sessions may have been a cunning plan that backfired. If the president had indeed intended to reshuffle his cabinet, the estizah possibly came too early. Either way, whether the summonings came at his instigation or the MPs’, parliament has again proved it is unpredictable and has its own will. The president was left having to do damage control yet again.

But even if the estizah had been successful in getting rid of exactly those ministers he considers in the way of his policies, the president would have alienated key partners in the NUG – while possible new allies, such as Atta, would have had demands, too, including on appointments. And there would again be no guarantee that the new people would be more effective than those who are now in positions and who cooperate with the president on his reform plans.

The estizah motions have revealed what everyone suspected, that the internal problems of the NUG are far from over. All the intrigues and rumours that were part and parcel of the latest developments – even if the rumours were false – create further mutual distrust, rather than enhance cooperation. The fragmented character of Afghan institutions (including not only the party-less parliament, but also parties such as Jamiat) results in unpredictability for all sides and continues to produce mixed results. In the end, it is difficult to judge who gains and who loses. Moreover, the bad relations between the executive and legislative branches in an over-centralised presidential system, part of the Karzai legacy, continues to stand in the way of smooth political work.

There is more to come, and probably very soon. If overruled by the Supreme Court on behalf of the president, an unhappy parliament might block the budget for the 1396 (2017) fiscal year which it has to vote on next week. That has been threatened already by one MP, Zazai Watandost, speaking to AAN earlier this week (and publicly repeated by influential eastern MP Haji Qadir). It will also be very time-consuming to again fill the vacant cabinet positions. Appointments have been the main bone of contention between Ghani and Abdullah, and there is no reason to believe the two men will suddenly be able to agree on new appointments without rancour or endless delay.

Edited by Kate Clark

 

(1) The new threshold had been set in the Wolesi Jirga’s plenary session on 2 November 2016, after the representatives of its 15 permanent commissions failed to agree on one in a joint meeting in the second half of October.

Only four ministers escaped estizah by spending more than 70 per cent of their development budgets: Minister of Commerce and Industries, Humayun Rasa from Abdullah’s team; Minister of Interior, Taj Mohammad Jahed from Abdullah’s team, who secured his position after the fiscal year in discussion (1394/2015) had ended; Minister of Women Affairs, Delbar Nazari from Abdullah’s team; and the Minister of Haj and Endowments, Faiz Muhammad Usmani. The Ministry of Defense does not have a development budget.

(2) Out of the women ministers, Oryakhel and Momand were voted out, but Salamat Azimi, the Jombesh-affiliated Minister of Counter-Narcotics survived. Usually, women are particularly vulnerable to votes of no confidence.

(3) This group of MPs included: Engineer Zikria, Nazir Ahmad Ahmadzai, Hashem Rahmani, Saheb Khan, Kamal Nasir Osuli, Eqbal Safi, Muhammad Reza Khoshak Watandost, Obaidullah Kalimzai, Masuda Karokhi, Haji Almas Zahed, Munawar Shah Bahaduri, Saleh Muhammad Saleh, Sayed Muhammad Akhund, Qazi Abdul Rahim, Lalai Hamidzai and Haji Abdul Majid.

 

Annex: The estizah votes

No. Ministers Positive Negative Blank Invalid Results

1

Foreign Minister 58 140 6 3 Dismissed

2

Labour and Social Affairs Ministers 56 144 5 2 Dismissed

3

Public Works Minister 33 164 5 2 Dismissed

4

Finance Minister 85 112 2 5 Remained in his position

5

Minister of Education 68 131 3 2 Dismissed

6

Minister of Transport 51 142 6 5 Dismissed

7

Urban Development Minister 135 59 2 5 Remained

8

Justice Minister 95 101 1 4 Remained

9

Higher Education Minister 63 131 3 4 Dismissed

10

Telecommunication Minister 49 147 3 2 Dismissed

11

Agriculture Minister 131 62 4 4 Remained

12

Counter-narcotics Minister 72 114 9 6 Remained

13

Water and Energy Minister 60 115 23 3 Remained

14

Minister of Refugees 105 90 3 3 Remained

15

Minister of Economy 114 81 4 2 Remained

16

Minister of Public Health 170 28 2 1 Remained

Taiwanese T91 Assault Rifle

Last week (8-11 November), and for the second time since December 2015, the European Defence Agency (EDA) provided cyber awareness training to more than 100 staff from EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA at the mission’s Operations Headquarters (OHQ) in Rome, Italy.

The seminars covered important aspects such as mission-specific cyber threats, the legal framework applicable to cyberspace, common vocabulary and best practices when using communications and information systems. They also served to inform participants about the development and establishment of EU cyber defence capabilities for CSDP military operations and missions.

The seminars also allowed the command team of OHQ Rome and the EDA to exchange views on the next steps to be taken to enhance the cyber defence capabilities for EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia and other EU-led military operations.

The seminars were conducted with the support of the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) in Tallinn and from SYMANTEC Corporation.
The EDA started organizing Cyber Awareness Seminars in 2014 in support of EUFOR RCA as a valuable contribution to raising cyber awareness for all the personnel of activated Headquarters (HQ) for EU-led military operations.

 

Background

The EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework, as adopted by the Council on 18 November 2014, states that “Cyberspace is often described as the fifth domain of military activity, equally critical to European Union (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) implementation as the domains of land, sea, air, and space. The successful implementation of CSDP has been increasingly dependent on the availability of, and access to, a secure cyberspace. Robust and resilient cyber defence capabilities are now required to support CSDP structures and CSDP missions and operations”. The Policy Framework puts strong emphasis on cyber education and training.

 

EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia

EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia is only one element of a broader EU comprehensive response to the migration issue, which seeks to address not only its physical component, but also its root causes such as conflict, poverty, climate change and persecution.

The mission core mandate is to undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers, in order to contribute to wider EU efforts to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean and prevent the further loss of life at sea.

Since 7 October 2015, the operation has moved to phase 2 International Waters, which entails boarding, search, seizure and diversion, on the high seas, of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking.

Last June , Operation Sophia’s mandate was extended until 27 July 2017 and also reinforced by adding two supporting tasks:

• training of the Libyan coastguards and navy;
• contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya.

On 30 August and 6 September 2016, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) authorized the launch of the capacity building and training task, and the start of the mission’s role contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo respectively.

 

More information:

• Support to operations (EDA factsheet)
• EDA provides cyber defence support to operation EUFOR RCA (webnews September 2014)
• EEAS website on EUNAVFOR MED      

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has begun one of its largest maritime warfare activities, Exercise Ocean Raider, at locations off the coast of New South Wales, Australia.

Huntington Ingalls Industries' Ingalls Shipbuilding division has launched the US Navy's future Arleigh Burke-class (DDG 51) guided missile destroyer, Paul Ignatius (DDG 117).

The US Naval Sea Systems Command has awarded a $125.18m-worth engineering services contract modification to Lockheed Martin Rotary and Mission Systems.

CACI International has secured a prime position on a $192m indefinite delivery / indefinite quantity contract to provide training and curriculum development to Naval Education and Training Command (NETC).

Americas

• An agreement has been signed between Airbus and the Chilean government to pursue collaborative business development in the defense and aerospace industry. Both sides will cooperate on manufacturing and maintenance for future projects while exploring further possibilities. The Airbus deal is one of several agreements Chile has made with defense firms which includes a contract with Lockheed Martin to produce spare parts for C-130 aircraft.

Middle East & North Africa

• The Turkish Defence Minister Fikri Isik stated that the first two of a batch of 24 more Lockheed Martin F-35 aircraft will be delivered in 2018. 24 of the Joint Strike Fighter will be ordered over the next three years, of which six, including the two expected in 2018, had already been ordered. Ankara has committed to procuring a total of 115 F-35s.

Europe

• Greece has taken delivery of three second-hand CH-47SD heavy-lift helicopters. The transfer of the ex-National Guard Chinooks was completed on November 11. Seven more are expected by the end of 2017 as part of a $120 million deal with the US.

• European Defense Ministers agreed to raise the budget of the European Defence Agency (EDA) ending a six-year freeze. While small, the increase will see 2016’s $32.7 million increased to $33.1 for 2017’s activities. All 27 EU members gave their resounding support for the measure and will use the extra funds to develop and procure additional aircraft and other defense materials.

• Spain’s Air Force has received its first A400M transporter from Airbus. Aircraft MSN44 carried out its maiden flight from Airbus’s Seville final assembly site in September, and is the first of 27 examples on order for Spain. The delivery came days after Airbus announced that two A400Ms had successfully demonstrated the in-flight transfer of fuel using a fuselage-housed hose-and-drum unit.

Asia Pacific

• South Korean investigators have raided the offices of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA). An official from DAPA is suspected of leaking confidential information on military equipment to BAE Systems during a mismanaged project to upgrade the KF-16 fighter jet. The 2011 modernization award with the company has since been dissolved.

• Boeing is eager to sell its KC-46A aerial refueling tanker to India. The Indian Air Force has yet to procure a capability to refuel its C-17 and P-8I aircraft, and New Delhi has eyed up the Pegasus to fill such a role. A laborious search has been underway to fill a six multi-role tanker capability soon to be vacated by their aging IL-76 aircraft. Earlier attempts to procure Airbus A 330 MRTT never came to fruition.

• The first flight of India’s Rustom-II UAV has been successfully completed. Conducted by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), the drone accomplished all main objectives during the test, including takeoff, bank, level flight, and landing. While this marks a good milestone for the program, officials maintain that a lot more evaluation and testing needs to be done before operational evaluation and eventual entry into service with India’s military branches can take place.

Today’s Video

Live demonstration of South Korea’s K30 Biho twin 30 mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun:

Taiwanese T86 Assault Rifle

Rustom-H mockup
(click to view full)

India has not been left out of the global UAV push. The country operates Israeli Searcher tactical UAVs, and Heron Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) UAVs, placing an additional Heron order in 2005. It has also undertaken development programs for a smaller UAV, the “Nishant”. With its “Rustom” program, however, India hopes to offer a UAV in the Heron/ Predator/ Watchkeeper class of MALE UAVs.

It had also hoped to begin to change a culture and tradition of wholly state-owned development of military hardware, which has not always performed well, or served India’s needs. A recent award has selected a winner, and moved the project forward. It may also serve as a reminder that bureaucracies are very difficult to change.

The Rustom family of UAVs Rustom-1 scale model
(click to view full)

“Rustom” translates as “warrior,” and may remind some readers of the great hero in Persia’s classic The Shah-nameh. Reports indicate that India’s UAV is named after a more contemporary personality, however: Rustom Damania, a former professor of IISc, Bangalore, who led the National Aeronautical Laboratories’ light canard research aircraft (LCRA) project in the 1980s.

The LCRA is reportedly the initial basis for the DRDO ADE’s 1,100-1,800 kg UAV design, which aims for a maximum altitude of 35,000 feet and a range of 300 km/ 240 miles, with endurance around 24 hours. This will be the Rustom-C/H, with the “C” variant expected to carry weapons as well as surveillance gear.

A lighter “Rustom-1” looks more like Burt Rutan’s Long-EZ design, with canards up front, winglets on a squared delta wing, and a pusher propeller in back. It will act as a test platform, and could fill a tactical UAV slot, with endurance of only 12-14 hours, maximum altitude of 22,000 feet, and a range of around 250 km.

Procurement & the Private Sector: India’s Struggles

In some ways, Rustom’s naming is also a fine encapsulation of India’s defense industry struggles. Given the sensitive nature of defence projects, private firms have generally been limited to step-and-fetch roles as component suppliers or sub-contractors on projects designed and managed by state-owned agencies or firms such as DRDO, NAL, HAL, BEL, et. al. Many of those projects have fared poorly, leaving India with gaps in critical defense capabilities that then had to be filled by buying foreign equipment as a “temporary” measure. Which would frequently become permanent mainstays for India’s forces.

In 2002, India took the first steps toward changing its procurement model. It opened up defence equipment production to private sector companies, and even allowed up to 26% foreign direct investment in such ventures. In 2006, “India’s DRDO Rethinking the Way it Does Business” covered changes in government statements, and even grudging DRDO admissions that more private sector involvement was necessary, if India’s industry was to develop and deliver the equipment a rising power needs. Subsequent moves by the government on a number of fronts, from aircraft to tanks, are opening up a far larger role for global defense firms in supplying India’s needs.

The problem is that bureaucracies are entirely uninterested in changing their long-standing and comfortable models, especially if those changes promise reduced future roles for those bureaucracies. Domestic development remains largely the bailiwick of existing agencies and bureaucracies. In those competitions so far, Indian firms partnered with experienced foreign suppliers like Thales, IAI, et. al. continue to lose to state-owned Indian firms whose overall record in the sectors under competition is shallower, and arguably adds development risks to these projects.

That appears to have been the case with Rustom.

IAI Heron UAV
(click to view larger)

DRDO intended to move away from its traditional model of developing and finalizing the system itself, then handing the designs and technology over to a production agency. Instead, they would introduce concurrent engineering that involves the producing firm, and initial design efforts also take into consideration production issues. This production agency development partner (PADP) was whittled down from 23 firms to 4 finalists: Larsen and Toubro Ltd. (L&T), Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Tata Advanced Systems Ltd. – and a joint bid from state-owned firms Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Bharat Electronics.

The accompanying maritime patrol radars and electro-optical systems were expected to come from Israel, whose systems equip current UAVs and aircraft. The engine is also expected to come from a selection process, rather than being a product of new R&D.

So far, that’s an improvement. Unfortunately, Rustom’s reported contract structure is a fine illustration of the time and performance blindness that has crippled so many indigenous Indian efforts. LiveMint describes an agreement that involved INR 4 billion investment in prototypes and trials, over a decade or more. All in a field where major new designs are being fielded, now, in 2 year cycles – and where the capabilities India seeks already exist in several fielded platforms. One hopes that is a reporting error.

The Rustom development contract also contains no guarantee of an order from the armed forces once it is complete. That’s normal in India, and not unusual in many countries that used staged-gate approval processes for weapons. What’s unusual is the combination of no commitment plus partnership financing requirements, which is a poor fit for the private sector. The HAL official who confirmed these arrangements for LiveMint asked the logical question: “If there is no assurance of an order [and such a high investment target], why should the private industry come forward and invest?” Yet some firms did make that offer, in conjunction with experienced foreign partners. They lost to HAL, whose history of aviation production does not extend to UAVs of this size and complexity.

What is clear, is that India’s efforts to build up its private sector defense industry beyond a mere conduit for foreign firms’ industrial offset programs is off to a slow start. N.S. Sisodia, director general of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, is typically diplomatic in his survey of the broader situation. He is also correct:

“The process does take a little time. There are efforts made in DPP (the defence procurement procedure) to involve private industry. But I think much more can be done.”

Contracts & Key Events

November 18/16: The first flight of India’s Rustom-II UAV has been successfully completed. Conducted by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), the drone accomplished all main objectives during the test, including takeoff, bank, level flight, and landing. While this marks a good milestone for the program, officials maintain that a lot more evaluation and testing needs to be done before operational evaluation and eventual entry into service with India’s military branches can take place.

November 23/15: The long awaited death of India’s indigenous Nishat UAV program has come to pass. The final of four UAVs in use by the Army has crashed less than a week after the program was officially cancelled. The final nail in the program’s coffin occurred earlier this month after a third UAV crashed amid technical problems cited by the Indian Army. However, these claims have been refuted by the Defence Research & Development Organization (DRDO), who claim army incompetence and poor handling by the army. While the blame game continues, we do know that we won’t be seeing any more Nishats in the Indian sky.

November 18/15: The Indian Army has decided to cancel a two decade long indigenous Nishant UAV program after the third of four in use by the army crashed near the city of Jaisalmer on November 4. The Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) had been developing the Nishant UAV since 1995 with the aim of developing India’s own reconnaissance and intelligence gathering abilities. Phase 1 had seen four of the UAVs introduced in 2011 and continuation would have seen 8 more orders of the UAV by the army. The announcement comes shortly after Prime Minister Modi’s recent push to increase development within India’s private defense industry and the sharing of indigenously designed Rustom UAVs by the government. In the wake of the Nishant duds, these companies may be best served looking elsewhere for design ideas.

September 25/15: In a bid to spur development in the country’s private defense industry, the Modi government has decided to share designs of indigenously-developed unmanned aerial vehicles with private firms. Developed by the Indian state-owned Defence Research and Development Organisation, details of the Rustom family of UAVs were until now kept secret from the private sector. As the Indian government looks to develop its defense industrial base domestically, it has also recently relaxed joint venture restrictions on foreign companies in a bid to build expertise through collaborative working. However, foreign companies still face stringent offset policies and investment restrictions, despite slow progress.

November 2013: Rustom-II. India Strategic quotes Honeywell Aerospace India President Pritam Bhavnani as saying that:

“As well as propulsion, our technology portfolio across these [American UAV] platforms spans electrical power systems, Auxiliary Power Units, navigation, air thermal systems, fuel controls, pneumatics, wheels and brakes and high integrity controls…. Rustom II is an exciting development in the evolution of India’s defence capabilities. I cannot give any specific details today regarding our involvement with the program…”

Sources: India Strategic, “Rustom II: An exciting opportunity for Honeywell”.

May 8/12: Test flight 14. India’s MoD:

“Indigenously designed and developed RUSTOM-1 made 14th successful flight this morning at Kolar with attainment of about 11,500 ft AGL (above ground level) and speed of above 140 Kmph during 2 hrs 10 minutes of cruise. It may be noted that this unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), developed by Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE), a DRDO lab at Bangalore, had its maiden flight in Nov 2009. Mr. PS Krishnan, Director ADE stated that the flight was successful. All the parameters were achieved by the UAV which weigh around 690 Kg and the total performance was satisfactory.”

Nov 11/11: Test flight 5. India’s government announces that the 661 kg Rustom-1 UAV had made its 5th test flight, at 100 knots and 2,300 feet above ground level near Hosur. The release adds that: “This UAV can attain a maximum speed of 150 Knots, 22,000 ft of altitude and endurance of 12-15 Hours with an operating range of 250 Kms when fully developed.”

May 24/11: DRDO’s Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) has flown an upgraded version of “Rustom-1” from TAAL’s airfield near Hosur. It’s reported to be a converted manned aircraft, and the goal is an endurance of 14 hours and altitude ceiling of 8 km/ 26,000 feet. ADE reports it was happy with the flight, conducted as a precursor to flights with payloads. DNA India.

Prahlada, chief controller of research and development (aeronautics programme), said “with the successful accurate flying of Rustom 1, ADE is geared up for integration of payloads with the Aircraft within next three months, to demonstrate performance of payloads and necessary secure data-link to the users.”

Rustom 1st flight
(click for video)

Oct 26/10: Rustom-1’s first flight.

April 25/10: State-run Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) and Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) win the bid to design and build Rustom. The award marks the 3rd large Indian defence project in which private firms have lost out to public sector rivals, after the Saras light passenger plane and the Army’s tactical communication system project. That trend is causing some questioning of the government’s sincerity regarding its pledges to advance private Indian defense firms. Larsen & Tourbo aerospace and defence VP M.V. Kotwal, whose firm bid on all 3 contracts, is quoted by LiveMint:

“This is a disappointment for us since we had been told that the projects would be open for participation by the private sector on a competitive basis… Otherwise we would not have spent the time and efforts in preparing for the bids. Detailed plans for execution had also been presented as required…”

That last statement alludes to DRDO chief controller of R&D Prahlada’s statement that “HAL-BEL gave us a clear road map for manufacture” as the reason for their victory. LiveMint.

Nov 16/09: DRDO’s Rustom technology demonstrator crashes at the Taneja Aerospace Air Field near Hosur, during its 1st flight. The taxiing and takeoff went as planned, but “due to misjudgment of altitude of the flight, the on-board engine was switched off through ground command…”

That’s not generally a good thing. On the flip side, DRDO says the shortened flight was useful for establishing more confidence in the UAV’s aerodynamics, redundant flight control, engine and datalink. Defense News.

Aug 6/09: India’s Tata Group signs a wide-ranging joint venture agreement with Israel Aerospace Industries, the builders of India’s Searcher and Heron UAVs. The agreement finalizes a commitment made in February 2009 by IAI CEO Itzhak Nissan and Tata Sons Chairman Ratan N. Tata.

Under the terms of the MoU, the new Company will develop, manufacture and support a wide range of defence and aerospace products, including missiles, UAVs, radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems and home land security (HLS) systems. The new company will also perform offset work for IAI and other defence and aerospace programs in India. domain-b.

May 15/09: Larsen and Toubro Ltd. (L&T), Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd., and Tata Advanced Systems Ltd. bid to develop India’s Rostam MALE UAV. The 4th bidder is a joint effort by state-owned defence equipment makers Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) and Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL).

The Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) is testing a technology demonstrator. Once a vendor is selected, ADE and that vendor will design an enhanced version; a selection is expected later in 2009.

ADE’s tender expects that the cost of producing one set of 5 Rustom vehicles with 5 sets of spares, plus payload and ground handling/control equipment, would be around INR 2.5 billion (just under $50 million). India Defence.

Sept 22/08: The first low-speed taxi tests of ADE’s Rustom technology demonstrator take place.

Additional Readings

• Air Force Technology – Rustom Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Chitradurga

• DID – India’s DRDO Rethinking the Way it Does Business.

• iHLS (July 5/13) – Indian desire for UAS results in home production

• DID (June 10/10) – Private Shipbuilding Firm Wins Indian OPV Contract. It’s a slow opening in an important military sector.

• India Defence (March 12/09) – DRDO’s Rustom UAV To Roll Out Soon

Russian SKS Semi-Automatic Rifle

Following the agreement between EUROCONTROL and the European Defence Agency (EDA) signed in 2013, both organisations have started a close cooperation on the SESAR programme. In compliance with the initial agreement, the cooperative work has been updated by the two organisations for the years 2017-2018 in order to accommodate the tasks as defined in the SESAR 2020 programme.

The work programme makes EUROCONTROL’s expertise in civil-military ATM coordination available to EDA to facilitate EDA’s role regarding the coordination of military views in the context of the Single European Sky (SES) and its interface towards the EU institutions.

During the implementation of the previous joint work programme, the EDA-EUROCONTROL cooperation successfully contributed to the provision of harmonised military inputs to the 2015 ATM Master Plan update campaign, supported Member States bidding for EU co-financing in INEA calls and provided technical impact analysis on the SESAR deployment programme and EASA regulatory material under development.

“The needs of military aviation often go beyond the scope of civil aviation,” said Frank Brenner, Director General of EUROCONTROL. “To work effectively, European airspace management must address both military and civil airspace user needs with coordinated processes and consultation between civilian and military stakeholders. EUROCONTROL and EDA are working together to contribute to this process”.

“To preserve military access to all airspace, it remains essential that we develop harmonised low-cost interoperable SESAR solutions, including standardisation and certification processes, and that we provide common mitigation actions”, said Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency. “Moreover the deployment phase of SESAR offers an opportunity for the military, to avail itself of funding to enhance their ATM technology, when appropriate. This has already been the case for INEA Call 2015, whereby 14 military projects submitted through EDA have been awarded funds adding up to a total of €53.5 million, which is roughly 10.5% of total funds awarded.”

EUROCONTROL and EDA have been working closely together since 2008 to ensure improved coordination and cooperation between civil and military air traffic, moving towards a Single European Sky for both military and civil air transport.

 

For further information, please contact:

Kyla Evans
Head of Corporate Communications
EUROCONTROL
Tel: +32 2 729 51 51
press@eurocontrol.int
www.eurocontrol.int

Eric Platteau
Head of Media & Communications
European Defence Agency
Tel: +32 2 504 28 23
eric.platteau@eda.europa.eu
www.eda.europa.eu

The International Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor has said it will “imminently” be taking a decision on whether to request authorisation from judges to commence an investigation into war crimes in Afghanistan. The Taleban could be investigated, among other offences, for murder and intentionally attacking civilians, while Afghan government forces, and the US military and CIA could be investigated for torturing security detainees. As Kate Clark and Ehsan Qaane report, this next step towards US citizens possibly being called to trial in The Hague has arisen just as Donald Trump, a man who believes in torture, has been voted into the White House.

The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) released its 2016 Preliminary Examination Report on Afghanistan (released annually) on 14 November 2016. The report says that the OTP had determined there was a reasonable basis to believe that, at a minimum, the following crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction had occurred:

• Crimes against humanity and war crimes by the Taliban and their affiliated Haqqani Network;
• War crimes of torture and related ill-treatment by Afghan government forces, in particular the intelligence agency (National Directorate for Security) and the Afghan National Police;
• War crimes of torture and related ill-treatment, by US military forces deployed to Afghanistan and in secret detention facilities operated by the Central Intelligence Agency, principally in the 2003-2004 period, although allegedly continuing in some cases until 2014.

The Preliminary Examination also said that thresholds of admissibility had been reached, ie the alleged crimes are under ICC jurisdiction, are sufficiently grave, are not being addressed by domestic or other legal bodies (although this is “subject to further information that could be provided by the relevant national authorities in the course of the preliminary examination or any subsequent investigation”) and there are “no substantial reasons to believe that the opening of an investigation would not be in the interests of justice.”

The Taleban

There is a reasonable basis, the OTP said, to believe that the Taleban and the Haqqani network have committed war crimes (murder; intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population, humanitarian personnel and protected objects; conscripting children; and killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary – all of which, it said, “were committed on a large scale and as part of a plan or policy”) and crimes against humanity (murder; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty and persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political grounds and on gender grounds, all “allegedly committed as part of a widespread and/or systematic attack…” – for full quote, see paragraphs 206 and 207 of the report.)

In terms of admissibility, the Taleban and Haqqani network’s crimes passed the gravity threshold. As to whether domestic courts are dealing with suspected war criminals, the OTP pointed to the almost complete lack of any investigation or trial of alleged war criminals in Afghanistan (1) and to the 2009 Amnesty Law which provides amnesty to everyone who committed war crimes, including those who, in the future, reconcile with the Afghan government (see also this AAN report). It was noticeable, in this respect, that the government recently also granted immunity to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his armed men in the context of the peace agreement signed with Hezb-e Islami on 29 September 2016. (2) Amnesty for war crimes in domestic legislation can be interpreted as unwillingness by the state to prosecute.

The NDS and Afghan police

Multiple sources, the OTP said, including the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), UNAMA and a presidential fact-finding commission in 2013 have reported on the prevalence of torture in Afghan government detention facilities. The OTP estimates 35 to 50 per cent of conflict-related detainees “may be subjected to torture” and says there is a “state of total impunity.”

There is a reasonable basis to believe, the OTP said, that Afghan authorities have committed the war crimes of torture and cruel treatment; outrages upon personal dignity pursuant to article; and (this is new in the OTP’s reports) sexual violence. Naming the Afghan intelligence agency the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the Afghan National Police, Afghan National Army, Afghan Border Police and the Afghan Local Police (ALP), it says available information suggests the alleged crimes were committed on a “large scale.” Although there is no indication that they were committed “as part of any plans or policies at the national level,” in some cases, it said, there were plans or policies at the level of facility, district or province.

The US military and CIA

The information available, says the OTP, provides a reasonable basis to believe that during interrogations of security detainees and in conduct supporting those interrogations, members of the US armed forces and the CIA:

… resorted to techniques amounting to the commission of the war crimes of torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, and rape… Specifically:

Members of US armed forces appear to have subjected at least 61 detained persons to torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity on the territory of Afghanistan between 1 May 2003 and 31 December 2014. The majority of the abuses are alleged to have occurred in 2003-2004.

Members of the CIA appear to have subjected at least 27 detained persons to torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity and/or rape on the territory of Afghanistan and other States Parties to the Statute (namely Poland, Romania and Lithuania) between December 2002 and March 2008. The majority of the abuses are alleged to have occurred in 2003-2004.

Crucially, the OTP says these “alleged crimes were not the abuses of a few isolated individuals,” but rather were part of a policy:

The Office considers that there is a reasonable basis to believe these alleged crimes were committed in furtherance of a policy or policies aimed at eliciting information through the use of interrogation techniques involving cruel or violent methods which would support US objectives in the conflict in Afghanistan.

It notes their use ended when the authorities decided to stop using them, indicating the alleged crimes were ordered, rather than being the work of random individuals.

Unlike the 2015 Preliminary Examination report, for both US and Afghan forces, rape is mentioned in the sections on the use of torture in the interrogation of security detainees.

As to civilian casualties caused by the international military, something which many survivors and the families of those killed hoped would be taken up by the ICC, this now looks unlikely. Civilians can be lawfully killed during conflict. (3) As the OTP said, “[A]lthough these operations resulted in incidental loss of civilian life and harm to civilians, in most incidents the information available does not provide a reasonable basis to believe that the military forces intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.”

There were a few incidents where lack of information meant the OTP could not determine whether harm done to civilians amounted to war crimes. If the judges (the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber) authorised an investigation, it said, and depending on whether this matter passed selection and prioritisation criteria, they could be looked into further. However, it is unclear if even these incidents of civilian casualties, if investigated, would be considered potential war crimes or whether they would meet the gravity threshold of admissibility.

The evidence 

The OTP does not go into the evidence, so the following is very much the authors’ initial take on possible investigations.

The Taleban regularly and publically claim to have committed what are, in effect, war crimes, as in a recent example, the deliberate attack on the German Consulate (a civilian target) in Mazar-e Sharif last week. (The attack killed four and injured more than one hundred civilians living nearby.) UNAMA routinely reports such incidents in its Protection of Civilians reports. In the first six months of this year, for example, it found the Taleban had claimed 51 attacks which deliberately targeted civilians or civilian locations. AAN has itself investigated such incidents claimed by the Taleban (see for example, here and here). Both in their codes of conduct (layhas) and public declarations, the Taleban allow or have ordered the commission of war crimes; these include the targeting of Afghan civilians working with the government and foreign organisations, justice sector workers and journalists with certain media organisations (see here and here) and in the early days of the insurgency also schools, teachers and NGO workers.(4)

There have been multiple reports on the use of torture by NDS, in particular, but also by the Afghan police and ALP (see here and here). The Afghan government has acknowledged the use of torture in government facilities, but as UNAMA has reported, has failed to take criminal or even administrative action against torturers, creating effective impunity. AAN has also reported regularly on this issue (dispatches also contain links to the major investigations by UNAMA and AIHRC: see for instance here, here and here). (5)

In 2001/2002, the US administration of George Bush decided, in its handling of ‘war on terror’ detainees, to forgo the Geneva Conventions, including common article 3 which, among other things, bans torture and “degrading and humiliating treatment.” The president claimed the ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ he authorised did not amount to torture, although the OTP clearly believes otherwise.

The US’s use of torture against security detainees was systemic (although not every detainee was tortured) and there is a wealth of documentation about how decisions were taken and the misgivings of many in the military and the CIA about its use. The torture has been detailed by human rights organisations; the US government (see a list of investigations up to 2008 put together by the International Center for Transitional Justice); Congress, looking at both the military and the
 CIA; journalists (for example, here and here) and former detainees. Methods used included being deprived of sleep for days, waterboarding, food deprivation, being continuously shackled, being forced to kneel or stand in painful ‘stress positions’ for extended periods, being beaten, kicked, soaked in cold water, being stripped and sexually humiliated, and being forced to listen to music loud enough to deafen for hours at a time.

Media headlines (for example, here and here) about the ICC report have mainly focussed on the possibility of Americans being in the dock for war crimes. The US is not a member of the ICC. Bill Clinton signed the Rome treaty that established the court in December 2000, but George W Bush renounced the signature in May 2002 saying he feared Americans would be unfairly prosecuted for political reasons. However, Americans could still be prosecuted for alleged crimes committed in Afghanistan because it is a member. The Rome Treaty came into force in Afghanistan in May 2003 and only crimes committed after then are admissible (some of the most egregious and best-documented US torture cases, including three deaths in custody took place before then). However, there could be investigations into earlier alleged of torture by the CIA of detainees in Poland, Romania and Lithuania, given, the OTP said, there was a nexus to the Afghanistan conflict. The Rome Statue entered into force in Poland and Romania on 1 July 2002 and Lithuania on 1 August 2003.

Trump-era practices?

The interrogation practices which could now be investigated by the ICC as incidents of torture were eventually outlawed in the US. In 2005, Congress banned the techniques which Bush had authorised and, in 2009, Obama passed an executive order restricting interrogators to using only techniques authorised in the Army Field Manual; that order was codified into law by the Senate in 2015. Obama called waterboarding torture and his attorney general, Eric H Holder, said the country was owed “a reckoning” for torture carried out after the September 11th attacks. However, in the end, Obama decided not to conduct a broad criminal investigation into Bush-era officials saying, “We need to look forward, as opposed to looking backward.”

However, the new US president-elect is again officially championing those techniques. Like Bush, Trump believes torture ‘works’. As AAN has reported, he has praised waterboarding, saying, “I like it a lot. I don’t think it’s tough enough.” Even if it did not work, he said, he would authorise it because “they deserve it anyway for what they do to us.”

There may be other supporters of torture in the new Trump administration. Two men being suggested as possible secretaries of state are Newt Gingrich, former Senate speaker, who said of waterboarding, “under the normal rules internationally it’s not torture” and John Bolton, former Bush-era ambassador to the United Nations, who criticised Obama for saying the US state had used torture as it would be “aiding an effort to establish liability for the top political leaders up to and including President Bush and [former] Secretary [of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld.”

The name of Jose Rodrigues has also come up as a future director of the CIA. Just after the 9/11 attacks, he was appointed chief of staff of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Centre and was later promoted to director of the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. He was a key player in creating the CIA’s torture and rendition programme and in trying to cover up it up; in November 2010, after photographs showing detainees being abused at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were published, he ordered the destruction of video tapes showing detainees being water-boarded. Rodrigues could have been charged with misleading investigators or obstructing justice, but in 2010, the Department of Justice decided not to put him on trial.

Like Trump, Rodrigues has spoken of the need to go beyond the methods of torture signed off by Bush. “Enhanced interrogation techniques are well known to the enemy and we would have to come up with something else,” he told The Daily Beast, although he declined to tell the paper what that might entail. As anti-torture laws were passed during the Obama years, practicing torture again may not be as easy as it looks, although see here and here for legal analysis of what the new president’s options might be.

Trump has also said he wants to expand the ‘war on terror’ detention camp at Guantánamo Bay (with five remaining Afghan inmates, along with 55 others). Such a move would increase the potential for abuses to take place as inmates do not enjoy the same legal protections as those on mainland America and it is far more difficult for lawyers and journalists to scrutinise.

Conclusion

The ICC has been under fire for ‘only investigating Africans’ (that was the reason, said three countries, South Africa, Burundi and Gambia, why they were withdrawing from the ICC earlier this month. (6) In January of this year, Georgia became the first non-African country that the OTP received Pre-trial Chamber authorisation for to investigate – in this case, alleged war crimes committed during the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict over South Ossetia. Afghanistan could be the second. Even if it does, however, building cases against specific individuals, especially in a war zone, will be difficult. With its new report, the ICC may be one step closer, but it is still many steps away, from bringing Americans or Afghans accused of committing war crimes in Afghanistan to trial.

 

(1) The OTP mentions two possible exceptions: the pre-Amnesty Law conviction of Abdullah Shah, an Ettehad-e Islami commander for murders committed during the civil war in Kabul and “reportedly two senior members of the Haqqani Network… prosecuted and convicted by a national primary court in August 2016 for an unknown alleged conduct.”

(2) The OTP mentions Hezb-e Islami only in the context of the list of groups fighting the Afghan government.

(3) Civilians can lawfully be killed as ‘collateral damage’ during conflict. However, they cannot be targeted, combatants must take precautions to avoid causing civilian harm and if civilian harm is expected from an attack on a military objective, this must be proportional to the military gain.

(4) In the Taleban’s 2006 code of conduct, teaching in government schools was deemed illegal and punishments were harsh. Teachers were to be warned and if necessary beaten: “…if a teacher or mullah continues to instruct contrary to the principles of Islam, the district commander or group leader must kill him.” Education was allowed, but only in a mosque or similar institution, using jihad or Emirate-era textbooks and by someone with religious training. Schools were to be closed and if necessary burned. Any contract with an NGO, in exchange for money or materials, had to be authorised at the highest level, by the leadership shura. The 2006 code of conduct described NGOs as “tools of the infidels.” These instructions and descriptions were dropped in the subsequent codes of conduct of 2009 and 2010 (more on this here).

(5) A day after the OTP released its 2016 Preliminary Examination Report on Afghanistan, the Afghan National Security Council, led by President Ghani, finally publically announced its commitment to the Rome Statute and other related matters, including prohibiting the recruitment of child soldiers into the Afghan National Security Forces, prohibiting civilian casualties, eliminating torture and bringing reform to the judiciary so that it can adjudicate international crimes. Additionally, the National Security Council stressed its commitment to cooperate with the ICC. Prior to this, in in January 2016, Afghanistan had established an inter-ministerial committee to look into how the country could interact with the ICC. The committee was tasked with developing a regulation to manage Afghanistan’s interaction with the ICC. That regulation is now in operation with the AIHRC in charge. A year ago, the OTP complained about the lack of Afghan government cooperation. In this month’s report, it said Afghanistan was preparing to share the “required information” with it.

(6) South Africa, Burundi and Gambia were joined on 16 November 2016 by Russia which said it was formally withdrawing its signature from the Rome Treaty, a day after the ICC published a report classifying the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 as an occupation.

The UK Navy's Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel (RFA) Argus has resumed one of its primary roles as an aviation training ship after completing operational sea training.

SENER engineering and technology group has received the 11th Masterinstal Award in the Energy Efficiency and Energy Management category, for a power cogeneration project developed jointly with GTEL and Siemens for the Brazilian industry.

MBDA Deutschland has successfully conducted tracking tests with its new high-energy laser effector under real environmental conditions for the first time.

Insitu has successfully demonstrated its ScanEagle unmanned aerial system’s (UAS) newest wide-area maritime surface search and identification technology at the UK Royal Navy’s Unmanned Warrior exercise.

Argentine and Chilean sea platforms are to monitor the Antarctic from 15 November 2016 to 31 March 2017 under the Joint Antarctic Naval Patrol (Patrulla Antártica Naval Combinada: PANC) framework. The operation includes search-and-rescue missions, monitoring maritime traffic, potential cleanup

The first battalion for the new Central African Armed Forces (FACA) should be fully formed and trained by mid-2017, the commander of the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) has said. Addressing reporters in Brussels on 16 November, Major General Eric

The Iranian-backed Lebanese group Hizbullah showed off its recently established armoured unit in a parade held in the Syrian town of Al-Qusayr on 11 November. Held to mark the group's annual Martyrs' Day, the parade involved dozens of armoured vehicles, including T-72 and T-54/55 tanks, BMP-1