Defence`s Feeds

General Atomics Electromagnetic Systems (GA-EMS) has been contracted to deliver its Lithium-ion Fault Tolerant (LiFT) battery system for the semi-autonomous hydrographic reconnaissance vehicle (SAHRV).

The US Navy's first Ford-class aircraft carrier, the future USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), has returned to Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, after successfully completing builder's sea trials.

As part of its Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory (JDEAL) project, which has been launched in 2013 to support the fight against Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), the European Defence Agency (EDA) has launched today (18 April) a technical course which will last until 28 April and which is specifically designed to train military staff on the setting up and technical management of a new joint deployable capability (JDC) which will be delivered to the permanent technical exploitation training facility based in Soesterberg (The Netherlands) by the end of May.  

This new JDC is already the second deployable capability developed and delivered within EDA’s JDEAL project. The course is being hosted by the Spanish company Indra Sistemas at its facilities in San Fernando de Henares (Madrid). Trainees from the 13 EDA Member States participating in JDEAL will be instructed to handle the specific electronics items and tools, and to acquire the required skills to manage and operate the complex deployable laboratory. A visitor’s day for participating Member States will take place on 27 April.

This scalable and rapidly deployable capability will enable the participating Member States to deploy exactly the equipment that is required in a given situation, from a full laboratory deployment with all essential equipment to limited interventions with specific material only.  

Once the course is finished, the laboratory will be packed up and moved to Soesterberg where the delivery is expected by the end of May. After a final review and acceptance process in Soesterberg, this second deployable capability will be considered to have reached Full Operational Capability (FOC). 

 

More information:

• EDA programme launched to improve IED Detection (News January 2017)
• “C-IED proficiency needs to be improved and shared”, says Jorge Domecq (News October 2016)
• Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory (JDEAL) (EDA project page)

 

 

Israeli MAPATS Anti-Tank Guided Missile

The US Navy has laid the keel for its future littoral combat ship (LCS 20) USS Cincinnati at Austal USA's shipyard in Mobile, Alabama, marking the beginning of vessel's construction.

The US Navy has received its USS Providence (SSN 719) Los Angeles-class submarine from Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, following the completion of a major maintenance availability programme.

The Royal Australian Navy's S-70B-2 (Skeletor) anti-submarine Seahawk helicopter has been retired, after completing more than 28 years of service and logging 6,200 airframe hours.

Technical superiority and extreme robustness of equipment are vital for successful military operations.

South African ZT-6 Mokopa Anti-Tank Guided Missile

French APILAS Anti-Tank Rocket Launcher

American and Afghan forces have arrived at the site of the massive US bomb blast that targeted a complex of tunnels and caves in Achin, Nangarhar, the stronghold of the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), on 13 April 2017. Journalists and other independent observers have not yet been allowed to enter the area, so information about the immediate impact of the 11-ton bomb, dropped in the early evening, so far still only comes from official sources. AAN’s Martine van Bijlert, Borhan Osman and Kate Clark have looked at why the US chose to drop such a colossal bomb, wondering whether it was proportionate to the threat posed by ISKP, and what its impact on ISKP and Afghanistan may be.

In the early evening (19.32) of 13 April, the US Air Force dropped what is known as a Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb, or MOAB (nick-named the ‘Mother of All Bombs’), on a complex of tunnels held by the local affiliate of Daesh, known as the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP or, for the US military, ISIS-K). The tunnel complex is at the entrance to the Mamand Valley in the Asadkhel area of Achin district in the mountainous south of Nangarhar, which borders the Pakistani tribal areas. At 11 tons, the bomb was the most powerful, non-nuclear bomb ever to have been launched in combat. (Video of the bomb’s impact, initially posted here by the US military, can still be accessed here).

Mark Galasco, previously with the US military (he later worked on civilian casualties for the United Nations in Afghanistan) said the US military had considered using the MOAB in Iraq in 2003, but decided against it because of the anticipated civilian harm. General John Nicholson, the commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, said that in this case they had been monitoring the site for days and were confident there were no civilians in the area of the blast. “As ISIS-K’s losses have mounted,” Nicholson said, “they are using IEDs, bunkers and tunnels to thicken their defense… This is the right munition to reduce these obstacles and maintain the momentum of our offensive against ISIS-K.” The Afghan government, in turn, said the attack was carried out in coordination with them and they supported it.

The number of bodies so far retrieved from the site, all judged to be ISKP, are reported to be in the dozens (local officials reported at least 90 dead), but the numbers are likely to rise. Afghan and US forces have yet to get into the ‘hole’ caused by the blast. Depending on how many fighters were killed and how senior they were, the military may be hoping this could be a ‘knock-out’ blow for ISKP.

How significant was the ISKP stronghold in Nangarhar?

Nangarhar is the only province in Afghanistan where ISKP still has a significant territorial presence. The movement captured eight districts in the south of the province in July 2015, which were later reduced to four. (Read about the reasons why this area was vulnerable to ISKP takeover – provincial government’s weakness and corruption, American bungling, Taleban fragmentation, the presence of multiple Afghan and foreign militant groups and a history of Salafism – here.)

The core of the ISKP group in Nangarhar is made up of a group of Orakzais and other tribal fighters from the Tehrik Taleban Pakistan (TTP), veterans of Pakistan’s tribal area insurgency who were pushed across the border by the Pakistani military in the Zarb-e Azb offensive, launched in June 2015. Originally ‘guests’ of the local Taleban, the Orakzais turned on their hosts in July 2015, and drove the Taleban out. As David Mansfield reported, the Taleban did regroup, with reinforcements from Bati Kot, Kot and Shinwar districts, and Mamand supporters from the local population still living in the Mamand valley. They pushed Daesh out and up the valley, Mansfield says, but there was a brutal counter attack:

The houses of what were seen as local Taliban supporters were burned to the ground, families forced to flee and those local elders viewed as collaborators were captured and executed. The result was an exodus of families relocating to the safety of their relatives’ houses in Taliban- or government-controlled areas to escape Daesh’s rule. In their stead, Orakzai and Bajauri families moved into their homes – the most prestigious going to senior Orakzai commanders.

ISKP ruled the area with particular brutality, beheading members of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), closing clinics and schools, and, in what were blows to families’ economic survival, banning opium and marijuana cultivation.

Ongoing operations and an ongoing war

To a large part of the European and American public, the dropping of the MOAB in Afghanistan must have come as a surprise, as if it were a massive one-off attack. The Afghan war in general, had dropped off the radar in America, where it was barely mentioned during the 2016 presidential campaign. Even if the Afghan war is remembered, people tend to consider it as a conflict that is only 16 years old, starting with the US intervention in 2001. (AAN has had to remind interviewers on the day after the bombing that the Afghan war has now lasted for nearer to four decades). Moreover, President Obama did announce on 27 May 2014 that by the end of that year the combat mission in Afghanistan would be over. And indeed on 1 January 2015, a new NATO non-combat mission, Resolute Support, with an advise, assist and train mandate was launched. Yet, the US military, with its separate counter-terrorism ‘Freedom Sentinel’ mission always had the authority to conduct combat operations. In reality, these combat operations never stopped. The US continued to use air strikes, place Special Operations Forces ‘advisors’ on the ground and occasionally use artillery against ISKP, al Qaeda and since June 2016 also Taleban targets. (1)

In Nangarhar, the US launched air strikes against ISKP (and the Taleban) throughout 2016 and during the first few months of 2017. The strikes were in support of Afghan and US Special Forces ground operations against ISKP that took place several times during that period. The emerging pattern of these efforts, though, was that of successful offensives, with the seizure of significant territory from ISKP, followed by the inability of conventional Afghan forces to hold the ground that the Special Forces had taken. As a result, ISKP would push back and return. In several cases, ISKP brutally killed local Afghan forces after the operations had ended.

The last operation, codenamed Hamza, was launched in early April 2017 and seemed more intense than previous ones. It led to significant ISKP casualties, as reported by official Afghan and US military sources, and confirmed by independent and ISKP sources. ISKP activists on social media reported the dispatch of several batches of suicide bombers to engage in face-to-face battles with Afghan and US forces or to attack their Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). Operation Hamza led to a significant loss of territory for ISKP in Kot district and for the first time, Afghan and US forces were carrying out operations inside the Mamand Valley, itself, the strategic stronghold of ISKP. The group was so firmly entrenched in the mountainous valley that neither the Afghan/US forces, or previously, the Taleban had ever been able to dislodge them from there, even after clearing most other areas, according to local elders from the valley. They said that since the valley appeared unbreachable, most of the ISKP’s political and military leadership had based themselves there. Afghan commandos and US Special Forces had been poised to take the Mamand Valley as the next step during its campaign. There is no precise information about how much of the original population had fled the Mamand valley. Elders thought that more than half of the people had left, after ISKP brutality and the burning of people’s houses had forced many to flee.

ISKP has long used the network of caves in the Mamand Valley to hold prisoners. Ever since the group maintained strong control over the area, it brought captives from any of the four districts where it controlled territory to the caves, so that they did not need to be moved as battle frontlines shifted. Although it is not clear as yet if there were any captives held in the caves at the time of the bombing, it was one of the first concerns expressed by locals in the wake of the strike. Prisoners included members of the communities under ISKP rule who did not submit to its orders. Many of these prisoners were also considered spies by the group, for having links to the Taleban or the Afghan government.

The MOAB was dropped in the Asadkhel area, at the entrance into the valley. The question now is whether it was militarily necessary to destroy the cave complex in Asadkhel in order to capture Mamand, and whether it was necessary to use this bomb to do it, with all the drama and headlines it brought with it.

Both the Afghan Ministry of Defence General Nicholson have suggested that it had been necessary. Nicholson said the MOAB was necessary to “minimize the risk to Afghan and U.S. Forces conducting clearing operations in the area while maximizing the destruction of ISIS-K fighters and facilities.” The US military point of view is that, in (what it says was) the absence of civilians, and with the knowledge that hard fighting would have led to casualties among their own and Afghan forces, overwhelming force was a legitimate means of shortening the fight and protecting their troops.

Were there really no civilian casualties?

With a bomb of such force and magnitude, it is difficult to conceive that only the intended target will be affected and that civilian suffering can be prevented. Afghan authorities, however, have claimed that there were indeed no civilian casualties (this included statements by defence ministry spokesman Dawlat Waziri, the army spokesman in Nangarhar, and the Achin district governor).

Their claims have been difficult to verify, due to a serious – and long-standing – shortage of information coming from areas under the control of ISKP generally, and Mamand Valley, its tightly-kept stronghold, in particular. Journalists have been unable to travel to the area. Normally, local elders would provide information, but most have fled the area. The number of detailed reports about developments and life within ISKP-controlled areas has been close to zero. In the light of this blackout of reporting, Afghan and US officials have had a comfortable monopoly on the flow of information about the outcome of the strike in Achin. It may be true that there were no civilian casualties – sustained aerial surveillance from drones will have given the US a clear idea of who was living in the area of the blast. But we may also find casualties coming to light in the coming days and weeks.

UNAMA had already drawn attention to the rising number of casualties from air strikes (both US and Afghan) in the war generally and the “considerable increases in civilian casualties caused solely by international military [ie US] forces in Nangarhar province” in particular. UNAMA’s 2016 annual report on the Protection of Civilians, noted that 89 civilians had been killed or injured in 13 aerial operations in 2016 compared to 18 during 10 aerial operations in 2015.

Some of the commentary on the MOAB strike on Twitter and in the press has focused on whether locals support such strikes, or not. Given the difficulty of getting views from the area, assertions either way seem premature. It may also be that a more complex, nuanced view of the bomb may be nearer the mark (see also these first reactions).

The complexities involved in discussing local views is illustrated by the one piece of research on the impact of drones in Afghanistan, from the UK’s Durham University. The study gathered opinions from people in two (un-named) districts of Nangarhar, described as pro-government and Pashtun, found people to be generally supportive. They said the strikes accurately targeted militants who had been making their lives a misery. However, the research also found that locals’ were living lives horribly constrained by both the drones and the militants, leaving them unable to live normal lives. They were worried about attack if they went out into the mountains to gather fodder or herd livestock, or when they gathered for weddings and funerals or hosted guests, with the threats coming from both sides. It was a bleak picture of a life where the successful killing of militants did not feel like victory and did not lead to an easing of the difficult living conditions (Read about UNAMA statistics and the drone study here.)

Was the scale of the attack proportionate to the ISKP threat?

When the MOAB was developed in 2003, the Pentagon ordered a legal review to ensure the impact of the bomb could not be deemed indiscriminate, and therefore illegal under the Law of Armed Conflict. It found that, “Although the moab weapon leaves a large footprint, it is discriminate and requires a deliberate launching toward the target.” One aspect of the bomb, the report found, was that, “It is expected that the weapon will have a substantial psychological effect on those who witness its use.” And indeed, local reporting suggested that the explosion could be felt across several districts.

Given ISKP’s limited role in Afghanistan, there are questions as to whether the size and the threat the group posed warranted such a dramatic strike. (One commentator described the attack as: “America’s biggest non-nuclear bomb… used on one of the smallest militias it faces anywhere in the world.”)

When the US decided to drop the MOAB, ISKP was under pressure. Its territory was shrinking and although they still had a well-entrenched stronghold in the Mamand Valley, there was no great threat of expansion or momentum.  Elsewhere in the country, the movement had largely been suppressed by the Taleban. ISKP groups that had sprung up in different parts of Afghanistan had all been tiny and most of them were not linked to ‘IS central’ in Syria and Iraq, at all – they had merely adopted the brand and flag of IS. The ISKP group based in Nangarhar did have stronger, institutional links, as it was recognized by the IS ‘headquarters’ and its operations were carried on central IS media platforms. ISKP sources, moreover, told AAN in March 2017 that Raqqa had dispatched a couple of commanders from the centre to oversee operations in Khorasan after the death of the group’s leader Saeed Khan in July 2016. ISKP is also reputed to have better funding than the Taleban – a possible incentive for dissatisfied Taleban commanders to switch. But its reach was still limited.

All in all, in terms of IS internationally and the overall war in Afghanistan, ISKP is marginal. Its territorial hold is tiny and has been shrinking (2). It has failed to move beyond its initial pattern of recruitment that mainly involved foreign militants and ‘dissident’ Taleban, often men thrown out of the movement for being Salafist or criminal. The one place where its significance has grown is Kabul, where it managed to launch two sectarian attacks which led to mass casualties: the Ashura commemorations of 2016 and a gathering of largely Hazara (so mainly Shia) protesters about the routing of the TUTAP electricity line. (AAN reported on the presence of ISKP cells in the capital here.) The group’s ability to carry out such mass murders in the capital may not be hindered by setbacks – or defeat – in Nangarhar. ISKP also has a sizeable following of ‘desk-bound’ supporters, who support it virtually from their computers, and from a range of Salafist networks (usually centred around madrasas in Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan) of previously non-violent, non-jihadi, ulama.

One reason for wanting to ‘stamp out’ the ISKP stronghold in Nangarhar, also mentioned by General Nicholson during his press conference (see video here) was the fear of the consequences of further defeats to IS in Iraq and Syria, with the possibility of Arab and other supporters from there re-locating to Afghanistan. There are already reports of more foreign fighters, including Arabs, coming to join ISKP and of there being some movement to and from the Middle East.

The bomb may well have killed a large number of ISKP fighters and commanders, diminishing its leadership and affecting its operational capabilities. But there may also be unintended consequences. The use of such a huge bomb made a strike against a minor organisation world news, which in turn could help ISKP recruit. ISKP radio, Khilafat Ghag, already said, in its evening transmission on 14 April 2017 that the battle in ‘Khorasan’ (the old Islamic name for the region now containing Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan and Iran) against the US had entered a conclusive point, where Muslims have no justification not to support its campaign. “These orientalists know our religion well,” the broadcast said. “They know about the prophetic narrations that an army that will emerge from Khorasan and knock on the doors of Jerusalem.” It was the strict resistance of ISKP against the US-Afghan offensive, it said, that had forced the US to drop its biggest bomb: “It is obvious that the enemy feels the need for such huge strikes when they face, proportionally, a huge level of resistance. There is no other reason for this strike than that the US and its allies have lost their morale against the lions of the Islamic State in Khorasan.” Another statement from the radio said “By God, hundreds of youth are preparing to join the Islamic State ranks, thanks to the dropping of this bomb.”

The main actual threat ISKP represents is against the Taleban. ISKP has the image of being ‘younger and more radical’, more media savvy and reputedly better funded than the old guard. The Taleban fear a threat akin to what the mujahedin faced in 1994, when it was the Taleban that was the young, rising power. Although that fear may be overplayed, the Taleban has taken the threat seriously, moving in to try to physically eliminate ISKP (as it did in Zabul) or to disarm dissident and wavering commanders.

But for Afghanistan as a whole, and in the context of the entire insurgency, the threat posed by ISKP is marginal. The Taleban are, by far, the largest and best organised element in the insurgency. Even among foreign groups, al Qaeda may still be stronger and have better international and Afghan linkages than Daesh. Although General Nicholson stressed that the attack had been determined by events and circumstances on the ground, one could therefore ask whether the strike was about Afghanistan in the first place.

Wider political calculations?

Eliminating ISKP is, along with al Qaeda, is at the top of US strategic aims in Afghanistan (see for example Nicholson’s testimony to Congress in January). Defeating IS featured heavily, as one of the few foreign policy objectives, during President Trump’s 2016 election campaign – he, among other things, promised to “bomb the shit out of them.” Islamic State is a name which carries weight in America.

Pentagon officials have said that planning to use the MOAB pre-dated the Trump presidency and that the bomb had been in Afghanistan for months. Even so, the drama of launching the MOAB seems to have been part of the political calculation of wanting to be seen to strike IS and to strike them hard.

The bombing of ISKP targets in Afghanistan by the US is not new, but the size of the bomb –and the consistent use of the “America’s biggest non-nuclear bomb” moniker – made the strike into a huge news story, both in the US and worldwide. The bomb thus appears to be part and parcel of a desire by president Trump to ‘take the gloves off’ his military. He had already removed restrictions aimed at protecting civilians when the US conducts air strikes in Somalia and Yemen. In Afghanistan, the US military had learned, to its cost, that civilian casualties harm the military effort and had worked hard over the years to increase safeguards and precautions, realising that protecting civilians was of strategic value.

Although Nicholson stressed that the possibility for collateral damage had been carefully assessed, the colossal nature of the weapon that was used feels like a step-change in the war. Moreover, the framing of this bomb as the largest non-nuclear weapon ever used on the battlefield betrays a fascination with lethal force that is worrying. A former intelligence officer described the MOAB as “a bravado weapon” which meant that “You basically have a mushroom cloud in Afghanistan.”

Indeed, some Afghans have expressed concerns that their country is being used as an arena to try out the impact of rarely used weapons, project an image of American strength and show other countries what happens if you cross Washington. “This is not the war on terror“ tweeted former Afghan president Hamid Karzai, “but the inhuman and most brutal misuse of our country as [a] testing ground for new and dangerous weapons.”

As Afghan and US soldiers pick through the rubble, the success of the operation in terms of its damage to ISKP will become clearer: how many ISKP fighters and commanders were killed, what was their seniority and were any of the leadership killed. More operations are anyway expected against the group elsewhere in Nangarhar. Local sources in Achin reported that Afghan forces (most likely jointly with US forces) were already carrying an operation in Pekha area, another tightly-held ISKP centre adjacent to the Mamand Valley. ISKP in its radio transmission on 14 April 2017 dedicated fully to MOAB, vowed to take revenge for dropping the bomb “on the oppressed people of Achin.”

The final verdict on the bomb for many Afghans may rest on how reckless the use of the bomb turns out to have been, after it becomes clear whether civilians were or were not harmed. Its impact on ISKP may take more time to assess. As for its impact on the Afghan war, generally, it is difficult to imagine that even a bomb of this size and nature will have an effect that is anything more than marginal.

 

(1) In June 2016, Obama increased the authority of the US commander in Afghanistan to order offensive strikes, with potential targets including not just al Qaeda, but also the Taleban, and for reasons not just of ‘counterterrorism’. The US commander could additionally also strike for “strategic effects,” for example, if he believed US firepower could prevent a population centre falling to the Taleban.

(2) Sources in the Nangarhar-based ISKP said the emir had recently officially extended the group’s presence to neighboring Kunar province, after two years of muted presence there. They claimed the group had carried out attacks against Afghan forces there in February 2017. ISKP social media activists also carried statements claiming attacks in two districts of Jawzjan, last week. Overall, though, its territorial control has still been decreasing rather than expanding.

Taiwanese Kestrel Anti-Tank Rocket Launcher

Shamshatu refugee camp, headquarters of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami in Pakistan since the 1980s, is increasingly empty. Many residents, including a number of important Hezb leaders, have left for Afghanistan, encouraged to return by the peace agreement signed by Hekmatyar and President Ashraf Ghani in September 2016. The deal paved the way for the return of those living in the camp and included promises of land and government posts. However, many residents fear the deal will not be fully implemented and are not yet ready to leave permanently. AAN’s Fazal Muzhary has been to the camp and describes the history, current mood and recent developments in this, Hekmatyar’s stronghold (with input from Thomas Ruttig and Kate Clark).

A look into Nasrat Mena (better known as Shamshatu)

After almost three and a half decades of existence, one of the best known and most significant Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan is slowly emptying. Following the peace agreement with the government – and the general pressure Afghan refugees are under from Pakistan to leave (on repatriation see AAN analysis here) – many are deciding to ‘go home’.

Although the camp is officially known as Nasrat Mena – which translates as the Victory Quarter, an allusion to the hope that Afghans would overcome the Soviet occupation – the camp is better known as Shamshatu. This is the name of the barren, desert-like area inhabited by tortoises in which it was set up in 1983. (Shamshatu means ‘tortoise’ in Pashto.) It was founded to host Afghan refugees who poured out of their country after the coup d’etat by leftists in 1978 and subsequent Soviet military invasion over Christmas, 1979. What was supposed to be a temporary refugee camp, where people lived in tents, developed into a full-blown town of mud buildings, a large sprawl to the southeast of the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s provincial capital, Peshawar. There was a bazaar, schools, mosques, small restaurants, two hospitals (one for men and one for women) and two universities, one military and another with a medical, engineering and education faculties.

Like many of the other Afghan refugee camps that were established in the 1980s, control over Shamshatu camp was handed to an Afghan mujahedin faction then fighting the Soviet occupation, in this case, Hezb-e Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (or HIG) (1). Islamabad had become the funnel for large amounts of cash, weapons and other supplies from western and Arab countries and China to the mujahedin. Donors allowed Islamabad to distribute the aid as it saw fit. It chose to recognise only seven factions, all Sunni and all Islamist or with a ‘Muslim’ orientation, who became known as ‘the Seven’ or ‘the Peshawar Seven’, Haftgana in Dari. If refugees wanted humanitarian supplies, they had to join one of these factions and, in some camps, including Shamshatu, they had to ‘join’ the faction controlling the camp. Hezb-e Islami was Pakistan’s most favoured faction (until the rise of the Taleban in the mid-1990s) and it received the bulk of foreign arms and funding. Jamestown’s Terrorism Monitor quoted a financial officer for the camp’s administration in 2007 as saying that “Whoever lives or has lived in the camp is a supporter of Engineer Hekmatyar and a member of Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan, because this camp belongs to Hezb-e Islami.” This was not entirely the case; the population was always more mixed. However, it was Hezb’s stronghold and most people who lived there were ‘members’.

Almost a city

If you travel along the road leading from Peshawar to Shamshatu, you meet two check-posts at the immediate entrance to the camp. The first, outer check-post is manned by Pakistani police and the second by security guards of the camp, deployed by Hezb-e Islami.

Once inside, the road from Peshawar divides the camp into two parts. To the left is Area A (Alef Saha, in Pashto) and, to the right, Area B (Ba Saha). Area A is dominated by a large congregational mosque. It was the first building constructed in Shamshatu, according to Wahid Muzhda, a Kabul-based political analyst and former member of Hezb-e Islami (and then of the Taleban). For Eid, when the camp was still fully populated, about 50,000 men and boys would come here to perform the holiday prayers. While laying its foundation stone in 1982, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar named the mosque Imam Muhammad Bin Hassan al-Shaibani. Dominant in Area B is the large Qais Bin Saad School, built on about 40 to 50 jeribs (8 to 10 hectares) of land in 1984. Part of this school is still used by Hezb as a party office. According to Muzhda, there was also an underground bunker available in case of explosions and other attacks.

At the height of its population, there were about 800 shops in Shamshatu which were rented to refugees by the municipality of the camp which is also controlled by the party. Almost all day-to-day necessities are available in these shops, including medicine, bread, fruit, vegetables, cooking oil and all kinds of other foodstuffs and household items. Furthermore, people living in the camp have access to several types of services. As in any Afghan town, there are workshops belonging to carpenters, car mechanics and electricians, and technicians and labourers for hire. This saves people journeys to Peshawar for shopping or employment, and also means the party has benefited from the rent and the economic activity.

There was a particular place for shopping in the camp where only women with their mahram or male family member could go. The security guards were always present there and they would not allow a girl or woman to enter without a mahram. The market only sold ‘women’s items’ – female clothes, cosmetics and other daily necessities. The shops in this area would close before the evening call to prayer and beyond that time, no one could be seen in the area. The residents of Shamshatu were not allowed to sell or buy naswar (snuff), cigarettes, or music tapes and videos and shaving beards was outlawed. Hezb members told AAN that the shopping area for women, and the ban on naswar and shaving no longer exist, but playing loud music and selling video CDs of western and Indian movies are still banned.

Apart from the large Friday mosque, 38 small mosques also sprang up over the decades. Friday and Eid prayers were only ever performed in the major congregational mosque, though; imams at the other mosques were banned from performing these prayers. There were also three high schools such as (Qais Bin Saad High School and Abu Ayub Ansari for boys and Al-Banat al-Mu’minat for girls) and a few primary schools. A ‘jihadi university’, which focused on training fighters, whom the Hezb people referred to as ‘army officers’, was established in the camp around 1985. Engineer Abdul Salam, Hekmatyar’s military assistant, told AAN that during the resistance against the Soviet occupation, six classes, each of 60 to 70 students (a total of around 300 to 400 people) graduated as ‘officers’ from the academy. The university was closed in the 1990s; Hezb officials did not recall the exact year. Another, civilian university, was also established; it was later moved to Peshawar city and then, in 2008, to Khost province, where it was renamed Sheikh Zayed University after the founder of the United Arab Emirates which funded the relocation.

How Hezb came to dominate Shamshatu

Hekmatyar, fled Afghanistan to Pakistan in 1975, after an unsuccessful attempt to start an Islamist uprising in July that year. According to Muzhda, Hekmatyar first did his political work from a small building in the Faqirabad district of Peshawar. After the coup and Soviet invasion and the huge influx of Afghan refugees into Peshawar, and looming security threats – including a bomb blast in front of the Hezb office, thought to be the work of KhAD (Afghan state intelligence) – the Pakistani government was convinced to move the bases of Afghan jihadi groups out of the city.

In 1982, a six-member team was tasked with finding a location for a camp for Hezb-affiliated refuges and negotiating the lease of the land from the local government. One of the six was Engineer Salam, who worked at different positions in the party and is currently head of all Hezb-e Islami offices in Kabul. He told AAN that they leased 500 jeribs (100 hectares) of land from the local government and another 500 jeribs from local people, both for 99 years. Hezb still pays 1,300 Pakistani rupees (today roughly 11 USD) per jerib, per year. Once it was decided to set up the camp, a plan was drawn up and it was divided into two parts, parts A and B, either side of the road from Peshawar.

According to a military commission member of Hezb, Akhtar Muhammad Sharafat, 4,000 plots were distributed to party supporters from different provinces. Most of the important party commanders lived in the camp, at least temporarily when sheltering from operations in Afghanistan and coming for supplies. Hekmatyar’s office was put into Area B of the camp, and although he also had a home in Peshawar city, he preferred to be in Shamshatu and would stay there most of the time (2).

In order to manage the daily affairs in the camp, a number of departments were set up, including on security, culture, judicial matters, education, finance, planning and management, health and social services, which focused on helping martyrs’ relatives. A mayor was selected every three years by the members of the financial committee (there was no election). The members of the power and water (the camp had 11 wells, each about 400 feet deep) collected taxes and payments for bills. There were more than 100 security personnel, who would patrol the camp or man security posts that were spread over the camp, specifically near hospitals, wells, in the bazaar and in other important areas.

Engineer Salam told AAN that, although Shamshatu was dominated by Hezb members, supporters of other mujahedin factions, such as Jamiat and Harakat, were also living there, making use of the facilities such as the schools, hospitals, the security provided and the large bazaar (other camps did not have all the facilities that were available in Shamshatu). They were not given land by the party and personally purchased the land from Pakistanis. In addition to Afghans, some foreign fighters also lived in the camp at the time of the resistance against the Soviet invasion, including Arabs and Central Asians. This is not the case anymore, according to Salam.

The darker history: prisons and torture

During the anti-Soviet ‘jihad’, Shamshatu also had its own prison where, allegedly, torture was carried out; this is detailed in a 2005 report by the Afghanistan Justice Project (AJP.

Mujahidin factions based in Pakistan maintained prisons where they held, tortured and in some cases executed Afghan refugees suspected of opposition to the policies or practices of the Pakistan-based groups. Hizb-i Islami (Hikmatyar) and Hizb-i Islami (Khalis) both maintained prisons near Peshawar. Human Rights Watch has described some of these prisons. One of the best known was Shamshatoo, which was used by Hikmatyar to detain men and women. According to Human Rights Watch, “Torture [was] reported to be routine, including severe beatings and the use of electric shock.” The intelligence agencies of these factions also carried out abductions of Afghan refugees. Human Rights Watch also reported that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) also interrogated, and sometimes tortured Afghan refugees considered to be a “security threat,” in some cases because they did not support one of the Peshawar-based mujahidin parties recognized by Pakistan. In some cases these detainees would be handed over from the ISI to Hikmatyar.

Asia Watch, which interviewed refugees in Pakistan in mid-1990 and gathered the names of people who had been allegedly detained in the detention facility, described the prison: “[The detention facility] is reportedly a two-story prison, part of which is underground. The prison reportedly included a section for women prisoners.”

In addition, Hezb is also accused of carrying out assassination of people they deemed enemies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with operations based out of Shamshatu. Hezb-e Islami was blamed for the killings of members of other mujahedin factions, monarchists, women’s activists and intellectuals. One of the most notorious was that of Sayed Bahauddin Majruh in February 1988. Majruh was the publisher of the highly respected Afghan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin, which, a few months before his murder, had published the results of a survey that found that 70 per cent of Afghan refugees supported the former king, Zahir Shah, over any of the mujahedin leaders. Hekmatyar got very few votes. Asia Watch reported that Majruh had received death threats from Hezb-e Islami before his murder.

First deputy CEO, Muhammad Khan, who was Hezb’s intelligence or deputy intelligence chief and living in Shamshatu at the time of these alleged war crimes, denied them in an interview with AAN in June 2014. He said he had only been concerned with foiling plots by Afghan state intelligence agency, KhAD, and Shamshatu had had no detention centre, only security offices which dealt with the “internal affairs of the war” and one [weapons] depot.

The camp’s population; then and now

Shamshatu has seen rises and falls in its population over the last thirty years. Member of military commission of Hezb, Akhtar Muhammad Sharafat told AAN how the camp’s population quickly increased from the initial 1,000 families, mainly Hezb supporters, who came in the early 1980s, to, at its maximum, about 8,000 families (a more politically mixed population). According to Muzhda, who closely followed the changes in Shamshatu over the years, a number of Shamshatu residents started to support the Taleban around 1995 because of news of the Taleban surge in Afghanistan. Also, Pakistan started to strongly support the Taleban. When the Taleban regime fell in 2001, there were again population movements. At first, the number of non-Hezbi residents increased after the Taleban lost power as some families affiliated with the Taleban fled Afghanistan and settled in Shamshatu. However, there was also soon a movement in the opposite movement. Various Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan emptied after the fall of the Taleban regime when many Afghans decided to return to Afghanistan. Since 2001, more than 4.5 million Afghans living in Pakistan as refugees have returned, but most of them were non-Hezbis. Shamshatu was a partial exception; decisions by Hekmatyar drove also the decisions of many Shamshatu inhabitants about whether to stay or go.

Hekmatyar was at first ambivalent about the ‘developments’ of late 2001 and then became hostile to the new government. Although his son-in-law, Humayun Jarir, was in the Bonn conference in late 2001 but under the umbrella of another delegation (the Cyprus Group), it was not clear whether he had a Hezb mandate for this, the faction did not become part of the Afghan government and suffered some revenge harassment from its long-term rivals, Jamiat-e Islami which had captured Kabul; in the end, Hekmatyar opted to launch a ‘jihad’ against the Kabul administration and its foreign backers. In February 2002, he was deported from Iran where he had found asylum after he was forced out of Kabul by the Taleban in 1996. He claimed to have gone into hiding in the Shegal valley of eastern Kunar. (3) Although he was away from Shamshatu, he was able to continue to control the camp with the help of his military assistant, Engineer Salam.

Hezb members told AAN that the camp did not see a considerable decrease of inhabitants after the fall of Taleban regime in 2001, but this is not quite accurate. At the time of the fall of the Taleban UNHCR estimated the camp’s population at 53,000 people (roughly 7000 families). It later reported that, by November 2002, more than 15,000 residents of Shamshatu, mainly non-Pashtuns, had handed in their ration cards, destroyed their houses and boarded trucks back to Afghanistan. The camp’s population was now down to just over 37,600, according to an UNHCR update. Services had been reduced due to the smaller population and “the number of non-governmental organisations active in the camp has shrunk from 37 to nine.” Nevertheless, Sharafat stated that, based on electricity and water bills, there were still around 8000 families (roughly 53,000 people) living in this camp until mid-2016. Although he admitted that the population saw a decrease, he said it was not as much as in other – non-Hezbi – camps (which was true).

Although, since 2001 some pro-Hezb-e Islami people returned to Kabul, or decided to have houses both in Kabul and Shamshatu, most of the Hezb supporters felt they were not in a position to completely return. Two reasons can be considered: one is the fact that they had leased the land for 99 years and second that the Pakistani government, at the time, did not put much pressure on Afghan refugees, generally, to leave.

Nasrat Mena after the peace deal

Two developments came in 2016 to ‘encourage’ residents of Shamshatu to leave. Firstly, like all other Afghan refugees, pressure by the Pakistani authorities on Afghans to leave intensified. Moves included the border closure of Torkham in June 2016, the building of a gate for the first time on the Pakistani side of the border and a number of new rules including the necessity for Afghans to carry a passport and valid visa to enter Pakistan. Afghans living in Shamsahtu said they began to fear the border closure might be permanent and their way home would be blocked. Moreover, the new border measures made it difficult for Afghans living in Shamshatu to commute between Kabul and Peshawar using their refugee cards, as had used to be the case. Families began to leave Shamshatu camp from June 2016.

Secondly, the signing of the peace agreement between the Afghan government and Hezb-e Islami on 29 September 2016 additionally galvanised the decision of many Afghans in Shamshatu to return to Afghanistan (on repatriation see AAN dispatches here). After the peace agreement was signed, Hezb members in the camp changed how they spoke about Afghanistan. Before the peace deal, one resident told AAN, members and supporters would say that Afghanistan was occupied by the United States and the Afghan soldiers were their puppets. They have now reportedly dropped this rhetoric and say that those fighting the government are causing destruction.

Based on the agreement, the Afghan government is committed to “take all measures to resolve the problems of Afghan refugees living in Nusrat Mina Camp [Shamshatu] and other refugees based Pakistan and Iran.” These returnees would receive privileges including provision of land for their shelter with other necessary services in Kabul and other provinces, once the agreement is fully implemented. This can be considered as one of the incentives for Hezb supporters to return to Afghanistan. According to Engineer Salam, around a quarter of the inhabitants of Shamshatu have now returned to Afghanistan, but the number might actually be higher. As was the case earlier, some poor people destroyed their houses in the camp when leaving, taking the timber with them to use to build new homes (see photos). Currently there is only one high school for boys and one for girls left, and the number of security personnel reduced to about 60 from more 100 in 1980s.

Hezb people who spoke to AAN said that, there was no plan to fully destroy or abandon the camp. They said officials were still waiting for the full implementation of the peace agreement. They fear that if the agreement is not fully implemented or if there are disagreements between the government and Hekmatyar, there might be fresh fighting and they would then be unable to return to Pakistan, and in particular, to Shamshatu. Even Abdul Salam, Hekmatyar’s military assistant, is concerned as his family still lives in Shamshatu. He said once the agreement was implemented the Hezb supporters were going to return to Afghanistan in a ‘dignified’ way. However, it seems that low level Hezb supporters do not care whether the deal is implemented or not – they just want to go home. AAN was told, the accelerated rate of return from Shamshatu, mainly among low-level supporters lasted till the end of December 2016 when UNHCR stopped the repatriation process, for all Afghan refugees, due to cold weather in Afghanistan. That programme started again, on 3 April 2017.

Non-Hezbis in Shamshatu believe Hezb supporters will definitely return to Afghanistan, in order to get dividends from the peace deal, such as plots of land and jobs in the government. They also said that the return of Salam and other important Hezb members to Kabul in December 2016, though their families are still in Shamshatu, had further strengthened their belief that Hezb-affiliated people were serious about returning. It seems that once the agreement is fully implemented, it is likely that most residents of Shamshatu, including families of key Hezb members will return, particularly given the heightened pressure from Pakistan, which has extended the stay for Afghans only till end of 2017.

Engineer Salam told AAN that the assets and weapons that the party owned and used for protection would be shifted to Afghanistan, once the peace deal is fully implemented. Hezb is also planning to move schools, madrasas and other institutions to Afghanistan. He said that the leadership will decide about the fate of Shamshatu camp, but that for now they try to keep the camp as far as it is possible, until the peace agreement is fully implemented and the refugees have returned.

New Hezb mobilisation and preparations for Hekmatyar’s return

One of the changes seen in Shamshatu after the peace deal was signed, is that Hezb supporters started distributing new membership cards, both to the old members who lost their cards or were inactive for long time, and to new recruits that want to become members. These cards were also given to the new generation, who were born in Shamshatu and are ‘intellectually’ affiliated with Hezb, but had not become members. Afghan refugees in Shamshatu told AAN that many people had got new cards as they hoped to receive the benefits promised in the peace deal once they are in Afghanistan. The new recruits hope for government posts in Afghanistan, as they believe that Hezb will be given a quota in the government based on the peace deal “that entails Hezb’s participation in government in accordance to the law.” A rumour driving the distribution of the cards is that Turkey and Saudi Arabia may give money to party members to enable them to build houses upon their return in Afghanistan. The party leadership seems also to be trying to push membership to demonstrate its large following when party leader Hekmatyar finally returns to Kabul.

Sources in Shamshatu told AAN that another important change is the training of 250 to 400 armed Hezb members who would serve as a special guard for Hekmatyar after his return to Kabul. One source there told AAN that Hezb supporters in the camp stopped movement of ordinary people in the area where the training was carried out. According to this Afghan media report, these guards will receive a salary of between 200 and 250 USD from the government budget. According to the same source the training was supposed to be completed in January 2017, but in March, 2017, residents in Shamshatu confirmed that it was still ongoing. Although Hezb chief negotiator Muhammad Karim Amin did not confirm the training of the guards in Shamshatu, he did say that preparations for Hekmatyar’s security were underway, both in and outside of Afghanistan.

Last minute delays to the deal

Aside from general worries about the peace deal not going through, there have been particular problems in the last few weeks. Although the UN removed Hekmatyar’s name from its sanctions list, two commanders, Engineer Abdul Sabur and Abdullah Nawbahar, are on a US terrorism blacklist. The US State Department has offered two and three million dollars, respectively, of reward money for information leading to the men’s arrests. According to the peace deal the Afghan government is supposed to ‘request’ the UN Security Council and other relevant countries to lift sanctions against Hezb-e Islami leadership and its members. However, the request of Afghan government in December 2016 to the UN only included Hekmatyar’s name but not the names of the upper mentioned Hezb commanders (see report here). Sabur and Nawbahar are not going to return to Afghanistan unless their names are removed from the US blacklist, but that is unlikely to scupper the deal.

A more serious problem is prisoners. Based on the peace agreement the Afghan government is committed to releasing Hezb prisoners who have been imprisoned for political and military activities and against whom “there are no haq-ul-abd ‘right of people, as opposed to right of God’ claims.” During March 2017, Hezb repeatedly accused the government of not honouring its commitments, (see for example here). Some of the dispute is about the nature of the detainees. Hezb-e Islami submitted a list of 488 prisoners to be released, but the government only announced that some of the prisoners were going to be released. Officials told AAN they would not include those who had been involved in terrorist attacks. A source in Hezb-e Islami also told Pajhwok that, as well as not releasing prisoners, 70 Hezb supporters who had come to Kabul to celebrate the peace deal had been detained.

Hezb officials have also been concerned that plots of land have not been distributed. Based on this Washington Post report, Hekmatyar wants a big number of his supporters to be given land, but the Afghan government has said that was not feasible.

On 2 April 2017, however, Shah Hussain Murtazawi, acting spokesman for the president, said in a press conference that some Hezb prisoners would be released the following week (no releases have been reported), that all other responsibilities of the government would be completed within 15 days and that it was now up to Hezb to announce when their leader would return.

Concerns and a shifting composition

Since many pro-Hezb people have left Shahshatu for Afghanistan, and many more are planning to do so, non-Hezbis, who include many Taleban and Taleban-sympathisers, still living in the camp are concerned that it will become difficult for them to continue living there. Services will decline, they believe and the Pakistani police may continue to pressure those Afghan refugees remaining in this camp. It will then not be easy for the non-Hezbis to live in peace, on either side of the border. In Pakistan, Afghans are no longer welcome, and on the Afghan side, they will not be covered by the privileges obtained by Hezb for its members through the peace deal. The composition of the camp’s inhabitants is likely to change, with active members of the Taleban and sympathisers gaining more influence – if they are allowed to stay.

Editing by Thomas Ruttig, Kate Clark and Martine van Bijlert

 

 

(1) Other camps include Jalozai Refugee Camp that was given to Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittehad-e islami (now Dawat-e islami) party and a camp in Cherat that was given to Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi’s Harakat-e Enqelab-e Islami. This camp was also close to Jalozai camp, as was the small Khurasan camp, related to Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-e Islami in Pabbi area. In the Shamshatu desert, in addition to Nasrat Mena, two other camps existed, one given to Mawlawi Yunos Khales’ Hezb-e Islami (despite its name, it is a separate party from Hekmatyar’s), which still exists, and the second given to Qazi Muhammad Amin Waqad, who was a co-founder of Hekmatyar’s Hezb but later parted ways with it; it had been destroyed.

(2) Until the fall of the communist regime under Najibullah in 1992, Hekmatyar lived most of the time in Shamshatu. When he came to Kabul, he was mainly based in Chahar Asiab to the south of the city. After the Taleban took control of Kabul from the mujahedin in 1996, Hekmatyar fled to Iran.

(3) This was according to Hekmatyar’s book “Khubuna” (Dreams).

 

Americas

• Orbital ATK has won a USAF contract to supply rocket motors for AIM-9P Sidewinder missiles. The agreement, which could reach a potential value of $67 million, covers the production and provision of motors for ordinance that will be sold to other governments under the US foreign military sales program. First developed in the 1970s, the AIM-9 has undergone significant upgrades to improve its capabilities and lethality over the years, with the present version featuring Orbital ATK’s SR116-HP-1 reduced-smoke rocket motor. Work will continue through until February 2022.

• UTC Aerospace Systems’ MS-177 sensor has been successfully tested by Northrop Grumman onboard an RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV. The sensor is a high-resolution imaging device designed to improve capabilities for the Global Hawk in addition to several other surveillance platforms operated by the USAF, with UTC adding that the sensor will provide warfighters with the most advanced reconnaissance tools to date. Demonstrations with the sensor began in early March and Northrop will continue through the first half of 2017. Prior to being integrated on such a high altitude platform, the MS-177 has been equipped on the E-8C JSTARS aircraft.

• The USAF’s F-16 fighting fleet is to receive service life extension work from Lockheed Martin. The decision boosts the service life for the jets from 8,000 Equivalent Flight Hours to 12,000 with the service looking to continue operating the jets through to 2048. As many as 300 F-16C/D Block 40-52 aircraft will be affected by the work, and will also benefit foreign military customers. It’s intended that the aircraft will supplement US and allied forces while they recapitalize with new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

• Lockheed Martin has secured legal permission to explore the potential use of exoskeleton technology for the military market. The firm secured licensing of bionic augmentation technology from B-Temia and will incorporate it to supplement its FORTIS industrial exoskeleton project. Designed to make labor easier by transferring pressure through the exoskeleton to the ground in a process that makes heavy tools “weightless,” the system requires no external power to operate, and can boost military capabilities by enabling soldiers to carry more equipment over longer distances. The product can be used in standing or kneeling positions, and uses a tool arm to reduce muscle fatigue and boost productivity.

Middle East & North Africa

• Despite issues with gaining certain technology transfers for the Altay, Turkey could begin serial production of the main battle tank as early as this May, according to Defense Minister Fikri Isik. Pakistan and some Gulf nations are believed to be lined up as potential customers for the vehicle. Talk of potential delays to the Altay surfaced when local contractor Tümosan was unable to continue working on providing a domestic diesel engine for the tank, after Austria’s AVL List GmbH, which it had as a technical support partner, ceased working with the Turkish firm amid concerns that the Turkish government were sliding on human rights issues. It now looks like Ankara may instead turn to Ukraine for help, with the Altay possibly adopting the Kharkiv Morozov Machine Building Design Bureau’s (KMDB) 1,500 hp 6TD-3 diesel engine.

Europe

• Italian manufacturer Leonardo has handed over its 500th operational Eurofighter Typhoon to the Italian Air Force. Marking the occasion was a ceremony at the firm’s Turin facility and saw attendance from various military and security industry representatives, including leaders from Leonardo, NETMA, and Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug. Speaking at the event, Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug CEO Volker Paltzo stated that the “500-strong Eurofighter Typhoon fleet represents one of the largest and most capable fighter fleets in the western hemisphere, and will be the backbone of European airpower for decades to come.” European armed forces have been operating the Typhoon since 2003, when the first completed jet was delivered to Britain’s Royal Air Force. The service received their 100th plane in September 2006 while Germany’s air force accepted the delivery of the 400th jet in 2013.

• Russia has displayed its Pantsyr-S1 and Tor-M2 air defense systems integrated on DT-30-series all-terrain tracked carriers (ATTCs) optimised for Arctic operations. The DT-30 vehicle is amphibious, has a load-carrying capability of around 30 tonnes, and wide tracks that provide a low ground pressure that allows it to cross terrain that is not passable by conventional tracked and wheeled platforms. It consists of two sections that are joined by an articulated joint to allow for a high degree of articulation while moving across rough terrain, including sand, ice, and snow. However, while normally the Pantsyr-S1 usually contains 12 missile launch tubes (six on each side) and two twin 30 mm 2A38M cannons, the arctic version drops the use of the 30mm guns.

Asia Pacific

• The first three months of the year have shown an increase in the number of times that the Japanese air force has had to scramble its fighter jets to ward off foreign aircraft. Figures released by Tokyo show that fighters were scrambled 1,168 times over the 12 months, up from 873 last year. A record 851 jets headed off approaching Chinese planes, or 280 more instances than in the corresponding period last year. The uptick in Chinese activity has contributed to rising tension in East Asia since the start of the year as North Korea pushes ahead with ballistic missile and nuclear bomb tests that have stoked fears in Japan, the United States and elsewhere.

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