Africa

January 22, 2017 (JUBA) - The Governor of South Sudan's Lol State Rizik Zachariah Hassan has issued several executive orders sacking two senior advisors and one minister in his administration.

Rizik Zachariah Hassan, Governor of Lol state (UN photo)

Governor Hassan, according to the order which became public on Saturday, removed the state security adviser Joseph Akok Aleu, peace and reconciliation Advisor Akon Wol Deng and political advisor Pasquale Fama.

A separate order removed Ajar wet Awath from his position as minister of education, science and technology and appointed him to serve as minister of physical infrastructure. Awath replaced Macam Macam Angui. No reasons were given for making changes.

Local official and legislators argued said the new changes are meant to improve services to the people by appointing the right people with right skills in the right place for service delivery.

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January 22, 2017 (JUBA) - South Sudanese rebels claimed they killed six government soldiers during a road ambush, which occurred along Magwi-Pajok road Sunday.

South Sudanese SPLA soldiers in Pageri in Eastern Equatoria state on August 20, 2015 (Photo AFP/Samir Bol)

The rebel-appointed governor of Imatong state, Oyet Nathaniel Pierino, claimed militias loyal to South Sudan president, Salva Kiir attacked civilian hideouts in the area.

At dawn on Sunday at around 10:43 am, forces loyal to President Salva Kiir accompanied by local militias in Magwi county fell into a laid ambush, explained Oyet.

He further claimed pro-government forces and its allied militias went and burnt villages in Licari, a neighborhood suspected to be harbouring armed opposition faction forces.

Government troops were repulsed with heavy causalities, including military weapons, he further told Sudan Tribune.

Oyet, however, accused the pro-government forces of allegedly planning genocide against the area population.

In recent weeks, multiples residents claimed, government forces have unlawfully detained civilians believed to be supporters of the armed opposition and allegedly demand ransom of 200,000 South Sudan Pounds (SSP) for each detainee.

Should one fail to pay the ransom demanded, government soldiers allegedly demand for goats, cows as well as chicken in compensation for release of civilians detained.

“This is a policy of exploitation and making the community poor by looting their resources by themselves,” said Oyet.

Since July last year, fighting has escalated in South Sudan's Equatoria region between pro-government and the armed opposition forces, amidst reports of gross human rights violations in form of rape and abductions of civilians.

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January 22, 2017 (JUBA) – At least $167 million is needed as an inter-agency response strategy and financial requirements for the South Sudanese refugee emergency across Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR).

South Sudanese refugees seen at Khor Omar camp for the displaced in El Daein, East Darfur on March 20, 2016 (UNAMID Photo)

The figure is contained in the South Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP) for 2017, which outlines UNHCR's response strategy.

The conflict in South Sudan has intensified since July 2016 and has generated Africa's largest refugee crisis. Over 130,000 South Sudanese refugees, including an estimated 85,000 children, reportedly fled to Sudan in 2016.

This brings the total number of South Sudanese refugees arriving in Sudan since December 2013 to over 297,000, according to UNHCR.

However, despite Sudan's significant response needs, the 2016 RRRP was reportedly only 24 per cent funded, with the UN refugee agency stressing that the existing funding shortfall has stretched the capacity of inter-agency partners to respond while putting additional pressure on host communities, many of whom are already struggling.

The steady, yet significant flow of new refugee arrivals seeking safety in Sudan, UNHCR anticipates, is expected to continue into 2017, following the continuation of localised fighting, critical food insecurity and limited humanitarian assistance in South Sudan.

Under the RRRP 2017, UNHCR and inter-agency partners are reportedly seeking $166.6 million to meet the protection and assistance needs of South Sudanese refugees currently living in Sudan and over 60,000 new arrivals anticipated in 2017.

As such, the Sudan response plan reportedly seeks to maintain an emergency response capacity to ensure immediate protection responses, including legal protection, and address the urgent needs of new arrivals in 2017, stabilise the existing programme by aiming to achieve at least minimum emergency standards across sectors, particularly by enhancing further integration with national response mechanisms, promote solutions with a particular emphasis on enhancing protection through self-reliance and host community support, as well as create links to other national development plans.

UNHCR and the Commission for Refugees in collaboration with UN agencies, local and international non-governmental organisations, refugee and host communities are coordinating the response plan.

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January 22, 2017 (JUBA) – The United Nations under-secretary general for peacekeeping operations, Herve Ladsous will on Monday brief the Security Council members on South Sudan.

Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, speaks to journalists following Security Council consultations on the situation in Darfur, 4 October 2016 (UN Photo)

The security, humanitarian and human rights situation in South Sudan remains dire, amidst a faltering political process and ongoing concerns that inter-communal violence could spiral out of control.

Ladsous' briefing is expected to focus on the confidential 30-day report to the 15-member Council on planning for the deployment of the Regional Protection Forces (RPF) and obstructions to UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

South Sudanese officials were recently quoted expressing reservations about the deployments of the protection forces.

On 13 January, information minister, Michael Makuei Lueth said that while the government did not object to the force, the Council would need to adopt a new resolution with respect to the Force, as its initial mandate under resolution 2304 had expired on 15 December 2016.

The mandate of the regional protection forces was re-authorised by the Council through resolution 2327 adopted on 16 December 2016.

Another issues of concern, it has emerged, regards the issue of visas and the Council members are interested in knowing where South Sudan government would issue out visas for members of the RPF.

Meanwhile, the Council members are also scheduled to hold an informal interactive dialogue with Festus Mogae, the chairman of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) tasked with overseeing the implementation of South Sudan peace agreement.

The Security Council is reportedly interest in hearing from Mogae and Ladsous about their impressions of the national dialogue process that South Sudan President, Salva Kiir announced on 19 December 2016.

During the meeting, however, key issues that could be raised with regard to the national dialogue include how to ensure that it is conducted in an inclusive manner without fear and intimidation, and whether or not conditions are suitable for the dialogue to occur in South Sudan or whether another venue may be more suitable.

Also likely to feature during these consultative meeting could be how the UN plans to work with the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on the mediation process.

"A key question that may be raised is whether to include opposition leader Riek Machar in the political process, and if so, how this could be done," partly reads an insight, which Sudan Tribune has obtained, on activities of the 15-member Council.

Machar, currently in South Africa, may have fled Juba in July 2016, after his forces clashed with government troops, but continues to maintain a considerable following in South Sudan, with many of his supporters fighting against government forces.

There have been concerns for several months now about the potential for mass atrocities to be committed in the young nation.

Fighting has been reported in several parts of the country, much of it along ethnic lines, with the UN earlier warning of possible genocide.

“Members will be interested in an assessment from Mogae and Ladsous on the security and human right situation in South Sudan. Of interest to some members might be the activities of the UN working group designed to develop strategies to prevent mass atrocities in South Sudan, jointly chaired by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide,” the insig

It further states, “Consistent with the mandate of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, Mogae may be able to give an overview of the location and nature of ceasefire violations in recent months, as well as to discuss efforts to canton opposition troops”.

While speaking during his monthly luncheon on 9 January, the new UN Secretary-General António Guterres raised key issues with South Sudanese officials, including the importance of revitalising the political process, the need to deploy the RPF, which the Council first authorised in August 2016 to, among other things, protect UN staff, humanitarian actors and civilians in Juba, as well as the importance of raising awareness of the risk of atrocities in South Sudan.

This will be the first time Council members will meet on South Sudan since they failed to adopt the 23 December 2016 draft resolution that would have imposed an arms embargo on South Sudan and targeted sanctions on three government and opposition leaders.

Despite UN warnings of possible genocide in Africa's newest nation, the Security Council voted on 23 December, 2016, to reject a U.S.-sponsored resolution calling for an arms embargo and targeted sanctions, with Russia and its allies accusing Washington of ignoring President Kiir's calls recent advocacy for a national dialogue.

The draft resolution thus received only seven affirmative votes and nine abstentions.

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State coffers are said to be empty as troops secure Banjul for the return of President Adama Barrow.

Nigeria's largest city Lagos is facing a housing crisis. The BBC's Nancy Kacungira looks at how entrepreneurs are trying to solve the crisis.

By Beny Gideon Mabor, Esq

Western Sahara known as Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) was Spanish protectorate in the Maghreb region of North Africa. It is situated north of Kingdom of Morocco, South of Mauritania and east of Algeria and populated by Berber tribes with an elected government under President Brahim Ghali, following the death of long serving President Mohamed Abdelaziz Ezzedine, founder and leader of revolutionary Polisario Front. This territory has been subject of regional and international debate being counterclaimed by Morocco and Saharawi people seeking self-determination and global recognition. SADR is an independent country declared in 1976 by Polisario Front separatist movement and a recognized member state of the African Union and other international organizations. This move led to a withdrawal of Morocco from African Union in 1984 in protest of AU's recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as an independent state.

On 18 July, 2016 after 32 years of absence from African Union and its politics, King Mohammed VI of Morocco declared his country's intention to return to the African Union in what he called “friends have been asking them to return so that Morocco can take up its natural place within its institutional family” according to the excerpts of the letter read to the AU summit and later shared by Aljazeera news outlet. On the other hand, the Moroccan return to the African Union is not easy walk back, but can only be validated by majority votes at the African Union Summit.

It's upon this notion that the entire political leadership led by the King embarks on bribery expedition to number of African countries in October and December, 2016 with first leg in Rwanda, to Tanzania, Ethiopia and Nigeria amongst others. His Majesty the King has been pledging and paying billion US dollars in all those countries for investment projects to get support, notwithstanding the attached condition to also suspend membership of rival Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) from the African Union and possibly not to recognize its independence.

Today, South Sudan is now at the whelm of strategic ambiguity in its foreign policy between taking blood money and vote for Morocco to return to the African Union and by implication support forceful occupation of land of indigenous Sahrawi people or refuse and stick to the principle of the rights to self-determination for indigenous Saharawi people for self-rule, the basis upon which South Sudan was also brought about seven years ago.

King Mohamed VI visit to South Sudan

As explained in the summary, the planned visit of the Moroccan King Mohamed VI to Juba, South Sudan is nothing nearer to any diplomatic engagement, but a clear business deal for his agenda to seek support from world newest state for their readmission to the membership of the African Union. The second objective of his visit is to request South Sudan to join other AU member states to suspend SADR from African Union and other intentional organizations, but also not to recognize SADR as independent state on top of their cordial request to the South Sudan political leadership.

According to high leveled source within the African Union, as revealed in the investigative report published by Ayah Aman of Al-Monitor media house dated 27 July, 2016 under article entitled: why Morocco really wants back in the African Union, it's confirmed that the Kingdom of Morocco has convinced 16 African countries to withdraw their recognition of SADR and form a front to expel SADR from the African Union. However, Morocco is already warned that such action is neither recognized in international law nor in the AU charters.

In a similar move, I was privileged to see the conspiracy deal in the making at the last African Union Summit in Kigali, Rwanda on 18 July, 2016 where we all witnessed on the same day the Moroccan king conveyed his message for readmission when, 28 African countries signed a statement and delivered it to AU Chairperson President Idriss Deby of Chad asking him to take legal action to suspend SADR's membership from African Union. South Sudan was not included at the time which was a well thought decision and I applauded the government for not being part of such conspiracy theory of oppression and marginalization of other fellow human beings.

In light of this development, it is difficult to understand now why South Sudan is ready to receive Moroccan King and possibly vote in favor of Morocco back to the African Union. In other words, South Sudan will have to endorse both the Moroccan readmission to the AU and join the rest of the African states in non-recognition of SADR as an independent country and from membership of the African Union and other international organizations. Therefore, the question would be, if South Sudan can support such deadly move of forceful occupation of foreign land by others, when in fact, it has contested land with Sudan, what will prevent Khartoum Administration and their alliances to do the same to South Sudan over the issue of Abyei? South Sudan must think twice before making a decision that will bear liability on the present and future generations in term of geopolitical relationships.

In the famous sermon of plank and the splinter it says “why do you look at the splinter in your brother's eye, but do not consider the plank in your own eye? Or how can you say to your brother, ‘Let me remove the splinter from your eye'; and look, a plank is in your own eye? That is hypocrisy of highest order! First South Sudanese should remove the plank from your own eye, and then you will see clearly to remove the splinter from your brother's eye.

Second, South Sudan is the newest member state of the African Union and other international organization including United Nations all of which ruled out forceful occupation of foreign land. In particular, Article 2 of the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted by General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 provides that “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Further, article 7 of the same legal instrument provides that “All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.

Due to observance of the United Nations principle on the rights to self-determination, the International Court of Justice ICJ in its advisory opinion on the situation of Western Sahara as requested by the General Assembly of the United Nations, unanimously reach the opinion that “Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain was not a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius). In other words, it was a separate territory with indigenous Sahrawi people who can enjoy inalienable right to self-rule that must be recognized. Therefore, South Sudan must not interfere in the internal affairs of the rights of indigenous Sahrawi's people.

After having explained what everybody know about the issue of Morocco and the rival Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) including clear position of the regional and international community for the last for decades, South Sudan should be careful in approaching this matter. The Kingdom of Morocco has no right whatsoever to forcefully continue occupying Western Sahara but must engage in dialogue for amicable solution. In my opinion, the Government of South Sudan is free to discharge other bilateral cooperation with Kingdom of Morocco for common good of the two countries however, not anything connected with SADR. Any attempt by the government to support the position of Morocco over status of SADR is a contradiction of the very principle of right to self-determination where the people of South Sudan fought for decades and finally got their independence. Finally, I advise the government not take the blood money in return of what would be blind support to the kingdom of morocco and by extension support continue occupation of indigenous land belonging to the Saharawi people who have suffered in the hand of Moroccans just like the way South Sudanese suffers in the hand of Arabs.

Beny Gideon Mabor is South Sudanese private lawyer and a human rights defender. His areas of research are international politics, human rights and social accountability. He can be reach via benygmabor@gmail.com

Burkina Faso progress to the Africa Cup of Nations quarter-finals as Group A winners after beating Guinea-Bissau on Sunday.

Gabon become only the third hosts to exit the Africa Cup of Nations after a 0-0 draw with Cameroon, who make it through to the quarter-finals.

Ghana coach Avram Grant hails his players after they edged a 1-0 win over Mali that put them in the Nations Cup quarter-finals.

Uganda coach Milutin 'Micho' Sredojevic says it is "hard to accept" his side's exit from the Nations Cup after they lost to a late goal against Egypt.

While women marched on Washington DC, why did others march around the world? Here are some reasons from Kenya, India and Germany.

January 21, 2017 (KHARTOUM) - "Sudanese President Omer Hassan al-Bashir will visit Russia next summer," announced on Saturday Foreign Minister Ibrahim Ghandour without further details about the exact date of the trip .

Several weeks ago Ghandour had said that Bashir would pay a visit to Moscow by the end of 2016, but the visit didn't take place. No explanation has been made for the postponement of the visit.

"Al-Bashir's visit to Russia will be at the beginning of the summer, it aims to strengthen bilateral relations and cementing economic and political cooperation," further said the foreign minister in statements reported by the official news agency SUNA.

He added that a number of agreements will be signed during the visit.

The top diplomat underscored that the Sudanese Russian Ministerial Committee is one of the most active committees, and that the presidential visit will consolidate the gains made at the level of the joint ministerial committee.

On 5 December 2016, the 4th session of the joint Sudanese-Russian High-level Committee met in Moscow and discussed a number of issues including minerals investments.

The foreign minister pointed to Russian stance supporting his government during the past years and described its support for the Sudan as "strong and unchanged". "Russia, is one of the chief supporters of the Sudan in the Security Council and international organizations," he further said.

Politically, Russia is seen as a major ally of the government of Omer al-Bashir that faces isolation from the West. However, economic cooperation between the two countries has remained very low, with a trade balance that does not exceed $400 million.

In December 2015, Sudan and Russia signed 14 cooperation agreements in different domains, including oil, minerals and banks.

The agreements also include a concession contract between Sudan and the Russian Rus Geology to prospect for oil in Sudan's Bloc E57 and another accord for the geological mapping of the Jebal Moya area, North Kordofan State.

(ST)

January 21, 2017 (BOR) -At least 1, 067 people are currently living with HIV/Aids in South Sudan's Jonglei state, an official disclosed.

Jonglei state HIV/Aids and STI coordinator Ajak Mach Gut, January 20, 2017 (ST)

In an interview with Sudan Tribune Friday, the coordinator for HIV/Aids and Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs), Ajak Mac Gut, said infection was prevalence rate was high within ages 15 to 46.

“HIV is very high among the youth, mostly from the age of 15 to 46. These people are vulnerable group to the disease, as most of them are victims of HIV”, Mac said during the interview at Bor hospital.

HIV, the main cause of Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), is described as a condition in human beings in which progressive failure of the immune system allows life-threatening opportunistic infections and cancers, which could lead to death.

According to state statistics, 785 people lived with the virus in 2015, but the number of infected persons rose to 1,067 by the end of 2016.

Mac said the rise in cases of the deadly disease could mainly be attributed to returnees from Eastern African countries, who took refuge in Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia during the long civil war.

“During the years of civil war, many people from here went to Kenya, others went to Uganda and Ethiopia. When they started coming back homes, most of them came with this disease and then they passed it on to others,” he told Sudan Tribune.

However, although HIV/Aids related death tolls have not been ascertained in the state, it is highly believed to be a contributing factor to the current mortality rate in Jonglei, the official stressed.

“The HIV infection rate in Jonglei state could be more than 1.3 per cent, which the national infection rate,” explained Mac.

Out of the 1,067 infected people, only 599 people are reportedly registered in the state hospital for monthly drug supply, which are used to suppress the virus to undetectable levels, when adhered to.

Mac further said a total of 468 people had dropped out from taking drugs in the state hospital and other health facilities in the counties.

“Some of these people are feared dead while others might have registered in other places within or outside the country for treatment,” he added.

According to the health official, majority of the pregnant mothers who were found to be HIV positive in Jonglei state, neither turned up for drugs, nor informed their husbands about their health status.

Last year, Mac said, 84 pregnant women were found HIV positive, but only three were coming for drugs, while 81 never showed up.

“These 81 women have their 81 husbands who are also infected, but they had not come back for drugs. Some did not even inform their husbands about their status, so this is a big challenge,” said Mac.

He added, “Some of these men could be having more than two wives, so all of them may be infected. In this case, the number of infection outside there is very high”.

He advised the youth to stop involving themselves in random sex activities to prevent the infection. He encouraged the use of condoms, voluntary testing and counseling as well as abstinence.

(ST)

By Elwathig Kameir

1. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) issued a press statement, on Jan. 17, declining a US initiative (of which I have seen a copy) for the delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief. In a letter to the US special envoy, Donald Booth, (of which I also have a copy ) dated Jan. 12, the chairperson of SPLM-N set out six preconditions to be met before accepting the American proposal. Again, the SPLM-N has reiterated its position, during a meeting between some of its leaders with international envoys: the US, British, French, Norwegian, and representatives of USAID, in Paris on Jan. 17.

2. In my opinion, the rejection of the US initiative is a miscalculated step on the part of the SPLM-N's leadership, starting with intentionally delaying the announcement of its position Jan. 13, the date that the US administration fixed for declaring its stance regarding sanctions on Sudan. Perhaps, the leadership of the SPLM-N has mistakenly assume that since the term of the Obama administration is about to end, it would not dare lift the sanctions. Thus, the whole matter will soon be in the hands of President Trump's administration, allowing the SPLM-N a large margin for maneuver and room for disrupting the negotiation process, hoping, perhaps, for the outbreak of Al-intifada or a swing in the mood of the international community in favor of the opposition. In addition, the declaration by the President of the Republic, on the 1stt of January 2017, of a ceasefire for a month, which was followed by a Council of Ministers' resolution extending the truce for another six months, with effect from January 30, has confounded the calculations of the SPLM-N's leadership, especially since the government will be praised by the international community for agreeing to the US initiative for the delivery of aid, thus restricting the options available to the SPLM-N outside the context of negotiations.

3. In fact, this position raises many legitimate questions about the position of the SPLM-N towards the citizens of the Two Areas, particularly when the bulk of the humanitarian aid is largely medicines and medical equipments. Added to that, the proposal commits the US government to determine the origin of the humanitarian relief and the appropriate routing for itd delivery to the areas under the control of the SPLM-N, after clearing the intended assistance with the Sudanese customs/immigration at some point within Sudan. The fundamental question, which I have never seized repeating, is about the continued viability/feasibility of armed struggle, especially in terms of the inability to protect innocent civilians, and also the incapacity to provide food for the victims of the war. Perhaps, most importantly, these people, who really bear the consequences, have not been consulted on the decision of resorting to armed resistance.

4. In this regard, I had sent a lengthy letter to the Chairman of SPLM-N, on 23 April, 2012, which was widely published (see, Sudantribune.com), in 8 November, 2015. The message started with underlining the disastrous effects, and far-reaching consequences, of the unabatedly continued violent fighting and bloody confrontations in the Two Areas, since 5 June, 2011. On top of these : the loss of life and disabilities, a grim and grievous humanitarian crisis, an appalling human rights situation, the destruction of infrastructure; and threatening the livelihoods and lives of people in the "Tamazuj" zone between the North and the South. Indeed, one could imagine, after five years have passed since that date, the increasing casualties, the exacerbation of peoples' suffering, and depriving children of their legitimate right to education and health care. The letter also underlined the adverse impacts of the war on the grassroots of the SPLM-N and its organizational structure, disrupting the process of drafting the vision and the Program Framework, resulting in the disintegration of the SPLM-N, and the fragmentation of its membership into a number of factions, along ethnic/ regional lines, competing for recognition and registration as political parties.

5. The gist of the message, and what followed in my published articles, and subsequent letters to the Chairman of the SPLM-N, is that the armed struggle is no longer the right tool, or the most promising mechanism/means, for achieving the aspirations of the masses to a real change in their lives. In the final analysis, it is the marginalized people in the Two Areas who remain both the fuel and victims of the war. Therefore, the question is: for how long would they remain steadfast and resilient, and for how long they will continue to pay the high cost and exorbitant price? If the armed struggle, which lasted for decades, resulted in achieving SPLM's goal of secession of the south, it is not necessarily the best strategy for achieving the political objectives of the SPLM-N, under a completely different set of objective and subjective conditions.

6. The cherished political change may be difficult, if impossible, to realize in light of the prevalent "asymmetrical" situation, with respect to the means of change, whereas part of the opposition is pursuing armed struggle, while the other part espouses civil and peaceful resistance. In a previous article, I opined that since the launch of the "civil disobedience" initiative, in November 2016, the armed movements, have incessantly lent support to, and solidarity with, the peaceful youth movement, as a viable way to change, and reaching its final aim of overthrowing Al-Bashir's ruling regime. The SPLM-N went further to advance specific practical proposals in the arena of peaceful political struggle. Thus, in a press statement, the Secretary-General of the SPLM-N called on “Sudanese nationals who hold foreign passports to organize a campaign for collective return to Sudan and challenge the regime (SPLM-N: Captivated by Civil Resistance, Sudantribune.com, January, 3, 2017).

7. In a remarkable turn, and perhaps for the first time, the leadership of the SPLM-N, publicly recognized that "armed struggle" was the preferred means of struggle during the early years of the dictatorship of the National Congress party. While, "at this point in time however, there is a qualitative change, and the peaceful mass movement is taking the lead. We can certainly say the peaceful resistance of the Sudanese people has been born again" (Speech of the Secretary General (SG) of the SPLM-N, at El Dorado Book, Oslo, Norway, January 10, 2017). There is no doubt, that this declaration is a step forward and sends a positive message, both internally and to the international community, of a new orientation toward civil and peaceful means for change, if the leaders of the SPLM-N manage this transformation well .

8. However, what I could not fathom is attributing the resort to armed struggle to the ruling Inqaz regime's systematic destruction of "the peaceful means in the context of what they called the (empowerment policy)", in the words of the SPLM-N's SG. It is no secret that armed struggle was the road taken by the SPLM/A since its inception, in May 1983, inspired by the past experiences of the resistance movements in southern Sudan, under the leadership of the late Dr. John Garang. That was during the last two years of President Nimeiri in power, while armed struggle continued for the whole duration of the elected governments (1986-1989), the "empowerment policy" was launched in the wake of the military takeover of the National Islamic Front (NIF) on 30 June 1989. Thereafter, the SPLM-N pursued the same means to achieve its political goals, since the outbreak of war in South Kordofan, on the 5th of June 2011. A question that arises here is the following: does the choice of resorting to arms in the earlier phase of the Inqaz regime mean that the "empowerment policy" has withered away, thus opening the door for themass movement to take the initiative and leadership?

9. It is imperative to note, that in the midst of celebrating the birth of the mass movement, the SG's speech did not clearly explain the role of armed resistance, in the dynamics of the civil and political struggle for change, and how the SPLM-N relates to the peaceful forces of change? That is, with the exception 0f a timid reference, in the context of the speech's presentation of the efforts to renew the SPLM-N, including to "critically examine the failures and successes of the national liberation movements and our means of struggle". However, neither a specific way is suggested as to how such examination will be carried out, nor is a time ceiling determined. Nevertheless, it is clear that the SPLM-N is seeking to build a broad political base, and to provide the leadership for this "new mass movement", having identified all of its components by the SG. These include: the official opposition and different alliances, new professionals and syndicate movements (medical doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, university lecturers, teachers unions, new social movement of youth, women, students, and movements of specific causes such as land grabbing, dams, farmers, internally displaced etc. In addition, to social media groups, who played a major role in the civil disobedience of November and December 2016.

10. In the initial version of the armed struggle, 1983 to 2005, the SPLM/A was the driving force of the political opposition, though from behind the scene, under the umbrella of the National Democratic Alliance. The SPLA was a fierce military force, occupying large stretches of land, thus earning remarkable influence and leverage on the overall political process, while the SPLM gained regional and international support. The keenness of the late leader, and Chairperson, of the SPLM/A in consolidating his alliance with Northern political parties was not only motivated by the objective of overthrowing the regime. Rather, essentially his intention was to win their hearts, and ensure a popular support-base, necessary for the political endorsement of the right of self-determination, an unquestionably national issue. However, it seems this time, that the goal of the SPLM-N of making alliances with civil forces is not precisely defined, excluding the painstaking research for the missing unified "mechanism" to, in the words of the SG, "bring together the opposition forces, from different backgrounds, with a minimal plan of action to remove the NCP government, and bring about a new socio-economic/political dispensation". Most of these forces (which were classified above) are scattered, disorganized, with a varied spectra and multiple entities, thus it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to seek their involvement in any organizational structure, however it is loosely defined. Moreover, the record and credit of the SPLM-N in alliance making is not promising. For instance, as the experience of the Revolutionary Front has failed and resulted into two conflicting splinter factions, along ethnic/regional lines.

11. If the leadership of the SPLM-N is genuine in endorsing the civil modalities of struggle, what is the nature and form of its contribution, while all the leaders of the Movement are either outside the country, or in the areas of military operations? Is this contribution a mere act of issuing statements to promote and encourage the civil and peaceful struggle, or appealing to the remaining members of the SPLM-N, who lack any semblance of organizational structure, to participate in this struggle, especially in the absence of leadership? Above all, what is the fate of the hundreds of thousands of people in the Two Areas, who are suffering from the scourge of war, being subjected to air bombardment, and paying their own lives as a price for a seemingly endless war. Particularly, when the speech of the SPLM's SG admits that "the road to change is not an easy one. It is going to take a lot of effort in such a complex situation", which makes it impossible to determine a time frame for overthrowing the regime, thus compounding the loss of lives and increasing the pace of displacement and asylum.

12. It is as if the SPLM-N, albeit unintentionally, contributes to worsening the plight of civilians in the Two Areas, especially in the areas controlled by the SPLA, refusing to negotiate the political issues, except on the arrangements of power transition, confining negotiations, only, on the delivery of humanitarian aid (already showing an obstinate position regarding the US proposal, which is difficult to comprehend). And so, while the leadership of the SPLM-N is well aware that the issue of relief, in any case, cannot be isolated from the political issues, in conformity with the steps stipulated in the AUHIP roadmap, which was signed by the armed movements, albeit belatedly. The African roadmap remains the only document agreed to by the signatory parties as a reference for the management of the peace process. Of course, there is little doubt that there are violations and abuses of the roadmap by the government, particularly with regards to 1) the proposed "preparatory" meeting of the stakeholders, and 2) closing the door of the national dialogue, with those who attended only. However, these breaches should not necessarily stand in the way of the flow of humanitarian assistance to the needy, and putting a spoke in the wheels of stopping the war, and the resumption of the peaceful political process.

13. If the SPLM-N opted for the overthrow of the regime as the best route for realizing the desired change, its leadership would be obliged to answer a key question: does the SPLA have the capacity, in the short or medium term, to make a radical shift in the balance of forces on the ground? For how long will the citizens, in the war-affected areas, be held hostage to a prospective change contingent on factors that are beyond the control of the SPLM-N. It is important, for both the civil and military opposition to take notice of the implicit signals in the decision to lift the sanctions, and the significance of continuing efforts to ensure the delivery of the humanitarian assistance to the needy people in the Two Areas. With this intervention, the US is sending messages to these forces that weakening the ruling regime, let alone its downfall, in light of the current balance of forces, is not a favored policy toward Sudan. It is in America's interest, as well as the European Union's, from the national security perspective, that the regime remains intact, and in control of its national territories, in order to carry out the tasks they entrusted it with in the fields of counter-terrorism, human trafficking, and cooperation in dealing with regional conflicts, particularly in southern Sudan, and forcing the government to stay away from the parties that target the interests of US and its allies in the region.

14. Against this background, barring the occurrence of dramatic changes, in my opinion, the leaders of the SPLM-N remain accountable for the fate of hundreds of thousands of citizens, and their exposure to a dire humanitarian situation. This political and moral responsibility dictates the acceptance of the US proposal, as long as the government had agreed to it, thus reaching an agreement on cessation of hostilities. This is an important step for restoring and putting the political process back on track, after the collapse of the initial round of negotiations, which immediately followed the signing of the African roadmap by the armed movements and the National Umma Party, on 15 August, 2015.

15. I have repeatedly stressed, in previous articles, that the major obstacle for reaching an agreement with the government is divergence, of the two parties to the talks as regards both the scope and the expected outcome of the negotiations. While the SPLM-N calls for the inclusion of national constitutional issues in the agenda, the government insists on restricting negotiations to the Two Areas. Equally, national dialogue will be an exercise in futility and its findings will not lead to a national consensus on how to move the country forward to a better future, unless all Sudanese political parties and strong engaged societal forces agree on the "scope of change" required in the institutional and political structure(s) of the Sudanese state after more than a quarter a century of one-party rule.

16. Therefore, there is a strategic disagreement between the government and the SPLM-N, and the rest of the armed movements in Darfur, on what must come first: an agreement on political issues or a security-military agreement. In other words, the SPLM-N wants to preserve its army and its troops to ensure the realization of its political objectives, the raison d'etre for taking up arms. Meanwhile, the government is continuing to stick to its stated position of reaching a comprehensive security arrangements agreement, before delving into the negotiations on the political issues. In the same vein, at the level of the general political discourse, the opposition calls for expanding the scope of freedoms, especially freedom of association and expression, first, while the government sees that the launch of freedoms is contingent on ending the war, first. This is a Catch 22 situation, par excellence

17. Thus, in order to resolve this paradox, it is incumbent on all parties to agree on the end game of the dialogue process, so that each party comes to the table with an open mind, and confidence in the expected outcomes. On the side of the government, the NCP, and the ruling coalition, should recognize this predicament. This, in turn, requires the immediate embarking, following the conclusion of a cessation of hostilities agreement, on simultaneous and synchronized negotiations leading to a comprehensive political agreement (with political guarantees for the SPLM-N and its transformation into a political entity), while reaching a comprehensive security arrangements agreement, according to schedules and specific time ceilings.

The author is a former member of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Leadership Council (SPLM) . He is reachable at kameir@yahoo.com

Civil lawsuit on behalf of Sudanese victims of Khartoum's atrocity crimes brought against BNP Paribas in U.S. Federal District Court (filed January 20, 2017)

By Eric Reeves

The civil suit brought yesterday on behalf of victims of atrocity crimes for which the NIF/NCP regime in Khartoum is responsible marks a moment of extraordinary revelation. French banking giant BNP Paribas is shown to be deeply complicit in these crimes, and we have a much clearer sense of why U.S. financial sanctions have proved ineffective in curtailing the atrocities of the regime. By virtue of criminal violations of U.S. financial law, to which BNP Paribas (“BNPP”) pled guilty in mid-2015, many tens of billions of dollars of were effectively “laundered” and made available to Khartoum, which thus encountered none of the restrictions on the sale of petroleum that would otherwise have been prohibitive. The Complaint, filed by the law firm of McKool Smith, P.C.?(Los Angeles), is a devastating indictment that goes far beyond the Statement of Facts to which BNPP agreed in its settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice; the “facts” as we can see them now extend to many times the $9 billion in forfeitures and fines that PNBB paid in acknowledging its criminal guilt.

This guilt extended to aiding Cuba and Iran, then on the U.S. State Department list of “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” as was Sudan. But it was the people of Sudan who suffered the consequences of what was the massive and shameless criminality associated with BNPP's financial services to the Khartoum regime—72 percent of the overall total even in the inadequate Justice Department “Statement of Facts.” Reprehensibly, the Obama administration directed none of the billions in forfeiture money to the Sudanese victims of atrocity crimes, or to humanitarian efforts seeking to provide relief to the people who continue to suffer from military activity very substantially financed by BNPP.

[The first crucial 20 pages of this extraordinarily damning legal Complaint may be found at | http://sudanreeves.org/2017/01/21/7740; the entire 166-page document is available upon request.]

The recent, departing Executive Order by former President Barack Obama—essentially lifting sanctions on Khartoum—was a further despicable betrayal of the people of Sudan, and a gratuitous gift to a regime that continues to wage terrible war against the marginalized peoples of it peripheral regions. In her final interview as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power spoke of improvement in humanitarian access that amounted to a “sea change” (her incomprehensible phrase), failing to acknowledge that Khartoum continues to impose humanitarian embargoes on vast areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. As one extremely experienced and knowledgeable humanitarian—on the ground in South Kordofan—declared in an email to me:

“There's been absolutely no change in humanitarian access [in the Nuba Mountains—suffering under Khartoum's humanitarian embargo for over five and a half years]. Not a single grain of sorghum nor one tablet of medicine has entered Nuba from any of the usual humanitarian agencies.” (email received January 17, 2017)

And as has been true for many years, Khartoum continues to deny access to vast areas of Darfur and regularly expels humanitarians and humanitarian organizations without meaningful explanation. This not has changed, and Power's claim to the contrary is terribly destructive mendacity, convincing Khartoum that in fact there is no reason to improve access. It is quite possible that tens of thousands of people will die because of this gross misrepresentation of humanitarian access.

The Obama administration's policy toward Sudan, which reduces to an accommodation of Khartoum's barbarism in exchange for putatively valuable counter-terrorism intelligence, remains guided by a willingness to forgive or turn a blind eye to the reality of genocidal counter-insurgencies—the preferred method of domestic control by this regime since it came to power by military coup in June 1989. Nor has it mattered to Obama administration officials that the regime has essentially destroyed the Sudanese economy and thereby imposed terrible hardship on the people of Sudan (see | http://sudanreeves.org/2015/12/09/7041/). Nor has it mattered that the regime is engaging in increasingly violent repression of human rights activists, newspapers, and civil society expressions of discontent. What has mattered is keeping the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime in power, a point emphasized by former special envoy for the Sudans Princeton Lyman, offered in an interview I have cited many times but that continues to demonstrate just how preposterous the Obama administration has been in characterizing the ruling junta in Khartoum:

“We [the Obama administration] do not want to see the ouster of the [Khartoum] regime, nor regime change. We want to see the regime carrying out reform via constitutional democratic measures.” (Interview with Asharq al-Awsat, December 3, 2011 | http://english.aawsat.com/2011/12/article55244147/asharq-al-awsat-talks-to-us-special-envoy-to-sudan-princeton-lyman)

Although perversely contemptuous of what is truly possible under the regime, this view nonetheless continues to guide the policies of the current special envoy, Donald Booth (who certainly must have or should have known about the effects of BNPP money laundering in shielding Khartoum from the effects of U.S. sanctions). Booth's justification for lifting sanctions is based on a “look-back” period of 180 days, during which Khartoum is supposed to have shown, (in the words of Obama's Executive Order) “positive actions.”

One must wonder: do these “positive actions” include arrest of some 20 people for daring to meeting with Ambassador Booth (August 2016), this in the wake of the vast campaign in Jebel Marra, during which Khartoum used chemical weapons against civilians? (See | http://sudanreeves.org/2017/01/19/7735/). Do they include the slaughter of civilians by regular army forces in Nertiti (Central Darfur) on the first day of this new year (see | http://wp.me/s45rOG-7710)? Does it include the refusal to rein in the epidemic of sexual violence throughout Darfur, regularly reported by Radio Dabanga if not by the spectacularly incompetent and corrupt UN/African Union force (UNAMID) deployed in the region? (See | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Rr). What of repeated reports of fighting initiated by SAF and militia forces in South Kordofan and Blue Nile? Much could be determined with the devotion of minimal satellite photographic resources, but the Obama administration proved in June 2011 that it wasn't interested in what was visible on the ground during the beginning of massive violence in South Kordofan, including the building of mass graves (see http://wp.me/p45rOG-BU).

We can expect nothing encouraging on Sudan from the incoming “America First” administration of a racist Donald Trump. But Obama administration officials, including Secretary of State John Kerry, have left office with nothing to show by way of removing the “stain on our soul,” a phrase that Obama so unctuously campaigned on in 2008, speaking about Darfur. Though promising not to “avert his eyes from human slaughter,” he has ended doing precisely that in Sudan—departing office with a contemptibly implausible claim of “positive actions” by the Khartoum regime. Sudanese who understand the implications of Obama's actions and policies will not forgive him—and neither will history.

—
Eric Reeves, Senior Fellow at Harvard University's François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights. He can be reached at ereeves@smith.edu. www.sudanreeves.org

January 18, 2017 (JUBA) – South Sudan government has lifted the ban it had earlier imposed on flights to Payinjiar county in the wake of continuous rebel activities in the area.

The Payinjiar community at a meeting in Bentiu town, August 23, 2015 (ST)

The move came after the country director for the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) petitioned the humanitarian affairs and disaster management ministry last week.

The undersecretary in the humanitarian affairs ministry, Gatwech Peter Kulang assured WFP of government support.

“I'm pleased to inform you that the ministry of interior has advised that all humanitarian flights and boats to Payinjiar can resume operations at your own risk,” reads a letter addressed to WFP.

South Sudan's national security service, in a circular it issued on 31 December, 2016, warned humanitarian agencies operating in the area and banned water and air transport.

The decision, officials said, forced most international and national staffs to pullout out of Payinjiar last week after the government requested them to abandon their operations.

Although it remains unclear why government imposed the ban, multiple sources, including aid worker said the decision was meant to prevent rebel groups controlling the area from benefiting from relief items.

Currently, Payinjiar county is reportedly hosting nearly 200,000 internal displaced persons (IDPs), mainly from Guit, Koch, Mayiandit and Leer counties of oil-rich Unity state.

(ST)

January 21, 2017 (EL-FASHER) - A splinter faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement-Abdel Wahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) signed on Saturday a peace agreement with the Sudanese government in El-Fasher, capital of North Darfur State, after three months of secret negotiations.

The ceremony was held in presence of the North Darfur deputy governor; members of the state government, and the leader of the dissident faction Sadiq Adam Abdel-Karim (aka Foka).

The Commissioner of Tawila locality, Adam Yagoub Gadid who negotiated the peace agreement with the splinter group told Sudan Tribune that the peace agreement was signed under the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.

He further stressed the government seriousness to implement all the terms of the signed deal which include security, political and civil provisions.

According to Gadid, Foka has 1500 fighters under his command, a figure that Sudan Tribune was not able to verify. However, the official Sudan News Agency (SUNA) said the group has only 15 vehicles loaded with military hardware and ammunition.

Officials and rebels used to magnify or shrink the number of fighters or causalities depending on the circumstances. Also, they say every vehicle carries 10 fighters.

Speaking at the ceremony the group leader said their decision to join peace expresses "a definite and sincere desire to participate in the construction and development" of the country.

He added that the war brought only devastation and destruction, stressing the seriousness of his group to bring stability in the region.

Sudanese government troops carried out attacks on the SLM-AW fighters in Jebel Marra during the last year, accusing them of armed robbery and attacks on commercial convoys.

Last November, Central Darfur government signed a peace agreement with another splinter group from the SLM-AW led by Amin Toro. But the SLM-AW minimized the move, saying their number does not exceed 20 fighters.

The SLM-AW refuses to negotiate with the Sudanese government as they ask the government to implement unilaterally a number of measures including restoring security and financial compensations before to negotiate the root causes of the conflict.

(ST)

The United Nations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) have commended the &#8220goodwill and the statesmanship&#8221 of the former President of The Gambia, Yahya Jammeh, who decided to facilitate an immediate and orderly transition process and transfer of power to President Adama Barrow.

Anerood Jugnauth, 86, says he will resign in favour of a younger leader - his own son, Pravind.