June 22, 2017 (RUMBEK) – At least 35 people have been killed in revenge attacks that occurred in South Sudan's Western Lakes state between Rup and Pakam communities of Rumbek Central county.
The clashes, local officials told Sudan Tribune, erupted when a pastoralist was reportedly shot dead by a suspected armed youth.
Up to 40 people were reportedly wounded during the same attack.
A Criminal Investigation Department (CID) officer in Rumbek County described it as the ever fight that ended without state intervention.
Meanwhile the Commissioner of Alor County, Stephen Mathiang Deng denied allegations that security forces failed to intervene.
He urged the national government to seek a quick solution to end cycles of revenge attacks in Western Lakes state capital, Rumbek.
Cycles of revenge attacks become rampant in the region in the aftermath of Matur Chut Dhuol's re-appointment as governor by President Salva Kiir early this year. Dhuol replaced Abraham Makoi Bol.
(ST)
June 21, 2017 (KHARTOUM) - U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, Steven Koutsis Wednesday reiterated the support of his country for a stable Sudan, adding that the African Union roadmap remains the only way for a peaceful solution.
Koutsis made his remarks at the end of a three-day visit to North, Central and East Darfur states that he described as "fruitful".
He said the visit enabled him to see the consequences of war and the positives effects of humanitarian assistance to the civilians in the war-affected areas.
"I reiterated the United States' support for a peaceful and stable Sudan. I have also made it very clear ?that negotiations for a lasting peace based on the African Union roadmap is the only way to settle differences. Returning to war is not an option," he said in a written statement posted on the embassy's page on Facebook.
He further called on all the warring parties to sign a humanitarian cessation of hostilities and to join the negotiating table to achieve peace and stability.
The government and armed groups failed in August 2017 to ink a cessation of hostilities and a humanitarian agreement to reach the needy in the war-affected zones. Washington has made some proposals to encourage the parties but in vain.
For the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, a recent rift in the group is delaying the resumption of talks as the SPLM-N has suspended its participation in the peace process until the settlement of the internal crisis.
For Darfur, the divergence over the framework of the political process prevented any progress. The mediation and facilitators are struggling to find a common group between Khartoum and the armed groups.
"I hope to return soon to Darfur to see the progress the government and people have made in securing peace," Koutsis said.
The American diplomat concluded on Wednesday was in East Darfur State to visit South Sudanese refugees who fled violence and hunger in South Sudan. He celebrated World Refugee Day in El-Nimir camp in Ed Daein.
He discussed with representatives ?of East Darfur Humanitarian Aid Commission and Commission for Refugees the ongoing aid operation to South Sudanese refugees
"We commended them on the work they have done to respond to the refugee crisis and their efforts in facilitating NGO and UN agencies' access to all areas of East Darfur," he said.
(ST)
By Salman M.A. Salman
A summit of the head of states of the Nile Basin countries is planned for June 22, 2017, in Entebbe, Uganda, to discuss the impasse over the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). The summit is to be preceded by a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the Nile countries on June 20 – 21, 2017. The purpose of this Note is to clarify the differences over the CFA, and to propose a roadmap for resolving these differences.
The CFA and the Differences Thereon
The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was born on February 22, 1999, in Dar-es-Salam, Tanzania, following the signing of the minutes of the meeting by nine of the Nile ministers of water resources in attendance. The NBI was facilitated by a number of donors led by the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The NBI was established as a transitional arrangement to foster cooperation and sustainable development of the Nile River for the benefit of the inhabitants of those countries. The NBI is guided by a shared vision “to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through equitable utilisation of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources.”
Work started immediately on the CFA, and lasted ten years. However, by 2009, major differences over some basic issues erupted, and could not be resolved, neither at the technical, nor at the political levels, leading to the impasse on the CFA. These major differences persisted as a result of the resurfacing and hardening of the respective positions of the Nile riparians over the colonial treaties, as well as the Egyptian and Sudanese claims to what they see as their acquired uses and rights of the Nile waters, and the rejection of these claims by the upper riparians.
The first difference related to water security. Article 14 of the CFA required the Basin states to work together to ensure that all states achieve and sustain water security. However, this paragraph did not satisfy Egypt and Sudan who wanted to ensure, through an additional clause, that their existing uses and rights are fully protected under the CFA. Consequently, Egypt and Sudan demanded and insisted that Article 14 of the CFA should include a specific provision, to be added at the end of the Article, that would oblige the Basin states “not to adversely affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin State.” This demand was rejected by the upper riparians who saw it as a denial of the basic principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation, and a breach of the vision of the NBI itself.
The second major difference related to the concept of notification, demanded by Egypt and Sudan and rejected by the upper riparians. The upper riparians saw it as a means for Egypt and Sudan to invoke the colonial treaties and their claim of veto power.
While the impasse persisted, on May 14, 2010, four of the Nile riparians (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda) signed the CFA in Entebbe, Uganda. They were joined five days later by Kenya, and by Burundi on February 28, 2011. The CFA has thus far been ratified by Ethiopia, Tanzania and Rwanda. It needs a total of six instruments of ratification/accession to enter into force. Egypt and Sudan continue to vehemently reject the CFA.
Developments Since Conclusion of the CFA
The upper riparians continued with their projects on the Nile notwithstanding the impasse over the CFA, and the erosion of the NBI. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which commenced in 2011, has proven a major challenge to, and a source of a bitter dispute between Ethiopia on the one hand, and Egypt and Sudan on the other. However, by December 2013, Sudan broke ranks with Egypt and declared its full support of the GERD.
Egypt followed, albeit reluctantly, fifteen months later. Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia concluded in March 2015, through their head of states the Agreement on Declaration of Principles on the GERD (DoP). Egypt and Sudan basically accepted, through the DoP, the GERD and declared for the first time ever “the significance of the River Nile as a source of livelihood and the significant resource to the development of the people of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan.” The three countries agreed further “to cooperate based on common understanding, mutual benefit, good faith, win-win, and the principles of international law, (as well as) in understanding upstream and downstream needs in its various aspects.” The DoP went on to state explicitly that “the purpose of the GERD is for power generation to contribute to economic development, promotion of transboundary cooperation and regional integration…”
The DoP included other provisions on equitable and reasonable utilisation, the obligation not to cause significant harm, as well as a peaceful settlement of disputes. It also contained explicit provisions on the GERD, including cooperation on filling its reservoir, as well as its safety. The DoP was confirmed nine months later through the signature by the three countries of the Khartoum Document in December 2015 at their 4th tripartite meeting.
Breaking the Impasse
These developments clearly annulled Egypt and Sudan previously held a position of securing all the Nile waters for their exclusive use through existing uses and rights and the veto power over other Nile countries' projects. Equality of all the riparians, as pronounced by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 1929 River Oder case, and reconfirmed by the International Court of Justice in the 1997 Gab?íkovo-Nagymaros Project case, is now fully accepted by Egypt and Sudan. Similarly, Egypt and Sudan have confirmed their acceptance of the basic and cardinal principle of international water law of equitable and reasonable utilisation.
The consequent and logical step for Egypt and Sudan is to drop their demand for recognition of their existing uses and rights as a part of the water security paragraph of the CFA. Indeed, the whole section of the CFA on water security is no longer needed, given that the CFA includes the same provisions of the United Nations Watercourses Convention (UNWC) on equitable and reasonable utilisation, as well as on the obligation not to cause significant harm. It is worth mentioning that the UNWC includes no provisions on water security, as this is not a legal concept – merely a political pronouncement.
The quid pro quo for Egypt and Sudan agreeing to drop their demand for recognition of their existing uses and rights is to include provisions in the CFA similar to those of the UNWC on the notification. This should cause no alarm to the upper riparians as the basis of Egypt and Sudan of their veto power in case of notification – the colonial treaties – is no longer on the table since the two countries have accepted the principle of equality of all the riparians. Besides, a notification could take place through the Commission to be established under the CFA, or through the ministerial council of the Nile Basin States as happened in the latter years of the NBI before the differences erupted over the CFA.
This compromise would address the concerns of both Egypt and Sudan on the one hand and those of the upper riparians on the other. Its details can be successfully worked out through good faith negotiations if the political will among the Nile riparians exist. Indeed, this political will is urgently needed to resolve the differences over the CFA and conclude an agreement that is inclusive of all the Nile riparians, so as to pull the 250 million inhabitants of the Nile Basin out of their poverty, underdevelopment, hunger and darkness.The first difference related to water security. Article 14 of the CFA required the Basin states to work together to ensure that all states achieve and sustain water security. However, this paragraph did not satisfy Egypt and Sudan who wanted to ensure, through an additional clause, that their existing uses and rights are fully protected under the CFA. Consequently, Egypt and Sudan demanded and insisted that Article 14 of the CFA should include a specific provision, to be added at the end of the Article, that would oblige the Basin states “not to adversely affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin State.” This demand was rejected by the upper riparians who saw it as a denial of the basic principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation, and a breach of the vision of the NBI itself.
The second major difference related to the concept of notification, demanded by Egypt and Sudan and rejected by the upper riparians. The upper riparians saw it as a means for Egypt and Sudan to invoke the colonial treaties and their claim of veto power.
While the impasse persisted, on May 14, 2010, four of the Nile riparians (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda) signed the CFA in Entebbe, Uganda. They were joined five days later by Kenya, and by Burundi on February 28, 2011. The CFA has thus far been ratified by Ethiopia, Tanzania and Rwanda. It needs a total of six instruments of ratification/accession to enter into force. Egypt and Sudan continue to vehemently reject the CFA.
Developments Since Conclusion of the CFA
The upper riparians continued with their projects on the Nile notwithstanding the impasse over the CFA, and the erosion of the NBI. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which commenced in 2011, has proven a major challenge to, and a source of a bitter dispute between Ethiopia on the one hand, and Egypt and Sudan on the other. However, by December 2013, Sudan broke ranks with Egypt and declared its full support of the GERD.
Egypt followed, albeit reluctantly, fifteen months later. Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia concluded in March 2015, through their head of states the Agreement on Declaration of Principles on the GERD (DoP). Egypt and Sudan basically accepted, through the DoP, the GERD and declared for the first time ever “the significance of the River Nile as a source of livelihood and the significant resource to the development of the people of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan.” The three countries agreed further “to cooperate based on common understanding, mutual benefit, good faith, win-win, and the principles of international law, (as well as) in understanding upstream and downstream needs in its various aspects.” The DoP went on to state explicitly that “the purpose of the GERD is for power generation to contribute to economic development, promotion of transboundary cooperation and regional integration…”
The DoP included other provisions on equitable and reasonable utilisation, the obligation not to cause significant harm, as well as a peaceful settlement of disputes. It also contained explicit provisions on the GERD, including cooperation on filling its reservoir, as well as its safety. The DoP was confirmed nine months later through the signature by the three countries of the Khartoum Document in December 2015 at their 4th tripartite meeting.
Breaking the Impasse
These developments clearly annulled Egypt and Sudan previously held a position of securing all the Nile waters for their exclusive use through existing uses and rights and the veto power over other Nile countries' projects. Equality of all the riparians, as pronounced by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 1929 River Oder case, and reconfirmed by the International Court of Justice in the 1997 Gab?íkovo-Nagymaros Project case, is now fully accepted by Egypt and Sudan. Similarly, Egypt and Sudan have confirmed their acceptance of the basic and cardinal principle of international water law of equitable and reasonable utilisation.
The consequent and logical step for Egypt and Sudan is to drop their demand for recognition of their existing uses and rights as a part of the water security paragraph of the CFA. Indeed, the whole section of the CFA on water security is no longer needed, given that the CFA includes the same provisions of the United Nations Watercourses Convention (UNWC) on equitable and reasonable utilisation, as well as on the obligation not to cause significant harm. It is worth mentioning that the UNWC includes no provisions on water security, as this is not a legal concept – merely a political pronouncement.
The quid pro quo for Egypt and Sudan agreeing to drop their demand for recognition of their existing uses and rights is to include provisions in the CFA similar to those of the UNWC on the notification. This should cause no alarm to the upper riparians as the basis of Egypt and Sudan of their veto power in case of notification – the colonial treaties – is no longer on the table since the two countries have accepted the principle of equality of all the riparians. Besides, the notification could take place through the Commission to be established under the CFA, or through the ministerial council of the Nile Basin States as happened in the latter years of the NBI before the differences erupted over the CFA.
This compromise would address the concerns of both Egypt and Sudan on the one hand and those of the upper riparians on the other. Its details can be successfully worked out through good faith negotiations if the political will among the Nile riparians exist. Indeed, this political will is urgently needed to resolve the differences over the CFA and conclude an agreement that is inclusive of all the Nile riparians, so as to pull the 250 million inhabitants of the Nile Basin out of their poverty, underdevelopment, hunger and darkness.
Dr. Salman M.A. Salman, an academic researcher and consultant on water law and policy and Editor-in-Chief of Brill Research Perspectives, International Water Law. Until 2009, he served as Lead Counsel and Water Law Adviser for the World Bank. He can be reached at SalmanMASalman@gmail.com.
June 21, 2017 (KHARTOUM) - A Sudanese military plane crashed on Wednesday in the Northern State, killing all four crew members on board, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) said.
In a press release extended to Sudan Tribune Wednesday, SAF spokesperson Ahmed Khalifa al-Shami said the “Mi-17 helicopter crashed after taking off on an official mission from Dongola Airport to El-Daba town”.
He blamed “bad weather conditions” for the incident, saying all four crew have been killed without disclosing the identities of the victims.
Sudan's air force fleet of Russian-made planes and helicopters has suffered a number of losses in recent years, with the military frequently blaming technical problems.
Last October, a Bo 360 helicopter crashed in Um Hani area, White Nile State, 105 kilometres south of Khartoum killing the pilot and injuring two crew members.
In April 2016, an Antonov 26 fighter jet crashed while landing at the airport in El Obied, the capital of North Kordofan state, killing all five crew members on board.
Also, 32 people were killed in August 2012 when their Antonov AN-26 crashed in Talodi, South Kordofan's third-largest town.
In October 2012, an Antonov plane crashed in Khartoum's twin city of Omdurman killing 12 people.
Two air force crew died in June 2013 when their helicopter crashed in war-torn Blue Nile state, just a week after one went down in South Kordofan.
(ST)
June 21, 2017 (NYALA) - Heavy rains and severe flooding have completely destroyed 1100 houses at Kalma camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), some 18 kilometres south-east of Nyala, South Darfur state capital.
The Deputy Chairman of IDPs and Refugees Association Adam Abdallah told Sudan Tribune heavy rains on Tuesday have caused flash floods destroying 110 homes, saying thousands of IDPs are now living in the open under very dire humanitarian conditions.
He added there is an urgent need to provide the IDPs with food and shelter as well as developing health precautions to respond to any emergencies, calling on the national and foreign aid groups and the government to act immediately to avoid further deterioration in the humanitarian situation.
Abdallah pointed out that most of those affected are women, children and the elderly, saying they are incapable of encountering the damage on their own.
Kalma, which is the home of some 100,000 residents, is considered the largest IDPs camp in Darfur.
The Sudanese army has been fighting a group of armed movements in Darfur since 2003. UN agencies estimate that over 300,000 people were killed in the conflict, and over 2.5 million were displaced.
(ST)
June 21, 2017 (NEW YORK) – The government and the armed opposition bear the responsibility for South Sudan humanitarian tragedy and political instability, said the head of UN Peacekeeping Department on Wednesday.
"We must not lose sight of the fact that this tragedy is man-made" (...) It is the result of deliberate decisions by the SPLA-in Government, the SPLA-in-Opposition and various other entities, to prosecute and sustain armed conflict to achieve political goals," said Jean-Pierre Lacroix in a briefing on the situation in South Sudan to the UN Security Council.
The French diplomat told the 15-member body that the government forces, despite the unilateral ceasefire announced earlier by President Salva Kiir, dislodged the opposition SPLA-IO forces from their strongholds on the west bank of the Nile River. In the east, it has taken towns in northern Greater Jonglei.
"In the west, clashes between Government and Opposition forces around Wau led to 22,000 people taking refuge with the mission. And fighting in the south has left towns in the Equatorias with as little as 10% of their previous populations," he added.
However, Lacroix stressed that the United Nations continues to make every effort to implement its commitment to the country, adding that“only a truly inclusive political process and the genuine political will” of the key protagonists to end the conflict and implement agreements they reached will bring peace to the war-torn country.
The over three-year conflict has left more than half of South Sudan's population in need of food aid. Furthermore, a third of its population is displaced and half of those displaced have sought refuge in neighbouring Uganda, Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia.
The IGAD leaders recently decided to hold a forum to revitalise the implementation of a peace agreement it brokered between the warring parties, but the resumption of hostilities in July 2017 broke the enforcement of the deal and was followed by the resumption of hostilities.
The head of UN peacekeeping department informed the Security Council that in the midst of the fighting, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is “doing its utmost” to protect civilians.
“Our peacekeepers are persistent in getting through checkpoints to reach vulnerable populations, even when the patrols are threatened and, at times, shot at […], giving the populations confidence that we are there to protect them enables us to report human rights abuses and helps us to support our humanitarian partners in ensuring that assistance goes to those who need it most.”
He further pointed that some issues concerning the plot of land provided by the Government to the Rapid Protection Force (RPF), to establish its northern basing site, are behind the delay in its deployment. The RPF is tasked with the security in and around capital Juba.
Concerning the pledge made by President Kiir to release political prisoners, Lacroix told the Council that while one UN staff member was released recently, two others have been held for two years without charge, and another has recently been detained in Rumbek.
“We must judge the President's commitments by his actions, not his words,” he said.
Lacroix, also calling for full freedom of movement for the Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) to monitor and verify ceasefire violations as well as UNMISS, “which have faced far too many obstructions to their movements, making their work extremely challenging, and in some cases, impossible.”
In his remarks before the Security Council, the Chargé d'Affaires of South Sudanese mission to the UN, Ambassador Joseph Mourn Malok, said the situation in the country is relatively calm since Kiir's declaration of a unilateral ceasefire.
"In order for the unilateral ceasefire to hold, we call upon the Security Council and the International Community to call on the other stakeholders to respect the ceasefire so as to allow the humanitarian actors to pass," he said.
The Council members may issue a press statement after a consultations meeting but they remain divided on the way forward, as some members support an arms embargo and more targeted sanctions, measures that reject some others describing it "counterproductive".
(ST)
June 21, 2017 (JUBA) – The South Sudanese government welcomed and commended, on Wednesday, the joint national and international efforts collaboratively exerted to avert famine from occurring in the east African country.
These efforts were the result of the immediate and sustained multi-sector humanitarian assistance delivered to the population in the conflict-affected areas where the government is fighting opposition armed groups since over three years.
“This encouraging result clearly reflects the commitment the government has made to provide unfettered access to the humanitarian organisations to all parts of the country,” said Cabinet Affairs Minister Martin Elia Lomuro to Sudan Tribune on Wednesday.
"It is through these concerted efforts that the famine has been averted and as the government, we would like to commend and appreciate the work of the humanitarian organisation and reaffirm our commitment to working together to improve the situation," he added.
Minister Lomuro, who is also the head of the South Sudanese task force responsible for monitoring and coordinating administrative efforts to remove blockages and provide access to humanitarian agencies, said the government would continue to exert more efforts in this respect.
He was reacting to the reports that were released on Wednesday by South Sudan's National Bureau of Statistics and the UN's updated food and security analysis which showed famine was no longer taking place. The report, however, warned that the situation remains desperate as the number of people at risk of starvation increased during May.
The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) report shows 1.7 million people are still facing emergency levels of hunger, one step below famine.
In February, South Sudan declared two counties in Unity State as famine-hit areas.
The IPC report says the current situation in the areas has improved, however, there are certain areas still in critical condition. Though early detection and a rapid response succeeded in pulling them out of famine and grouped them under a Phase 5 classification, according to the World Food Program analysis.
The UN had warned of a worsening humanitarian situation and emphasised that downgrading the level of existing famine in the region does not mean the situation has completely improved. An estimated 45,000 people are still facing starvation in Leer, Koch and Mayendit Counties, with additional areas across the country having deteriorated as well.
The report shows former Jonglei State which had one of the lowest levels of acute malnutrition with roughly 20,000 people currently experiencing catastrophic food insecurity.
Yei, Lainya, Morobo, Kajo-Keji and Magwi, which were areas in Equatoria region classified as greenbelt areas are facing crisis and emergency levels of acute food insecurity. The conflict in the country is an attributing cause that has driven people out of their homes, resulting and subsequently leading to severe effects on agricultural activities and markets.
The Western Upper Nile region is equally experiencing food insecurity, especially in Manyo, Panyikang, and Fashoda where large displacements have occurred due to the ongoing armed conflict. Through a situational analysis, it has been found that former Northern Bahr el Ghazal State is facing severe food insecurity caused by high food prices and diminished household purchasing power.
While Western Bahr el Ghazal State saw a rise in armed conflict in the counties of Wau and Raga, the disruption of trade, displaced of populations, and livelihoods have been destroyed.
(ST)
June 21, 2017 (KHARTOUM) - The Sudanese government on Wednesday denied media reports that the decision to ban the Egyptian agricultural products has been reversed.
The semi-official Sudan Media Center (SMC) has quoted the state minister of commerce Al-Sadiq Mohamed Ali as saying “the measures that have been taken to ban some Egyptian products are still in force”.
He stressing there was nothing new on this matter, saying the reasons which led to banning the Egyptian products still exist.
Last September, Sudanese government temporarily suspended all imports of vegetables, fruit and fish from Egypt following U.S. reports about cases of strawberries from Egypt causing chronic hepatitis and other diseases.
Also, seven countries including Kuwait, Jordan, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Japan have taken strict measures banning imports of Egyptian agricultural products.
Last month, Sudan's Prime Minister Bakri Hassan Saleh issued a decision to continue the ban on Egyptian farming products and to stop the importation of any seeds or seedlings from the neighbouring country.
The Sudanese authorities in March expanded the list of banned Egyptian farming products by adding agricultural goods and products, canned fish and manufactured goods, following reports that these products were rotten.
Tensions between Khartoum and Cairo have escalated following the former's decision to restrict imports of Egyptian farming products which was reciprocated by Cairo's decision to raise residency fees for Sudanese living in Egypt.
The deterioration of bilateral relations between the two countries goes back to the attempt to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 followed by the deployment of Egyptian troops in the disputed area of Halayeb triangle.
(ST)
June 21, 2017 (KHARTOUM) - A new splinter faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/AW led by Abdel-Wahid al-Nur has joined the peace process following years of rebellion in Jebel Marra area, said Central Darfur governor.
The Central Darfur government last November signed a peace deal with a number of breakaway commanders from SPLM-AW including Abu Gamal Khalil Bakr, Al-Amin Abdel-Jabar al-Tahir (aka al-Amin Turo) and the movement's spokesperson Shihab al-Din Ahmed Hagar.
According to the official news agency SUNA Wednesday, a new dissident group from the SLM-AW led by commander Haroun (aka Kalmang Koi) has joined the peace process at Fugi area east of Golo in Jebel Marra, Central Darfur state.
SUNA quoted the leader of the dissident group as saying they “joined the peace process after they became convinced of the futility of war that continued for years without achieving anything but further suffering”.
He demanded the government to provide services, reconstruct what have been destroyed during the war and to integrate his group into the Sudanese army.
Under such peace deal, the rebels hand over their weapons after being granted a pardon and receive financial compensations. Sometimes, they are recruited in the government militias to fight against their former comrades.
For his part, Governor of Central Darfur Jaafar Abdel-Hakam said Haroun's group would enhance peace efforts, pointing his government has adopted a plan to end the war, address the root causes of the problem, provide services and reconstruct the region.
He pointed that a number of SLM-AW dissident groups have joined the peace process, saying al-Nur has continued to cling to foreign powers and rejects all peace initiatives.
Abdel-Hakam added the dissident groups were “fed up with the non-objective stances of al-Nur and chose to lay down arms and join the peace process”, vowing to include Haroun's group on the security arrangements programme.
Al-Nur refuses to negotiate with the government since the failure of Abuja peace process in 2006. He says that the Sudanese authorities have to disarm militias, provide security for the displaced persons and civilians in Darfur and re-institute grabbed land.
He further insists that any talks should only deal with the root causes of the conflict, not its consequences.
On 12 April 2016, the Sudanese army declared Darfur a region free of rebellion following the capture of Srounq area, the last SLM-AW stronghold in Jebel Marra.
However, the army continued for several months to carry out attacks on rebel pockets in the mountainous area.
(ST)
June 21, 2017 (JUBA) - South Sudan President Salva Kiir said he will not accept being forced to step down by force, insisting it would set a bad precedent for the country.
Kiir made these remarks during a meeting with Akobo state governor, Johnson Gony Biliu, who was in Juba to brief him on the current security and humanitarian situation in the area.
Biliu was accompanied to the South Sudan capital by his Bieh state counterpart, Moses Majok.
“You need to talk to your communities, to local leadership, chiefs and you about the importance of the national dialogue which has started the process. They have set up committees. Some will go to those in the diaspora and to refugee camps in countries in the region to where people have gone. Other committees will go to states and different places within the country,” said Kiir.
He added, “This is the only way to stop this war and return the country to the path of peace so that people get the opportunity to go for elections and make their own choices, not through violence”.
During the meeting, Kiir lauded efforts of the two governors and asked them to continue with the efforts of mobilisation for peaceful settlement of the conflict to allow people regain hope and trust.
“Your efforts through these briefings are commendable and you should ahead so that our people understand and embrace peace because it is through peace that people can only make choices. You know I did not into this position by violent means,” said Kiir.
Kiir, elected as president in March 2010, vowed not to accept forceful removal from power.
“They [citizens] want peace and I will not accept to let them down and step down by force,” stressed the South Sudanese leader, who said the unity government will ensure peace returns to the young nation.
South Sudan was plunged into conflict in December 2013 as the rivalry between President Kiir and his then-vice president, Riek Machar, turned into a civil war. Since then, the fighting, which has often been along ethnic lines, triggered Africa's worst refugee crisis, with over three million people fleeing their homes.
(ST)
By Eric Reeves | June 21, 2017
In October 2014, I analysed some of the implications of minutes reflecting the deliberations of the most senior military and intelligence officials of the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime during a “Joint Military and Security Committee Meeting held at the National Defense College on 31/08/2014 (http://wp.me/p45rOG-1wk ). These minutes have been repeatedly and authoritatively confirmed by a wide range of sources (http://wp.me/p45rOG-1w5 ). They were leaked to me by a Sudanese source of unimpeachable character and honesty, although his identity—and those who assisted him in this extremely dangerous undertaking—must remain confidential for obvious reasons.
The minutes are highly revealing on various counts, including what at the time was the vehement insistence that Iran was Khartoum's singularly vital ally in the region. This insistence is a virtual refrain, appearing in the comments of nearly every senior official present, including First Vice President Bakri Hassan, who presided at the meeting. The ongoing implosion of the Sudanese economy has forced that Khartoum regime to abandon Iran and side with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States; but ideologically—as the minutes clearly reveal—the regime is very much on the side of Tehran. Only the possibility of immense financial assistance from the Saudis and the Gulf States compelled the abandonment of Iran. Notably, the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen, mentioned in the minutes as recipients of aid from Khartoum, are now being targeted by Sudan Armed Forces in concert with the Saudi-led campaign.
This is the context in which to see the import of a dispatch in today's Sudan Tribune, concerning the repatriation of Sudanese nationals who had gone to Libya to fight with ISIS (Sudan Tribune, June 21, 2017). This is obviously a delicate issue for Khartoum's security services, something reflected clearly in the Sudan Tribune analysis.
But let's return to the views of the Khartoum regime in late 2014, and the question of how that regime saw the opportunities presented by Libya in chaos. I offered contemporaneous commentary on particular passages from the minutes, reproduced here without change or editing. The leaked minutes obviously put Khartoum in an extremely awkward position in communicating with recognised Libyan authorities, and this is where I began. Although reflecting only one issue in a very wide-ranging set of topics covered in the meeting of senior officials, let us remember that there is not a shred of evidence that ideologically the NIF/NCP has changed its views about radical Islamic militants.
“Fallout from Leaked Minutes of August 31 2014 Military/Security Meeting: Khartoum's Obligatory Lies" | 29 October 2014 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1wo
(Speakers in each case are identified; emphases in bold have been added; my commentary appears in italics followed by my initials, ER)
Travelling to Khartoum this month [October 2014], the Libyan Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani undoubtedly had the August 31 minutes much on his mind when meeting with regime officials. Libya comes up frequently in these minutes, and at several points in ways that must be deeply disconcerting to the struggling Libyan government, and reveal yet again the depth of the mendacity that characterises the regime. On 7 October 2014 Sudan Tribune reported:
The head of the Libyan government, Abdullah al-Thani, will visit Khartoum in response to an invitation extended by Sudanese president Omer al-Bashir, a government source disclosed this week. “The Libyan government welcomes the invitation received from President al-Bashir. (The government) considers it as a step in the right direction and a confirmation of Sudan's support to the democratic process in Libya,” a Libyan official told the Libyan Bawabat Alwasat on Monday.
The official further said that al-Thani accepted the invitation after Khartoum's full recognition of the House of Representatives as the sole legitimate body representing the will of the Libyan people. Observers in Khartoum says the public acceptance of the invitation is seen by the Sudanese government as the first positive signal from Tripoli after repeated Libyan accusations of supporting extremists groups in the north African nation. On 2 October, Sudan's foreign ministry for the second time within a less than three weeks summoned the Libyan ambassador in Khartoum to protest against these accusations.
Earlier, on 2 October 2014, the Sudan Tribune reported more particularly on the accusations by Libya against Khartoum:
The Sudanese foreign ministry announced on Thursday that it summoned the Libyan charge d'affaires to protest recent remarks by an army general in which he accused Khartoum of backing extremist groups in the North African nation. This follows a similar move on September 15th by the ministry in which the acting Libyan CDA was summoned to complain over same allegations made by Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni. The latter warned that Tripoli may sever ties with Khartoum as well as Doha if they continue aiding these militias. Sudan's foreign ministry reiterated its denial of meddling in Libyan internal affairs or taking sides in the ongoing conflict.
"The misleading information transmitted by media that is attributed to Libyan [army] officer claimed Sudan's interference in the internal affairs of his country,” the ministry said in a statement adding that this information is “unfounded." It denounced attempts seeking to involve Sudan in the Libyan conflict and noted the Sudanese government's recognition of the legitimacy of the elected Council of Representatives, which meets in Tobruk.
So Khartoum would appear to be ready to bluster with denial of what is revealed clearly in the minutes of the 31 August 2014 meeting of senior regime officials:
"We have intensified the work to train and graduate Libyan [Islamist rebels] Military Intelligence cadres. Currently, they are doing an advanced course on Internet operation, deciphering of codes, interception of telephones and wireless radios. Their leadership requested us to train and establish for them a strong Military Intelligence system." (General Siddiq Amer, Director General of Intelligence and Security)
"Our intelligence and security files can play a role in the improvement of our economy [how is never explained—ER] and diplomatic relations. They can also be used to abort the conspiracies of the rebellion against us. The victory of our people [Islamists of the Libya Dawn rebel movement—ER] in Libya is an indication that we will also achieve victory over the New Sudan Project ["New Sudan Project" is Khartoum's catch-all phrase for any movement toward democratization, press freedoms, equality in citizenship, and secular governance—ER]
And there seems no way to deal with this assertion by General Imad al-Din Adawy, Chief of Joint Operations:
"The Libyan border is totally secured, especially after the victory of our allies [Libya Dawn forces] in Tripoli. We managed to deliver to them the weapons and military equipment donated by Qatar and Turkey and we formed a joint operations room with them under one of the colonels in order to coordinate and administer the military operations. Turkey and Qatar provided us with information in favour of the revolutionaries on top of the information collected by our own agents so they can control the whole country."
Radio Dabanga reported very recently (28 October 2014) on further details of the Libyan accusations:
[In] late September, Libyan army officers intercepted a Sudanese convoy with Yemeni fighters at El Kufra on the Sudanese-Libyan border. On 6 September, a Sudanese military aircraft was grounded at El Kufra airport, “laden with weapons bound for [Libya Dawn] rebels.” The week before, the Sudanese military attaché in Tripoli was declared persona non grata, after being accused of supporting Libyan militia groups.
Our best news account of what is really at stake here, and the character of Libya Dawn militias is The Guardian [Tunis], 7 September 2014:
Libya has expelled the Sudanese military attaché after accusing Khartoum of flying weapons to Islamist rebels in Tripoli, raising fears of a widening regional conflict. The government, which has fled Tripoli for eastern Libya, accused Khartoum of sending a transport plane loaded with munitions for the Islamist-led Libya Dawn militias who control the capital.
"Sudan is interposing itself by providing arms to a terrorist group that is attacking the headquarters of the state," said a government statement. "This also represents a clear violation of international resolutions, and the latest UN Security Council resolution." The government said the plane entered Libyan airspace without permission on Thursday, making a refuelling stop in the southern oasis town of Kufra, where the weapons were discovered. It said the weapons were destined for the Tripoli airport of Mitiga, controlled by Libya Dawn. Sudan, which is sympathetic to Libya's Islamists, confirmed sending the plane but insisted the weapons were intended for legitimate border forces patrolling the southern desert.
This is who the NIF/NCP was and remains. And if we want to know the face of radical Islam in Libya in 2014, I can think of no more telling image than one showing some twenty-one Egyptian Coptic Christians being led to their beheadings on a beach in November 2015: http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Cg .
Sudan and Terrorism
In Senate testimony of July 2009, the Obama administration's first special envoy for Sudan, Air Force Major-General (ret.) Scott Gration, declared that:
"There's no evidence in our intelligence community that supports [Sudan] being on the state sponsors of terrorism. It's a political decision," Gration said.
At the same hearing, former Senator Russ Feingold, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa rightly pushed back:
Gration said Sudan, once home to Osama Bin Laden, has been helpful in counterterrorism efforts. However, Sen. Russ Feingold, a Democrat from Wisconsin, said Sudan's cooperation is always overstated in this area.
More fully, Feingold had issued a strong statement in May of that year (2009):
"I take serious issue with the way the report [on international terrorism by the U.S. State Department] overstates the level of cooperation in our counterterrorism relationship with Sudan, a nation which the U.S. classifies as a state sponsor of terrorism. A more accurate assessment is important not only for effectively countering terrorism in the region but as part of a review of our overall policy toward Sudan, including U.S. pressure to address the ongoing crisis in Darfur and maintain the fragile peace between the North and the South." (Statement by Senator Russell Feingold, Chair of the Africa Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, May 1, 2009)
Gration was spectacularly ignorant about Sudan and was simply wrong in his claim about what U.S. intelligence knew at the time—and on multiple counts, including Khartoum's assistance in Iran's movements of weapons to Gaza—well reported at the time in The Guardian (December 6, 2010)—and the bald fact that Hamas was allowed to operate freely in Khartoum, despite being on the list of terrorist organizations compelled by a wide range of countries besides the U.S. There were many other examples as well that Gration simply chose to ignore. Rightly, Sudan remains one of only three countries on the State Department's list of “state sponsors of terrorism,” including Syria and “best-strategic-ally-for-life” Iran.
All this becomes particularly important as a Trump administration, easily as ignorant as former special envoy Gration and even more cynical, approaches a decision about whether or not to lift U.S. economic sanctions on Khartoum permanently. The terribly misguided and mendaciously justified decision by the Obama administration in January 2017 provisionally to lift sanctions can still be reversed. But depending on the administration of a xenophobic, pathologically narcissistic, and profoundly ignorant President Trump seems to make reversal a distinct long shot. And although the Trump administration that will make the decision, it was President Obama that set the clock ticking. In rewarding Khartoum's génocidaires, he is a disgrace to the campaign statement he made in running for the presidency in 2008—“that genocide in Darfur was a "stain on our souls" and that he would not "avert his eyes from human slaughter."
Unctuous words that meant nothing for the eight years of his administration, which concluded with Obama's decision to begin the process of lifting longstanding U.S. economic sanctions on a regime guilty of serial genocides.
Eric Reeves, Senior Fellow at Harvard University's François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights