Click to access the briefing
FleishmanHillard publishes today its briefing on the Better Regulation package, which will be presented tomorrow by the Commission.
When Jean-Claude Juncker took office he made it clear that he would not only make Europe “bigger on the bigger things”, but also promised to make it more efficient. The ultimate goal is to restore confidence in the EU.
Tomorrow, the Commission will present its Better Regulation package to the Parliament. It will consist of a Communication to explain a number of new working methods, alongside a proposal for an interinstitutional agreement on better law-making, a common understanding on delegated acts and a new REFIT scoreboard. It is expected to make the decision-making process more efficient, but most importantly it will include additional opportunities for consultations, notably on impact assessments.
The initiative will have a direct impact on any future policy proposal and is aimed at making the legislative process more accountable, more transparent, and more science-based. The Commission will be looking to reach an agreement with the Parliament and Council by the end of 2015. Ahead of the debates, FleishmanHillard wanted to share some of the main elements of the proposals, and whether they are likely to have an impact on how European legislation is prepared.
Juncker, left, with Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras at last month's EU summit in Brussels
The Greek daily To Vima has a nice scoop this afternoon about a document they’ve been leaked purporting to be a new proposal from Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, on how to break the standoff between Athens and its creditors.
According to the To Vima report, the plan envisions a deal with Greece that completely cuts out the International Monetary Fund and releases about €5bn in aid to Athens from three different sources: the €1.8bn remaining in the EU’s portion of the current bailout; €1.9bn in profits from Greek bonds purchased by the European Central Bank back in 2010; and another €1.3bn or so in additional Greek bond profits the ECB will get in July.
In exchange, Greece would agree to adopt a relatively short list of economic reforms that are significantly narrower from those being sought by the IMF and a German-led group of hardliners within the eurozone.
The Commission’s spokeswoman responsible for economic issues, former Reuters correspondent Annika Briedthardt, has already distanced the Commission from the document, saying in a tweet that she’s not aware the proposal actually exists:
Can't confirm media reports on @EU_Commission /Juncker proposal on GR. Not aware of such proposal. Working towards comprehensive deal.
— Annika Breidthardt (@A_Breidthardt) May 18, 2015Other commission officials are similarly playing down its importance. “We have many documents,” said one, only half-jokingly.
Although nobody is admitting the provenance of the document, what it appears to be is one in a series of proposals going back and forth between the Commission and Athens in an effort to find common ground, rather than a full-blown “Juncker Plan” to cut the Gordian Knot.
Read moreYemen has become the testing ground for Saudi Arabia’s new assertive foreign policy and its bid for regional leadership. A Saudi-led coalition launched an aerial bombing campaign at the end of March to contain and reverse Houthi rebels’ expansion and reinstate exiled President Hadi.
The Saudi Kingdom was able to leverage shared concerns over the threat represented by Iran’s growing influence and backing of the Houthis to gain the support of other Sunni regimes in the region. However, Yemen represents little more than a backwater for many of the external actors involved. This is why Saudi Arabia, the country that has most invested in the crisis, may end up paying the highest political price for it.
The Yemen intervention epitomises the hawkish posture of the new generation of leaders who acceded to power following Saudi King Abdullah’s death in January 2015, in particular Crown Prince and Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef and Deputy Crown Prince and Defence Minister Mohammed bin Salman. Alongside a more muscular foreign policy, they are also keen to portray Saudi Arabia as a modern technocratic state that ensures order and stability. Therefore, the Saudis have justified their intervention as a response to an appeal for help by the legitimate government of Yemen.
But Saudi Arabia has over-reached. The coalition it has crafted is at best tenuous, presenting a common front against Iran but papering over major areas of disagreement. Turkey and Pakistan backtracked after initially signaling their willingness to participate. Egypt, despite significant financial inducements, has limited its contribution to a small naval presence as opposed to the ground troops coveted by Riyadh. Oman bowed out, Iraq is openly critical and Jordan is dissatisfied with the diversion of resources away from the fight against Daesh (or Islamic State).
There is no viable military strategy in place. While the coalition air force has destroyed the aerial and ballistic capabilities of the Houthis and their allies, the Saudis have been unable to force their retreat. There is no united front on the ground but rather a mix of Islamists, tribesmen, and southern separatists spurred on by financial inducements. Many of them are not even supportive of Hadi’s return. By mobilising local forces (popular committees), the Saudis are further contributing to the dismantling of formal state structures. Riyadh has also resorted to retraining Yemeni forces, while rumblings of a ground intervention continue.
There is no viable political strategy in place either. In fact, former United Nations (UN) chief envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar, has stated that the Saudi-led coalition airstrikes have derailed efforts towards a power-sharing deal. Saudi Arabia has insisted that peace talks be held in Riyadh, rather than at a neutral venue. Consequently, the dialogue conference that started on May 17th in Riyadh does not include representatives from the Houthis or supporters of former President Saleh.
The intervention is turning into an image problem for Saudi Arabia. Cognisant of growing international concern, Riyadh paid 100 percent of a UN ‘flash appeal’ emergency fund, amounting to $274 million, and then doubled its contribution to $540 million. But the limited military objectives achieved have come at the expense of an acute humanitarian crisis. According to OCHA, as of May 6th 1,527 had died as a result of the conflict, at least 646 of them civilians. An embargo by the coalition is blocking deliveries of fuel, food, water and medicine, while humanitarian groups estimate the number of displaced people at almost 550,000. According to Human Rights Watch, the Saudi-led coalition has used cluster munitions supplied by the United States. Disorder has flamed sectarianism and opened up space for the expansion of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
The humanitarian crisis has increased pressure on Washington to push Riyadh towards a ceasefire. The United States (US) supported Saudi Arabia’s intervention because it would have been unable to stop it. It also wanted to prove to its Gulf allies that nuclear negotiations with Iran would not come at their expense; an effort which it reiterated at the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit at Camp David on March 14th, where it lent support to the Riyadh Conference under GCC auspices and committed to help GCC member states defend themselves against external threats emanating from Yemen. The US contributed intelligence, surveillance and re-supply of equipment and munitions, deployed aircraft carriers to the Arabian Sea and issued warnings to Iran not to get involved, all in an effort to reassure the Saudis. But the conflagration has exposed the US’ declining leverage in the region. The most Washington has been able to achieve has been Saudi acquiescence to a five-day humanitarian ceasefire, which broadly held between May 12th and 17th.
Paradoxically, Iran might end up being the one to gain the most. For Tehran, Yemen represents a low-risk, high-return proposition. Its interests in Yemen are not vital and any eventual political solution will have to incorporate the Houthis. Its support for the Houthis is an opportunistic attempt to expand its political influence rather than a strategic long-term investment (as opposed to its long-standing interests in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq). Foreign Minister Zarif has proposed a four-point plan to address the conflict, including a ceasefire, humanitarian assistance, a resumption of broad national dialogue and the establishment of an inclusive national unity government, which has not received much traction. However, Kerry has asked Iran to use its influence to get the Houthis to negotiate and the US has signalled its openness to potentially agree to Iran participating in negotiations.
The actions of the main external players involved in Yemen are tangential to the political struggle being waged within the country. For Saudi Arabia, it is about confronting Iran and stepping up to a coveted regional leadership role. For the US, it is about addressing its terrorism concerns and trying to balance its geopolitical game. For Iran, it is an opportunity to expand its political influence. Yemen is not a priority issue for any of these players, but some stand to lose more than others in this conflict.
Ana Echagüe is senior researcher at FRIDE.
Photo credits: Ibrahem_Qasim_CC_BY-S_4.0
The European Economic Area (EEA) was established on 1 January 1994 following an agreement between the member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Union (EU).
EU Ministers of Foreign and European Affairs meet in Brussels on 19 May 2015 to prepare the European Council of June and to discuss topics such as the migratory pressures in the Mediterranean and the state of play on the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
Despite the $5.4bn pledged at the Cairo donors’ conference last October, Gaza remains in ruins. This cannot continue.
When I visited the bombed-out wreckage of Gaza at the time, the conference was seen as a success, creating a glimmer of hope for families who sat amid the rubble. They thought better days were ahead, the blockade would be lifted and reconstruction would actually begin, creating jobs for the unemployed. That optimism has gone.
Growing bitterness
Over 100,000 men, women and children remain displaced, unable to rebuild their homes. The UN-designed mechanism to allow building materials to pass through the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip has been slow to make any visible impact. Bitterness is growing over the scarcity of cement and other materials making it through. The blockade is also preventing exports and economic opportunities. On the streets, the talk is no longer about how to rebuild, but about desperation and possible war. Militants are again telling people “you have nothing left to lose”.
The lack of building material is down to strict Israeli restrictions rather than shortages of money. Israel claims the restrictions are necessary for its security. If that is the case, and Israeli security is really the reason for the crippling border closures, I have a solution: let security personnel from Heathrow or JFK airports control the crossing of people and goods at Gaza’s borders.
Israeli politicians feel safe when they pass through the world’s busiest airports – even in the age of international terror – so the Americans and Europeans should convince Israel to transfer responsibility for border security from its young soldiers to real professionals, experienced in detecting security threats and explosives.
It’s hard to see how Israeli could oppose such a proposal without signalling that the Gaza blockade is actually not about security, but is in reality designed to foster regime change by strangling reconstruction, development and hope – in violation of international law. As the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has stated, the closure is now a collective punishment against the civilians of Gaza.
Slow reconstruction
If all the houses, schools and other buildings destroyed during the war last summer are to be rebuilt over the next five years, and Gaza’s housing needs are fully met, approximately 430,000 tons of basic construction material will need to enter Gaza every month. Even at their highest, levels this year have failed to reach a quarter of that amount. In March, construction material entering Gaza peaked at 64,000 tons. At this rate, it will take decades to complete the reconstruction.
The blockade continues to blight the lives of tens of thousands of women, children and men who have nothing to do with terrorism. The international community is almost unanimous in verbally denouncing its illegality. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has stated that the blockade of Gaza must end, the EU has called for the immediate and unconditional lifting of the border closure, and both the ICRC and the Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, have spoken out against the punitive collective nature of the blockade under international law.
Oslo agreement
In 1993, I co-organised the Norwegian Channel that led to the Oslo Agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). Through active international diplomacy, Gaza was able to get Palestinian self-rule for the first time. Palestinian-Israeli joint industrial parks were planned, tens of thousands of Palestinians continued to cross the border into Israel for work every week, the Israeli stock exchange surged and Shimon Peres declared “Gaza can become the Singapore of the Middle East”.
The contrast with today’s dismal situation could not be starker. The IMF reported a contraction of Palestinian economic activity in 2014. The desperation in today’s Gaza is damning both for the Israeli and Palestinian political and military elites, and for the Quartet of U.S., UN, EU and Russian mediators. Things have to change. Israelis are not safe when their Palestinian neighbours are left without hope. International players cannot accept spending scarce public funds on rebuilding from the rubble of each new war.
The EU can lead
For those of us who have mediated in the many frustrated peace efforts since Oslo, it is clear that the Quartet – in particular the EU and the U.S. – must work with regional actors to take the lead, instead of being led along by Israeli and Palestinian politicians incapable of breaking their peoples out of the vicious cycle of hatred and revenge.
Instead of ritualistic donor conferences and new declarations of intent, Brussels and Washington should set deadlines for Palestinian elections and ending Israel’s blockade. They should impose compromise solutions. There are many excellent plans hidden away in drawers that could bring security to Israelis and justice to Palestinians, but they need to be driven by international pressure.
So let 2015 be different. Start by giving hope to Gaza. We have seen over the last 20 years that there are no entities on earth less qualified to control Gaza’s borders than those doing it now. It is time to lead rather than be led in Middle Eastern diplomacy.
IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – andlun1
The post Time to lead rather than be led in Middle East diplomacy appeared first on Europe’s World.
On 18 February 2008 the Council adopted a new European partnership with Albania and on 1 April 2009, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) entered into force. Albania submitted its application for EU membership on 28 April 2009.