In his Chatham House speech setting out the UK’s demands for a renegotiated relationship, David Cameron argued Britain’s EU membership is not merely a question of jobs and trade but of national security. Eurosceptics argue Britain’s leaders have too often allowed such foreign policy concerns to be put before domestic priorities, especially economic and democratic needs. Recent events in Paris and Brussels have raised questions about the vulnerability of EU member states, not least over the practicality of Schengen. As the UK’s new Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) made clear, traditional state-based threats and renewed challenges posed by terrorist organisations do not recognise national borders. Britain’s security is – and has long been – shaped by EU membership, whether by enhancing the UK’s international power, allowing the UK to shape European geopolitics and transatlantic relations, or by holding the UK together. As a result, as Ian Bond of the Centre for European Reform recently argued, ‘The British government’s obsession with the details of its relationship with the EU has led it to lose sight of the big strategic picture and of the EU’s role in managing the national security threats identified in the SDSR.’
European integration has long had a security side to it whether as Franco-German reconciliation or integrating former Communist states in Eastern Europe. To what extent the EU has itself been able to keep the peace is open to debate. Nevertheless, for post-war prime ministers such as Harold Macmillan, Britain’s ability to shape the world around it was declining as rapidly as its economic base. Joining the then European Economic Community was, in part, a step forward for the security and stability of a country that had recently ended its retreat from empire and was struggling internally and externally to find a place in the world. Support for membership amongst Conservative MPs in the 1970s was driven by hopes that EEC membership would lock Britain into a capitalist, free market club allowing the country to shed its ‘sick man of Europe’ label, a reason some on the left resisted membership. Membership would also enhance Western European unity in the face of a still formidable Communist world, Saigon having fallen to North Vietnam only a month before the 1975 referendum.
Today, EU membership still means a lot to Britain’s national security. As the UK’s Strategic Defence and Security Review showed, Britain’s own economic and military capabilities remain substantial, but being able to draw on the EU as a force multiplier has become increasingly central as they have been stretched to their limits. For David Hannay, the EU allows Britain to better manage challenges as diverse as a newly assertive Russia through to climate change and instability in the Middle East. Working through the EU is not without its flaws, but other options for Britain to pursue its interests such as by rebuilding the Commonwealth, developing the ‘Anglosphere’, joining NAFTA, or becoming a ‘Switzerland with nukes’, are either limited or overplayed. Leaders from around Europe and the world have regularly cast doubts on whether a Brexit will boost Britain’s international standing and security. Eurosceptics will argue that Britain is weak in the EU, frequently outvoted and sidelined. Such an approach views the EU through the prism of Westminster’s majoritarian politics: a zero-sum game where you either win or lose. Through such an outlook every EU member state struggles to win. The one thing that does set you up for failure is isolating yourself, an approach the UK has in recent years adoptedmore than ever before.
Close relations with the USA remain, despite all the arguments, the cornerstone of UK and European security. Brexit is not going to end such arrangements as ‘Five Eyes’ or cooperation on Special Forces. But wider relations with the USA would be tested. Only a few on the fringe of the US political right think a Brexit would be a sound idea for the UK, USA, EU and transatlantic relations. As Condoleezza Rice, former Bush Administration Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, recently told Chatham House: ‘It is a very different Europe if it is a continental one’. The US has been a long-standing supporter of European integration and Britain’s part in it. A Britain that challenges both of these could find it damages relations with the USA and the USA’s commitment to Europe at a time of heightened US exasperation at Europe’s inability to think about geostrategic concerns – whether they be Russia, China or ISIS – and invest in the necessary defence commitments.
In his Chatham House speech David Cameron argued that the prosperity and security of the rest of Europe are vital for Britain. In doing so he came close to the often overlooked question of what Brexit would mean for Europe. A Brexit could change the European geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape in ways that would not be in Britain’s interests. It would see the departure of the EU’s largest and keenest supporter of Atlanticism and outward looking economic liberalism. The EU could become more inward looking and protectionist. The idea that Brexit could lead to the EU and Eurozone’s disintegration is not to be casually overlooked given the likely costs for the UK and Europe. As HM the Queen warned in June 2015 during a state visit to Germany, Europe’s division is in nobody’s interests. While a British exit is not going to lead to war, it would add to strains on an organisation which however imperfect remains with NATO one of the two pillars on which European politics and security have been built since 1945 and 1989.
At the same time, is the unification of Europe in Britain’s interests? For Eurosceptics, ‘ever closer union’ threatens Britain’s sovereignty, democracy and allows immigration to pressure its social unity, meaning Britain’s security and stability would be better preserved by leaving. But Britain’s departure could allow the EU to further unite. One of Britain’s longest standing international aims has been to prevent any single power dominating Europe. The EU would be a benign power compared to previous attempts, but such an outcome warrants careful consideration.
Finally, if the first concern of any state is its own survival then the referendum could tear the UK apart. The immediate concern is Scotland: a vote by the rest of the UK to leave the EU while the Scots vote to stay could trigger another independence referendum. This would lead to an avalanche of political, economic and social costs to say nothing of the costs for UK defence and national security, most notably over Trident. Northern Ireland might seem peaceful from the perspective of the UK mainland, but the peace process is under constant pressure and a Brexit could test it to breaking point. A descent into violence in the province should not be overlooked. Brexit could also add to tensions within England. In focusing on Scotland we have overlooked that the part of the UK that is increasingly different is London. An international metropolis that doubles as the UK and England’s capital, London has thrived from immigration, Europe and globalisation, much to the chagrin of some elsewhere in England and Britain who feel they have been left behind.
For scholars of international relations and the EU, Brexit confronts us with the need to theorise European disintegration. Theories are tools that allow us to focus on certain aspects of developments in the world around us, highlighting – and testing – their importance over others. In a simplified way, a constructivist approach would point to the role of ideas as paramount in shaping how a Brexit is handled in international relations. For example, will Brexit push to the fore ideas of European disintegration or lead the rest of the EU to push forward with ideas of unification? For realists it will be economic and security interests, especially ones shaped by international pressures, that will define how the UK and EU handle a Brexit. Institutionalists will point to the role existing institutions and networks – the multiple links that are part of or defined by the EU, EFTA, EEA, NATO – will play in defining what happens to the UK and EU (or might not define it if Brexit exposed any weaknesses in them). Liberal intergovernmentalists will point to a mix of interests, institutions and ideas to show that Britain and the EU (especially Germany, France and other big states) are so caught up in a deeply enmeshed set of interdependencies that Britain (and the EU) suffer from the Hotel California dilemma: you can check-out anytime you like, but you can never leave.
Note: this piece first appeared on the blog of the LSE’s International Security Society.
The post Britain and the EU: a Question of International Relations appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
After receiving two pointed letters from Warsaw, Timmermans seeks a meeting with minister
For days, EU officials had been signaling they would only issue a strongly-worded démarche to Warsaw for its new laws that critics argue undermine democratic norms. But on Wednesday, the European Commission took the unexpected step of moving forward with a formal “rule-of-law procedure” to determine whether the two new laws – one dismissing the management of the state TV and radio broadcasters, the other limiting the powers of the constitutional court – pose a “systemic threat” to European norms.
Frans Timmermans, the commission vice-president in charge of rule-of-law issues, announced the decision after Wednesday’s meeting of the 28 commissioners. But he also formally notified Warsaw in a letter that we got our hands on and posted here.
Mr Timmermans letter comes after two letters from Warsaw that were far more pointed – particularly an especially invective-filled one sent justice minister Zbigniew Ziorbro on Monday – effectively telling the Dutchman to butt out of Poland’s internal affairs.
EU officials insist that the decision to move forward with the review were unrelated to the impolitic letters. Instead, they say, commissioners felt the procedure would lend some structure to their dialogue with Warsaw; otherwise, it would have remained unclear how either side would proceed.
Read moreEU Finance Ministers of the eurozone meet in Brussels on 14 January 2016 to The Eurogroup discuss Greece and Cyprus, the draft European Semester recommendation for the euro area and the interim results of the IMF Article IV consultation.
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Flag-waving protesters demonstrate against Poland's new media law in Warsaw last week
“I regarded your letter as an attempt to exert pressure upon the democratically elected parliament and government of the sovereign Republic of Poland.” Not a phrase you’d normally expect in official governmental communications between two ministerial-level politicians in the EU. But it was part of an invective-filled response to Frans Timmermans, the European Commission’s first vice-president, from Polish justice minister Zbigniew Ziobro sent Monday night ahead of today’s highly-anticipated European Commission debate on two new laws that many critics believe undermine rule of law in Warsaw.
Despite the tendentious tone of the letter in response to questions on legal changes that will make it difficult for the country’s constitutional court to overturn legislation – and a similarly direct letter from senior diplomat Aleksander Stepkowski in response to concerns about a new Polish media law – officials tell us that Brussels is likely to keep its powder dry at today’s meeting, at least for now.
Read moreMuch is being made of the potential for Big Data to improve governance in Europe. But all data sets require context. Unless this is available, the contents is less than useful.
Summer 2015 saw the EU Publications Office, through the Open Data Portal website, begin making a selection of public procurement data available, drawn from the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) website. This site is the main route for publication of the Official Journal Supplementary series and contains all contract advertisements and awards made by public bodies (that exceed a financial threshold). Prior to this point, the data was only available to either the Commission, or paid subscribers to the TED database.
The scope of the data is incredible, with every advertised procurement project detailed from 2009 to 2015 across thousands of Contracting Authorities. Garnering meaning from such a rich resource is however difficult for all but the initiated few. While this may well be ‘open’, without a glossary, or guide to the data, one is left floundering.
To help remedy this information deficit, and provide some much needed context, the Commission assembled just such a guide to the data table headings. This should help anyone looking through the databases to ascertain the areas that they will find most interesting or applicable for their research.
The data guide is available here: http://open-data.europa.eu/repository/ec/dg-grow/mapps/TED(csv)_data_information_v1.doc
A link to the main data set (2009 onwards) is available here: https://open-data.europa.eu/en/data/dataset/ted-1
A CSV (comma separated value) version available here: https://open-data.europa.eu/en/data/dataset/ted-csv
By way of example, one may draw upon columns CPV and CAE_NAME to ascertain relationships between the Contract Authority type (local council, centralised procurement office etc) and the type of goods or services they contract (facilities management, uniforms, infrastructure etc). This may throw light on the organisation of a State’s policy implementation. While case study research may give a more granular level of detail in such matters, there is something to be said about looking across the whole Union’s economy and seeing the patterns emerge from within.
The post The Meaning of ‘Open’ Procurement Data appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
According to Prime Minister, David Cameron, Britain doesn’t need EU funds to help areas devastated by floods because ‘it’s quicker and better’ to use the country’s own money.
So it seems that Britain is so flush with cash that it can turn down around £125 million in EU emergency help for areas of the country devastated by record levels of rain. Really?
Labour MP for Bury South, Ivan Lewis, asked David Cameron in Parliament, “When are the Government going to apply for the European solidarity fund money?” (Hansard, Column 41)
Mr Lewis explained, “Hundreds of my constituents in Radcliffe have had a terrible Christmas due to the flooding that has devastated so many people’s homes and businesses in Greater Manchester and across the north of England. Bury and other councils have to pick up the infrastructure costs.
“The European solidarity fund exists to help in such circumstances. It would be unforgivable to put Tory party management and posturing on Europe ahead of the national interest.”
Mr Cameron responded, “First of all, I send the hon. Gentleman’s constituents my sympathy for the flooding that they suffered”
But he made clear, “I think it is quicker and better to give people the help they need from our own resources.”
Mr Cameron explained, “I have looked very carefully at the question of EU funding; we looked at it previously in 2013. It takes a very long time to get hold of any money and it is very uncertain whether you get it. Indeed, you end up paying for it in many ways as well.”
He added, “Let me say that we will do everything we can, including through the Bellwin scheme, to make sure that his council is fully reimbursed for all the emergency measures that it had to take. We will also make sure that we put in place the flood prevention measures and investment that are coming down the track.”
As I reported here last week, EU member states are entitled to apply for money from the EU Solidarity Fund when a natural disaster causes substantial damage, calculated as a percentage of Gross National Income.
According to calculations by accountants, KPMG, the floods have already caused over £5 billion of damage, meaning that the UK is entitled to apply for emergency EU help.
Catherine Bearder, Liberal Democrat MEP for south-east England, said that EU officials told her that the UK government could apply for £125m in grants for flood victims, 10% of which could be available within six weeks.
Although some of the grants would be clawed back from our EU rebate, the European Commission explained to me today that this would only affect a proportion of the funds, and overall Britain would gain a net benefit from the receipt of the emergency money.
I asked Defra, the UK’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, whether the Prime Minister’s reply definitely meant that the UK would not be applying for EU funds to help with our floods disaster.
Defra emailed me a reply from ‘a government spokesperson’ that I could use as a quote for my story:
“We are committed to supporting communities hit by the recent flooding. We have opened the Bellwin scheme for local authorities, with 100% of eligible costs to be met by the Government, and our investment in recovery from Storm Eva and Storm Desmond now stands at nearly £200m.
“This will help people directly affected by the floods, support homeowners protect their properties and ensure flood affected businesses that have had their trading disrupted can get back on their feet.”
I immediately complained to the Defra Press Office:
“Thank you, but the quote doesn’t even mention the EU Solidarity Fund, which seems somewhat odd. Is the government going to apply for the fund or not? Is it the case that the country is rich enough not to need the EU emergency help?”
I will report back here if I receive a reply.
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— Jon Danzig (@Jon_Danzig) January 8, 2016
The post Britain doesn’t need EU help for floods, says PM appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
The Netherlands is facing Europe’s toughest stress test for Member States – the EU Presidency. The task of the Netherlands Presidency is to give Europe its mojo back, as the continent is faced with a refugee crisis, internal security issues, a looming Brexit, remnants of an economic crisis and an ongoing problem in Greece.
Generally speaking, EU presidencies are memorable when they manage to conclude difficult or valuable dossiers, to overcome barriers in advancing legislation, or to promote a transformation in the direction or spirit of the EU. The rotating Presidency has an influential position among the institutions, as its role is to chair Council meetings and set its work programme, but, most importantly, to lead negotiations on important legislative files with the European Parliament and the European Commission. The Netherlands Presidency is under significant pressure to be successful, since it is a highly respected country, with a strong reputation for efficient administration, focused on pragmatism and problem-solving. The country also enjoys a high degree of geopolitical strength, making it fit to play the role of an ‘honest broker’.
What is the Dutch Presidency’s focus?
It is usually the case that the Presidency’s work programme is closely aligned to the Commission’s work programme and the Dutch Presidency is no exception. The Netherlands Presidency has announced that it will focus on four major areas: migration and international security; making Europe stand out as an innovator and job creator; finance and the economy; climate and energy policy.
What about digital?
What is less straight-forward are the Dutch Presidency’s plans for the tech industry and the Digital Single Market (DSM). One of Commissioner Juncker’s flagship initiatives, the DSM is set to put the European Union on the digital map, but, if regulated too heavily, it can handicap its potential to be a technology leader. Thus, many hope that the Dutch will lead the agenda in the right direction, with their ‘no-nonsense’ approach to politics and pro-business attitude.
While the DSM has not been called out as one of the Netherlands Presidency’s top four priorities, it is included in almost each one of them, as it is one of the most far-reaching initiatives. The main reason for the lack of outspoken support for the DSM is that the process has already started, leaving the Dutch Presidency with the not-so-sexy job to put together the nuts and bolts to finally create a digital single market.
More specifically, there are still quite a few legislative proposals left for the Netherlands Presidency to finalise, and even though they might not be as controversial as the General Data Protection Regulation completed during the last days of 2015, there are still important consequence for citizens and businesses alike.
Perhaps one of the most burning issues at the moment for the technology industry, especially in light of the current internal security question, is encryption – a means through which privacy is protected by encoding private messages, emails and others, so that only authorised parties can read them. After the Paris attacks in November, concerns of national security in a digitalised world grew. As a consequence, national governments called for restricting encryption, as it can lead to back-doors which can be used for criminal purposes. The Dutch government has released its position recently, and it has taken a strong stance against weakening encryption programmes, saying that tech firms will not be forced to share encrypted communications with the Dutch security agencies. The position of the Dutch government provides an indication that there will be no EU-level plan on weakening encryption, at least not on their watch.
When it comes to the DSM, the Netherlands Presidency will mainly plan to:
Last but not least, the Dutch Presidency has also inherited Safe Harbour. The European Court of Justice ruled in October that the Safe Harbour data transfer agreement between the EU and the US is invalid, as it believed that EU citizens’ data was not properly safeguarded in the US. Following the ruling, the European Commission is working to create a ‘safer’ Safe Harbour, and it will fall under the Dutch Presidency’s term to facilitate negotiations if a proposal from the Commission is presented during its term.
What are the engagement opportunities for businesses during the Netherlands Presidency?
The Dutch Parliament is set to have an influence, thus making engagement at a national level valuable. Furthermore, national delegations linked to the Dutch government can also play a very important role in the European Parliament and can prove to be influential during negotiations. However, at this time, engagement with the Council is low during the Netherlands Presidency, as it is vital for them to be seen as facilitating compromise and they cannot take a strong stance on any issue.
Even though most EU Presidencies come and go and are quickly forgotten, the Netherlands Presidency seems to meet the necessary criteria to make significant contributions during its six months term. As a business-focused Presidency, it is noticeable from their work programme that each priority area, including digital, is planned with a business-friendly approach in mind. As such, on critical issues such as geo-blocking, spectrum and data transfers, this type of approach might prove to be beneficial for the tech industry.