The European Council last week had three main topics: Migration, trade and Russia including Russia's role in Syria.
On migration. For the first time for more than a year, the European Council was not a crisis meeting. The flows to the Greek islands are down by 98 per cent compared to this time last year. However, irregular flows on the Central Mediterranean route, that is from Africa to Italy, remain far too high and actually have not changed for the last two years. That is why we focused most of our discussion on the cooperation with Africa. Leaders heard a first assessment from the High Representative on efforts to control the flows in the Central Mediterranean in partnership with key countries. Good groundwork has been laid with Senegal, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Ethiopia on the so-called 'migration compacts'. Leaders will assess first results in December in terms of our goal, which is to prevent illegal migration to Italy and to the rest of Europe, and to ensure effective returns of irregular migrants.
Leaders also discussed getting back to Schengen. The goal continues to be lifting temporary border controls over time. However, it has to be accompanied by further reinforcement of the external borders. The Commission will continue assessing the situation and come forward with its recommendations on this basis.
The question of a reform of the Common European Asylum System was also discussed, including on how to apply the principles of solidarity and responsibility in the future. We agreed to consider concrete proposals by the Slovak presidency on this sensitive issue in December.
We also had a discussion about Russia. Leaders shared individual experiences of several countries ranging from disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, interference in political processes in the EU, and elsewhere; to airspace violations and the fanning of community conflicts in Ukraine, the Balkans and further afield. Also the developments in the MH17 investigation raise troubling questions. Overall, we had a sober assessment of this reality, and no illusions. Increasing tensions with Russia is not our aim. We are simply reacting to steps taken by Russia, which is working with considerable energy and focus to weaken and divide the EU. Our long-term objective remains to find a modus vivendi. This means sticking to our values and interests, but also keeping the door open to dialogue. We all agreed that European unity in approaching Russia is our greatest strength. And so we will stand united.
We also discussed Syria. We condemn the attacks by the Syrian regime and its allies, notably Russia, on civilians in Aleppo. The EU is calling for an end to the atrocities and an immediate cessation of hostilities. We asked the High Representative to pursue further diplomatic and humanitarian efforts. If these atrocities continue, all available options will be considered. The Syrian people need an immediate and permanent ceasefire and the re-opening of humanitarian aid corridors.
The last issue we discussed was trade. Our citizens are increasingly concerned about whether the trade deals we negotiate are in their best interests. And I am afraid that we won't be able to continue to negotiate Free Trade Agreements if we do not prove that we are very serious about protecting European consumers, workers and companies. And when we discussed it, we drew a big red line between protection and protectionism. In this spirit, leaders committed to reaching an urgent agreement on the modernisation of all the EU's trade defence instruments. I know that this Parliament is ready to support this. We have now tasked our trade ministers with breaking the deadlock.
When it comes to CETA, the EU is still not ready to sign the agreement with Canada. But talks continue in Belgium, also this morning. I thank all those who have helped facilitate these talks; especially Martin Schulz and Jean-Claude Juncker, you have showed a genuine leadership and responsibility. Thank you very much for your help. But at the end of the day, only the Belgians can decide on Belgium's position. I am impressed by the determination and engagement they have shown during the last hours. I still hope that Belgium will prove that it is a consensus-building champion and that we will be able to finalise this agreement soon. Here I must also express my gratitude to the Canadian side for their cooperation and perseverance. If we cannot make the case for free trade with a country like Canada - the most European country outside Europe and a close friend and ally - there are obvious consequences for Europe's global position. But it is too early to go there yet. As we speak, the summit tomorrow is still possible.
On the Ukraine Association Agreement and DCFTA, the Dutch Prime Minister informed the European Council about the difficulties in ratifying the agreement. Prime Minister Rutte promised to use the next few days to try to work out a solution with the Dutch parliament to address these difficulties. Whatever the outcome of the debate in the Netherlands is going to be, it is clear that we need to find a way-ahead that is also agreeable to the other 27 Member States and to Ukraine.
Let me also report that we were glad to welcome Prime Minister May at the European Council. She confirmed that the United Kingdom will invoke Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty before the end of March next year. Consistent with our policy of no negotiations without notification, we did not discuss Brexit. However, given PM May's confirmation that Article 50 will be triggered, let me recall the EU27 position of 29 June. We want as close relations as possible with the U.K. There must be a balance between rights and obligations. And the UK can continue enjoying access to the Single Market but it requires accepting all four freedoms.
To conclude, let me recall the meeting of the 27 EU leaders that was held in September in Bratislava. We met informally to discuss the future of Europe in light of the UK referendum on Brexit. As also reflected in the Bratislava Roadmap, the summit set out a number of actions to address the main concerns of Europeans: migration, security both internal and external, and economic anxieties. It is now for Member States and the EU institutions to implement the road map, and as a matter of fact we already started to do so. On 5 October, the EU ratified the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The next day, the European Border and Coast Guard was launched in record time. Here I want to thank the European Parliament for its excellent and swift cooperation. And last week the Bulgarian Prime Minister Borissov thanked his colleagues for the support to help protect the borders with Turkey, as decided in Bratislava. Thank you.
The EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) signed an agreement establishing the European Union - Latin America and the Caribbean Foundation, the EU-LAC Foundation, as an international organisation on 25 October in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. The agreement is a key deliverable of the meeting of the foreign ministers of EU and LAC countries.
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, the Foreign Minister of the Dominican Republic Miguel Vargas as well as foreign ministers of the EU and of CELAC countries attended the signing ceremony. The President of the EU-LAC Foundation Leonel Fernández was also present.
The EU-LAC Foundation brings together the European Union and its 28 member states and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and its 33 member states with the following objectives:
- encouraging further mutual knowledge and understanding between both regions;
- strengthening the CELAC-EU bi-regional partnership process, with increased participation of the civil society;
- enhancing the mutual visibility between both regions, as well as of the bi-regional partnership itself.
The EU-LAC Foundation fulfils its objectives through activities such as encouraging debates through seminars, conferences and publications; promoting events related to the topics addressed in CELAC-EU Summits; launching bi-regional programmes and organising exchanges; encouraging studies and creating new contact opportunities.
The EU-LAC Foundation is headquartered in Hamburg (Germany). The transitional EU LAC Foundation established in 2011 will be dissolved.
Two grand frameworks govern EU relations with African countries. The most long-standing one is the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP), updated in 2000 by the Cotonou Agreement. More recently, the Joint-EU Africa Strategy (JAES) conceived in the 2007 EU-Africa summit.
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On Monday, they came to pass: objections from Wallonia seemed to scupper CETA, the proposed EU-Canada trade deal, in an embarrassing setback both for Belgium’s federal government and the European Commission.
Read moreOn 15 September 2016, the Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1671[1].
The Council Decision extends the existing measures until 15 March 2017 and amends the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures as set out in the Annex to Decision 2014/145/CFSP.
The Candidate Countries Montenegro* and Albania*, and the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine align themselves with this Council Decision.
They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision.
The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.
[1] Published on 16.9.2016 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L 249, p.39.
Never has global trade been so complex and inter-dependent. So it was no surprise that the initial shock of the UK referendum result was wide-reaching, prompting policymakers and analysts everywhere to ponder the new situation.
The dust is starting to settle, and we are starting that as well as challenges, there are also ample opportunities for economic growth, competitive advantage and innovation in the market. Given the global importance of the UK’s economy, the Brexit vote has sharpened the focus on the road ahead in shaping international trade.
Like all our European partners, Iceland is working to adapt to the new realities before us. The Icelandic government is advocating a pragmatic and realistic approach that assumes relations with Britain will continue to be as strong as they have been in years gone by. There are clear reasons behind this conviction. Today, Britain is Iceland’s largest trading partner, accounting for 11% of all our exports and imports. For the Icelandic economy, the future relationship with Britain is of critical importance.
In recent times, Iceland and the UK have had similar approaches to regional economic integration. In 1970, Iceland joined the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which Britain helped to found in 1960. And although our common journey within the EFTA turned out to be brief, with Britain joining the European Economic Community in 1973, the EFTA remains under British influence to this day: English is the working language, and pragmatism is the magic word. The four EFTA countries – Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein – have cast a wide-reaching net of free trade agreements with the EU and partners around the globe, and continue to be pragmatic and flexible in expanding and deepening their network.
The course has now been set for Britain to leave the EU. This poses a challenge for Iceland’s trade with the UK in goods and services, the free movement of people and participation in various programmes and projects that have been functioning on the basis of the European Economic Area Agreement with the EU. In short, there is an urgent need to find a new contractual basis for these processes with the UK. The first priority for the Icelandic government is to safeguard our common interests and maintain our access to the British market. The first priority of the British government will presumably be to safeguard British interests and preferential access to the single market, although it’s clear that negotiations can only begin in earnest after the British government has invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.
EFTA has, in the past, often joined various EU agreements with third countries after the EU has concluded negotiations. But given the importance of our relationship with Britain, it’s not an option to sit idly by and wait for the final outcome. In this context, there are three scenarios that Iceland is working with as possible outcomes for its future relationship with Britain. The first is simply a bilateral free trade agreement, with substantial provisions for the abolition of tariffs and technical barriers to trade (TBTs), opening up trade in services and cooperation on research and development, education and culture, mutual recognition of standards, and other areas.
The second possibility is that the four EFTA countries negotiate an agreement with the UK. We already enjoy excellent cooperation and, from our viewpoint in Iceland, we see no reason to fear a conflict of interests. And should Britain at any time in the future consider re-joining the EFTA, I am confident I will not be the only Icelandic politician willing to take that into favourable consideration. But Iceland is a full member of the EU’s internal market through the EEA agreement, and for the UK to join the EEA is an entirely different matter that would entail complications of almost the same order as re-joining the EU.
The third scenario on the table is that Britain and the EU make an exit agreement and EEA countries opt into the terms not long after to safeguard their interests. It’s my firm belief that all three options should be seriously considered: there’s a great deal of uncertainty around these processes and it’s difficult to forecast what the future relationship between Britain and the EU will look like.
For Iceland, there are important aspects of our relations that aren’t directly a part of the EEA Agreement but will still be affected by Brexit. Britain will leave the Common Fisheries Policy and enter international fisheries agreements on straddling stocks in its own right. This shouldn’t change much in substance, but certain elements of Iceland’s fisheries policy may well be of interest to the British authorities now that they must establish a fisheries policy of their own – and these must be the subject of any upcoming discussions. Britain outside a common trade policy will, however, have leeway to negotiate independently on tariff reductions and market access. If the will is there and British interests permit, the UK could, for instance, be free to negotiate on full free trade in fisheries products. Maybe Britain on its own will be quicker in seizing opportunities with partners like Iceland and Norway.
It’s still too early to assess what Brexit’s regional implications will be, let alone its long-term influence on international trade structures. Whatever the outcome, 2016 has marked an important milestone, and it’s clear to Iceland that the next two years are pivotal in setting the parameters that will govern trade relations between us and our largest trading partner. Iceland will use this time well and approach the imminent tasks with a combination of pragmatism and a progressive approach, with the end goal of developing closer trade relations.
IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – David O’Leary
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Contributions from the EU and its member states to help developing countries reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and cope with the impacts of climate change showed a sharp increase in 2015, particularly for adaptation finance.
The total was confirmed on 24 October 2016 at a meeting of the EU Economic and Financial Committee, ahead of a UN climate change conference in Marrakesh.
Total contributions from the EU and its member states amounted to €17.6 billion in 20151, a significant increase compared to 2014. The contributions were successfully channelled into climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives in developing countries.
The contribution is seen as an important step towards the implementation of the legally binding climate change agreement reached in Paris in December 2015.
The latest figure demonstrates the EU's determination to scale up its international climate finance contribution towards the $100 billion per year goal set for industrialised countries by 2020 and through until 2025. Before 2025, the parties to the UN framework convention on climate change will set a new collective goal.
In response to the Paris conference, outcome in 2015, the member states also particularly welcome the concrete 'roadmap' prepared by developed countries, which illustrates the measures developed countries are taking to achieve the $100 billion goal. Contributions for mitigation and adaptation will be jointly mobilised from a wide variety of sources: public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance and with transparency of implementation.
1 - This figure includes climate finance sources from public budgets and other development financial institutions, as reported by member states in the context of article 16 of regulation 525/2013. It also includes €1.5 billion from the EU budget and €2.2 billion from the European Investment Bank.