Montenegro officially applied to join the EU on 15 December 2008. On 19 December 2009, it achieved visa liberalisation with the EU and on 1 May 2010, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), entered into force. In November 2010, the Commission issued a favourable opinion on Montenegro's application and the Council granted it candidate status.The accession negotiations with Montenegro started on 29 June 2012. The 8th meeting of the Accession Conference with Montenegro at ministerial level was held on 13 December 2016 to open negotiations on Chapter 11 - Agriculture and rural development and Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment. In addition, the Conference confirmed at ministerial level the opening of Chapter 12 - Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy, and of Chapter 13 - Fisheries.
In March 2012 Serbia was granted EU candidate status. In September 2013 a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Serbia entered into force. The 4th meeting of the Accession Conference with Serbia at ministerial level was held on 13 December 2013 in Brussels to open negotiations on Chapter 5 - Public procurement, and to open and provisionally close Chapter 25 - Science and research.
Space matters for the world and for Europe. Over the last 60 years it has become an increasing presence in our society, supporting telecommunications and broadcasting, weather forecasting, Earth observation and environment monitoring. We rely on space activities for positioning, navigation and timing, and increasingly for security and defence. Space is radically transforming our daily lives.
Imagine the disturbance, even paralysis, which our society would experience if satellites were shut down for an hour, a day or a week: an enormous slice of human activity would just come to a standstill.
To underline such dependence on space assets, it’s worth noting that each European ‘uses’ about 50 satellites every day. Today, ten per cent of European activity depends on navigation satellite systems. This is expected to reach 30% in 2030. 80% of data required for accurate weather forecast originates from weather satellites. 26 out of the 50 parameters needed for global climate monitoring can be measured only from space. Hundreds of millions of broadcast receivers are satellite dependent.
The recent communication from the European Commission on ’Space Strategy for Europe’ stresses the importance of space for economic growth, innovation and new services, and calls for Europe to take a much stronger role on the world stage when it comes to space matters. This will be possible only if, in parallel to delivering new and improved services to an ever-widening community of users, Europe is able to ensure a safe, secure and sustainable environment for its space activities. Regrettably, this central element is missing in the proposed strategy.
“Each European ‘uses’ about 50 satellites every day”
The increasing level of space dependency means that our society is more vulnerable to the space environment, which has become congested and contested over the years.
It is congested with over 1400 active satellites and an increasing amount of space debris that can severely damage or destroy valuable space assets. There is also an increasing risk of radio frequency interference due to the increase of the number of satellite transponders and the low Earth orbit constellations of thousands of small satellites destined to bridge the digital divide experienced by isolated and/or low-income populations.
It is contested in all orbits by man-made threats that may deny, degrade, deceive, disrupt or destroy one or several assets. These threats include jamming telecommunication satellites or taking control of one of several satellites. China, Russia and the United States have also demonstrated their anti-satellite weapons and robotic inspector capabilities for a variety of orbits. Competing for such limited orbital and radiofrequency resources will demand more innovative and high-performing satellites, setting the bar higher when it comes to their reliability and efficiency.
Moving from a handful of players in the 1970s, when the Outer Space Treaty (1967) seemed sufficient to regulate space activities, to a complex present and future requires adapted governance schemes and some greater awareness, control and ability to manage space traffic – via technical, political and legal means.
Space surveillance and tracking (SST) data are mainly provided to European satellite operators by the US Space Surveillance Network (USSSN), part of the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The USSSN helps to build up space situational awareness of the different space objects in question.
In that respect, the EU is almost blind, but considering its increased involvement in space matters and the security dimension of space activities (one in six active satellites are European-operated), a consortium was eventually created in 2014 under the EU’s auspices, with five countries putting together their own national capabilities. These may be used to provide common services that can assess collision risks and re-entry-related events.
“So far, nations have been able to maintain safe, secure, and sustainable activities on land, on sea and in the air”
The EU Satellite Centre (SATCEN) can act as the implementing body, providing SST services by connecting the national operation centres. Currently a modest €70m has been allocated for the period from 2015 to 2020 to cover expenditure related to existing infrastructure and new developments.
On the political side, in December 2008 the EU presented an International Code of Conduct for outer space activities (ICoC). While not legally binding, it proposes a series of transparency- and confidence-building measures to promote international cooperation and help prevent an arms race in outer space.
Despite three open-ended multilateral consultations which brought interest from many nations, the negotiations on a revised draft failed in July 2015. Although the ICoC initiative remains stalled, it is worth noting that major European space-faring nations are actively involved within the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN-COPUOS) to adopt a set of guidelines that should ensure the long-term sustainability of activities in outer space.
Enhancing Europe’s role in space security, as part of a collective security endeavour, could mean building on the undergoing consortium to develop and operate a significant and credible set of national and European SST capabilities, moving Europe to a full partner status with the USSSN. In parallel, the EU could prepare a joint proposal with the United States for a revised Code of Conduct that could then be introduced by several member states for discussion at the UN. This would improve inclusiveness and maximise the chances of a successful negotiation and the adoption of a workable Code.
So far, nations have been able to maintain safe, secure, and sustainable activities on land, on sea and in the air. It ought to be done now in space too, and Europe can be instrumental in that work.
IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – – François –
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EU Ministers of Agriculture and Fisheries meet in Brussels on 12 and 13 December 2016 to try to agree to the 2017 fishing opportunities for the main stocks in Union waters and certain non-Union waters, and in the Black Sea; they may adopt conclusions on strengthening farmers' position in the supply chain and tackling unfair trading practices. Agriculture and climate change, as well as organic production, are also on the agenda.
EU Foreign Affairs ministers meet in Brussels on 12 December 2016 to discuss EU-Africa relations. The Council is taking stock of the latest developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Ahead of the European Council, Foreign Affairs ministers are discussing migration and taking stock of the progress made in the partnership framework approach and country-specific compacts.
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The mass-casualty attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016, as well as the plethora of self-starter plots uncovered in countries like Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom over the last few years, have highlighted the extent of the terrorist threat across Europe.
Terrorism has illustrated that it is borderless, and the cooperation between the European Union’s 28 member nations has to seamlessly confront that reality. But the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy has not reached its full potential and significant challenges still remain despite the great steps taken since 2002.
The EU first established a mutually-agreed definition of terrorism in 2002. This was a significant moment in cooperation as up to that moment only five member states – the UK, Germany, France, Spain and Italy – had detailed legislation on terrorism. As the threats evolved, the EU updated its list of terrorism-related offences to include public provocation, recruitment and training for terrorism.
Another step forward was the EU’s current counter-terrorism policy, agreed in November 2005. It has four principal aims, to be achieved by cooperation on both domestic and international levels. These include preventing the radicalisation of individuals, protecting the public from attacks, pursuing terrorists within the EU and, finally, responding to terrorist attacks whenever they occur.
Another important element has been the European Arrest Warrant, which was introduced in 2002 but has been operational only since January 2007. Under the previous extradition procedure, the process could last more than a year. Now the average length is between 16 and 48 days.
The procedure is better at extraditing suspected terrorists such as Salah Abdeslam, accused of plotting the November 2015 attacks in Paris. During the attack, Abdeslam fled to Belgium. He was eventually captured by police on 18 March 2016 and extradited to France within six weeks.
But the words of the EU and its member states are often not matched with action. This is largely illustrated by the unwillingness of member states to share intelligence and exchange information on security issues within the EU framework, including through institutions such as Europol. Instead, some nations opt for bilateral agreements to share intelligence outside EU structures.
The G6 group – an unofficial group of interior ministers from Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and Poland – works closely together and shares information due to its dissatisfaction with the workings of the Justice and Home Affairs Council.
Although Europol, which doesn’t have powers of arrest, has attained significant support from member states to facilitate the exchange of information, its operational role is limited. This, in turn, results in a restricted role and less influence for the EU institutions.
In 2014, Europol launched the Focal Point Travellers scheme, which is designed to hold information about individuals suspected of traveling across borders to participate in terrorist activities. The intention was to help European countries by collecting, analysing and sharing information on the recruitment and movements of outgoing and returning terrorists. But Europol never received across-the-board support, with only half of the EU’s 28 members registering their respective nationals on the Europol Information System database by the day of the Paris attacks.
Another problem has been that Europol principally interacts with national and federal police forces rather than intelligence agencies. This restricts access to potentially significant information. To try to mitigate this, in 2016 Europol announced the formation of the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) to combat terrorism in Europe, act as a central information hub and boost cooperation. Its success will take time to judge and assess.
The Schengen Agreement preserves the principle of no checks on internal borders across 26 countries, 22 of which are within the EU. However, if ever there is a serious threat to internal security, such as the one resulting from the November 2015 Paris attacks, internal border controls can be temporarily re-introduced for a limited period of time. Two of the suicide bombers behind the Stade de France attack used the migrant route from Turkey, Greece and the Balkans and continued across western Europe to orchestrate the attack. Both had falsified Syrian passports. Several of the individuals involved in the Brussels attacks on 22 March 2016 had also travelled across Europe using the migrant trail.
The threat of foreign terrorist fighters, either as returnees or from countries outside the EU, makes in-depth real-time exchange of information on individuals entering and leaving the Schengen zone essential. Frontex, the European border agency, is responsible for the supervision of operational cooperation on EU member states’ external borders. Although Frontex is not a counter-terrorism organisation, it needs to become an information provider and exchange intelligence with other EU agencies and national authorities.
In April 2016 the European Parliament and the Council adopted the European Air Passenger Name Record proposal, which had been under discussion since 2011. It will allow EU agencies and national law enforcement authorities to identify individuals whose methods of travel are unusual and unconventional, and to monitor their itineraries and contacts should they be suspected of involvement in terrorist activities.
Achievement of the EU’s counter-terrorism goals is beset by slow bureaucratic progress and tends to only take a degree of momentum in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Because of the reluctance of member states to transfer sovereignty to the EU’s supranational institutions, and factoring in Brexit, a more effective and practical response could be achieved by continuing national policies, with bilateral agreements on information-sharing.
To achieve practical cooperation, the EU should assist and coordinate national efforts − not to replace them.
IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – frankieleon
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