The traditional mainstream parties in France are not dead yet, and neither is the French establishment.
Much has been made of the ways in which Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen — the two remaining candidates in the race to become the next French president — have cast themselves as anti-establishment figures.
But the reality is far more nuanced. Le Pen, although the leader of a political party not considered to be mainstream, is a well-established politician who has been a Member of the European Parliament since 2009 and is, of course, part of a political dynasty, in the form of the Le Pen family. Macron is a former investment banker and economics minister in the government of the current President, François Hollande.
Although Macron has sought to establish a new movement, En Marche!, around his presidential bid and has never actually held political office, there is no hiding the fact that his economic policy under Hollande was one that sought to reform France’s labour laws in favour of a quick-hire, quick-fire approach.
In many ways, Macron is closer to the centre-right candidate François Fillon in his economic views than he is to some within the Socialist Party, who would prefer to maintain the status quo rather than to challenge the somewhat staid French economic model. Fillon, viewed by many as a French Margaret Thatcher because of his policies of trying to slim down the size of the French state and to challenge the supremacy of the 35-hour working week, was of course more zealous than Macron in this regard.
“The traditional mainstream parties in France are not dead yet, and neither is the French establishment”
Nevertheless, despite Macron’s persistent denial of responsibility for the actions of Hollande’s government in the head-to-head debate with Le Pen on 3 May, he is essentially a figure of the establishment trying to position himself as a centrist in the hope of winning over voters from the centre-left and centre-right. The endorsements of Macron from Hollande, Fillon and former president Nicolas Sarkozy since the first round result on 23 April reinforce in many ways the sense that Macron is part of the political classes that voters on both the extreme-left and extreme-right so dislike. Having the backing of such political heavyweights may appear to be a positive, but this does not necessarily guarantee Macron the support of their electorate in the second round.
Given that one of Macron’s tactics in the period between the two rounds of voting has been to distance himself from the Hollande presidency, receiving the backing of the vastly unpopular incumbent may well dent Macron’s share of the vote.
Le Pen, by contrast, has sought to distance herself from the brand of her National Front party through her temporary retirement from the presidency of the party. In many ways, this is a cynical move designed to appeal to centrist and extreme-left voters disillusioned with precisely the aspects of Macron’s candidacy that appear to make him much more part of the establishment than he has claimed.
But Le Pen has held political office, as an MEP and member of the regional council for the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region. She is far from an outsider. The distancing between Le Pen and the party, does rather dampen down comparisons between Le Pen’s candidacy and that of the President of the United States, Donald Trump. While Trump is a multi-billionaire businessman whose lifestyle would, in many ways, associate him with the establishment, he sought to use the framework of the Republican Party to achieve elected office. Le Pen is seeking to avoid the still potentially toxic image of the National Front to gain more support in the second round, even though she remains president of the party in all but name.
“A victory for either Le Pen or Macron will result in an established party ruling the roost”
Where, then, does this leave the French political landscape? While Macron and Le Pen do not come from the two traditional mainstream parties in France, all is by no means lost for the Socialists and the centre-right Republicans.
In the face of the vast unpopularity of Hollande, it is very likely that the legislative elections in June will sweep the centre-right to a majority in the National Assembly, meaning either Macron or Le Pen will need to work with a potentially hostile ruling party. Despite the damaging image of Hollande and the catastrophic presidential campaign of Benoît Hamon, the Socialist candidate who came a lowly fifth in the first-round poll, the Socialists will look to reform and to regroup in the same way as the British Labour Party did in the 1980s and 1990s.
Macron’s connections to the Socialists mean that he is unlikely to preside over a complete disintegration of the party on his watch, if elected in Sunday’s vote. In many ways, it is the establishment parties of centre-left and centre-right that still hold the cards in shaping the future of France over the next five years.
Forget talk of the death of the establishment: a victory for either Le Pen or Macron will result in an established party (probably the centre-right) ruling the roost.
IMAGE CREDIT: RazvanPhotography/Bigstock
The post Forget the anti-establishment debates: Macron and Le Pen are no outsiders appeared first on Europe’s World.
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With the French election on Sunday, the big names came out to urge voters to back their horse.
Read moreWritten by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig,
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On 29 March 2017, Theresa May, the UK Prime Minister, officially notified the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the European Union (EU), following the previous year’s referendum which resulted in a narrow vote to leave the EU (by 51.9 % to 48.1 %). Despite the EU and the UK being about to start negotiations, with a common aim of delivering an orderly withdrawal and minimising the negative impact on citizens and businesses, many issues remain far from clear.
Withdrawing from the EU: Article 50The Lisbon Treaty introduced for the first time in the EU’s history the explicit possibility for a Member State to withdraw from the EU – a possibility open to some doubt prior to Article 50 being added in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Article 50 now offers the only legal way for a Member State to exit the Union.
There are no substantive conditions in the EU Treaties relating to a Member State’s right to withdraw, apart from the procedure set out in Article 50 TEU:
During the exit negotiations, the UK will not take part in discussions within the Council and the European Council related to withdrawal, but Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) elected in the UK – as representatives of all EU citizens – will be able to take part in all EP debates on the withdrawal process and vote on the eventual deal. For issues not related to Brexit, the UK will continue to enjoy all the rights and obligations of an EU Member State until the withdrawal takes effect. Once the UK leaves the Union, EU law will cease to apply to the UK and its overseas countries and territories. International agreements between the EU and third countries will also no longer apply to the UK. The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) could be called upon to rule on various aspects of the withdrawal, including a withdrawal deal’s compatibility with EU law.
Recent developmentsOn 29 March 2017, the UK Prime Minister notified the European Council of the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU, in accordance with Article 50 TEU; the UK will also withdraw from the Euratom Treaty (covering cooperation in nuclear energy). Furthermore, the UK government clarified that it would not seek continued membership of the EU Single Market, but rather rely on a comprehensive free trade deal with the EU. On 30 March 2017, the UK government published a White Paper on its planned Great Repeal Bill, which would revoke the 1972 European Communities Act, which gives effect to EU law in the UK, as from the day of the withdrawal, as well as transpose most existing EU law into UK law.
Meeting at a Special European Council on 29 April, the 27 Heads of State or Government adopted the political guidelines which will form the basis for the negotiations with the UK, in line with Article 50 TEU. Accordingly, the EU will conduct the negotiations with the UK in unity, in transparency, and as a single package (nothing is agreed until everything is agreed). Any deal with the UK must be based on a balance of rights and obligations, while the integrity of the Single Market, the EU’s decision-making autonomy and the role of the CJEU will be preserved. The guidelines set out a phased approach to the negotiations: in a first phase, the negotiations should aim to provide clarity and legal certainty to citizens, businesses and international partners on the immediate effects of Brexit, as well as to disentangle the UK from its commitments as a Member State; in a second phase, if the European Council decides sufficient progress has been achieved on the withdrawal deal, preliminary discussions could take place on the framework for the future EU-UK relationship (any agreement(s) would be finalised and concluded once the UK becomes a third country), as well as regarding any possible transitional arrangements following the withdrawal. The 27 EU leaders reaffirmed that the first priority for negotiations was to safeguard the status and rights of EU and UK citizens derived from EU law, and sought a single financial settlement to ensure compliance with the obligations resulting from the entire duration of the UK’s membership of the EU. The procedural arrangements previously set out in the statement of 27 Heads of State or Government of 15 December 2016 were confirmed.
On 5 April 2017, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the negotiations with the UK, setting out the EP’s priorities and red lines for the future talks, with citizens being the main concern for the EP. The integrity of the Single Market and the EU’s fundamental freedoms, settling financial matters, the issue of Northern Ireland and its peace process are other priorities for Parliament. The EP also stated its wish for fair and close future relations between the EU and the UK, after Brexit.
Potential timelineFollowing the UK notification and the European Council guidelines, the Commission made its recommendation to the Council on 3 May that talks be opened with the UK. The General Affairs Council should then, on 22 May 2017, adopt the negotiating directives and appoint the Commission as the Union negotiator. The Commission has already nominated Michel Barnier as its chief negotiator. According to the Commission, the actual negotiating period would only be around 18 months, to allow time for the conclusion of the withdrawal deal (EP consent, and conclusion of the agreement by the Council) to be completed in time for the 29 March 2019 deadline for UK membership of the EU to end (if the negotiating period is not extended). The UK government has committed to submitting a final deal to the UK Parliament for a yes or no vote, before the EP votes on the matter. It is unclear what would happen if the UK Parliament were to vote to reject a final deal.
Timeline
The future EU-UK relationshipThe withdrawal agreement is expected to address issues concerning acquired rights, including the legal status of British and EU citizens; the phasing-out of EU programmes and funding; UK disengagement from the EU budget; border issues; the relocation of the UK-based EU agencies; and EU international agreements to which the UK would no longer be party. The negotiations on the future EU-UK relationship will touch upon many more dimensions. Besides the future trade and economic relationship, parameters for cooperation will need to be established in various fields, such as foreign policy, security and defence, police and judicial cooperation, freedom to travel and immigration, environment and climate change, transport, agriculture and fisheries, higher education and research. Both sides have expressed the wish for a close future partnership.
Read this ‘At a glance’ publication on ‘Outlook for Brexit negotiations‘ in PDF.
The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) is a 15-member committee that serves as the principal policy-level coordination mechanism for development assistance to the Palestinian people.