Prime Minister Ratas has asked me to chair our dinner ahead of the Tallinn Digital Summit, which is why I am writing to you.
On 29 June 2016, a few days after the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, we decided to begin a reflection on the future of a European Union of 27 Member States. The first meeting devoted to this, in September 2016, resulted in the Bratislava roadmap. We agreed to focus our attention on the issues of most immediate concern to our citizens: migration, security as well as economic and social matters. We further developed this agenda in Malta and in Brussels this year, leading to the Rome declaration, which outlined a more comprehensive vision for the years to come.
In parallel, we set out to deliver on this agenda also during our regular European Councils. We managed to sort out several issues, which is why the situation in Europe is better today and we can look to the future with more optimism. On migration, we focused first on the Eastern Mediterranean Route, then the Central Mediterranean Route, regaining control of our external borders and bringing down the number of irregular migrants and deaths at sea. On security, we continued to strengthen our instruments against terrorism and made important progress on European defence, including in cooperation with NATO. On the economic front we embarked on a reorientation of our trade policy so that negative effects of globalisation are mitigated. We are maintaining high ambitions in terms of market opening (trade agreements with Canada and Japan) while strengthening the robustness of our response to unfair trading practices.
On each of these issues, we still have important and hard work ahead of us. We need to consolidate our external migration policy, improve our capacity for returns and reach durable solutions on a reformed asylum system. We must continue to strengthen European defence, in the first instance by launching the Permanent Structured Cooperation in December. Equally, we need to continue to improve our economic base, including through the digital single market (Tallinn summit), while ensuring that it is socially balanced (Gothenburg summit in November).
We must also decide on the further development of the Euro. There is no silver bullet to complete the Economic and Monetary Union once and for all. But I am convinced that we have the obligation to improve the functioning of the EMU and strengthen it step by step. Our priority should be to complete the Banking Union in line with the agreed roadmap so that the euro area is strengthened structurally. This means that we have to prepare a common backstop to the Banking Union, to advance further risk reduction and pave the way for a European deposit insurance scheme. We should also enhance Europe's capacity to act, which could involve developing the ESM towards a European Monetary Fund. A number of ideas on governance and budgetary resources specific to the euro area have been introduced, on which much more discussion will be needed. In order to advance this agenda I will call a Euro Summit in December in an inclusive format. Concrete decisions on these issues should be taken at the European Council by June next year at the latest.
At the same time, we should continue to develop the international role of the Union, in our neighbourhood as well as at the global level. In the October European Council I suggest that we discuss our reaction to developments in relations with Turkey, and in May next year I propose, in agreement with Prime Minister Borisov, that we gather in Bulgaria for a Western Balkans summit. Trade will also remain an important priority for our work.
Looking beyond these immediate priorities, we have a big task in front of us when it comes to the next multiannual EU budget. This discussion, which will shape our policies for the years to come, will start in earnest once we have concluded the agreement on the UK's withdrawal. It will be an important item on our agenda until we reach consensus in time for the entry of the new Multiannual Financial Framework in 2021.
We cannot deal with, let alone decide on, all these questions in Tallinn. But I do think that this meeting will be a good opportunity to discuss how we approach this debate, particularly given the many interesting voices we have recently heard on substance, method as well as objectives. I will be seeking your guidance with a view to deciding, after our discussion, how to organise the work of the European Council in this respect. In order to ensure an open, frank and informal exchange on these issues, there will be no texts on the table, and no written conclusions will be drawn from our discussion.
Finally, we should all be aware that Brexit remains one of the main tasks for us. This will be the subject of our next meeting at 27 in October, on the basis of Article 50.
The Council has closed the excessive deficit procedure for Greece. It confirmed that the country's deficit is now below 3% of GDP, the EU's reference value for government deficits.
On 25 September 2017, the Council repealed its 2009 decision on the existence of an excessive deficit.
"After many years of severe difficulties, Greece's finances are in much better shape. Today's decision is therefore welcome", said Toomas Tõniste, minister for finance of Estonia, which currently holds the Council presidency. "We are now in the last year of the financial support programme, and progress is being made to enable Greece to again raise money on the financial markets at sustainable rates."
From a deficit of 15.1% of GDP reached in 2009, Greece's fiscal balance has steadily improved, turning into a 0.7% of GDP surplus in 2016. Although a small deficit is projected for 2017, the fiscal outlook is expected to improve again thereafter. Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio peaked at 179.0% in 2016 and is expected to decrease over the coming years.
In the light of this, the Council found that Greece fulfils the conditions for closing the excessive deficit procedure.
Greece will now be subject to the preventive arm of the EU's fiscal rulebook, the Stability and Growth Pact. Monitoring will continue until August 2018 under its macroeconomic adjustment programme, and post-programme monitoring will follow. The Greek authorities have committed to maintaining a primary surplus of 3.5% of GDP until 2022 and a fiscal trajectory after that that is consistent with EU fiscal requirements.
When the excessive deficit procedure was opened in April 2009, the Council called on Greece to correct its deficit by 2010.
In February 2010 the Council stepped up the procedure, having found that Greece had not taken effective action. It set out a timetable of measures to be taken and extended the deadline for correction to 2012.
However, the deterioration of its financial situation led the Greek government to request financial support. In May 2010 the Eurogroup agreed on the provision of bilateral loans from the other eurozone member states, in conjunction with assistance from the IMF. A loan facility agreement was signed and the deadline for correcting the deficit was extended to 2014. Since March 2012, eurozone support has taken the form of loans from the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).
In December 2012, the Council granted Greece a further two years to correct its deficit. It set a new deadline of 2016 and relaxed the annual adjustment path previously set. This followed an agreement between the Greek government and the 'troika' of international creditors (Commission, European Central Bank and IMF) on the disbursement of further tranches of financial assistance. Despite having taken effective action, Greece again faced a worsening economic scenario and a deteriorating outlook for its public finances.
In July 2015 Greece requested further financial assistance, this time from the European Stability Mechanism that meanwhile had been established to take over from the EFSF. Agreement was reached on the provision of up to €86 billion in loans. A third macroeconomic adjustment programme started the following month and is scheduled to run until 20 August 2018. Its main aim is to secure for Greece a return to sustainable economic growth. And under the excessive deficit procedure, the Council issued a recommendation setting out a new timetable of measures to be taken. It extended the deadline for correcting the deficit by a further year, to 2017.
Greece's general government balance has steadily improved since the peak reached in 2009. The deficit declined to 5.9% of GDP in 2015 (3.2% of GDP if the net impact of financial sector support is excluded) and turned into a 0.7% of GDP surplus in 2016. The deficit reduction was driven broadly equally by expenditure restraint and fiscal consolidation.
Taking into account measures agreed under the third macroeconomic adjustment programme, the Commission in its spring 2017 economic forecast projects a 1.2% of GDP deficit for 2017. Based on a no-policy-change scenario, it projects a surplus of 0.6% of GDP for 2018. Measures outlined in Greece's 2018-21 fiscal strategy are expected to improve the fiscal outturn for 2018 and the medium term. Thus the deficit is set to remain below the 3% of GDP reference value over the forecast horizon.
In the light of this data, the Council concluded that Greece's deficit has been corrected.
The decision was taken without discussion at a meeting of the General Affairs Council.
The Informal Meeting of Energy and Transport Ministers (TTE) takes place on 20 and 21 September in Tallinn.
The Informal Meeting of Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers (ECOFIN) takes place on 15 and 16 September in Tallinn.